3F0314-02, Revisions to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures and Document

Revisions to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures and Document

ML14077A266
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	03/12/2014
From:	Dixon P Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
3F0314-02, FOIA/PA-2015-0005
Download: ML14077A266 (261)

Text

Crystal River Nuclear Plant 15760 W. Power Line Street ENERGY. Crystal River, FL 34428 Docket 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 10 CFR 50.4(b)(5)(iii) 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5) 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V March 12, 2014 3F0314-02 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 - Revisions to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures and Document

Dear Sir:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4(b)(5)(iii), 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section V, Duke Energy Florida, Inc. hereby submits revisions to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan implementing procedures and document for Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3).

CR-3 has evaluated these revisions, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), and determined the revisions do not reduce the effectiveness of the CR-3 Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the Plan continues to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

Enclosure 1 provides a list of the revised Radiological Emergency Response Plan implementing procedures and document. Enclosure 2 provides a 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5) analysis summary for the revised Radiological Emergency Response Plan implementing procedures and document.

Enclosure 3 provides a copy of the revised Radiological Emergency Response Plan implementing procedures and document.

There are no new regulatory commitments made within this submittal.

If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Dan Westcott, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, at (352) 563-4796.

,ncerely, I Phyllis A. Dixon Director - Decommissioning Support Crystal River Nuclear Plant PAD/sam

Enclosures:

1. List of Revisions to the Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures and Document

2. 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5) Analysis Summary

3. Copy of Revised Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures and Document xc: NRR Project Manager Regional Administrator, Region I

DUKE ENERGY FLORIDA, INC.

DOCKET NUMBER 50 - 302 / LICENSE NUMBER DPR - 72 ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF REVISIONS TO THE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENT

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 1 3F0314-02 Page 1 of 1 LIST OF REVISIONS TO THE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENT Title Revision Effective Date EM-103, Operation and Staffing of the CR-3 Control Room 23 02/25/2014 During Emergency Classifications EM-202, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator 102 02/11/2014 EM-206, Emergency Response Organization Notification 110 02/27/2014 EM-21 1, Duties of the CR3 Nuclear Security Organization 28 02/20/2014 EM-500, Equipment Important to Emergency Preparedness 1 03/05/2014 and Response Emergency Action Level Bases Manual 17 02/11/2014

DUKE ENERGY FLORIDA, INC.

DOCKET NUMBER 50 - 302 / LICENSE NUMBER DPR - 72 ENCLOSURE 2 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5) ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-02 Page 1 of 3 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5) ANALYSIS

SUMMARY

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5), Duke Energy Florida, Inc. (DEF), is providing an analysis summary for the revised Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) implementing procedures and document that are being submitted with this letter. The analysis summary for changes associated with program elements, administrative changes, and editorial corrections are described below.

The following changes do not require a 10 CFR 50.54 (q) Evaluation:

1. EM-103, "Operation and Staffing of the CR-3 Control Room During Emergency Classifications," Revision 23

• Nuclear Operations Commitment System (NOCS) references, equipment titles, position titles, and procedure title references were updated.

" SECTION 6, "PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, NOTES," was revised to identify that in the event that the Control Room is evacuated, Control Room Emergency Plan functions may be performed in the Technical Support Center (TSC).

" SECTION 7, "SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT," was revised to include a notation that the Emergency Response Data System, the Plant Integrated Computer System, and the Safety Parameters Display System are standard desktop items.

" SECTION 9, "INSTRUCTIONS," was revised to reflect communication from the TSC to Control Room personnel. A NOTE was modified to clarify that a Health Physics Technician does not need to be a member of the reentry team if there are no radiological consequences identified for an event.

• ENCLOSURE 1, "DISPATCHING OF RESOURCES DURING AN EMERGENCY PLAN ENTRY," was updated to correct capitalization, bold font use, and inconsistencies in the emphasis on the wording "Within" and "Outside."

Reference:

Emergency Response Regulatory Review Action Request (EREG AR) 666453

2. EM-202, "Duties of the Emergency Coordinator," Revision 102

• SECTION 3, "DEFINITIONS," was updated to align the definition of "OWNER CONTROLLED AREA" and "SITE BOUNDARY" with the definitions contained in the Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 33.

• SECTION 6, "PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND NOTES," was modified to document the expectation that all emergency declarations shall be made within 15 minutes of information becoming available to Control Room personnel that conditions have reached an Emergency Action Level (EAL) threshold. This allows adequate time to assess, classify and declare events, which complies with regulation 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.2.

Reference:

EREG AR 664742

3. EM-206, "Emergency Response Organization Notification," Revision 110

" Position titles, procedure title and section references were updated.

• Instructions were revised to incorporate applicable information from EMG-NGGC-0005, "Activation of the Emergency Response Organization Notification System," Revision 4, and remove reference to EMG-NGGC-0004, "Maintenance of the Emergency Response

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-02 Page 2 of 3 Organization Notification System," Revision 4, as a result of CR-3 removal from these fleet procedures. Changes to incorporate applicable portions of EMG-NGGC-0005 are identified below.

1. SECTION 3, "DEFINITIONS"

2. SECTION 4, "RESPONSIBILITIES"

3. SECTION 5, "PREREQUISITES"

4. SECTION 6, "PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND NOTES"

5. SECTION 9, "INSTRUCTIONS"

6. ATTACHMENTS 1 through 4 were added.

ATTACHMENT 5, "ERONS Using the Internet Launch Process to Activate the ERO,"

and ATTACHMENT 6, "ERONS Using the IVR Launch Process to Activate the ERO,"

were added to relocate instructions for human factoring.

Reference:

EREG AR 664005

4. EM-21 1, "Duties of the CR3 Nuclear Security Organization," Revision 28

" Position titles, references, procedure title and section references were updated.

• ENCLOSURE 1, "SUGGESTED NOTES," was revised to specify log entry notes for the Security Coordinator in the TSC.

" ATTACHMENT 1, "SECURITY COORDINATOR'S SUGGESTED ACTION CHECKLIST,"

was revised to add an additional note to give direction to the Security Coordinator to ensure notification is performed in accordance with SEC-92147, "Reporting of Safeguards and Fitness-For-Duty Events," Revision 0, to meet 10 CFR 73.71, "Reporting of safeguards events," requirements.

• ATTACHMENT 2, "SECURITY SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S (OR DESIGNEES) SUGGESTED ACTION CHECKLIST," was revised to include a step to notify Security on call to establish a follow up notification to the initial Emergency Response Organization standby notification by ERONS at an Unusual Event.

Reference:

EREG AR 666634

5. EM-500, "Equipment Important to Emergency Preparedness and Response," Revision 1

• Position titles, references, procedure title and section references were updated.

• Instructions were revised to incorporate applicable information from EMG-NGGC-0007, "Equipment Important to Emergency Preparedness and Response," Revision 0, as a result of the removal of CR-3 from this fleet procedure. Changes to SECTION 3, "DEFINITIONS/ABBREVIATIONS," and SECTION 9, "INSTRUCTIONS," incorporated applicable portions of EMG-NGGC-0007.

• SECTION 9, "INSTRUCTIONS," was revised to combine instructions for planned and unplanned loss of equipment important to Emergency Preparedness (EP) for human factoring.

• ATTACHMENT 1, "Planned or Unplanned Loss of Equipment Important to EP," was revised to combine the flowcharts that support instructions for planned and unplanned loss of equipment important to EP.

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure 2 3F0314-02 Page 3 of 3

• ATTACHMENT 2, "Equipment Important to Emergency Response (EIER) list and Compensatory Actions," was added to relocate the EIER information for human factoring. In addition, the recommendation for the Remote or Alternate TSC location areas was clarified.

" ATTACHMENT 3, "Reactor Coolant System Leakage Instrumentation," was added to relocate the applicable equipment list information for human factoring.

Reference:

EREG AR 669403

6. "Emergency Action Level Bases Manual," Revision 17

" SECTION 3.1, "DEFINITIONS," was updated to align the definition of "OWNER CONTROLLED AREA" and "SITE BOUNDARY" with the definitions contained in the CR-3 FSAR. The new definitions were incorporated as applicable throughout the EAL Bases Manual.

• EAL 2.19 (ALERT), "Security Event," was revised to clarify applicability of the EAL for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNER-CONTROLLED AREA outside of the PROTECTED AREA. For events that affect the PROTECTED AREA, EAL 2.20 (SITE AREA EMERGENCY), "Security Event," or EAL 2.21 (GENERAL EMERGENCY), "Security Event," should be referenced.

Reference:

EREG AR 664742 The changes described above (Items 1 through 6) do not add or delete currently applicable requirements, tasks, or commitments from RERP implementing procedures, and do not change the intent of the procedures. The changes do not involve 10 CFR 50, Appendix E or the 10 CFR 50.47(b) Planning Standards.

DUKE ENERGY FLORIDA, INC.

DOCKET NUMBER 50 - 302 / LICENSE NUMBER DPR - 72 ENCLOSURE 3 COPY OF REVISED RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES AND DOCUMENT

R DUKEDUKE Reference ENERGY, Use CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 PLANT OPERATING MANUAL EM-103 OPERATION AND STAFFING OF THE CR-3 CONTROL ROOM DURING EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS REVISION 23

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPO SE ....................................................................................................................... 3

2.0 REFERENCES

................................................................................................................ 3 2.1 Developm ental References ............................................................................. 3 3.0 DEFINITIO NS .................................................................................................................. 4 4.0 RESPO NSIBILITIES ................................................................................................... 4 5.0 PREREQ UISITES .................................................................................................... 4 6.0 PRECAUTIO NS, LIM ITATIO NS, AND NOTES .......................................................... 4 7.0 SPEC IAL TO O LS AND EQ UIPM ENT ......................................................................... 5 8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ........................................................................................... 5 9.0 INSTRUCTIO NS ...................................................................................................... 6 9.1 G eneral Control Room Staffing ......................................................................... 6 9.2 O perator Dispatch ............................................................................................ 8 10.0 RECO RDS ....................................................................................................................... 8 ENCLOSURES

1. Dispatching of Resources During Em ergency Plan Entry ........................................... 9 Sum m ary of Changes ............................................................................................................... 10 I EM-103 Rev. 23 Page 2 of 11

1.0 PURPOSE

1. This procedure provides instructions for the operation and staffing of the CR-3 Control Room during emergency classifications at CR-3. [R1]

2. This procedure is an Emergency Plan implementing procedure. Any revisions must be carefully considered for Emergency Plan impact.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Developmental References

1. 1 0CFR50, Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities

2. 10CFR50.47, Emergency Plans

3. AI-505, Conduct of Operations during Abnormal and Emergency Events

4. Control Room Habitability, NUREG-0737, Item III D.3.4

5. CR-3 Severe Accident Guideline

6. EM-1 02, Operation of the Technical Support Center

7. EM-104, Operation of the Operational Support Center

8. EM-202, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator

9. EM-21 0A, Duties of the Radiation Monitoring Team; CR-3 and Generating Complex Personnel and Area Monitoring

10. EM-225, Duties of the Technical Support Accident Assessment Team

11. HPP-409, Inventory and Availability of Emergency Supplies/Equipment

12. NEI 91-04, Revision 1, Severe Accident Issue Closure Guidelines

13. NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants

14. Radiological Emergency Response Plan

15. [R1] NOCS 12055 (Inactive)

16. [R2] NOCS 40743

17. [R3] NOCS 62719

18. [R4] NOCS 62720

19. [R5] NOCS 96042

20. [R6] NOCS 100056

21. [R7] NOCS 100521 I EM-1 03 1 Rev. 23 Page 3 of 11

3.0 DEFINITIONS

1. Re-entry: The return of personnel to an area evacuated during an emergency condition.

2. Severe Accident: An accident beyond that assumed in the CR-3 design and licensing basis that results in catastrophic fuel rod failure, core degradation and fission product release in the Rx vessel, Reactor Building, or the environment.

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The Shift Supervisor directs Control Room activities and implements this procedure and all actions required to place the plant in as safe a condition as possible to preserve the safety and well being of the general public.

2. The Shift Supervisor is the Emergency Coordinator during the initial phase of the emergency until properly relieved by the Plant General Manager or designee.

3. The Emergency Coordinator implements the requirements of EM-202.

4. The Emergency Coordinator assigns an individual the task of recording actions taken, information received, notifications made using procedures, log books or any other form of documenting the activities. Plant stabilization takes priority over assignment of these functions. [R5]

5. The Shift Supervisor /Emergency Coordinator is responsible for authorizing the administration of Potassium Iodide (KI).

6. The Shift Supervisor implements mitigation strategies developed and approved by the Technical Support Center (TSC) during a Severe Accident.

7. The Shift Supervisor maintains contact with the Emergency Coordinator located at the TSC by various communication systems.

5.0 PREREQUISITES None 6.0 PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND NOTES

1. RM-A5 monitors the Control Room atmosphere and places the Control Room ventilation system in a recirculation path, through charcoal and HEPA filters, when the high alarm set point on either the gas or iodine channel is reached.

2. If RM-A5 or RM-G1 becomes inoperable or unreliable, a Health Physics Technician provides additional monitoring equipment and gross iodine analysis.

These emergency supplies are provided in the Emergency Kit located in the Control Room.

3. In the event the Control Room is evacuated, Control Room Emergency Plan functions can be performed in the TSC.

4. In the event Control Room personnel are unable to arrange for the purchase of food during emergency conditions, a seven day food supply is located and maintained on the 124' elevation of the Control Complex in locked cabinets with key control by the Control Room Supervisor. [R2]

EM-103 Rev. 23 Page 4 of 11

7.0 SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

1. The following equipment is available in the Control Room:

a. Communication Equipment

1) State Hot Ringdown [State Watch Office (SWO), [Bureau of Radiation Control, Orlando, Citrus and Levy County notification] [R7]

2) Commercial Telephone System [R7]

3) Florida Emergency Management Network (EMnet) [SWO, Citrus, and Levy County notification] [R7]

4) Emergency Notification System (ENS) [NRC]

5) Microwave Telephone System

6) Dose Assessment Ringdown Telephone

7) PAX System

8) Accident Assessment Ringdown

9) Portable Transceivers (as assigned by the Emergency Coordinator)

10) Emergency Phone

11) Telecopy Machine (FAX)

b. Other Emergency Related Equipment

1) Dose Assessment software on Support Specialist's computer in office outside the Control Room)

2) SPDS (Safety Parameters Display System)*

3) PICS Archiver Retrieval (Plant Integrated Computer System stored data)*

4) ERDS (Emergency Response Data System)*

- Standard desktop item

c. Emergency Kits

1) Control Room Emergency Kit contents are described in HPP-409, Enclosure 1. General contents include protective clothing, respirators, personnel monitoring devices and smear capability.

d. Potassium Iodide (KI)

1) The KI tablets are located at the Control Room Supervisor's station in the Control Room.

8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA None EM-103 Rev. 23 Page 5 of 11

9.0 INSTRUCTIONS 9.1 General Control Room Staffing CAUTION Individuals who have known allergies to iodide substances such as shell fish, and adults with Graves' disease, thyroid nodules, or Hashimoto's thyroiditis shall NOT be issued KI

1. IF indication of high iodine concentrations are present in the Control Room (e.g., RM-A5 Particulate/Iodine channel off-scale), THEN ADMINISTER KI tablets to personnel in the Control Complex, AND NOTIFY the TSC of actions taken.

[R3], [R4]

NOTE: On-shift Operations Personnel may delay reporting to the Control Room to perform emergency actions during an Alert, as instructed by the Emergency Coordinator

2. During an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency classification, on-shift and off-shift Operations personnel REPORT to the Control Room.

3. ESTABLISH the following positions in the Control Room during an Alert, Site Area or General Emergency, as personnel become available and the TSC/OSC becomes operational, for monitoring key plant parameters and relaying information to and from the TSC as appropriate.

NOTE: The Control Room Accident Assessment Ringdown Communicator is designated by the TSC Accident Assessment Coordinator.

a. Control Room Accident Assessment Ringdown Communicator

• ESTABLISH communication with the TSC Ringdown Communicator on the Accident Assessment Ringdown phone.

COMMUNICATE status of overall plant conditions and questions to the TSC Accident Assessment Team.

• COMMUNICATE instructions to Control Room Personnel for mitigating actions as directed by the TSC Emergency Coordinator.

SO COMMUNICATE Control Complex repair requests to TSC Ringdown communicator.

EM-103 Rev. 23 Page 6 of 11

9.1 General Control Room Staffing (Cont'd)

NOTE: The Dose Assessment Communicator is an alternate source of radiological and meteorological monitoring data. This individual is assigned to the Control Room by the Radiation Controls Coordinator, or designee, in the TSC

b. Dose Assessment Communicator COLLECT AND EVALUATE radiological and meteorological information.

TRANSMIT the data to the Dose Assessment Team via the Dose Assessment Ringdown phone.

4. LIMIT access to the Control Room to Plant Staff directly responsible for operation of the plant, technical advisors who may be requested to support operations, and NRC personnel.

NOTES: 1. A Control Complex emergency team is assigned from the OSC consisting of an electrician, I/C Technician, HVAC Mechanic, and a Health Physics Technician (HPT), as they become available. This team takes direction from the OSC Manager and remains in the Control Complex for repairs.

2. Reentry teams consist of at least two people including a HPT, unless there are no radiological consequences. The HPT assigned to the Control Room may be used for re-entry if an immediate reentry is made by an operator

5. DETERMINE radiological conditions prior to re-entry.

6. ENSURE Control Room personnel follow the guidelines for exposure of emergency workers as outlined in EM-104, Section 6.0, Precautions, Limitations, and Notes, during re-entry activities.

7. Health Physics Technicians ENSURE completion of Emergency Team Authorization form. An additional ETA form is NOT needed for Control Complex repairs.

8. IF the Control Complex exceeds, or personnel evacuate to or through an area which exceeds, acceptable contamination or airborne activity levels, THEN DON respirators and protective clothing as needed, as provided in the Emergency Kit.

9. IF the Control Complex becomes the alternate location for TSC/OSC staff during an emergency, AND is placed in the emergency recirculation mode, THEN ENSURE Health Physics establishes 02 and CO 2 monitoring for the Control Complex as outlined in EM-210A, Section 4.2, RMT Functions.

10. IMPLEMENT mitigation strategies developed by the TSC Accident Assessment Team and approved by the Emergency Coordinator during a Severe Accident.

[R6]

EM-103 Rev. 23 Page 7 of 11

9.2 Operator Dispatch

1. REFER TO Enclosure 1, Dispatch of Resources During Emergency Plan Entry, for operator dispatch matrix.

2. WHEN the TSC is operational, AND additional personnel are available, THEN ASSIGN two operators to the TSC/OSC.

3. IF the TSC is operational, AND immediate re-entry of an operator from the Control Room is necessary, THEN DISPATCH operator from Control Room AND NOTIFY the TSC (via Accident Assessment Control Room Ringdown).

4. INSTRUCT operators assigned to the TSC/OSC to identify themselves to the OSC Manager and Accident Assessment Coordinator for TSC/OSC dispatch availability.

