05000298/FIN-2014003-03
From kanterella
(Redirected from 5000298/FIN-2014003-03)
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Failure to Follow Seismic Housekeeping Requirements for Scaffolding |
Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, associated with the licensees failure to follow the requirements of Station Procedure 0.41, Seismic Housekeeping, Revision 10. Specifically, the licensee stored a rolling scaffold in the vicinity of Division II service water booster pumps and failed to properly restrain it. The licensee restrained the rolling scaffold in accordance with Station Procedure 0.41 and assessed operability of the service water booster pumps. The licensee determined that during the time the rolling scaffold was unrestrained one of the Division II service water booster pumps was inoperable. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution as Condition Report CR-CNS-2014-03000. The licensees failure to follow Station Procedure 0.41 seismic housekeeping requirements for a rolling scaffold in the vicinity of Division II service water booster pumps was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the associated objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the unrestrained scaffolding resulted in a condition where during a seismic event a service water booster pump may not have been able to perform its specified safety function. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design and qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of a least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with training because the organization failed to provide training and ensure knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values [H.9]. |
Site: | Cooper |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000298/2014003 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | C Alldredge C Henderson C Norton D Allen J Drake J Josey M Keefe P Elkmann P Hernandez |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
CCA | H.9, Training |
INPO aspect | CL.4 |
' | |
Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2014003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Cooper) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Cooper)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||