3F1197-20, Notifies NRC of Determination That Makeup Valve 64 Does Not Have to Be Manually Closed within 10 Minutes Following Es Actuation.Informs NRC of Proposed Revs to FSAR for Design & Licensing Basis for MUV-64

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Notifies NRC of Determination That Makeup Valve 64 Does Not Have to Be Manually Closed within 10 Minutes Following Es Actuation.Informs NRC of Proposed Revs to FSAR for Design & Licensing Basis for MUV-64
ML20198R285
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/11/1997
From: Rencheck M
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
3F1197-20, NUDOCS 9711130222
Download: ML20198R285 (6)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:.. 8 f=Ti^AT Florida Power wr;.%. m.n November 11,1997 3F1197 20 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

MUV-64 Licensing Basis

References:

1. NRC to FPC letter,3N0884-32, dated August 22,1984 2. FPC to NRC letter,3F0397-09, dated March 18,1997 3. NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-302/97-11, dated September 12,1997 4. FPC to NRC '::tter,3F1083-25, dated October 31,1983 5. FPC to NRC letter,3F0584-01, dated May 1,1984

Dear Sir:

The purpose of this letter is two-fold. The first purpose is to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission-(NRC) that Florida Power Corporation (FPC) has determined that it is not necessary to manually close Makeup Valve 64 (MUV-64) within ten minutes following an Engineered Safeguards (ES) actuation. in Reference 1, the NRC concluded that FPC's request to remove the automatic closure of MUV-64 upon an ES actuation was acceptable if the valve was manually closed within ten minutes of the ES actuation. The second purpose of this letter is to inform the NRC of the proposed revisions to the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the design and licensing basis for MUV-64. In Reference E-2, in response to Violation 50-302/96-09-05, FPC committed to make these revisions prior to R restart from the current outage. This commitment is being tracked as Restart Issue OP-27. In gmi Reference 3, the NRC notified FPC that Violation 50-302/96-09-05 would remain open g pending inspector verification that appropriate documentaten describing the changes and

gig, clarifications made to the licensing and design bases for MUV-64 had been submitted to the gli!.

NRC staff for review. MUV-64 is a gate valve located in the common suction line from the Makeup Tank (MUT) for .the Makeup and Purification System (MU) pumps. The MU pumps provide the makeup and purification function during normal operation with suction from the MUT and the High Pressure Injection (llPI) function during accidents with suction from the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) (Attachments A and B). MUV-64 is currently a manually operated Y 9711130222 971111 PDR ADOCK 05000302 P PDR CMYSTAL RIVER ENERGY COMPLEX: 157so w. Power Line Street. Crystal River. Florida 344284703 p52) 7954488 A Florida Progress Company

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3Fi197-20 Page 2 of 3 valve with a chain operator whose only purpose is to provide isolation of the MUT from the MU pumps' suction for maintenance. Crystal Riser Unit 3's (CR-3) original FSAR and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.1.2.1.1 and Table 9-20, identified MUV-64 as an air-operated valve that received an ES actuation signal to automatically shut upon low Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure or high Reactor Building pressure. MU pumps could, and did, fail as a result of loss of suction inventory due to the isolation of the MUT during testing. This could also have happened in response to a real ES actuation coincident with a single failure, where one of the BWST outlet valves failed to open. Therefore, FPC requested removal of the MUV-64 ES signal as part of an overall change to ES testing (Reference 4). In response to NRC questions to this request, FPC noted that MUV-64 could be manually shut and that the operator would have from five minutes to several hours to do so before the MUT/BWST became drained (Reference 5). In Reference 1, the NRC then approved the removal of the ES signal from MUV-64 as a means of resolving the spurious closure issue noting that a less than ten minute operator action was acceptable due to the availability of the other train. FPC has recently confirmed that the issue of boron dilution is resolved through the Safety Assessment /Unreviewed Safety Question Determination performed for Modification Approval Record (MAR) 97-02-07-01, which installed MUV-541 as replacement for MUV-103. Througn this modification, MUV-541, not MUV-64, is the valve which functions to terminate boron dilution (Attachment C). Since removal of the ES signal to MUV-64 in 1984, FPC has made several additional changes which contribute to the position that MUV-64 is not required to be shut for any reason, other than as a maintenance action. These include: Installation of a low-low MUT interlock that sends an open signal to both MUV-58 and MUV-73 Ithe outlet valves from the BWST to the suctions of the MU pumps] to ensure a continuous supply of water is available to the MU pumps; and Enhancement of the Pressure-Level Curve for the MUT to minimize the amount of the MUT's hydrogen cover gas from being drawn into the MU pumps; and, Batch control of hydregen additions to the MUT preventing either spurious e control valve failure or maintenance of a set overpressure from driving all the water from the MUT. The original purpose for closing MUV-64 was to isolate the MUT from the IIPI flow path during accident conditions so that MU pump suction would be exclusively from the BWST. flydrogen binding of a MU pump as a result of MUT inventory depletion during accident mitigation would thus have been precluded. This concern has been, and is being, addressed by

s' U.S.' Nuclear Regul: tory Commission " 3F1197-20..- e Page 3 of 3; m- .. ( .h' appropriate control of the overpressure of the MUT.' FPC Calculation M94-0053, Revision 5, - developed to support the Pressure-Level Curve for the MUT, concludes that the MUT will not ~ be drawn 'down to a !cvel such that gas can become entrained and reach the MU pumps under ; o any circumstances. Calculation M94-0053, Revision 5 determined that there was no accident - condition requiring MUV-64 to. be closed within; a specified time -interval. Accidents evaluated 1 include ~ Moderator Dilution -(FSAR 14.1'2.4), Steam; Line _ Failures (FSAR 14.2.2.1), Steam Generator Tube Rupture (FSAR 14.2.2.2), loss of Coolant Accident (FSAR ~14.2.2.5.3), Small Break LOCA Accidents (FSAR 14.2.2.5.7.1 and 14.2.2.5.7.2), Makeup LSystem Letdown Line Failure Accident (FSAR 14.2.2.6), and Loss of Feedwater and Main' - Feedwater Line Break Accident (FSAR 14.2.1.9). . in the current FSAR revision (Rev. 23),- the requirements for MUV-64 are identified in Table i 9-20,- Air Operated Seismic Class I Control and-isolation-Valves, as sealed open for the _ Engineered Safeguards and Air Fall positions. Also, MU_ -64 is shown on Figure 9-2, sheets V 4 and 5, as a scaled open gate valve. Since there is currently no dc ign basis requirement to 3 close MUV-64 within a specified time frame, MUV-64 no longer has any function or requirement which would specifically require presentation in the FSAR. Therefore, consis:ent with-the_ requirements of 10 CFR-50.71(c), MUV-64 will be removed from Table 9-20 in FSAR Revision 24.- Based on_ the -plant configuration and operational changes described above, FPC has determined that climination of the requirements for MUV-64 to close within ten minutes following an ES actuation does not constitute an Unreviewed Safety Question. Consistent with .the NRC inspector's condition for closing Violation 96-09-05, FPC requests that the NRC review the conclusions of this letter. If you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact Mr. Da"id F. Kunsemiller,. . Manager, Nuclear Licensing at (352) 563-4566 Sincerely,. /h.- d/ - Michael W Rencheck, Director Nuclear Engineering and Projects I MWR:llBO:WJIf Attachments U xc: _ Regional Administrator, Region II -. Senior Resident inspo, tor? NRR Project Manager.

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