5. IF Operators are NOT available at the TSC/OSC, AND Operators are dispatched from the Control Room to perform an action or join reentry team from the OSC, THEN COORDINATE a briefing or meeting place with the OSC.

10.0 RECORDS None EM-103 Rev. 23 Page 8 of 11

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 1 of 1 DISPATCHING OF RESOURCES DURING EMERGENCY PLAN ENTRY TSC NOT Operational Dispatching Operators* and other resources (non-Operators) Dispatched by the on-duty SRO.

WITHIN Control Complex Habitability Envelope Dispatching Operators* and other resources (non-Operators) Dispatched by the on-duty SRO with Health OUTSIDE Control Complex Habitability Envelope Physics coverage as needed.

Provide turnover to TSC.

TSC Operational with Minimum Staffing Dispatching Operators* and other resources (non-Operators) Dispatched by the on-duty SRO with Health WITHIN and OUTSIDE Complex Habitability Envelope Physics coverage as needed.

(Keep TSC informed.)

TSC Operational with Full Staffing Dispatching Operators* Dispatched by the on-duty SRO.

WITHIN Control Complex Habitability Envelope (Keep TSC informed.)

Dispatching Operators IF Operators are assigned to OSC, OUTSIDE Control Complex Habitability Envelope THEN Operators are dispatched by TSC.

IF Operators are NOT assigned to OSC, THEN Operators are dispatched by the on-duty SRO.

(Keep TSC informed.)

Dispatching Fire Brigade Dispatched with EAD's by the on-duty SRO.

OUTSIDE Control Complex Habitability Envelope Then notify TSC to support with Health Physics coverage Dispatching Emergency Medical Personnel Notify Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC) of medical emergency.

Then notify TSC to coordinate support from Security and Health Physics.

Dispatching Other Resources (Non-Operators) Dispatched by the TSC.

WITHIN Control Complex Habitability Envelope Dispatching Other Resources (Non-Operators) Dispatched by the TSC.

OUTSIDE Control Complex Habitability Envelope

• Includes the Fire Brigade EM-103 Rev. 23 Page 9 of 11

Summary of Changes PRR 611246 NOTES: PROCEDURE SPONSOR: To ensure information between EPIPs does not conflict, review the following:

1.) EM-103, NOTES for 9.1.5 and EM-104, Step 6.0.5.

2.) EM-103, Step 9.2.5 and EM-104, Step 9.2.2.18.

3.) EM-103, Step 9.2.4 and EM-104, Step 9.3.1.1.

SECTION/STEP CHANGE Cover page Changed logo to Duke Energy.

Throughout Reformatted lAW PRO-NGGC-0201 and changed revision number to Rev. 23.

2.1.21, 7.0.1.a.1, Added new step for [R7] NOCS 100521, per PRR 545774 and 7.0.1 .a.2, & 7.0.1 .a.3 CR 539068-31. Also, added "[R7]" to appropriate steps.

Section 2.1 Moved Imbedded NOCS commitments to the Developmental References section and used the "[R]" number in the procedure where it is used.

4.0 Changed Shift Manager to Shift Supervisor to match DTO org chart.

6.0.3 Add " In the event the Control Room is evacuated, Control Room Emergency Plan functions can be performed in the TSC ." PRR 474927 7.0.1 .a.1, 7.0.1 .a.3 Changed "State Warning Point" to "State Watch Office" and removed the word "Tallahassee" to be consistent with EM-202.

Also, changed "SWP" to "SWO".

7.1 .b Add notation that ERDS, PICS and SPDS are standard desktop items. PRR 401390 9.1.3.a, 3 rd & 4 th bullet Deleted communication to control supervisor. This will be a direct communication from TSC to control room personnel.

Note 2 prior to 9.1.5 Added "unless there are no radiological consequences" to the end of the end of the first sentence. No HP technician will be necessary on a reentry team if there are no radiological consequences.

9.1.6 Added title of Precaution, Limitations, and Notes section reference 9.1.9 Added title of RMT Function section reference 9.2.3 Deleted word "communicator" as this is performed by any Control Room personnel.

EM-103 Rev. 23 Page10 ofl1 Corrected inconsistencies in the emphasis on the wording "Within" and "Outside" throughout the enclosure. Bolded and capitalized wording. Also, Bolded the word "NOT" throughout, for consistency.

Summary of Changes Added the NOTE to the top of this revision summary page per PRR 411896 EM-103 Rev. 23 Page 11 of 11

R DUKE Reference EN ERGY. Use CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 PLANT OPERATING MANUAL EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EM-202 DUTIES OF THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR REVISION 102

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1 .0 P UR P O S E ....................................................................................................................... 3 2 .0 R E F E R E NC E S ................................................................................................................ 3 2.1 Developmental References ............................................................................... 3 3 .0 D EF INITIO NS .................................................................................................................. 5 4 .0 R E S PO NS IB ILIT IE S ................................................................................................. . . 11 5 .0 P R E R E Q UIS IT E S .......................................................................................................... 13 6.0 PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND NOTES .......................................................... 14 7.0 SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT ....................................................................... 15 8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ........................................................................................ 15 9 .0 INS T R UC T IO NS ............................................................................................................ 16 9.1 Emergency Coordinator's Guide for Unusual Event [NOCS 1129, 96042] ..... 18 9.2 Emergency Coordinator's Guide for an Alert [NOCS 1129, 96042] ................. 21 9.3 Emergency Coordinator's Guide for Site Area Emergency [NOCS 1129, 9 6 0 4 2 ] ................................................................................................................. 25 9.4 Emergency Coordinator's Guide for General Emergency [NOCS 1129, 9 6 0 4 2 ] ................................................................................................................. 29 1 0 .0 R E C O R D S ..................................................................................................................... 32 ENCLOSURES

1. Emergency Classification Table ............................................................................. 33

2. Evacuation Planning Guide .................................................................................... 50

3. Guidelines for Protective Action Recommendations for Non-Essential Energy Complex Personnel and General Population .................... 57

4. EAL Descriptions for Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form ........ 60

5. Emergency Response Facility Activation Scenarios ............................................. 62

6. Communication with NRC Management During an Event .................................... 64 ATTACHMENTS

1. Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form ................................................. 65

2. AT T AC HME NT 2 ........................................................................................................ 66

3. Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet .......................................................... 78

4. Emergency Notification for Units 1/2 & 4/5 ........................................................... 82

5. Initiation of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) ................................ 83 S u m m a ry of C h a nge s .............................................................................................................. 85 I EM-202 Rev. 102 Page2of85

1.0 PURPOSE

1. This procedure provides instructions and guidelines used by the Emergency Coordinator during initiation of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

Specific guidelines include emergency classification, reporting and notification requirements, and protective action recommendations for non-essential Energy Complex personnel and the public. Portions of this procedure are also used by the Emergency Operations Facility staff for offsite notifications, protective action recommendations, and Emergency Action Level determinations.

2. This procedure is an Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure. Any revisions must be carefully considered for Emergency Plan impact.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Developmental References

1. 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans

2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities

3. 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors

4. CR3 Severe Accident Guideline

5. Emergency Action Level Bases Manual

6. Letter FCS-9852, Oct 12, 1988, Gilbert Engineering Study "Internal Flooding of Power Plant Building."

7. Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, EPA-400-R-92-001, Environmental Protection Agency (October, 1991)

8. NEI 91-04, Revision 1, Severe Accident Issue Closure Guidelines

9. NEI 97-03, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels

10. NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants

11. Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual

12. Radiological Emergency Response Plan

13. Safety Evaluation of FPC proposed EAL changes for CR3 (TAC No. MA2231),

NRC to FPC letter 3N0299-02

14. NRC Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures, Dated 02/25/02

15. NRC RIS 2003-12, Clarification of NRC Guidance for Modifying Protective Actions

16. NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-based Events"

17. NEI 99-01, Rev. 5, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels

18. EMG-NGGC-0005, Activation of the Emergency Response Organization Notification System EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 3 of 85]

19. NRC RIS 2009-10, Communications Between the NRC and Reactor Licensees During Emergencies and Significant Events

20. EM-102, Operation of the Technical Support Center (TSC)

21. EM-1 03, Operation and Staffing of the CR-3 Control Room During Emergency Classifications

22. EM-400. Operation of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 4 of 85 J

3.0 DEFINITIONS

1. Aircraft: Aircraft smaller than an Airliner.

2. Airliner: A large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the Plant. (The NRC notification should designate aircraft vs. airliner.)

3. Bomb: An explosive device suspected of having sufficient force to damage Plant systems or structures. (See EXPLOSION.)

4. Civil Disturbance: A group of persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. A civil disturbance is considered violent when force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage Plant property.

5. Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE): Dose to an organ due to the intake of radioactive materials.

6. Credible Site-Specific Security Threat Notification: A threat specifically to CR3 confirmed and validated by Nuclear Security or received over the Emergency Notification System (ENS) from the NRC. Notification may be received from recognized law enforcement or governmental agencies (e.g. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), Division of Emergency Management (DEM), Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC.)

7. Deep Dose Equivalent (DDE): External whole body dose.

8. Emergency Action Level (EAL): A pre-determined, observable threshold for Plant conditions that places the Plant in a given emergency classification.

9. Emergency Classification: A system of classification in which emergency occurrences are categorized according to specific protective action levels. The four emergency classifications are:

a. Unusual Event: This classification refers to any event(s), in process or having occurred, indicating a potential degradation of the level of safety of the Plant OR indicate a security threat to facility protection. NO releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety occurs. This classification brings the operating staff to a state of readiness if escalation to a more severe action level classification occurs.

b. Alert: This classification refers to event(s) that are in process, or have occurred, involving an actual or potentially substantial degradation of the level of safety of the Plant OR a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels. The Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) are staffed and assembly and accountability are performed at local assembly areas.

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 5 of 85 1

3.0 Definitions (Cont'd)

c. Site Area Emergency: This classification refers to event(s) that are in process, or have occurred, involving actual or likely major failures of Plant functions needed for the protection of the public OR HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) prevents effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are NOT expected to result in exposure levels, which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels at the SITE BOUNDARY. The TSC and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) are staffed and radiation monitoring teams may be dispatched. Protected Area evacuation and accountability is performed at CR3. Assembly and accountability is performed at Units 1/2 & 4/5.

d. General Emergency: This classification refers to event(s) that are in process, or have occurred, involving actual or imminent substantial core degradation or nuclear fuel melting with the potential for loss of containment integrity OR HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels for more than the immediate site area. This classification initiates predetermined protective actions for the public, provides continuous assessment of information from on-site and off-site measurements, initiates additional measures indicated by the event, and provides current information and consultation with off-site authorities and the public. The Emergency Coordinator will probably decide to evacuate the Energy Complex.

10. Emergency Coordinator (EC): This position is the highest level of authority for the CR3 Emergency Organization and on-site emergency activities. This position is held by the Plant General Manager or designated alternate. The Shift Manager assumes the position until the Plant General Manager or designated alternate arrives to assume Emergency Coordinator responsibilities.

11. Emergency Response Data System (ERDS): NRC requirement {10 CFR 50.72(a)(4)} to have the ability to acquire data from nuclear power Plants in the event of an emergency at the Plant. ERDS is a direct real-time transfer of data from CR3 to NRC. Once initiated, ERDS operates automatically.

12. Explosion: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components.

13. Extortion: An attempt to cause an action at CR3 by threat of force. Bomb threats that are unsubstantiated are NOT included in this definition.

14. Fire: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do NOT constitute fires.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

15. Hostage: A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by CR3.

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 6 of 85

3.0 Definitions (Cont'd)

16. Hostile Action: An act toward a nuclear power Plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force.

Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. Hostile action should NOT be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are NOT part of a concerted attack on the nuclear power Plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used address such activities (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the Owner Controlled Area).

17. Hostile Force: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

18. IDLH Level: Level of toxic gas Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health

19. Incident Report: A report of the actual scenario of the emergency, the identified cause(s) of the emergency, and the radiological history of the emergency, including released quantities, existing radiological activity, abnormal doses for emergency worker and population doses.

20. Intrusion/Intruder: Suspected hostile individual (outsider) present in the Protected Area without authorization. An intruder also includes a badged employee (insider) attempting to commit or providing assistance to others in committing sabotage. These activities may occur while the insider is either physically inside or outside the Protected Area. Upon identification, the insider's authorization is immediately revoked by Nuclear Security.

21. Local Assembly Area: A pre-designated area personnel report for organization, roll call, and supervision following an "Alert" emergency classification.

22. Main Assembly Area (MAA): The place personnel report for organization and supervision following an evacuation of the CR3 Protected Area. The Main Assembly Area is the Site Administration Building Auditorium.

23. MODES: The ITS based designator of Plant status based on Reactivity, Temperature and RCS status and includes operating modes 1 through 6 and defueled (no mode) as applicable. The term "MODES:ALL" applies to MODES 1-6 and defueled (no mode).

24. Owner-Controlled Area: The area of land (approximately 4738 acres) that is owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by DEF, situated between the mouths of the Withlacoochee and Crystal Rivers and bounded to the north by woodlands, to the east by Highway 19, to the south by medium to dense woodlands and to the west by marshlands and the Gulf of Mexico. The OWNER CONTROLLED AREA is indicated in Figure 2-3 of the FSAR and encompasses both the PROTECTED AREA and the SITE BOUNDARY.

25. Protected Area: All areas within the CR3 security perimeter fence that require badged authorization for entry.

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page7of85

3.0 Definitions (Cont'd)

26. Protective Action Recommendations: Emergency measures recommended for purposes of preventing or minimizing radiological exposures to Energy Complex personnel or members of the public. Protective Action Recommendations are made using all available data, primarily Plant conditions. Off-site dose projections and/or field survey results can also be factored in to Protective Action Recommendations if confidence in their accuracy is high (monitored release, confirmed field survey results).

27. RCS Barrier: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the Pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves. An isolable leak in an interfacing or connecting system that contains reactor coolant (MU, DH, SF, WD, etc.) is NOT an "RCS leak."

28. Release (Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form): Any of the following:

NOTE: If RM-A2 is out of service and normal Auxiliary Building ventilation is in service, RM-A4 and/or RM-A8 exceeding its warning setpoint may be used to determine a release in progress.

• Exceeding the warning setpoint in count rate on an effluent monitor that is a direct result of an event that has initiated an emergency declaration OR Radioactivity detected by environmental monitoring OR OTSG tube rupture > 10 gpm with either of the following:

• Prolonged steaming to the atmosphere from the affected OTSG OR

• an unisolable steam leak outside RB from the affected OTSG OR NOTE: Design Basis Leakage or other suspected leakage should NOT be categorized as a release until confirmed by environmental monitoring.

0 Radioactivity escaping unmonitored from the Plant.

29. Release, Unplanned (Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet): Release is NOT authorized by a Release Permit or exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints, etc.) on the applicable permit.

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 8 of 85

3.0 Definitions (Cont'd)

30. Sabotage: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. Equipment found tampered with or damaged due to malicious mischief may NOT meet the definition of SABOTAGE until this determination is made by Nuclear Security.

31. Safe Shutdown Equipment: Equipment necessary to achieve and maintain the reactor subcritical with controlled decay heat removal to bring the Plant to the ITS applicable shutdown condition / mode.

32. Security Condition: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant.

A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

33. Severe Accident: An accident beyond that assumed in the CR3 design and licensing basis that results in catastrophic fuel rod failure, core degradation, and fission product release into the Reactor vessel, Reactor Building, or the environment.

34. Significant Transient: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following:

a. Automatic turbine trip at greater than 25% reactor thermal power

b. Electrical load rejection greater than 25% full electrical load

c. Plant runback

d. Reactor trip

e. Safety injection system actuation

f. Greater than 10% thermal power oscillations

g. Loss of decay heat removal in Mode 4 ("Significant Transient" is NOT used in any Mode 5 or 6 EAL)

35. Site Boundary: That area, including the PROTECTED AREA that extends 4400 feet or 0.83 miles in a circle around the Reactor Building.

36. Strike Action: Is a work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made. The strike actions must threaten to interrupt normal Plant operations.

37. Thyroid CDE Dose: Dose to the thyroid due to intake of radioactive iodine.

38. Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE): The sum of external dose (DDE) and the equivalent amount of whole body dose due to individual organ uptakes.

39. Unplanned: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is NOT the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 9 of 85]

3.0 Definitions (Cont'd)

40. Valid: An indication or report or condition is considered VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by Plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (e.g., within 15 minutes).

41. Visible Damage: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example system/component damage includes:

deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering due to fire. Example structure damage includes exposed and/or broken rebar, failed supports/pipe hangers, etc. Surface blemishing (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, concrete spalling) should NOT be included.

IEM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 10 of 85 1

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The Emergency Coordinator controls all activities at CR3 during activation of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

2. The Emergency Coordinator shall NOT delegate the decisions related to classification of the emergency condition.

3. The Emergency Coordinator shall NOT delegate the decisions related to notification and protective action recommendations to State and Local authorities who implement off-site emergency measures, until the EOF Director communicates to the Emergency Coordinator the EOF accepts the State notification and Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) responsibilities. At this time, the EOF completes the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form.

4. Upon arrival on-site, the Plant General Manager (PGM) or designated alternate contacts the Control Room Emergency Coordinator or goes to the Control Room and receives a briefing about the status of the emergency condition and the implementation of the Radiological Emergency Response Plan. When ready to assume responsibility as the Emergency Coordinator and declare the TSC operational, inform the Control Room Emergency Coordinator and Technical Support Center staff.

5. The Emergency Coordinator provides the Emergency Operations Facility Director an Incident Report when a sustained Site Area Emergency or General Emergency involves a Recovery Plan. This documents the emergency and serves as a basis for recovery phase operations.

6. During declared emergency conditions, the Emergency Coordinator is the sole contact for emergency regulatory directives and evaluates these directives for possible response to the emergency condition.

7. The Emergency Coordinator responsibilities in other Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures are implemented when Plant conditions warrant.

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 11 of 85]

4.0 Responsibilities (Cont'd)

8. Based on the evaluation of the emergency condition, the Emergency Coordinator has the authority to implement the following actions:

• Direct personnel to shelter or evacuate the Energy Complex.

• Order Energy Complex Plants placed in a safe shutdown condition.

0 Notify all applicable agencies of the Plant status.

0 Suspend security safeguards as appropriate. {10 CFR 50.54(x) (y)) or Section 24, Temporary Suspension of Security Measures of the CR3 Physical Security Plan.

a Request outside assistance, if necessary.

• Make the necessary personnel assignments to provide continuing response for long-term activities.

0 Approve media releases until the EOF is operational and assumes responsibility.

• Approve re-entries into the Plant by emergency response teams 0 Approve emergency exposure dose during re-entries. Refer to Enclosure 3, Guidelines for Protective Action Recommendations for Non-Essential Energy Complex Personnel and General Population for emergency worker exposure limits.

Provide support for the Incident Commander in performance of EM-913.

9. The Emergency Coordinator reports to the EOF Director, once the EOF is operational.

10. The EOF Director provides for the direction and control of all emergency phase activities once the EOF is declared operational. The EOF Director has authority and responsibility for management of emergency response resources, coordination of radiological and environmental assessment, recommendations for public protective actions, and coordination of emergency response activities with Federal, State, and local agencies.

11. The Licensing / Regulatory Programs Unit prepares a written summary of any Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency for the NRC and the State of Florida within twenty-four hours (or the next working day) from termination of the event.

12. The TSC Emergency Coordinator and/or the EOF Director may be requested to participate in conference calls with the NRC during certain emergencies and significant events. The purpose of these calls is to assist the NRC in their understanding of the nature of the emergency or significant event in a timely fashion. Depending on the nature of the event, participants from the NRC may include the NRC Executive Team Director, NRC Headquarters Safeguards Team personnel, and/or NRC regional responders. These calls may be conducted over existing telecommunication networks (i.e. the FTS-2001 system). Other conference / bridge lines may also be established by the NRC. Refer to Enclosure 6, Communication with NRC Management During an Event, for typical topics likely to be discussed during these conference calls.

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 12 of 85:1

4.0 Responsibilities (Cont'd)

13. During Severe Accident conditions, the Emergency Coordinator reviews and provides final approval of all mitigation strategies developed by the Accident Assessment Team before implementation. [NOCS 100056]

14. Nuclear Security activates the Emergency Response Organization and implements evacuation of the Crystal River Energy Complex based on requests from the Emergency Coordinator. If Nuclear Security is unable to activate the ERO due to the nature of the event, ERO activation will be performed by the Control Room staff.

15. During certain emergencies (e.g., security-related events, large area fire), the Crystal River Energy Complex Emergency Response Coordinator may establish an Incident Command Post (ICP). In the event an ICP is established, the Emergency Coordinator may assign Operations personnel to staff the ICP to support its function and to provide liaison between CR3 Operations and off-site response agencies (e.g., local law enforcement, fire/rescue, emergency medical, etc.)

5.0 PREREQUISITES None EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 13 of 85 1

6.0 PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND NOTES

1. Upon declaration of a General Emergency, the minimum protective action recommendation is EVACUATE ZONE 1.

2. Some EALs allow an off-normal condition to exist for a period of time before the EAL threshold is met. This time period is intended to be used for validation and assessment of the off-normal condition. For example, EAL 2.14 (Fire - Unusual Event) allows 15 minutes for a fire to be extinguished before the EAL threshold is met. However, the emergency assessment and declaration phases should occur concurrently in order to ensure that emergencies are declared in a timely manner.

The Emergency Coordinator should not delay declaration of an event when it is likely that the event will meet an EAL threshold even if the specified assessment time period has not expired.

3. All emergency declarations shall be made within 15 minutes following information becoming available to Control Room personnel that conditions have reached an EAL threshold based upon VALID indications, reports or conditions. The expectation is that emergency classifications are to be made as soon as conditions are present for the classification, but within 15 minutes in all cases. The 15 minute time period allows adequate time to assess, classify and declare events.

4. During the initial phase of an emergency condition, the lack of information may prevent the Emergency Coordinator from completing the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form. If information is NOT available, do NOT delay notification to State Watch Office. Indicate additional information will follow when it becomes available.

5. The Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet is used as a guideline to provide adequate detail to the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer to understand the event and its significance. The initial NRC notification may be performed using the information from Items 4 through 7 and Item 11 of the FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM, in order to expedite notification from the Main Control Room. Since the NRC is NOT familiar with the EAL numbers from Item 6, Enclosure 4 should be used to provide the paraphrased EAL. If an open communications channel is established, routine use of the form is NOT required, if verified changes in Plant / equipment status are communicated to the NRC verbally and a summary of the communications with the NRC is maintained in the log. All the information regarding an event may NOT be available at the time of notification, but at a minimum must provide the event classification and description as soon as possible after the State of Florida notification, within the required time.

6. For all radiological, hazardous material spills, toxic gas releases or violent weather conditions, the Emergency Coordinator determines the safe actions for Plant personnel, which may include delaying the staffing of the TSC and EOF until it is safe to do so.

7. The Emergency Coordinator directly notifies the Plant General Manager or EC On-Call and EOF Director to ensure the rationale of the emergency classification is understood. It is acceptable, if the EC requests the PGM or EC On-Call to notify the EOF Director or the EC may establish a conference call.

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 14 of 85

6.0 Precautions, Limitations, and Notes (Cont'd)

8. Individuals assigned to make notifications are trained on how to make notifications and are familiar with communication systems. [NOCS 21207]

9. The Technical Support Center (TSC) continues to complete items on the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form and transmits to the EOF until the EOF Director declares the EOF operational, and informs the Emergency Coordinator the EOF accepts responsibility for State notifications and Protective Action Recommendations. At this time, the EOF Director assumes full responsibility for completing the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form. Any exceptions to the transfer of these responsibilities (delay in transfer, etc) must be clearly communicated during the facility turnover briefing.

10. Telephone notifications to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), State of Florida, Citrus and Levy Counties are complete when direct voice contacts are made with the responsible representatives of the agencies notified. The leaving of a message with an agency's telephone operator, secretary, answering service, or message recording device is NOT a completed notification.

11. The Emergency Action Levels are NOT intended for maintenance and/or testing situations where abnormal instrument readings, alarms, and observations are expected. Some maintenance evolutions may require compensatory actions.

12. A security threat or event presents unique challenges to protecting the health and safety of the public and Plant staff. Normal emergency response procedure steps may be hindered due to events that are occurring. EM-911 provides operational activities and considerations to protect Plant personnel for a security threat. All actions of EM-911 should still be completed from the Control Room even when the TSC/EOF are operational.

13. Once Protective Action Recommendations are made to the State of Florida and Risk Counties, do NOT relax / reduce the recommendations until the threat is clearly under control or the emergency is terminated.

7.0 SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT None 8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA None IEM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 15 of 85J

9.0 INSTRUCTIONS

1. RECORD significant information, events, and actions taken during the emergency condition AND RETAIN for later evaluation. Information substantiating the sequence of events is compiled from procedures, communication logs, tape recordings, flip charts, message copies, photographs (if available) and other pertinent documentation

2. DETERMINE the emergency classification using Enclosure 1, Emergency Classification Table.

0 Page 2 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX

• Page 3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT

• Page 5 NATURAL / MANMADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGEMENT

• Page 12 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION

• Page 17 LOSS OF POWER

3. PERFORM steps from the Emergency Coordinator Guide for each emergency classification as indicated in the following Subsections:

• 9.1 UNUSUAL EVENT

• 9.2 ALERT

• 9.3 SITE AREA EMERGENCY

• 9.4 GENERAL EMERGENCY

4. USE the time blocks in Subsections 9.1, 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 to provide a reference of actions taken during the emergency condition. All actions, with the exception of decisions relating to classification and notification and Protective Action Recommendations made to State and Local authorities, can be performed in parallel by delegation from the Emergency Coordinator.

5. IF an emergency classification is upgraded before the first notification is made, THEN ENSURE SWO notification is made within 15 minutes of original classification.

6. IF it is discovered after the fact (review of routine log entries, etc.) that a condition previously existed that should have resulted in an emergency declaration, AND the condition NO longer exists, THEN make notifications to the NRC Operations Center via ENS within one hour of discovering the undeclared event, AND NOTIFY the Emergency Preparedness staff to NOTIFY the State and Local Governments on the next working day. An emergency declaration is NOT required.

FEM-202 Rev. 102 Page 16 of 85

Subsection 9.0, INSTRUCTIONS (Cont'd)

7. IF a transient event condition is corrected before a declaration is made, AND analyses of the event is NOT required to determine whether further Plant damage occurred while corrective actions were being taken, THEN a declaration is NOT warranted but the event is reported and notification made to the NRC Operations Center via ENS within one hour of the event, AND ENSURE the Emergency Preparedness staff is notified to NOTIFY the State and Local Governments on the next working day. (e.g., the PORV (RCV-10) develops a leak or fails open with a leak rate of greater than 25 gpm and the block valve (RCV-1 1) is closed and successfully isolates the leak to less than the EAL threshold).

8. Information requested for TSC turnover is contained in Attachment 1 of EM-102, Operation of the Technical Support Center. CONSIDER establishing a conference call with the EC On-Call and EOF Director for this turnover.

9. REFER to EM-103 for additional Control Room activities during a declared emergency including dispatch of Operators outside of the Control Complex.

10. In most situations, events are terminated rather than downgraded. However, there may be conditions where downgrading is appropriate. For downgrading the emergency classification level, if the current Plant conditions have improved to satisfy a lower classification Emergency Action Level, NOTIFY the Emergency Coordinator On-Call and EOF Director for concurrence to downgrade. For Alerts or higher, unless the conditions are resolved within 30 minutes, downgrading should NOT occur until after the TSC and EOF (as appropriate) are operational and the event sufficiently evaluated by the Emergency Response Organization.

11. For Emergency Phase termination and transition to the Recovery Phase, from an Unusual Event or Alert, DETERMINE the need for a Recovery Plan and a support organization. For a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency, ASSIST the EOF Director with the completion of the Termination Checklist from EM-400. IF the Site Area Emergency event is of short duration (approximately 30 minutes or less), and the EOF is NOT operational, THEN TERMINATE the event. If conditions will allow for termination of the Emergency Phase, ENTER the Recovery Phase. If conditions do NOT support termination of the emergency and entry into the Recovery Phase, CONTINUE the Emergency Phase.

12. REFER to EM-913 for EC/EC Designee responsibilities in response to a large area fire.

IEM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 17 of 85

9.1 Emergency Coordinator's Guide for Unusual Event [NOCS 1129, 96042]

TIME

1. UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED ............................................. DATE /

(If event is transitory in nature, refer to item 9.0.7 before declaring event)

2. RECOMMENDED WITHIN 5 MINUTES

a. NO TIFY C ontrol Room staff of: .............................................................

1) Emergency declaration

2) Upgrade criteria (if any)

3) Release status

b. IF the emergency is due to a Security Event, THEN REFER TO EM-911 before proceeding with the following steps ........................ __

c. NOTIFY Plant Personnel using information from Step 9.1.7 ................. __

3. REQUIRED WITHIN 15 MINUTES

a. NOTIFY SWO, Citrus County, and Levy County within 15 minutes of declaration using Attachment 1, Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form, AND FAX after notification is complete. [NOCS 1129, 96042] ...................................... __

4. RECOMMENDED WITHIN 30 MINUTES

a. NOTIFY PGM or EC On-Call and the EOF Director ............... /.

b. NOTIFY Nuclear Security to place the Emergency Response Organization on standby using Scenario 2 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility Activation Scenarios) ............................... __

c. IF Emergency Response Organization support is desired, THEN NOTIFY Nuclear Security to activate:

• TSC/OSC using Scenario 3 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility Activation Scenarios) ............................................ __

OR

• TSC/OSC/EOF/ENC using Scenario 4 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility Activation Scenarios) ......................... __

d. NOTIFY CR3 NRC Resident Inspector .................................................... __

e. NOTIFY Units 1/2 & 4/5 Control Rooms per Attachment 4 ......... /

EM-202 Rev. 102 F Page 18 of 85 1

Subsection 9.1, Emergency Coordinator's Guide for Unusual Event [NOCS 1129, 96042] (Cont'd)

TIME

f. REVIEW Enclosure 2, Evacuation Planning Guide for applicability to this event .......................................................................... __

g. IF a release is occurring as a result of this event, AND RM-A2 is needed for evaluation, THEN COMPLETE EM-204A or EMG-NGGC-0002, as time permits ................................... __

h. NOTIFY NRC via ENS as soon as practicable after the State using information from Items 4 - 7 and Item 11 of the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form or Attachment 3, Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet.

REQUIRED WITHIN 60 MINUTES. [NOCS 96042] ............................... ...

i. NOTIFY CR3 Emergency Preparedness ............................................... __

5. UNUSUAL EVENT UPDATES

a. PROVIDE periodic Plant status updates to:

• SWO (every 60 minutes or as agreed upon) per Attachment 1, Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency No tificatio n F o rm ................................................................................. D

• NRC per Attachment 3, Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet (after State of Florida update, unless continuous communication is established) .............................. El

• Units 1/2 & 4/5 Control Rooms per Attachment 4, Emergency Notification for Units 1/2 & 4/5 ......................................... El 0 CR3 Plant Personnel via PA announcements .....................................

6. UNUSUAL EVENT TERMINATION

a. Upon the decision to terminate, NOTIFY: ........................... DATE /

• Emergency Coordinator On-Call and EOF Director ..........

• SWO and document on Attachment 1, Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form .............................................. __

Nuclear Security to inform the Emergency Response Organization of event termination using Scenario 13 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility A ctivation S cenarios) . .................................................................... __

NRC within one hour of termination with verbal su m m a ry ...................................................................................... __

• Unit 1/2 & 4/5 Control Rooms per Attachment 4 .......................... __

• CR3 Plant Personnel via PA announcement ................................

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 19 of 85

Subsection 9.1, Emergency Coordinator's Guide for Unusual Event [NOCS 1129, 96042] (Cont'd)

7. PA Announcement for an Unusual Event (a. OR b.)

a. ANNOUNCE OR PERFORM the following:

Time:

1) ACTUATE the appropriate local evacuation alarm if re q u ire d . ............................................................................................. ED

2) "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL, CRYSTAL RIVER 3 IS IN AN UNUSUAL EVENT BASED ON

3) "THERE (IS OR IS NOT) A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE TO THE ENVIRONMENT IN PROGRESS... ................................................. E

4) STATE any appropriate special instructions (areas to be avoided or evacuated, etc.). (IF conditions warrant personnel accountability, THEN REQUEST personnel to report to Local Assembly Areas).

5) R EPEAT the announcem ent ...............................................................

6) ESTABLISH continuous monitoring on PL-1 ......................................

OR

b. USE this announcement for a Credible Site-Specific Security Threat where time is available and a decision has been made to use the Remote TSC (during normal hours) ....................................

1) ACTUATE the appropriate local evacuation alarm if required ........... D "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL, CRYSTAL RIVER 3 IS IN AN UNUSUAL EVENT BASED ON CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC SECURITY THREAT. TSC / OSC STAFF PERSONNEL ARE TO REPORT TO THE EOF. HEALTH PHYSICS PERSONNEL ARE TO RELOCATE THE ESV AND EMERGENCY KITS TO THE EOF.

FIRE BRIGADE MUSTER AT THE__

2) R EPEAT the announcem ent ...............................................................

3) ESTABLISH continuous monitoring on PL-1 ......................................

I EM-202 Rev. 102 _ Page 20 of 85

9.2 Emergency Coordinator's Guide for an Alert [NOCS 1129, 96042]

TIME

1. A LER T D EC LA R E D ..................................................................... DAT E /

(If event is transitory in nature, refer to item 9.0.7 before declaring event)

2. RECOMMENDED WITHIN 5 MINUTES

a. NO T IFY C ontrol R oom : ..........................................................................

1) Emergency declaration

2) Upgrade criteria (if any)

3) Release status

b. IF the emergency is due to a Security Event, THEN REFER TO EM-911 before proceeding with the following steps .......................... __

c. IF safe conditions exist, THEN NOTIFY Nuclear Security to activate the Emergency Response Organization using Scenario 5 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility A ctivation S cenarios) ............................................................................... __

d. IF conditions (security event, violent weather, natural disaster, etc.) require activation of remote emergency facilities, THEN NOTIFY Nuclear Security to activate the Emergency Response Organization using Scenario 8 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility Activation S ce n a rio s) . ..............................................................................................

e. NOTIFY Plant Personnel using information from Step 9.2.9 ...................

3. REQUIRED WITHIN 15 MINUTES

a. NOTIFY SWO, Citrus County, and Levy County within 15 minutes of declaration per Attachment 1, Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form, AND FAX after notification is complete. [NOCS 1129, 96042] .......................................

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 21 of 85

Subsection 9.2, Emergency Coordinator's Guide for an Alert [NOCS 1129, 96042] (Cont'd)

4. RECOMMENDED WITHIN 30 MINUTES TIME

a. NOTIFY PGM or EC On-Call and the EOF Director .................... _ ,

b. NOTIFY CR3 NRC Resident Inspector .................................................... __

c. NOTIFY Units 1/2 & 4/5 Control Rooms per Attachment 4 ..........

d. REVIEW Enclosure 2, Evacuation Planning Guide for applicability to this event ... ... ....................... __

e. IF a release is occurring as a result of this event, AND RM-A2 is needed for evaluation, THEN COMPLETE EM-204A or EMG-NGGC-0002, as time permits ...................................

f. NOTIFY NRC via ENS as soon as practicable after the State using information from Items 4 - 7 and Item 11 of the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form or Attachment 3, Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet. REQUIRED W ITHIN 60 MINUTES. [NOCS 96042] .................................................... __

g. ENSURE ERDS is activated per Attachment 5, Initiation of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS).

REQUIRED WITHIN 60 MINUTES [NOCS 40730] ......................... _ LL

h. REVIEW EM-1 03 for operator dispatch requirements ............................. __

5. ONCE TSC OPERATIONAL

a. NOTIFY ANI insurance that CR3 is in an emergency declaration. (Off-Site Support Phone Directory) ..................................... __

b. NOTIFY Risk Management to notify NEIL insurance that CR3 is in an emergency declaration. (Off-Site Support P hone D irectory ) ...................................................................................... __

c. NOTIFY INPO that CR3 has declared an Alert (Off-Site Support Phone Directory) .......................................................... __

6. ALERT UPDATES

a. PROVIDE periodic Plant status updates to:

SWO (every 60 minutes or as agreed upon) per Attachment 1, Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form including Items 12, 13, and 14 ...............................

• Units 1/2 & 4/5 Control Rooms per Attachment 4 ...............................

• CR3 Plant Personnel via PA announcements .....................................

7. ALERT DOWNGRADING

a. CONSULT with the EC and EOF Director for concurrence before dow ngrading occurs .......................................................... . /

Date / Time I EM-202 I Rev. 102 7 Page 22 of 85 1

Subsection 9.2, Emergency Coordinator's Guide for an Alert [NOCS 1129, 96042] (Cont'd)

8. ALERT TERMINATION TIME

a. Upon the decision to terminate, NOTIFY: ..................... Date: , __

• P G M and E O F D irector ...............................................................

• SWO and document on Attachment 1, Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form ............................................ __

• Nuclear Security to inform the Emergency Response Organization of event termination using Scenario 13 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility A ctivation Scenarios) . .................................................................. __

• NRC within one hour of termination with verbal sum m ary ..................................................................................... __

• Unit 1/2 & 4/5 Control Rooms per Attachment 4 ......................... __

• CR3 Plant Personnel via PA announcement ..............................

• American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) (Off-Site Support Phone D irectory ) ......................................................................... __

• Risk Management (Off-Site Support Phone Directory) ............... __

• INPO (Off-Site Support Phone Directory) ................................... __

b. REQUEST the Licensing/Regulatory Programs Unit to prepare a written summary within twenty-four hours (or next working day) of termination to SWO and NRC ...................................... __

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 23 of 85

Subsection 9.2, Emergency Coordinator's Guide for an Alert [NOCS 1129, 96042] (Cont'd)

9. PA ANNOUNCEMENT FOR AN ALERT

a. CONSIDER the safety of Plant personnel and then ANNOUNCE OR PERFORM the following:

Time:

1) ACTUATE the appropriate local evacuation alarm if re q u ire d . ............................................................................................. El

2) "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL, CRYSTAL RIVER 3 IS IN AN ALERT BASED ON

3) "THERE (IS OR IS NOT) A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE TO THE ENVIRONMENT IN P R O G R E S S . .......................................... ............................................

4) "ACTIVATE THE TSC/OSC. REPORT TO YOUR SHOP OR LOCAL ASSEMBLY AREA FOR A C C O UNTA BILITY ... ...................................................................... .

5) STATE any appropriate special instructions (areas to be avoided or evacuated, remaining at critical jobs, etc.).

6) "ALL EOF PERSONNEL, REPORT TO THE EOF.". ...................E

7) REPEAT the announcem ent ............................................................... 0

8) ESTABLISH continuous monitoring on PL-1 ...................................... FI EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 24 of 85

Subsection 9.3, Emergency Coordinator's Guide for Site Area Emergency [NOCS 1129, 96042]

9.3 Emergency Coordinator's Guide for Site Area Emergency [NOCS 1129, 96042]

TIME

1. SITE AREA EMERGENCY DECLARED ................................ DATE:

2. RECOMMENDED WITHIN 5 MINUTES

a. NO TIFY C ontrol Room staff: .................................................................

1) Emergency declaration

2) Upgrade criteria (if any)

3) Release status

b. IF the emergency is due to a Security Event, THEN REFER TO EM-911 before proceeding with the following steps ........................ __

c. IF safe conditions exist, THEN NOTIFY Nuclear Security to activate the Emergency Response Organization (if NOT already activated) using Scenario 6 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility Activation Scenarios) ............................ __

d. IF conditions (security event, violent weather, natural disaster, etc.) require activation of remote emergency facilities, THEN NOTIFY Nuclear Security to activate the Emergency Response Organization (if NOT already activated) using Scenario 9 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility Activation Scenarios) .................................................. __

e. IF personnel can evacuate safely, THEN NOTIFY Plant Personnel using information from Step 9.3.10 AND ACTUATE Site Evacuation Alarm. REVIEW Enclosure 2, Evacuation Planning Guide for applicability ...................... __

3. REQUIRED WITHIN 15 MINUTES

a. NOTIFY SWO, Citrus County, and Levy County within 15 minutes of declaration per Attachment 1, Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form, AND FAX after notification is complete. (Also REFER to Step 9.3.0.c)

[NO C S 1129, 96042] ............................................................................. __

4. RECOMMENDED WITHIN 15 MINUTES

a. DETERMINE protective actions for Energy Complex using Enclosure 2, Evacuation Planning Guide. NOTIFY Nuclear Security to coordinate protective action instructions for all areas of the Energy Com plex ................................................................ __

b. NOTIFY Units 1/2 & 4/5 Control Rooms per Attachment 4 ...... __

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 25 of 85 1

Subsection 9.3, Emergency Coordinator's Guide for Site Area Emergency [NOCS 1129, 96042]

TIME

5. RECOMMENDED WITHIN 30 MINUTES

a. NOTIFY PGM or EC On-Call and the EOF Director ................

b. NOTIFY CR3 NRC Resident Inspector .................................................

c. IF a release is occurring as a result of this event, AND RM-A2 is needed for evaluation, THEN COMPLETE EM-204A or EMG-NGGC-0002, as time permits ...................................

d. NOTIFY NRC via ENS as soon as practicable after the State using information from Items 4 - 7 and Item 11 of the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form or Attachment 3, Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet. REQUIRED W ITHIN 60 MINUTES. [NOCS 96042] .................................................. ...

e. ENSURE ERDS is activated per Attachment 5, Initiation of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS).

REQUIRED WITHIN 60 MINUTES. [NOCS 40730] .............................. ...

f. REVIEW EM-1 03 for operator dispatch requirements ........................... __

6. ONCE TSC OPERATIONAL

a. VERIFY Protected Area accountability is completed by Nuclear Security within 30 minutes of an evacuation of the P ro te cte d A re a . .....................................................................................

b. NOTIFY ANI insurance that CR3 is in an emergency declaration. (Off-Site Support Phone Directory) ....................................

c. NOTIFY Risk Management to notify NEIL insurance that CR3 is in an emergency declaration. (Off-Site Support P h o ne D ire cto ry ) ....................................................................................

d. NOTIFY INPO that CR3 has declared a Site Area Emergency. (Off-Site Support Phone Directory) .................................... __

7. SITE AREA EMERGENCY UPDATES

a. PROVIDE periodic Plant status updates to:

• SWO (every 60 minutes or as agreed upon) per Attachment 1, Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form including Items 12,13, and 14 ................................ Dl

• Units 1/2 & 4/5 Control Rooms per Attachment 4 ............................... Fl

• CR3 Plant Personnel via PA announcements .....................................

8. SITE AREA EMERGENCY DOWNGRADING

a. IF the EC and EOF Director were notified, THEN CONSULT with them for concurrence before dow ngrading occurs . ......................................................... DA T E EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 26 of 85

Subsection 9.3, Emergency Coordinator's Guide for Site Area Emergency [NOCS 1129, 96042]

9. SITE AREA EMERGENCY TERMINATION TIME

a. IF the EOF is operational, THEN ASSIST with the completion of the Termination Checklist from EM-400 ............................ __

b. IF the event is of short duration (approximately 30 minutes or less) and the EOF is NOT operational, THEN TERMINATE th e e v e nt .................................................................................................

c. Upon the decision to terminate, NOTIFY: ........................... DATE /

• SWO and document on Attachment 1, Florida Nuclear Plant Em ergency Notification Form ..............................................

• NRC within one hour of termination with verbal s u m m a ry .......................................................................................

• Nuclear Security to inform the Emergency Response Organization of event termination using Scenario 13 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility A ctivatio n S ce na rio s) ....................................................................

• Units 1/2 & 4/5 Control Rooms per Attachment 4 ......................... __

• CR3 Plant Personnel via PA announcement ................................

• American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) (Off-Site Support P hone Directory ) ........................................................................... __

• Risk Management (Off-Site Support Phone Directory) ................. __

• INPO (Off-Site Support Phone Directory) ..................................... __

d. REQUEST the Licensing/Regulatory Programs Unit to prepare a written summary within twenty-four hours (or next working day) of termination to SWO and NRC ........................................ __

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 27 of 85 ý

Subsection 9.3, Emergency Coordinator's Guide for Site Area Emergency [NOCS 1129, 96042]

10. PA Announcement for a Site Area Emergency [NOCS 7455]

a. CONSIDER the safety of Plant personnel and then ANNOUNCE OR PERFORM the following:

Time:

1) ACTUATE the Site Evacuation alarm ............................................ El

2) "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL, CRYSTAL RIVER 3 IS IN A SITE AREA EMERGENCY BASED ON

3) "THERE (IS OR IS NOT) A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE TO THE ENVIRONMENT IN P R O G R E S S ".............................................

4) IF the TSC/OSC is NOT activated, THEN ANNOUNCE: "ACTIVATE THE TSC/OSC.". ........... N/A El FI

5) "PERSONNEL ARE TO IMMEDIATELY EVACUATE THE PROTECTED AREA AND REPORT TO THE SITE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING AUDITORIUM.". ..................

6) "ALL EOF PERSONNEL, REPORT TO THE EOF...........".................

7) STATE any appropriate special instructions (areas to be avoided or evacuated, etc.).

8) REPEAT the announcem ent ............................................................... EL

9) ESTABLISH continuous monitoring on PL-1 ...................................... El I EM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 28 of 85

9.4 Emergency Coordinator's Guide for General Emergency [NOCS 1129, 96042]

1. GENERAL EMERGENCY DECLARED .............................. DATE TIME

2. RECOMMENDED WITHIN 5 MINUTES TIME

a. IF the EOF is operational, THEN NOTIFY the EOF Director of the classification change ................................................................... __

b. NO TIFY C ontrol Room staff of: ............................................................

1) Emergency declaration

2) Release status

c. IF the emergency is due to a Security Event, THEN REFER TO EM-911 before proceeding with the following steps ........................ __

d. IF safe conditions exist, THEN NOTIFY Nuclear Security to activate the Emergency Response Organization (if NOT already activated) using Scenario 7 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility Activation Scenarios) ............................. __

e. IF conditions (security event, violent weather, natural disaster, etc.) require activation of remote emergency facilities, THEN NOTIFY Nuclear Security to activate the Emergency Response Organization (if NOT already activated) using Scenario 10 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility Activation Scenarios) .................................................. __

f. IF personnel can evacuate safely, THEN NOTIFY Plant Personnel using information from Step 9.4.9 AND ACTUATE Site Evacuation Alarm if Protected Area NOT already evacuated. REVIEW Enclosure 2, Evacuation Planning G uide for applicability ............................................................................ __

3. REQUIRED WITHIN 15 MINUTES

a. DETERMINE Protective Action Recommendations per E n c lo s u re 3 ..........................................................................................

(Minimum Protective Action Recommendation is to evacuate Zone 1.)

b. IF the EOF is NOT operational, THEN NOTIFY SWO, Citrus County, and Levy County within 15 minutes of declaration per Attachment 1, Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form, AND FAX after notification is complete.

(Also REFER to Step 9.4.5.b) [NOCS 1129, 96042] .............................. __

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 29 of 85 1

Subsection 9.4, Emergency Coordinator's Guide for General Emergency [NOCS 1129, 96042]

4. RECOMMENDED WITHIN 15 MINUTES TIME

a. DETERMINE Energy Complex protective actions per Enclosure 2, Evacuation Planning Guide, AND NOTIFY Nuclear Security to coordinate evacuation instructions for all areas of the Energy Com plex ................................................................ __

b. NOTIFY Units 1/2 & 4/5 Control Rooms per Attachment 4 ...... _...

5. RECOMMENDED WITHIN 30 MINUTES (NOT necessary if TSC and EOF operational) TIME

a. NOTIFY CR3 NRC Resident Inspector .................................................... __

b. IF a release is occurring as a result of this event, AND RM-A2 is needed for evaluation, THEN COMPLETE EM-204A or EMG-NGGC-0002, as time permits ................................... __

c. NOTIFY NRC via ENS as soon as practicable after the State using information from Items 4 - 7 and Item 11 of the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form or Attachment 3, Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet. REQUIRED W ITHIN 60 MINUTES. [NOCS 96042] .................................................... ..

d. ENSURE ERDS is activated per Attachment 5, Initiation of the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS).

REQUIRED WITHIN 60 MINUTES. [NOCS 40730] ................................. ..

e. REVIEW EM-1 03 for operator dispatch requirements ............................. __

6. ONCE TSC IS OPERATIONAL TIME

a. VERIFY Protected Area accountability is completed by Security within 30 minutes of an evacuation of the Protected A re a .........................................................................................................

b. NOTIFY ANI insurance that CR3 is in an emergency declaration. (Off-Site Support Phone Directory) ..................................... __

c. NOTIFY Risk Management to notify NEIL insurance that CR3 is in an emergency declaration. (Off-Site Support P hone D irectory ) ...................................................................................... __

d. NOTIFY INPO that CR3 that CR3 has declared a General Emergency. (Off-Site Support Phone Directory) ....................................... __

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 30 of 85 1

Subsection 9.4, Emergency Coordinator's Guide for General Emergency [NOCS 1129, 96042]

7. GENERAL EMERGENCY UPDATES

a. PROVIDE periodic Plant status updates to:

• SWO (every 60 minutes or as agreed upon) per Attachment 1, Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form including Items 12, 13, and 14 ................................ ED

• Units 1/2 & 4/5 Control Rooms per Attachment 4, Emergency Notification for Units 1/2 & 4/5 ......................................... ED

• CR3 Plant Personnel via PA announcements ..................................... []

8. GENERAL EMERGENCY TERMINATION

a. IF the EOF is NOT operational, THEN WAIT until the EOF is operational before term inating ................................................................. __

b. IF the EOF is operational, THEN ASSIST with the completion of the Termination Checklist from EM-400 ............................ __

c. Upon the decision to terminate, NOTIFY: ........................... DATE /

• NRC within one hour of termination with verbal sum m ary ....................................................................................... __

• Nuclear Security to inform the Emergency Response Organization of event termination using Scenario 13 (Enclosure 5, Emergency Response Facility A ctivation Scenarios) .................................................................... __

0 Unit 1/2 & 4/5 Control Rooms per Attachment 4, Emergency Notification for Units 1/2 & 4/5 ................................... __

0 CR3 Plant Personnel via PA announcement ................................

0 American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) (Off-Site Support P ho ne D ire cto ry ) ........................................................................

0 Risk Management (Off-Site Support Phone Directory) ................. __

0 INPO (Off-Site Support Phone Directory) ..................................... __

d. REQUEST the Licensing/Regulatory Programs Unit to prepare a written summary within twenty-four hours (or next working day) of termination to SWO and NRC ........................................ __

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 31 of 85 1

Subsection 9.4, Emergency Coordinator's Guide for General Emergency [NOCS 1129, 96042]

9. PA ANNOUNCEMENT FOR A GENERAL EMERGENCY

[NOCS 7455]

a. CONSIDER the safety of Plant personnel and then ANNOUNCE or PERFORM the following:

Time:

1) IF the Protected Area has NOT been evacuated, THEN ACTUATE the Site Evacuation alarm .......................... N/A El El

2) "ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL, CRYSTAL RIVER 3 IS IN A GENERAL EMERGENCY BASED ON It

3) "THERE (IS OR IS NOT) A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE TO THE ENVIRONMENT IN P R O G R E S S "............................................

4) IF the TSC/OSC is NOT activated, THEN ANNOUNCE: "ACTIVATE THE TSC/OSC.". ...........N/A El El

5) IF the Protected Area has NOT been evacuated, THEN ANNOUNCE: "ALL NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL, IMMEDIATELY EVACUATE THE PROTECTED AREA AND FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS FRO M SEC URITY..................................."............................. N/A E] ER

6) IF the EOF is NOT activated, THEN ANNOUNCE:

"ALL EOF PERSONNEL, REPORT TO THE EOF................ N/A EL El

7) STATE any appropriate special instructions (areas to be avoided or evacuated, etc.).

8) R EPEAT the announcem ent ...............................................................

9) ESTABLISH continuous monitoring on PL-1 ......................................

10.0 RECORDS Subsection 9.1 - Emergency Coordinator's Guide for Unusual Event Subsection 9.2 - Emergency Coordinator's Guide for an Alert Subsection 9.3 - Emergency Coordinator's Guide for Site Area Emergency Subsection 9.4 - Emergency Coordinator's Guide for General Emergency Attachment 1- Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 32 of 85]

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 1 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL INDEX ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT CATEGORY UE ALERT SAE GE Gaseous Effluents 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Liquid Effluents 1.5 1.6 Unexpected Radiation Levels 1.7 1.8 Irradiated Fuel Damage Due to Mechanical Damage or Uncontrolled Loss of Water Level Outside the Reactor 1.9 1.10 Vessel NATURAL / MANMADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGEMENT;'.

CATEGORY UE ALERT  :*:SAE GE Earthquake Experienced 2.1 2.2 External Flooding 2.3 2.4 Hurricane 2.5 Tornado/High Winds 2.6 2.7 Aircraft/Vehicle Crash 2.8 2.9 Toxic or Flammable Gases 2.10 2.11 Explosions/Catastrophic Pressurized Equipment Failure 2.12 2.13 Fire 2.14 2.15 Control Room Evacuation 2.16 2.17 Security Event 2.18 2.19 2.20 2.21 Internal Flooding 2.22 2.23 Emergency Coordinator Judgment 2.24 2.25 2.26 2.27 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION.

CATEGORY .UE ALERT* SAE GE Loss of Communications 3.1 Failure of Reactor Protection 3.2 3.3 3.4 Inability to Reach ITS Time Limits 3.5 Loss of Alarms/Indications 3.6 3.7 3.8 Fuel Clad Degradation 3.9 Turbine Failure 3.10 3.11 RCS Leakage 3.12 Inability to Maintain Hot Shutdown 3.13 Inadvertent Criticality 3.14 Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown 3.15 Loss of Water Level in Reactor Vessel that has Uncovered 3.16 or Will Uncover Fuel

.LOSS.OF POWER _______

CATEGORY UE ALERT SAE GE:

Loss of AC Power 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 Loss of AC Power (Shutdown) 4.5 Loss of Vital DC Power 4.6 Loss of Vital DC Power (Shutdown) 4.7 MODES: ALL = Modes 1-6 and Defueled/No Mode EM-202 Rev. 102 I Page 33 of 85

ENCLOSURE 1 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE Page 2 of 17 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX Anolicable Modes: 1 - 4 Comolete For All Barriers 5.1 LOSS OF FUEL CLAD 6.1 LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 7.1 LOSS OF CONTAINMENT tlfany Item Is checked, barrier Is lost. If any Item Is checked, barrer Is lost : ... "..... .... If any item Is checked, barrier Is lost....

Enter 41for FUEL CLAD In classification table below. Enter 4 for RCS In classificatlon table bloW Enter 2 for CONTAINMENT In classification table below-.,

1 CORE CONDITIONS IN REGION 3 OR SEVERE 1. RCS LEAK OR OTSG TUBE LEAK RESULTING IN 1. RAPID UNEXPLAINED RB PRESSURE ACCIDENT REGION OF ICC CURVES LOSS OF ADEQUATE SUBCOOLING MARGIN DECREASE FOLLOWING INITIAL INCREASE (REFER TO EALBM EAL 6.1)

2. RCS ACTIVITY >300 pCi/gm 1-131 DOSE 2. RM-G29 OR 30 > 10 R/hr FOR 15 MINUTES OR 2. CONTAINMENT PRESSURE OR SUMP LEVEL EQUIVALENT (REFER TO EALBM EAL 5.1) LONGER RESPONSE NOT CONSISTENT WITH LOCA

[NOCS 100441] CONDITIONS

3. RM-G29 OR 30 >100 R/hr FOR 15 MINUTES OR 3. EC DEEMS RCS BARRIER IS LOST 3. AN OTSG HAS > 10 GPM TUBE RUPTURE LONGER (REFER TO EALBM EAL 5.1 & Att. 2) WITH PROLONGED STEAMING TO THE ATMOSPHERE FROM THE AFFECTED OTSG OR AN UNISOLABLE STEAM LEAK OUTSIDE RB FROM THE AFFECTED OTSG (REFER TO EALBM EAL 7.1)

4. EC DEEMS FUEL CLAD BARRIER IS LOST 4. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION IS INCOMPLETE AND RELEASE PATH TO THE ENVIRONMENT EXISTS

5. EC DEEMS CONTAINMENT BARRIER IS LOST 2POTENTIAIOSSOF UEL9I*D* *,6.2

- POTENTIAL LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT 7.2 POTENTIAL LOSS: OFCONTAINMENT If any eiemn gSchecked;.barrierIs potentially lost.. A "' SYSTEM If any Item Is checked, barrnerIs potentially lost.

Enter 3 for FUEL CLADinclassiicationtable below. *<, ., If anyitem is checked, barrier is potentially lost. Enter 1.5 for CONTAINMENT=In classiflcatlontable:below.#

. Enter3.for RCS in classification tabe~*ow.

a...:.... . .. .... .:

1. RCS LEAK OR OTSG TUBE LEAK REQUIRING ONE DIRECTION OR MORE INJECTION VALVES 1. RB PRESSURE >54 psig (REFER TO EALBM EAL 6.2)

2. CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLES >700°F 2. RCS LEAK OR OTSG TUBE LEAK RESULTS IN ES 2. RB HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION >4%

ACTUATION ON LOW RCS PRESSURE

3. EC DEEMS FUEL CLAD BARRIER IN 3. RCS PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE RELATIONSHIP 3. RB PRESSURE >30 psig WITH NO BUILDING JEOPARDY VIOLATES NDT LIMITS SPRAY AVAILABLE

4. HPI/PORV OR HPI/SAFETY VALVE COOLING IS IN 4. RMG-29 OR 30 READINGS >5,000 Rthr PROGRESS

5. CORE CONDITIONS IN SEVERE ACCIDENT

5. EC DEEMS RCS BARRIER IN JEOPARDY REGI OF I IO C OFICC VE R A1CINT REGION CURVES FOR >15 MINUTES

6. EC DEEMS CONTAINMENT BARRIER IN JEOPARDY CLASSIFICATIONTABLE. .

ENTER LOSS OR POTENTIAL LOSS OR ZERO FOR EACH BARRIER THEN TOTAL AND DETERMINE CLASS BELOW FUEL CLAD + RCS + CONTAINMENT IF TOTAL IS: RECOMMENDED EVENT CLASSIFICATION IS:

' 0 BUT s 2 UNUSUAL EVENT

> 2 BUTs 4 ALERT

> 4 BUT s 8.5 SITE AREA EMERGENCY

> 8.5 GENERAL EMERGENCY EM-202 Rev. 102 1 Page 34 of 85

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 3 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT CAiTEGORY . UNUSUAL EVENT .j K ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENSY GENERAL .EMERGENCY, Gaseous Effluents i.1 MODES: ALL 1.2 MODES: ALL 1.3 MODES: ALL 1.4 MODES: ALL MODES: ALL (1 or 2) (1 or 2) (1 or 2 or 3) (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALIDreading on RM-A1or RM-A2 1. A VALIDreading on RM-A1or RM-A2 1. VALIDRM-Ator RM-A2Accident NormalRange monitor exceeds the exceeds 5.0E-3 pCi/cc for15 minutes Range monitor reading exceeds the 1. VALIDRM-AIor RM-A2Accident high alarm selpoint for60 minutes or or longer values on the followingTable forthe Range monitor reading exceeds longer current Stability Class for15 minutes thevalues in the followingtable for or longer. 15 minutes or longer:

Extended Extended On-Line Shutdown Stability Olarperations Dn-Line Shutdown o Operations or Clss (yltc) SFPeels (pC/Icc) SFPools

.p c {*JCi/cc)

OR A. B, or C 5.1E-1 7.5E-2 3 0EnO 4.5E-1 OR 2. Sample analysis confirms gaseous F or D GE 3.OE 5 5.4E-2 O4.ER-

2. Sample analysis confirms gaseous effluent being released exceeds or 3.3E-1 O effluent being released exceeds 5 0E-3pCi/cc for 15 minutes or longer DR 2. Dose Assessment results indicate SITE 5.0E-4 pCi/cc for60 minutes or longer BOUNDARY dose >1000 mR TEDEor g5000 mR thyroidCDE forthe actual or

2. DeseAssessment resultsindicate projected duration of the release AND SITEBOUNDARY dose >100 mR core damage is suspected or has TEDE or >500 mR thyroid CDEforthe occurred actual or projected duration of the OR release OR 3. Fieldsurvey results indicate closed windows dose rates >100gmR/hr

3. Fieldsurvey results indicate closed expected to continue for more than one windows dose rates >100mR/hr hour, or analyses of fieldsurvey expected to continue for more than samples indicale thyroid CDEof 5000 one hour: or analyses of fieldsurvey mR forone hour of inhalation, at or samples indicate thyroid CDE of beyond SITE BOUNDARY 5O0mRfor one hour of inhalation, at or beyond SITE BOUNDARY Liquid Effluents 1.s MODES: ALL 1.6 MODES: ALL Not Applicable .. Not Applicable MODES: ALL (1 or 2) A VALIDreading on RM-L2,RM-L7,or sampleanalysisconflrm the release

1. A VALIDreading on RM-L2,RM-L7, exceeds 200 times the ODCM release or sample analysis confirms the setpoint for15 minutes or longer relase exceeds2 limesthe00CM release selpint for60 minutes or longer OR

2. Releasecontinued t e minutesor ..

tengerwith noxdilutionfumow (REFER TO EALBMEAL1.5)1 EM-202 Rev.102 Page 35 of 85

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 4 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT (Continued)

... CATEGORY. .. i1.. UNUSU*AL EVENT  ;  : = ALR T SITE AE MRE(Y ' .. ... ..

CALRT AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Unexpected Radiation 1.7 MODES: ALL 1.a MODES: ALL Refer to FissiosnProductramerMamx. ýReferto Flis*nr ProductBu.aer Matdi, Levels Gasebos Effluentsor Emergen,.y " GasEseeo-ntou.ie nqErgency One or more VALIDradiation monitor (11or 2) CoordinatorJudgrnent CooratetgJdnent readings unexpectedly exceed the values ": . ".

MODES:ALL below for15 minutes or longer: 1. VALIDradiation readinggreater than 15 mRlhrfur15 minutesor lungerin RM-G3= 400 mR/hr the Control Room (RM-G1)or the RM-G4= 600 mR/hr Central Alano Station (CAS)

RM-G5= 3,000 mR/hr RM-G9 =100 mR/hr OR RM-G14= 1 00 mRthr 2. One or more VALIDradiation monitor RM-G17 = 800 mR/hr readings unexpectedly exceed the values below for 15 minutes or longer:

RG3 = 5,000mR/hr RM-G4v5,000 mRflrr RM-Gg = 5.000 mR/hr RM-G17= 5.000 mR/ht Irradiated Fuel Damage 1.9 MODES:ALL 1.1o MODES:ALL mefertoGaueousE lueorsorEmerncy a e"n.... .. r:

Due to Mechanical Corhao ude Cnrtxao ogmo Damage or Uncontrolled (1 and 2) (1 or 2)

Loss of Water Level 1. (a or b) 1. (a and b)

Outside the Reactor a. Uncontrolled leveldecreaseresu.ling a. Plant personnelreport damage of .

Vessel in indications of -2.5 feet in spent fuel irradiated fuel  : " " '" v..*

pool MODES: ALL AND

b. VALIDhigh alarm as indicated on

b. Confirmed Plant persornel report of RM-G15 or RM-G16 uncontrolled significant water level drop in spent fuel pool or transfer OR canal when Spent Fuel transfer tubes are open 2. Plant personnel report spent fuel pool or transfercanal wuter leveldrophas AND or willexceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuelwillbe uncovered ..

2. Fuel remains covered with water EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 36 of 85

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 5 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

NATURAL I MANMADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGEMENT CATEG0 RV: UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT. SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERR"AEMEGENC"y Earthquake Experienced 2.1 MODES:ALL 2.2 MODES: ALL RefertoFissionProduct BamerMainxnor Refe.isto.Fis*"ductBarmrMatrixor Ennergency Cordinator J*dg-ot EmergencnyCoordinatoc judgment

[NOCS 24320) (1 and 2) (1 and 2)

MODES: ALL 1. Ground motion sensed by Plant 1. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel C'-3"14 -Seismic personnel SystemAnnunciator or confirmed Trouble"' .. * ".. . .. : *  :' , rv.

AND alarm . . , " .

2. Contirmedearthquake causing AND Annunciator C-3-14 "Seismic System Trouble" alarm 2. (a or b)

a. Analysis con.itms the earthquake at

>0.05g OR

b. Indications show degraded SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance due to the earthquake .

External Flooding 2.3 MODES:ALL 2.4 MODES: ALL Referto FisslonPductBarmerMatrix or Emergency CoordinarJmdgment RefertoatssionfProductLBmerMa.xor Emergency CoordinatorJudgment MODES: ALL Intake canal level or visual observation (1 and 2)-* .-  :.. " . * .

indicates flood water level > 98 feet

1. Intake canal level or visual

>8.seeation indicates flood water level ,

AND

2. Indications show degraded SAFE ,.". ..

SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance due to the flooding Hurricane 2.5 MODES:ALL R. .FissinarcucB-et S Mtr.t.. R(R'r-yolom Bnar.M.abyor

ý!duct Reerto FfissioifPrOmuct Parnner Matonor:

H rinand.*:

o figh wV or Ein re y

.rndO " ,..ErEgey Cood natorJ d me tt : "cEn ;t cy

.o 'rdaator our dgmeant The Plant is within a Hurricane Warning

• Coord-natoJudgm ".'t MODES: ALL area EM-202 Rev 102 Page 37 of 85

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 6 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

NATURAL I MANMADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGEMENT (Continued)

~r SITE AREA EMERGENCY GERAESR TornadolHigh Winds 2.6 MODES: ALL 2.7 MODES: ALL Refer to Fission Product BorderMatrx or Ený,rgency CoordinatorJudgment Refer.to.F-ion Product Barrier Matx or Erg**ncy CoordinatorJudgment MODES ALL Report by Plant personnel of a Tornado (1 or 2) .

striking withinthe PROTECTED AREA

1. Tornado or High Winds gr windbome object cause significant VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following structures:

Auxiliary Building. . . .

BWST. ".,

- Control Complex, Diesel Generator Building (EGDG-1AM B)

- EFT-2 Bailding.

Intermediate Building,

- Reactor Building

- EFP-3 Building

2. Indications show degraded SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance due to the tornado or high winds orw indbo.e objects Accidental Aircraftl 2.B MODES:iALL 2. MODES: ALL RetertoFissionProductBanierMatrxor Refer to FissionProduct arer Matrx or If or 2) Emnergency CoordinatorJudgment Emergency CoordinatorJudgment Vehicle Crash Report by Plant personnel of Aircraft or Vehicle Crash invotving the following 1. Confirred report ot significant MODES: ALL structures VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the

- Auxiliary Building, following structures:

• BWST AxlayBidn Control Complex Auxitiary Building Dieset Generator Building B (EGDG-1A1-B) Control Complex EFT-2Buildling Diesel Generator Building

- ntermediat e Building (EGDG-1A/1B)

Reactor Building EFT-2 Building EFP-3 Building Intermediate Building Reactor Building EFP-3 Building OR

2. Indications show degraded SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance due to the Aircraft or Vehicle Crash EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 38 of 85

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 7 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

NATURAL I MANMADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGEMENT (Continued)

CATEGORY, . j UNUSUAL EVEýT:: T ALERT r SITE AREA EMERGENCY '[ GENERAL EMERGENCY* ..

Toxic or Flammable 2.10 MODES:ALL 2.11 MODES ALL Referto Fission Product BarerMatn,. RefertoFissionProductBanterMatix, System Malfunction, or Emergency System Malfunction, or Emergency Gases (1or 2) (1 or 2 or 3) COOrdinatorJudginent CoordinatorJudgmentl MODES: ALL 1. Report or detection of Toxic or 1. Flammable Gas levels > 25%Lower Flammable Gas withinthe SITE Explosive Limitin areas required to BOUNDARY that could enter the maintain safe operations or establish Protected Area at levels > IDLHor and maintain coldshutdown.

> 25% Lower Explosive Limits ...

affecting normal operation of the '..

Plant. OR . . '

OR 2. Toxic Gas levels ý IDLHlevels in areas that require continuous

2. Coohnhed notitlcotion by PE, County, occupancy to maintain safe operation or State personnel to evacuate or or establish or maintain cold shutdown '1 shelter site personnel based on an offsde event OR .. "

3. Toxic Gas levels ý.IDLHlevels within the PROTECTED AREAsuch that Plant personnel are unable to perform , .:  : '

actions necessary to maintain safe operatiovs or establishand maintain cold shutdown using protective ... ..

equipment I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 39 of 85 1

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 8 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

NATURAL / MANMADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGEMENT (Continued)

CATEGORY UNUSUAL EVE [ , ,. ALERT: SITE AREA EMERGENCY 7] GERAL EMERGENCY Explosions/ 2.12 MODES ALL 2.13 MODES: ALL i<Refer to Fission Product BaerneMatrix. Ref"to Fision ProductBarrierMarixt System Malfunction. or Emergency . SystemMalfuncton, ,,,, Emergency' Catastrophic Pressurized Report byPlant personnel of VISIBLE (I or 2) Coordinator Judgment CoordinatorJudgment i Equipment Failure DAMAGE to permanent structures or eqauipmentwithinthe PROTECTED AREA 1. EXPLOSION or catastrophic failureof pressurized equipment causes ...

dueto an EXPLOSION or catastrophic MODES: ALL failure of pressurzed equipment significant VISIBLEDAMAGE to any of lhe followingsfructure...  :  :

Refer to Security Event AuxiliaryBuilding .

BWST Cuontrol Complex

- Diesel Generator Building (EGDG-1A/1B)

EFT-2 Building, "

InlernmediateBuilding Reactor Building ... . ........

EFP-3 Building OR

2. Indications showdegraded SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance due to the EXPLOSION or pressurized equipmenl failure Fire 2.14 MODES: ALL 2.15 MODES: ALL Refer to Fission Product Barier Marix, Control Room Evacuaton, System Refer to Fisson Product Baurer Matrix,.

ControlRoom Evacuation,System MODES: ALL (I and 2) (1 oe2) Maffunctions. or Emergency Coordinator Malfunctions, or Emergency Coortirnl,

1. FIREis orthreatening one ofthe 1. Report by Plant personnel of VISIBLE , Judgment Judgn*ent followingstructures: DAMAGE to SAFE SHUTDOWN AuxiliaryBuilding EQUIPMENT due to lhe FIRE ,:

BWST Control Complex.

-Diesel Generator Building OR (EGDG-AA1B)

EFT-2 Building 2. Indications show degraded SAFE Intermediate Building SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT Reactor Building performance due to the FIRE EFP-3 Building ...........

AND

2. FIREnot extinguished within 15 minules fromeither Control Room notificalion or receipt of a VALIDfire alarmin fhe Confrol Room . . . . ....

EM-202 IRev. 102 Page 40 of 85

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 9 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

NATURAL / MANMADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGEMENT (Continued)

'CATEGORY I UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT I SITE AREA

'EMERGENCY' .

1 GENERAL.

EMERGENCY..

Matv, .

Control Room Evacuation NOtAppllcable * " 2.16 MODES: ALL 2.17 MODES: ALL RefertoFissionProductBamer ystemn Malfunction, or Eniri.ecy MODES: ALL Control Room evacuation is required per (1 and 2) ,

• CoordinatorJudgment AP-990, 'Shutdown From Outside the Control Room' 1. Control Room evucuation is required .

per AP-990, "Shutdown From Outside the Control Room" AND

2. Control of the necessary equipment not established per AP-g90 mithin , :r.

15 minutes IREFER TO EALBM EAL 2.17)

Security Event 2.18 MODES:ALL 2.19 MODES:ALL 2.20 MODES:ALL 2.21 MODES: ALL MODES: ALL (1 or 2 or 3) (1 or 2) (1 or 2)

Report by Secunly Shift Supervisor or 1. A vahdated notification from NRC of an A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has 1. A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred NRC of one or more oflhe following AIRLINER attack threat less than 30 ocCurred within the PROTECTED AREA such that plant personnel are unable to events: minutes away as reported by the Security Shift operate equipment required to maintain Supervisor. safety functions.

1. A validated notification trom NRC OR providing information of an AIRCRAFT OR or AIRLINER threat. 2. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER 2. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused OR CONTROLLED AREA as reported by failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems the Security Shift Supervisor. and imminent fuel damage is lhkely.

2 A CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC SECURITY THREAT NOTIFICATION O._R

3. A SECURITY CONDITION that does NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shirt Supervisor.

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 41 of 85

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 10 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

NATURAL I MANMADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGEMENT (Continued)

CATE.O... .. USUA.L ALERT ""EN.T SITE AREA. EGENERA!LEMERGENCY 4.

Internal Flooding 2.22 MODES:ALL 2.23 MODES:ALL Refer to Refer to FissionProduct Banrer Mathx or F -ionProctuBatrierMateinor Emergency CoordtnatorfJudgmem.t Eergency Coordinator Judgmnent Modes: ALL (I and 2) (1 and 2)

1. Indication of uncontrolled flooding in 1. Water level exceeds 5 inches in the the Auxliary Buildingor Intenmediale AuxiliaryBuildingor Ioten-nediate Building Building AND AND

2. Water leveltflooding has the potential 2. (a or b) toaffect or immerse SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT a. Indications show degraded SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT due to the  :

• c. t * .

flooding

b. Electrical hazards prevent Plant personnel normal access to areas of " ". . 4w Plant containing SAFE SHUTDOWN "r .

EQUIPMENT I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 42 of 85 1

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 11 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

NATURAL I MANMADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGEMENT (Continued)

CATEGORY UNUSUAL EVENT '1.= AtERT sITE AREAeEMERGENCY GENERAICEMERGENCY Emergency Coordinator 2.24 MODES: ALL 2.25 MODES: ALL 2.26 MODES: ALL 2.27 MODES: ALL Judgment Other conditions exist which indicate a Other conditions exist which indicate that Other condilions exist which indicate actual (I or 2) potential degradation of the level of safety events are in process or have Occurred or likely major failures of Plant functions MODES: ALL oa the Plant which involve potential or actual substantial needed for the protection of the public Other conditions exist which indicate.

degradation of the level of safety of the Plant i. Actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential loss of containment integnty O.RR

2. The potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases that can be expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines Plume Exposure Levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see EAL 1.4)

EM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 43 of 85

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 12 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION CATEGORY. j..i UNUS'UAL-EVENT [ . ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Loss of Communication 3.1 MODES: ALL Not Applicable: Not Appflcabte NotApplicable MODES: ALL (I or 2)

1. Loss of all the followingin-Plant communications capability:

a. PE Internal Telephone System

b. PAX

c. PortableUHFRadios

° "*: * * :i'*: =i= *i.... ...

OR i

2. LOssof aft of the followingOffsite * .

Communication capability:

a. PE Telephone System lo. StateHotRingdono(SHRD)

c. AlIFTS 2001NRC phones (ENS, .......

HPN.etc.) ."

a. EmergencyManagement Netmork thMnetl

a. CellolarTelephones Failure of Reactor Protection

3..i.  :**

t.. pplicable .:.

.... . 32 MODES: 1,2,3 3.3 MODES: 1,2 3.4 MODES: 1,2 (1and 2) (1and 2) (1and 2 and 3)

MODES: 12,3 for ALERT 1. RPSTripsetpoint exceeded and no 1. RPS Tripselpoint exceeded and no 1. RPS Tripsetpoint exceeded and no Reactor trip occurred Reactor trip occurred Reactor trip MODES: 1,2 for SITE AREA and AND A" occurred GENERAL Emergencies AND AND AND

2. Manual Reactor tripfrom Control 2. Manual Reactor trip fromControl Room was successful and reactor is Room was not successful in shutting 2. Manual Reactor trip from Control shutdown down thereactor Room was not successful in shutting a (REFER TO EALBMEAL3.2) (REFER TOEALBMEAL3.3) down the reactor AND

3. (aonb)

a. Core exitthermocouple temperatures 700"F, as indicated on SPDS.

OR

b. Adequate Secondary Cooling not anailable EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 44 of 85

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 13 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION (Continued))

...... .A.......UN

.S . L.....EVENT.ALERT iTE.AREA EMERGENCY.,  ?,.GENEALEMERGENCY'.

Inability to reach required 3.6 MODES: 1,2,3,4 OtAppficable Not Applicable Not Applicable mode within Improved (1 and 2)

Technical Specification time limits t.

1.specification LCO statement Entry into an Improved requiring....

Technical

• a mode reduction MODES: 1,2,3,4 AND

2. The Plant is not in the required operating mode within the time prescribed by the LCO required action Loss of 3.6 MODES: 1,2,3,4 3.7 MODES: 1,2,3,4 3.8 MODES: 1,2,3,4 Reerto-issionProductBiMatnordooor

.... nctin -ey Coordinato-W o entn" Alarms/indications (1 or 2) (1 and 2) 11 and 2 and 3 and 4)

MODES: 1,2,3,4 1. UNPLANNED toss of Annonciator 1. (a or b) 1. (a or b) panels A-L and Annunciator printer for 15 minutes or longer a. UNPLANNED loss of Annunciator a. Loss of Annunciator panels A-L and panels A-L and.Annunciator prnter Annunciator printer for l5 minutes or . A:

OR for 15 minutes or longer longer

2. UNPLANNED loss of NNI-X and OR OR NNI-Y for 15 minutes or longer

b. UNPLANNED loss of NNI-X and b. Loss of NNI-X and NNI-Y for NNI-Y for 15 minutes or longer lS minutes or longer AND AND

2. (a or b) 2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in ' "

progress

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress AND OR 3. Loss of Plant Computer gnd SPOS

b. Loss 01 Plant Computer and SPOS AND '

4. Inabilitytodirectlymonitor any nonot  : 'f '

• the following:

SubCmlicalily Core Cooling Conlainme.t RCS Inventory -. J1 EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 45 of 851

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 14 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION (Continued)

CATýGORY ' I UNUSUAL EVENT . ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY ' 1ENERALIEMERGENCY i : Frod-t Bain Fission .**y Mafrhr Re Fssion Pr icfeamei o,,

Fuel Clad Degradation 3.9 MODES: 1,2,3,4,5 .Refertp Fission Pm , rer Ma.. : '=efer t (a or b)

MODES: 1,2,3,4,5 Radiochemistry analysis indicates:

a. Dose Equivalent Iodine(1-131)

, 1.0 M*Cigmfor,48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or longer OR.R

b. Specific activity>10O/E-bar for .

48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or longer Turbine Failure 3.10 MODES: 1,2,3 3.11 MODES: 1.2,3 Refertq -isionProductBarfnerMatrix. RefertoFiss.iofnPard~uftBa hn MODES: 1,2,3 Report by Plant personnel of main turbine (1 or 2) ... '

failure causing penetration of the turbine  : ".

• casing or damage to main generator seals 1. Report by Plant personnel of projectiles generated by a main turbine failure causing significant *. .

VISIBLE DAMAGE any ofthe Iollowingstructures:

• SAuxiliary Building ...

BWST Control Complex Diesel Generator Building (EGDG-1A/1B)

EFT-2 Building .

Intermediate Buding Reactor Building EFP-3 Building OR

2. Indications show degraded SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance due to turbine generated projectiles EM-202 Rev.102 Page 46 of 85

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 15 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION (Continued)

CATEGOR .' .UNUSUAL EVENT <., ~ AET 7 SITE AREA EMERGEC I MRGENY RCS Leakage 3.12 MODES 1,2,3,4 Refer to Fissi a- Rome,Mor Raterto gision Product airMerMatoor Refer to FissionProduct Barier Matx or Emergency CoordinatorJudgment Emergency CoordinatorJudgment Emergency CoordinatorJudgment

[NOCS 40503] (1 or 2)

MODES: 1,2,3,4 1. Unidentified LeakageolOgpmor .

PressureBoundary Leakage> 10gpm  :,.,.  :

OR

2. Identified leakage >25 gpm Inability to Maintain Hot N;.

eOtAppltoabte .:' Not AppRlicable 3.13 MODES: 1,2,3,4 ,Refer to Fission ProductBarrierMatrix or Shutdown Shutdo "*n "" " :P"*" ... ."" " . .. (I and 2)  : Emergency. Cobrdinator

.. JudgmentL.:,

MODES: 1,2,3,4 . i1. Complete loss of Main,Emergency, "s* i. . " .' . .... and AuAliary Feedwater and unable to establishHPIcooling ,~'~'5 S~AND

2. Loss ofsubcOoling margin Inadvertent Criticality 3.14 MODES: 2,3,4,5,6 N. t. yppi ,b., . .t .Ap.lkcabtae5' NotA.tl-ble '

MODES. 2,3,4,5,6 An extended and unplanned sustained i l<* "

positive stlyup rate monitored by nuclear instrumentation '

. s.,'.. ..'55' ,._ _._ _ __._ _ _"_. _* _._ ,

Inability to Maintain Plant . . ..NotA~ppficahk l ,:. " 3.15 MODES: 5,6 i<;4.':.

' * ., .. t ah.lr.eb:

No;: .

ReertLoss of Water mnReactor in Cold Shutdown (I or 2) ' vssthat has uncovemd orwtg W1 "

1. Inabilityto maintain reactor coolant uncover

-- fuel' MODES: 5,6 temperature below 200"F ,  : ..

2'R

2. Uncontrolled reactor coolant temperature approaching 200oF EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 47 of 85

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 16 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION (Continued)

CATEGORY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE'AREEMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGFENCY Loss of Water Level in  :.... , . , 3.16 MODES 5,6 Reac ter Level in Not ApplicableApplicpplicable Not Applicable Reactor Vessel that Has 2t (11anld Uncovered or Will 1. Lossofdecay heatremoval per Uncover Fuel AND04 MODES: 5,6 * (aor b)

a. Incores indicating superheated conditions OR .

b. locoresunavailable andtimet0 uncovery exceeded as specified in OP-103H I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 48 of 85 1

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 17 of 17 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION TABLE ACCIDENT CONDITION:

LOSS OF POWER CATEGORY ... UNUSUAL EVENT [.ALERT" SITEAREA EMERGENCY " GENERAL EMERGENCY Loss of AC Power 4.1 MODES. ALL 4.2 MODES: 1,2,3,4 4.3 MODES: 1,2,3,4 4.4 MODES: 1,2,3,4 (I and 2) AC power capability to the 4160V ES Neither 4160V ES bus is capable ofbeing (1 and 2) busses reduced to a single power source energized within15 minutes MODES: ALL for UNUSUAL 1. Oftsite Power Transformer (OPT) and for 15minutes or longer such that only 1. Neither 4180V ES bus iscapable of EVENT Backup ESTransformer (BEST) and one of the followingis available: being energized MODES: 1,2,3,4 for ALERT, AuxiliaryTransformer not available for SITE AREA and 15 minufes or longer - " hEDG AND GENERAL AND -B"EDG 2. (a orb)

Emergencies Offsite Power Transformer (OPT)

2. EDGs supplying power to 4160V ES Backup ES Transformer (BEST) a. Restoration of 4160V ES Bus A or Busses 4160V ES Bus Bis not likelywithin 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> O._R

b. Core exit thermocouples > 700°F as indicated on SPDS Loss of AC Power Not Applicable 4.S MODES: 5,6, No Mode Not Apphoabie Netcabfe .

(Shutdown) .... .*. Neither 4160V ES bus is capable of  : * ; * "  :

being energized within15 minutes * . ,

MODES: 5,6, No Mode (defueled)

Loss of Vital DC Power

• NotApptnable ....*:.  :... NotApphcabl .. 4.6 MODES: 1,2,3,4 Refer to Frssron Produit aarnetMatnix MODES: 1,2,3,4.: Stand PowerStatusLightsfor BUSAtl..

A2 and BUSBf, B2 on the MainControl Board(SSF Panel) are out for 15minutes or longer Loss of Vital DC Power .. Nt4phbM .

• 1tNt '.

(Shutdown) 4.7 MODES: 5,6, No Mode N...f-loNtAp" ~ p5w Standby Power Status LightsforBUSAt.

MODES: 5,6, No Mode (defueled) A2,and BUS B1, B2 on the MainControl Board(SSF Panel) ate out for15 minutes orrtoger R 10 EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 49 of 85

ENCLOSURE 2 Page 1 of 7 EVACUATION PLANNING GUIDE 1.0 ENERGY COMPLEX PROTECTIVE ACTIONS

1. DETERMINE protective actions for the Energy Complex using B or C or D or E below.

(USE information in the tables and map on the following pages of this enclosure as necessary.)

A. UNUSUAL EVENT OR ALERT: NO protective actions. (Actions may be required in some security events as determined by Security.)

B. SITE AREA EMERGENCY:

PERFORM assembly and accountability AND INSTRUCT Fossil Control Rooms to report results to Nuclear Security at extension 3258 or 795-5078.

CONSIDER discretionary evacuation of non-essential personnel if plant conditions are likely to degrade or conditions exist that could impede site evacuation.

• CONSIDER sheltering for releases lasting less than two hours.

• For releases lasting greater than two hours or for planned releases, EVACUATE non-essential personnel C. GENERAL EMERGENCY:

(Release has NOT occurred and release NOT likely within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.)

0 PERFORM assembly and accountability AND INSTRUCT Fossil Control Rooms to report results to Nuclear Security at extension 3258 or 795-5078.

0 EVACUATE non-essential personnel (including Main Assembly Area personnel).

0 NOTIFY Fossil Control Rooms to standby for instructions.

0 CONSIDER supplying dosimetry to remaining personnel.

D. GENERAL EMERGENCY:

(Release has occurred or is imminent AND RELEASE duration projected less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.)

• NOTIFY Fossil Control Rooms to direct all personnel to take shelter in closest building and standby for further instructions.

EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 50 of 85 1

ENCLOSURE 2 Page 2 of 7 EVACUATION PLANNING GUIDE (Cont'd) 1.0 ENERGY COMPLEX PROTECTIVE ACTIONS (Cont'd)

E. GENERAL EMERGENCY:

(Release has occurred or is likely within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> AND release duration unknown.)

• NOTIFY Fossil Control Rooms to secure their Plants.

• EVACUATE the Energy Complex even if a release has already started (including Main Assembly Area personnel).

• EVACUATE without performing assembly.

2. NOTIFY Units 1/2 & 4/5 using Attachment 4, Emergency Notification for Units 1/2 & 4/5.

3. ENSURE Nuclear Security coordinates these protective action instructions to all areas of the Energy Complex, per the EC Guide.

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 51 of 85

ENCLOSURE 2 Page 3 of 7 EVACUATION PLANNING GUIDE (Cont'd) 2.0 EVACUATION CONSIDERATIONS

1. IF evacuation is likely, THEN CONSIDER the following measures. UTILIZE Security, other CREC facilities, or local law enforcement agencies (LLEA) as needed.

NOTE: Evacuation of non-essential CREC personnel can be accomplished in 90-165 minutes depending upon onsite population size and weather conditions. "Contra-flow" is the establishment of outbound traffic utilizing both lanes of the access road.

CREC Worker Evacuation Times Evacuation Times Vehicles (Low) (High)

(Day Shift) (good weather (adverse weather w/contra-flow) w/o contra-flow)

Normal operations (all units) Up to -850 -90 minutes -110 minutes Typical Unit 3 refuel outage Up to -1100 -110 minutes -135 minutes Concurrent CREC outages and/or major Up to -1600 -125 minutes -165 minutes projects, etc.

• SUSPEND inbound traffic of non-essential personnel.

• SUSPEND inbound and outbound train traffic by calling (407) 880-8500

• SUSPEND barge traffic in the intake canal by calling (352) 302-2189.

• IMPLEMENT a staggered evacuation sequence of CREC facilities to reduce traffic congestion.

OPEN the exit lane vehicle barrier at the Access Control Point.

CAUTION Contra-flow should not be established if buses are used to evacuate personnel or if emergency vehicles are required onsite ESTABLISH contra-flow (outbound traffic utilizing both lanes of the access road) if practicable in the following order:

a) From the North Access Road east to US Highway 19 b) From the southeast corner of the main CR3 parking lot (3-way intersection) east to US Highway 19 EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 52 of 85

ENCLOSURE 2 Page 4 of 7 EVACUATION PLANNING GUIDE (Cont'd) 2.0 EVACUATION CONSIDERATIONS (Cont'd)

• IF buses are in use but inadequate to evacuate contractor personnel, THEN IMPLEMENT car-pooling to transport them to the bus staging area.

EVACUATE non-essential CR3 personnel directly from Local Assembly Areas, bypassing the Main Assembly Area. Essential personnel can report to the Main Assembly Area if deemed appropriate.

ESTABLISH traffic control points at the following intersections (in order of priority):

a) US Highway 19 and Power Line Road b) Power Line Road and the North Access Road c) Power Line Road and the southeast corner of the main CR3 parking lot (3-way intersection) d) Power Line Road and North Tallahassee Road I EM-202 I Rev. 102 _ Page 53 of 85

ENCLOSURE 2 Page 5 of 7 EVACUATION PLANNING GUIDE (Cont'd) 3.0 WIND DIRECTION DATA DIRECTION DEGREES AFFECTED'.

N 349-11 (349-371) HJ K NNE 12-33 (372-393) J KL NE 34-56 (394-416) KL M ENE 57-78 (417-438) LMN E 79-101 (439-461) MNP ESE 102-123 (462-483) NPQ SE 124-146 (484-506) PQR SSE 147-168 (507-528) QRA S 169-191 (529-540) RA B SSW 192-213 A BC SW 214-236 BC D WSW 237-258 C DE W 259-281 DE F WNW 282-303 EFG NW 304-326 FGH NNW 327-348 G HJ EM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 54 of 85

ENCLOSURE 2 Page 6 of 7 EVACUATION PLANNING GUIDE (Cont'd) 4.0 CONTACTS FOR PERSONNEL ASSEMBLY SECTOR AREA CONTACT A Units 4 & 5 Units 4 & 5 Control Room B/C Nuclear Administration Building Public Address System B/C North Coal Yard Units 4 & 5 Control Room D/E CR3 Warehouse Area Nuclear Security Site Administration Building D/ E Mariculture Center Nuclear Security E / F /G / H Coal Train Yard Units 4 & 5 Control Room J/K/L South Coal Yard Units 1 & 2 Control Room N Units 1 & 2 Units 1 & 2 Control Room N Security Training Building Nuclear Security EM-202 Rev. 102 1 Page 55 of 85

EVACUATION PLANNING GUIDE (Cont'd) ENCLOSURE 2 Page 7 of 7 82 OTSG RVCH STORAGE STORAGE I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 56 of 85

ENCLOSURE 3 Page 1 of 3 GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NON-ESSENTIAL ENERGY COMPLEX PERSONNEL AND GENERAL POPULATION

[NOCS 1128, 1592]

PLANT CONDITioiNs / OFFSiTE DosE ESTIMATES RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

1. CONDITION:

GENERAL EMERGENCY DECLARED. Evacuate Zone I NO APPARENT CORE DAMAGE. (See Notes 1 and 2)

Note 1:

CORE DAMAGE INDICATIONS: Relocate/evacuate population in any zone affected by

a. RCS pressure vs. temperature in Region 1 or 2 ground contamination after plume passage.

(REFER TO EOP-07); or

b. RM-G29/30 reading < 100 R/hr; or

c. RCS chemistry results. Relocate/evacuate population in Zones 2 & 3 at any time projected dose from actual release is > 1.0 REM TEDE or 5.0 REM Thyroid CDE in either zone.

Note 2:

Sheltering should be recommended for the following conditions for those areas that cannot be evacuated before plume arrival:

" Core damage is in progress and,

" Containment failure or a controlled release is imminent and,

" The release duration is known to be less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Known impediments to evacuation should also be considered in the decision to evacuate or shelter.

CONSIDER issuance of Potassium Iodide (KI).

2. CONDITION:

GENERAL EMERGENCY DECLARED. Evacuate Zone 1 CLAD DAMAGEIGAS GAP RELEASE (NO CORE MELT). (See Note 2)

Note 2:

CORE DAMAGE INDICATIONS:

Sheltering should be recommended for the following

a. RCS pressure vs. temperature in Region 3 (REFER TO EOP-07); or conditions for those areas that cannot be evacuated before

b. Core uncovered for 15-30 minutes; or plume arrival:

c. RM-G29/30 reading of 100-75,000 R/hr (RB spray " Core damage is in progress and, off) OR 100-25,000 R/hr (RB spray on); or " Containment failure or a controlled release is imminent

d. RCS chemistry results. and, OR: " The release duration is known to be less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

• Dose at the 0.83 mile Site Boundary is projected to be: Known impediments to evacuation should also be a) TEDE:  ? 1.0 Rem considered in the decision to evacuate or shelter.

b) Thyroid CDE: '- 5.0 Rem Shelter Zones 2 & 3 (See Note 1)

• PARs within the first hour of an event should be based Note 1:

on PLANT CONDITIONS ONLY until the Dose Relocate/evacuate population in any zone affected by Assessment Team is operational. ground contamination after plume passage.

Relocate/evacuate population in Zones 2 & 3 at any time projected dose from actual release is > 1.0 REM TEDE or 5.0 REM Thyroid CDE in either zone.

CONSIDER issuance of Potassium Iodide (KI).

(Continued on next page)

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 57 of 85 1

ENCLOSURE 3 Page 2 of 3 GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NON-ESSENTIAL ENERGY COMPLEX PERSONNEL AND GENERAL POPULATION

[NOCS 1128, 1592]

PLANT CONDITIONS / OFFSITE DOSE ESTIMATES RECOMMENDED ACTIONS*

3. CONDITION:

GENERAL EMERGENCY DECLARED. Evacuate Zone I CORE MELT OCCURRING OR LIKELY. (See Note 2)

Note 2:

CORE DAMAGE INDICATIONS: Sheltering should be recommended for the following

a. RCS pressure vs. temperature in the Severe Accident conditions for those areas that cannot be evacuated before Region (REFER TO EOP-07); or plume arrival:

b. Core uncovered for > 30 minutes; or " Core damage is in progress and,

c. RM-G29/30 reading > 75,000 R/hr (RB spray off) or > 25,000 R/hr (RB spray on). " Containment failure or a controlled release is imminent WITH: and, NO projected containment failure and NO release " The release duration is known to be less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

underway. Known impediments to evacuation should also be considered in the decision to evacuate or shelter.

Shelter Zones 2 & 3 (See Note 1)

Note 1:

Relocate/evacuate population in any zone affected by ground contamination after plume passage.

Relocate/evacuate population in Zones 2 & 3 at any time projected dose from actual release is > 1.0 REM TEDE or 5.0 REM Thyroid CDE in either zone.

CONSIDER issuance of Potassium Iodide (KI).

4. CONDITION:

GENERAL EMERGENCY DECLARED. Evacuate Zones I and 2 and 3 CORE MELT OCCURRING OR LIKELY. (See Notes 2 and 3)

Note 2:

CORE DAMAGE INDICATIONS: Sheltering should be recommended for the following

a. RCS pressure vs. temperature in the Severe Accident conditions for those areas that cannot be evacuated before Region (REFER TO EOP-07); or plume arrival:

b. Core uncovered for > 30 minutes; or " Core damage is in progress and,

c. RM-G29/30 reading > 75,000 RPhr (RB spray off) " Containment failure or a controlled release is imminent or > 25,000 R/hr (RB spray on). and, WITH: " The release duration is known to be less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Projected containment failure and/or release underway.

Known impediments to evacuation should also be considered in the decision to evacuate or shelter.

Note 3:

IF projected dose from an actual release is >1.0 REM TEDE or 5.0 REM Thyroid beyond 10 miles, THEN RECOMMEND evacuation to State and Local government by distance in miles, OR by subdivision and geographic boundaries.

CONSIDER issuance of Potassium Iodide (KI).

ZONE DESCRIPTIONS EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES:

Represents the longest elapsed time required for 90% of the population within a Region to evacuate from that Region, including consideration of mobilization times, time of year, week and day; weather conditions; and of estimated shadow evacuations from other regions within the EPZ and from the Shadow Region.

The times noted below, do not consider Special Event or Roadway Impact scenarios included in development of the Evacuation Time Estimates.

Zone 1: 0-5 miles 360 degrees and out to 10 miles in Gulf Zone 1:

2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, 15 minutes (Refer to Table 7-1, Crystal River Nuclear Plant Development of Evacuation Time Estimates, Revision 1, dated November 2012)

Zones 2 / 3: 5-10 miles in Citrus & Levy Counties Zones 1, 2, and 3:

2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, 30 minutes (Refer to Table 7-1, Crystal River Nuclear Plant Development of Evacuation Time Estimates, Revision 1, dated November 2012)

EM-202 Rev. 102 1 Page 58 of 85

ENCLOSURE 3 Page 3 of 3 GUIDELINES FOR PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NON-ESSENTIAL ENERGY COMPLEX PERSONNEL AND GENERAL POPULATION GUIDELINES FOR PE EMERGENCY WORKER EXPOSURE DOSE LIMIT CONDITION (REM TEDE) GUIDANCE

1. Emergency conditions 5 Emergency worker exposure should NOT requiring actions to NOT exceed 5 REM TEDE.

prevent serious injury or protect valuable property.

2. Emergency conditions 10 Exposure greater than 5 REM TEDE requiring actions to should receive approval of the prevent serious injury or Emergency Coordinator. Appropriate protect valuable property. controls for emergency workers include time limitations and respirators.

3. Emergency conditions 25 Exposure greater than 5 REM TEDE requiring lifesaving should receive approval of the actions or actions to Emergency Coordinator. Appropriate protect large populations. controls for emergency workers include time limitations, respirators, and thyroid blocking.

4. Emergency conditions > 25 Exposure greater than 5 REM TEDE requiring lifesaving receive approval of the Emergency actions or actions to Coordinator. Exposure at this level protect large populations. should be to volunteers who are healthy, above the age of 45, have an understanding of the health risks involved, and, preferably, be those whose normal duties have trained them for such missions. Appropriate controls for emergency workers include time limitations, respirators, and thyroid blocking.

NOTE: Reference for this table is Table 2.2 in the Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (EPA 400-R/92-001).

NOTE: The dose limits listed above are in addition to any annual occupational dose already received.

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 59 of 85

ENCLOSURE 4 Page 1 of 2 EAL DESCRIPTIONS FOR FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM 1.1 Release of aaseous radioactivitv exceeds the Unusual Event threshold 1.2 Release of gaseous radioactivity exceeds the Alert threshold 1.3 Site boundary dose from airborne radioactivity > 100 mREM total dose or 500 mREM thyroid

• dose 1.4 Site boundary dose from airborne radioactivity > 1000 mREM total dose or 5000 mREM thyroid dose ABNORMAL 1.5 Release of liquid radioactivity exceeds the Unusual Event threshold RADIATION LEVELS I 1.6 Release of liquid radioactivity exceeds the Alert threshold RADIOLOGICAL 1.7 Unexpected increase in radiation levels within the Plant NOT impeding necessary access to EFFLUENTS , Plant systems 1.8 Unexpected increase in radiation levels within the Plant impeding necessary access to Plant systems 1.9 An uncontrolled water level decrease in spent fuel pool or fuel transfer canal with fuel remaining covered 1.10 Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level resulting in uncovering irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel

• -4.

2.1 Earthauake detected bv seismic instrumentation and sensed by Control Room personnel 2.2 Earthquake at a magnitude greater than the limit for continued Plant operation 2.3 Flooding due to natural phenomena NOT affecting Plant vital equipment 2.4 Flooding due to natural phenomena affecting Plant vital equipment 2.5 The Plant is within a Hurricane Warning area 2.6 Tornado within the Protected Area 2.7 Tornado or High Winds or windborne object(s) strike within Protected Area and results in significant damage to structures or equipment 2.8 Accidental Aircraft or vehicle crash within the Protected Area damaging vital structures or equipment 2.9 Accidental Aircraft or vehicle strikes Plant and results in significant damage to structures or equipment 2.10 Toxic or flammable gases within or potentially affecting the Protected Area 2.11 Toxic or flammable gases within the Plant affecting the safe operation of the Plant or the ability to shutdown the Plant 2.12 Explosion or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment within the Protected Area NATURAL / MAN-MADE 2.13 Explosion or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment resulting in damage to vital structures HAZARDS AND EC or equipment JUDGMENT. 2.14 Fire within the Protected Area that could affect Plant vital equipment 2.15 Fire affecting the operability of Plant vital equipment 2.16 Evacuation of Control Room is required and Plant control is established 2.17 Evacuation of Control Room is required and Plant control CANNOT be established 2.18 Security Event which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the Plant 2.19 Security Event in the Owner Controlled Area 2.20 Security Event in the Protected Area 2.21 Security Event resulting in loss of physical control of the facility to intruders.

2.22 Internal flooding affecting areas containing Plant vital equipment 2.23 Internal flooding affecting Plant vital equipment 2.24 Conditions exist indicating a potential degradation of the level of safety of the Plant 2.25 Conditions exist indicating potential or actual substantial degradation of the level of safety of the Plant 2.26 Conditions exist indicating actual or likely major failures of Plant functions needed for the protection of the public 2.27 Actual or imminent substantial core deqradation with potential loss of containment inteqrity IEM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 60 of 851

ENCLOSURE 4 Page 2 of 2 EAL DESCRIPTIONS FOR FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM (Continued)

Y-Y 3.1 Unplanned loss of all in-Plant or all offsite communication capability 3.2 Failure of instrumentation to complete an automatic reactor shutdown when required and manual reactor shutdown was successful 3.3 Failure of instrumentation to complete an automatic reactor shutdown when required and manual reactor shutdown was NOT successful 3.4 Failure to complete an automatic reactor shutdown and manual reactor shutdown was NOT successful with indications of an extreme challenge of the ability to cool the Reactor core 3.5 Inability to shutdown the Plant to comply with Technical Specification limits 3.6 Unplanned loss of Control Room alarms 3.7 Unplanned loss of Control Room alarms with a significant Plant status change in progress SYSTEM 3.8 Inability to monitor a significant Plant status change in progress MALFUNCTION 3.9 Chemistry sample indicates fuel clad degradation 3.10 Turbine failure results in casing penetration or damage to main generator seals 3.11 Turbine failure generated projectiles cause significant damage to Plant structures or vital equipment 3.12 Reactor Coolant System leakage 3.13 Complete loss of core heat removal capability 3.14 Inadvertent Plant startup 3.15 Complete loss of core cooling functions during refueling and cold shutdown conditions 3.16 Loss of water level in the reactor vessel resulting in uncovering fuel 4.1 Loss of Plant electrical power from all offsite sources S

4.2 AC power capability reduced to a single source 4.3 Loss of all AC power LOSS OF POWER 4.4 Loss of all AC power for greater than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />

" 4.5 Loss of all AC power during Cold Shutdown or Refueling conditions

,. 4.6 Loss of all vital Plant batteries during operationalconditions

_ ."_.. __....... " " " '*; 4.7 Loss of all vital Plant batteries during shutdown conditions 5.1 Loss of Fuel Clad 5.2 Potential Loss of Fuel Clad FISSION PRODUCT 6.1 Loss of Reactor Coolant System BAiRRIERS 6.2 Potential Loss of Reactor Coolant System 7.1 Loss of Containment

_.___,_.. __,. '. 7.2 Potential Loss of Containment I EM-202 I Rev. 102 - Page 61 of 851

ENCLOSURE 5 Page 1 of 2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY ACTIVATION SCENARIOS

[NOCS 100521, 100533]

Scenario Scenario Title Applicability No.

Notification Error Retraction of any activation message sent in error 2 Unusual Event - ERO Standby Unusual Event declared. Notify ERO to assume a heightened state of awareness in anticipation of emergency escalation.

3 Discretionary - TSC/OSC At the discretion of the Emergency Coordinator, activate the following facilities:

" Technical Support Center

• Operational Support Center 4 Discretionary - At the discretion of the Emergency TSC/OSC/EOF/ENC Coordinator, activate the following facilities:

" Technical Support Center

" Operational Support Center

" Emergency Operations Facility

" Emergency News Center 5 _Alert declared. Activate the following NOTE: Refer to Scenario 8 if facilities:

activation of remote 0 Technical Support Center facilities is required. 0 Operational Support Center Alert

• Emergency Operations Facility

• Emergency News Center 6 _Site Area Emergency declared. Activate NOTE: Refer to Scenario 9 if the following facilities:

activation of remote

• Technical Support Center facilities is required. 0 Operational Support Center

• Emergency Operations Facility Site Area Emergency

• Emergency News Center I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 62 of 85

ENCLOSURE 5 Page 2 of 2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY ACTIVATION SCENARIOS

[NOCS 100521, 100533]

Scenario Scenario Title Applicability No.

7 _General Emergency declared. Activate the NOTE: Refer to Scenario 10 if following facilities:

activation of remote 0 Technical Support Center facilities is required. 0 Operational Support Center 0 Emergency Operations Facility General Emergency 0 Emergency News Center 8 Alert (Remote Facilities) Alert declared. Activate the following facilities:

• Remote Technical Support Center

" Remote Operational Support Center

• Emergency Operations Facility

• Emergency News Center 9 Site Area Emergency Site Area Emergency declared. Activate (Remote Facilities) the following facilities:

• Remote Technical Support Center

" Remote Operational Support Center

" Emergency Operations Facility

" Emergency News Center 10 General Emergency General Emergency declared. Activate the (Remote Facilities) following facilities:

" Remote Technical Support Center

" Remote Operational Support Center

" Emergency Operations Facility

" Emergency News Center 11 Fire Brigade Support to SAB Event requiring off-shift Fire Brigade support to report to the Site Admin Building. (Example: Large-area fire) 12 Fire Brigade Support to EOF Event requiring off-shift Fire Brigade support to report to the Emergency Operations Facility. (Example: Large-area fire) 13 Event Termination Plant conditions no longer require ERO to stand by or to report as determined by Emergency Coordinator or EOF Director.

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 63 of 85

ENCLOSURE 6 Page 1 of 1 COMMUNICATION WITH NRC MANAGEMENT DURING AN EVENT Communication with the NRC Executive Team Director During an incident that is serious enough to potentially require onsite or offsite protective actions, or that involves a significant security event, it is likely that the NRC Executive Team (ET) Director (NRC Chairman or designated Commissioner) will desire to speak periodically with the licensee's management representative.

The ET Director receives information from the NRC staff responding to the incident. However, the ET Director may wish to receive a periodic executive summary from the licensee's management representative before passing it on to other stakeholders such as other Federal agencies, Congress, or the White House. Generally, it is not necessary for the ET Director to be briefed on the detailed sequence of events, but rather on key issues for which the NRC may be able to provide assistance.

Some questions that the ET Director is likely to ask include:

• What are the licensee's current top priorities for the station?

• Are their significant uncertainties about any aspect of the event (e.g., is the situation improving or degrading)?

" Does the licensee need help from the NRC or other Federal agencies?

• Is the licensee having any communication or staffing problems?

The primary responsibilities of the licensee during an event is to mitigate the accident, secure the facility, classify the event, and make notification and protective action recommendations to State and local officials. Meeting those primary responsibilities takes precedence over discussions with ET Director regarding the event. If taking time to talk to the ET Director would interfere with those primary responsibilities, the NRC expects that the licensee's designated manager will direct a subordinate to take the call. If this is not feasible, the NRC will inform the licensee when the ET Director would subsequently like to speak with the licensee's designated representative.

Communication of Security-Related Information The Security Bridge is placed on the same conferencing system that hosts other NRC communications bridges such as the Emergency Notification System and the Health Physics Network. During a security-related incident, the NRC Safeguards Team will continuously monitor the Security Bridge so that the licensee can readily re-establish communication for situational updates or for other important security-related communications. Following the initial discussions and evaluation, the Safeguards Team will coordinate periodic, scheduled update conversations so that licensee personnel can return to other essential duties between scheduled updates to the NRC.

The Security Bridge is recorded, but it is not a secure line and is not approved for routine discussions involving classified or Safeguards Information (SGI). The NRC Resident Inspector's secure telephone should be used for discussing and transmitting such information unless extraordinary conditions exist, such as an ongoing attack.

The type of information of interest to the Safeguards Team includes:

" Has the facility sustained significant damage (including the central and secondary alarm stations), damage to the physical security features or security force, or loss of licensed materials?

" What are the sources and status of offsite emergency assistance (e.g., local law enforcement, State, Federal (especially Federal Bureau of Investigation), National Guard)?

" Is additional Federal assistance required (e.g., personnel, material, communications)?

" What compensatory measures have been implemented (e.g., temporary barriers, relocation of responders)?

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 64 of 851

ATTACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 1 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM

1. THIS IS CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3. A. [] This Is A Drill B. El This Is An Emergency ENSURE: Ei STATE El CITRUS F] LEVY El RADIATION CONTROL-ORLANDO (M-F ONLY) ARE ON LINE.

I HAVE A(N) E] UNUSUAL EVENT El ALERT El SITE AREA EMERGENCY El GENERAL EMERGENCY MESSAGE.

2. A. Date: / I B. Contact Time: i C. Reported By: (Name)

D. Message Number: E. Reported From: El Control Room El TSC E] EOF F. Fl Initial I New Classification OR E1 Update

3. SITE: A. CRUNIT3 B.D[]SLUNIT1 C.DSLUNIT2 D.D]TPUNIT3 E.[l]TPUNIT4 I4. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION: A. ] Notification Of Unusual Event B. E Alert C. El Site Area Emergency D. El General Emergency

5. A. E] EMERGENCY DECLARATION: B. E] EMERGENCY TERMINATION: Date: I Time: _

6. REASON FOR EMERGENCY DECLARATION: A. El EAL Number(s): OR B. []

Description:

7. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION OR UPDATE: A. E] None OR B. []

Description:

8. WEATHER DATA: A. Wind direction from _ degrees B. Downwind Sectors affected

9. RELEASE STATUS: A. E] None (Go to Item 11) B. El In Progress C. [] Has occurred, but stopped (Go to Item 11)

10. RELEASE SIGNIFICANCE CATEGORY: (at the Site Boundary)

A. El Under evaluation B. El Release is within Normal Operating Limits C. E] Non-Significant (Fraction of PAG Range) D. El Protective Action Guide range E. El Liquid release (no actions required)

11. UTILITY RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR THE PUBLIC:

A. El No utility recommended actions at this time. B. E] Utility recommends the following protective actions:

EVACUATE ZONES:

SHELTER ZONES:

AND consider issuance of Potassium Iodide (KI).

If form is completed in the Control Room, go to item 15. If completed in the TSC or EOF, CONTINUE with item 12.

12. PLANT CONDITIONS:

A. Reactor Shutdown? El YES [] NO B. Core Adequately Cooled? El YES El NO C. Containment Intact? El YES [I NO D. Core Condition: El Stable El Degrading

13. WEATHER DATA: A. Wind Speed MPH (m/sec x 2.24 = MPH) B. Stability Class

14. ADDITIONAL RELEASE INFORMATION: A. El Not Applicable (Go to Item 15)

Distance Projected Thyroid Dose (CDE) for _ Hour(s) Projected Total Dose (TEDE) for _ Hour(s) 1 Mile (Site Boundary) B. mrem C. mrem 2 Miles D. mrem E. mrem 5 Miles F. mrem G. mrem 10 Miles H. mrem I. mrem

15. MESSAGE RECEIVED BY: (Name) Date I I Time THIS IS CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3. E] This Is A Drill El This Is An Emergency END OF MESSAGE.

El Form FAXED EC I EOFD INITIALS:

EM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 65 of 85

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 1 of 12 CONDENSED INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF THE FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM (FOR CONTROL ROOM USE ONLY)

The purpose of these instructions is to provide succinct guidance for the completion of the Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form in the Control Room only. Its use assumes that the user is familiar with the form and the more detailed instructions found elsewhere in Attachment 2 and will refer to those instructions if needed.

Item 1 - CHECK "This is a Drill" OR "This is an Emergency" as appropriate. CHECK the applicable classification box.

Item 2.A - ENTER today's date.

Item 2.B - ENTER time of contact with SWO, Citrus County, and Levy County.

Item 2.C - ENTER name of person making notification. Typically, this is the CNO or the SM.

Item 2.D - ENTER the sequential message number.

Item 2.E - CHECK "Control Room".

Item 2.F - CHECK "Initial / New Classification" unless the notification is for the update of an existing classification. IF this is an update notification, THEN CHECK "Update".

Item 3 - No action. Pre-selected for CR3.

Item 4 - CHECK the emergency classification being declared.

Item 5 - CHECK "Emergency Declaration" and ENTER the date and time of the declaration. IF terminating an emergency, THEN REFER to detailed guidance in Attachment 2.

Item 6.A - ENTER the applicable EAL number(s).

Item 6.B - Not needed when contacting SWO. May be used when notifying NRC via ENS.

Item 7.A - IF no additional information or update is needed, THEN CHECK "None" Item 7.B - CHECK "Description" to provide additional information. Examples include:

" Conditions briefly warranting a higher classification but no longer exist.

" Conditions independently warranting a lower or equal classification. An example would be a fire in the Protected Area during a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency.

Item 8.A - ENTER 33' wind direction from the primary tower IF available. Alternate sources are the 175' primary tower and the 33' alternate tower.

Item 8.B - ENTER a minimum of 3 downwind sectors from the table below:

"btEGRfEE: SECTORS DEGREES *SECTORS . DEGREES.*f;, SECTORS&

349-11 (349-371) HJK 102-123 (462-483) N P0Q 214-236 BC D 12-33 (372-393) J KL . 124-146 (484-506) PQ R 237-258 C DE 34-56 (394-416) KLM 147-168 (507-528) Q RA

• 259-281 D EF 57-78 (417-438) L MN 169-191 (529-540) RAB 282-303 EF G 79-101 (439-461) MNP 192-213 A BC 304-326 FGH 327-348 GHJ NOTE: A release is any of the following:

• Exceeding the warning setpoint of an effluent monitor (e.g. RM-A2) as a direct result of the emergency initiating event condition.

• Radioactivity detected by environmental monitoring.

• OTSG tube rupture > 10 gpm with either: (1) prolonged steaming from the affected OTSG, OR (2) an unisolable steam leak outside RB from the affected OTSG.

• Radioactivity escaping unmonitored from the plant.

Item 9.A - IF a release is NOT occurring, THEN CHECK "None" AND GO TO Item 11.

Item 9.B - IF a release is occurring, THEN CHECK "In Progress" AND GO TO Item 10.

Item 9.C - IF a release occurred but has terminated, CHECK "Has occurred, but stopped" AND GO TO Item 11.

Item 10.A - IF core condition or release status cannot be determined, THEN CHECK "Under evaluation".

Item 10.B - IF the release is monitored by RM-A1 or RM-A2 AND the low range gas channel is below its high alarm setpoint, THEN CHECK "Release is within Normal Operating Limits".

Item 10.C - REFER to Attachment 2 for instructions.

Item 10.0- REFER to Attachment 2 for instructions.

Item 10.E - IF a liquid release exceeding limits is occurring, THEN CHECK "Liquid release (no actions required)".

Item 11 .A - IF no protective action recommendations are necessary, THEN CHECK "No utility recommended actions at this time".

Item 11 .B - IF protective action recommendations are necessary, THEN CHECK "Utility recommends the following protective actions:" AND REFER to Enclosure 3.

GO TO Item 15.

Item 15 - ENTER name of person receiving notification and date / time AND CHECK "This is a Drill" OR "This is an Emergency" as appropriate.

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 66 of 85

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 2 of 12 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM ASSOCIATED INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL 1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL

1. When communicating information to State and Risk Counties, ENUNCIATE properly, READ off the information by line number, TRANSMIT numbers digit by digit, AVOID sound alike action statements, SPELL difficult words, as appropriate, USE three word phrases for descriptions / narratives, and do NOT use technical jargon. Be prepared to answer questions from the State and Risk Counties.

2. If the emergency is terminated or reclassified before all contacts are made, or if the emergency is the result of an Emergency Action Level(s) indicating a higher classification that after a brief period is downgraded to a lower classification, PERFORM the following:

• STATE the current emergency classification STATE the highest classification status and when it was achieved STATE the period of time that the higher classification existed and the mitigating conditions that caused the emergency classification to be downgraded.

3. In long-lasting events caused by natural phenomena, regular update notifications to the State and Counties can be suspended or the frequency reduced (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, per shift, etc.) if both the following criteria are met:

State and Risk Counties agree to the suspension or reduction in frequency.

• There is NO significant change in Plant status.

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 67 of 85

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 3 of 12 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM ASSOCIATED INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL 1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL (Cont'd)

4. If during a notification, a change in classification occurs, COMPLETE the current notification in progress and within 15 minutes PROVIDE the State and Risk Counties with an update notification OR PERFORM the following as appropriate.

REFER TO initial notification protocols for when a classification is briefly met:

If a higher classification is met:

• SUSPEND notification of the lower classification.

INFORM off-site agencies to stand-by for classification upgrade.

TRANSMIT the higher classification verbally AND FAX the lower classification form to the agencies.

COMPLETE a new form with the upgraded classification.

• If a lower classification is met:

• COMPLETE the current communication in progress.

INFORM off-site agencies to stand-by for classification downgrade.

5. COMPLETE items 12, 13, and 14 when the EOF is operational. READ the form information as part of the emergency notification.

6. After the EOF Director or designee approves the FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM, any information added to or any changes to existing information requires re-approval before transmittal off-site.

7. To correct an error on the form, DRAW a single line through the error, ENTER the correct information, and initial and date.

8. USE the completion time of the last notification transmittal (Item 15) as the start time of the 60-minute clock for update notifications.

9. If the FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM is used for the initial notification from the Control Room, RECORD the name of the Headquarters Operations Officer and Event Notification Number on Attachment 3, Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet or the Control Room logbook. Do NOT write any NRC-type information on the FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM.

10. IF abbreviations / acronyms are used on the FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM, THEN state what the abbreviation /acronym stand for when verbally communicating to the State and Risk Counties.

EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 68 of 85

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 4 of 12 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM ASSOCIATED INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL 1.0 GENERAL INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL (Cont'd)

11. In the event where situations affect the entire State of Florida (hurricane, terrorist threat, etc.) and multiple notifications are being received at SWO, and the Duty Officer CANNOT take the notification from CR3, PROVIDE at least the emergency classification level and time of declaration and ask for a more suitable time to callback with the remainder of the information. If PARs are being recommended or changed during a similar event, INFORM SWO within 15 minutes of the recommendation or change. Ensure the Risk Counties are provided a separate notification using SHRD or Commercial telephone.

12. When EAL number(s) are used on the form, either have the Duty Officer CONFIRM the paraphrased EAL or state the paraphrased EAL using Enclosure 4 to PROVIDE confirmation of offsite agencies understanding of the event.

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 69 of 85 1

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 5 of 12 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM ASSOCIATED INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL 1.2 Initial Notification [NOCS 100521]

1. NOTIFY State Watch Office. This also notifies Citrus and Levy counties and the Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control (DHBRC)-Orlando. ENSURE offsite agencies are on-line by checking each box as station roll call is completed. If offsite agencies do NOT respond to roll call, separate notifications using Commercial telephones are required to Citrus (746-2555) and Levy County (1-352-486-5212 or 1-352-486-5111 after hours). SWO will contact DHBRC. If information is NOT available, do NOT delay notification to State Watch Office. Item 2.B of the form is the official time for the 15 minute notification time limit and update notifications and is considered completed when the roll call is completed and the emergency classification has been announced. If the roll call cannot be completed due to lack of response from an offsite agency, the classification announcement should not be delayed.

2. USE one of the following communications networks listed by priority:

• STATE Hot Ringdown (SHRD) - Station 120 or 121

• Commercial Telephone System 850-413-9911 or 1-800-320-0519 or 1-850-413-9900

• Florida Emergency Management Network (EMnet)

• Portable Satellite Phone (Located in TSC cabinet ONLY)

3. When making the initial notification of an emergency condition to SWO, REPORT the current emergency classification declared at the time the notification is made. If before initial notification or since the previous notification conditions were briefly met for a higher classification, EXPLAIN in Additional Information or Update section using guidance from item 7 on Attachment 1.

4. Once communications is established with the SWO Duty Officer and the station roll call is complete, READ the message in its entirety, REPEAT information AND ANSWER questions as requested

5. After the notification is completed, FAX the FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM by using Group 1 from the FAX machine.

Group 1 consists of SWO, Citrus County EOC, Levy County EOC, Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control (DHBRC)-Orlando, and Progress Energy Emergency Response Facilities.

I EM-202 Rev. 102 1 Page 70 of 85

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 6 of 12 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL 1.3 Update Notification

1. UPDATE SWO every 60 minutes after initial notification and upgrades of emergency classification.

2. The use of the FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM is required for:

b. Initial notification that an emergency condition exists (Item 4)

c. Any change in emergency classification (Item 4)

d. Any change in Protective Action Recommendations (Item 11)

e. Termination of an emergency classification (Item 5B)

3. Other updated information NOT meeting the above criteria does NOT require the use of the FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM.

4. The 60 minute update notification is still required with a statement there is NO change from last update, unless the SWO agrees to less frequent updates.

5. If the update notification will be delayed because of current Plant conditions and Control Room activities, INFORM the SWO Duty Officer.

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 71 of 85

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 7 of 12 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM ASSOCIATED INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL 2.0 GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETING THE FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM

1. CHECK Item "A" for a drill OR Item "B" for an emergency and the applicable classification box.

NOTE: Items 2.A, 2.A, and 2.C are completed at the time contact is made with the SWO and the Risk Counties.

2. A. ENTER the date (MM/DD/YY) contact is made with the State Watch Office and the Risk Counties.

B. ENTER the time (24-hour clock) contact is made with the State Watch Office and the Risk Counties. This time must be within 15 minutes of Item 5 for initial and upgrade notifications and within 60 minutes of Item 15 from the previous notification message form for update notifications.

C. ENTER the name of the person making the notification.

D. ENTER message number (beginning with #1 and following through sequentially in the TSC and EOF).

E. CHECK the facility location box from which the notification is made. If the notification is made from the Remote TSC, CHECK the TSC box.

F. CHECK whether notification is a new classification or an hourly update when classification or PARs have NOT changed.

3. ENSURE the CR3 box is checked and report to the State Watch Office or the Risk County during notification.

4. CHECK the appropriate emergency classification box corresponding to the current Plant conditions. REFER TO Item 7 guidance for when conditions briefly exist for a higher classification.

5. CHECK Item "A" and ENTER the declaration date (MM/DD/YY) and the time (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> clock) of the current emergency classification. CHECK Item "B" if the emergency is terminated or when the transition from the "Emergency Phase" to the "Recovery Phase" has taken place and ENTER the date (MM/DD/YY) and the time (24-hour clock) of emergency termination. Termination notification messages do NOT require Items 6 through 14 to be completed; however, ENTER the bases for the termination in Item 7. If classifying and terminating an emergency in the same notification message CHECK both Item "A" and Item "B," ENTER the declaration date (MM/DD/YY) and time (24-hour clock) in Item 5 AND COMPLETE Item 6 to PROVIDE EAL information. Items 7 through 14 can be skipped.

I EM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 72 of 85

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 8 of 12 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM ASSOCIATED INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL 2.0 GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETING THE FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM (Cont'd)

CAUTION When completed during a Security threat, the description should NOT contain Safeguards Information.

6. CHECK Item "A" AND ENTER the EAL Number corresponding to the EAL table or EAL Numbers if using the FPB Matrix OR CHECK Item "B" and ENTER a short description of the current event in layman's terms to indicate the accident condition Emergency Action Level (paraphrased) using Enclosure 4 or the status of the Fission Product Barriers used to declare the event (e.g., Loss of Reactor Coolant System Barrier, Potential Loss of Fuel Clad Barrier, etc.) from the FPB Matrix. Each EAL has one number (e.g., 2.13) therefore do NOT use any EAL sub-numbers on the form. When the classification is upgraded, include all applicable FPB EAL numbers, NOT just the EAL number causing the upgrade. Do NOT use the enclosure title (e.g., FPB Matrix, System Malfunction, etc.) as a description of the emergency. This information should remain the same throughout update messages unless there is a classification change. Avoid using Plant-specific acronyms or abbreviations.

CAUTION When completed during a Security threat, the description should NOT contain Safeguards Information.

7. CHECK Item "A" for NO additional information or UPDATE OR CHECK Item "B" and ENTER 1) additional significant events, including if conditions briefly existed for a higher emergency classification but NO longer exist, or 2) conditions that would have independently warranted declaration of an equal or lower classification (e.g., a fire within the Protected Area during a SITE AREA OR GENERAL EMERGENCY).

CONSIDER including emergency response actions underway, any requests for offsite assistance, the bases for termination of the emergency, and facility activation status. AVOID using Plant-specific acronyms or abbreviations. [NOCS 96024].

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 73 of 85

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 9 of 12 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM ASSOCIATED INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL 2.0 GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETING THE FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM (Cont'd)

NOTE: The preferred source of meteorological data is the 33' Primary Tower (MMP-5).

Alternate sources are the 175' Primary Tower and the 33' Alternate Tower (MMP-1).

If the wind direction or wind speed recorders are NOT in service, the appropriate meter may be observed for a brief period (approximately 30 seconds) to obtain an estimate.

8. ENTER the wind direction in degrees in Item "A." ENTER a minimum of 3 downwind sectors from the Sectors Affected table below in Item "B." The downwind sectors confirm wind direction because of potential confusion with degrees "from" versus degrees "to."

Sectors Affected DEGREES SECTORS. DEGREES SECTORS DEGREES SECTORS 349-11 (349-371) HJ K 102-123 (462-483) NP Q 214-236 BC D 12-33 (372-393) J KL 124-146 (484-506) PQR 237-258 CD E 34-56 (394-416) KLM 147-168 (507-528) 0 RA 259-281 DE F 57-78 (417-438) LMN 169-191 (529-540) R AB

• 282-303 E FG 79-101 (439-461) M NP 192-213 AB C 304-326 FG H 327-348 GHJ

9. CHECK Item "A" if there are NO indications of a release and go to Item 11. CHECK Item "B" if a release is occurring, even though it may be less than normal operating limits. CHECK Item "C" if a release has occurred but stopped and go to Item 11.

(REFER TO release definition).

10. CHECK applicable Release Significance Category box based on the table on page 12 of this attachment, OR CHECK Item "E" if it is a liquid effluent release exceeding limits. Ifthe PAG category is selected, INFORM the Emergency Coordinator that EM-202, Enclosure 1, Emergency Classification Table should be consulted for applicable EALs. Item "A" should be selected only if core condition or release status CANNOT be determined.

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 74 of 85

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 10 of 12 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM ASSOCIATED INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL 2.0 GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETING THE FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM (Cont'd)

11. CHECK Item "A" if NO Protective Actions Recommendations (PARs) are necessary.

IF Item "A" is checked, do NOT check Item "B" as this is a protective action recommendation. CHECK Item "B" if PARs are necessary AND ENTER the Zone designation(s) for evacuation and shelter. If Item A is checked, Item B does NOT need completing.

NOTES: 1. If the form is completed in the Main Control Room, completion of Items 12-14 is not required. If the form is completed in the TSC, completion of Items 12-15 is required.

2. The Accident Assessment Coordinator PROVIDES information for Item 12 for all classification levels OR this information (A, B, and C) may be obtained from the Critical Safety Function Status Board.

12. CHECK the appropriate status boxes for Item "A" Reactor Shutdown, Item "B" Core Adequately Cooled, Item "C" Containment Intact, and "D" Core Condition based on current Plant conditions.

The Radiation Controls Coordinator PROVIDES information for Item 13 for all classification levels. This item information may be obtained from a current dose assessment printout or the status board.

13. ENTER the wind speed in mph (mph = m/sec x 2.24) in Item "A." ENTER the Stability Class in Item "B" based on the Sigma Theta, Wind Range, or Delta T from table below.

Stability Class Determination iSigmaTheta Wifd'Range Delta T (Degrees) Stability Class (Degrees)., (Degrees)

> 22.5 > 135 < -1.46 A (Most Dispersed Plume)

< 22.5 to 17.5 134 to 105 -1.45 to -1.31 B

< 17.5 to 12.5 104 to 75 -1.30 to -1.16 C

< 12.5 to 7.5 74 to 45 -1.15 to -0.39 D

< 7.5 to 3.8 44 to 23 -0.38 to 1.15 E

< 3.8 to 2.1 22 to 13 1.16 to 3.07 F

< 2.1 < 12 > 3.08 G (most concentrated plume)

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 75 of 85

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 11 of 12 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM ASSOCIATED INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL 2.0 GUIDANCE FOR COMPLETING THE FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM (Cont'd)

NOTE: The Radiation Controls Coordinator only completes Item 14 if a release is occurring or occurred, but stopped. Otherwise, this item may be "N/A." This item information may be obtained from a current dose assessment printout or the status board.

14. CHECK Item "A" (NOT Applicable) if no release AND GO TO Item 15. If a RASCAL dose projection is available, ENTER the calculation duration in the blanks in the headings of the CDE and TEDE columns (normally 6 hrs.). ENTER the projected thyroid (CDE) and Total Dose (TEDE) for each distance location in Items "B through i si.

SNOTE: Item 15 is completed after the message has been read to the offsite agencies.

15. ENTER the name of the SWO Duty Officer or individual receiving the notification.

ENTER the date (MM/DD/YY) and time (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> clock) provided by the SWO Duty Officer or individual receiving the notification.

CHECK the Form FAXED box when the action (FAX, email, copies distributed to positions, etc.) is completed.

ENSURE the Emergency Coordinator initials the Form before it is communicated to the SWO.

I EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 76 of 85

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 12 of 12 FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM ASSOCIATED INFORMATION AND PROTOCOL 3.0 RELEASE SIGNIFICANCE CATEGORIES RELEASE . RELEASE SIGNIFICANCE MFLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT STATUS

• _______..__ CATEGORY

_______________jFORM EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION REFERENCE*

NO release NR 9.A I<NOL NS j 10.B 10.C Release inprogress The Release Significance Category in CR3's permanently defueled condition is limited to No Release (NR), Less Than Normal Operating Limits (<NOL) and Non-Significant (NS). RASCAL projections show fuel damaged underwater is insufficient to cause a release that would approach Protective Action Guideline (PAG) levels. Additionally, calculation F13-0002 concludes that the surface temperature of the cladding in the spent fuel pools will not exceed the failure temperature for zirconium following a total loss of water from the pools. Calculation N1 3-0002 conclusion notes doses for hypothetical cladding failure releases from the spent fuel pools that are well under PAG levels and gamma shine dose rates at the Exclusion Area Boundary from drained pools that are at or below detectable limits for typical Health Physics instrumentation.

NR: NO RELEASE This category indicates NO release is occurring. This category is appropriate regardless of fuel status, if there are NO indications of a release (e.g., unexplained abnormal radiation levels in Auxiliary Building, on the berm, or in the field).

If a release occurred but has now stopped, MAINTAIN the appropriate category below until field doses have dissipated.

<NOL: RELEASE WITHIN NORMAL OPERATING LIMITS (ITS/ODCM)

This category indicates releases that are monitored by RM-A1 or RM-A2. These releases are within normal operating limits if the normal-range is below its high alarm set-point. Do NOT make this selection for releases NOT monitored by RM-A1 or RM-A2 unless they have been evaluated per the ODCM.

NS: NON-SIGNIFICANT (FRACTION OF PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDELINE VALUES)

This category indicates releases exceeding the RM-A1 or RM-A2 high alarm set-point or releases that are unmonitored.

PAG: AT OR NEAR PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDELINE VALUES This category is no longer applicable at CR-3.

EM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 77 of 85

ATTACHMENT 3 Page 1 of 4 REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET NRC FORM 361 REACTOR PLANT (12-2000) EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET NRC OPS CENTER COMMUNICATOR EN #

1) Use ENS phone sticker numberfor NRC direct. IF ENS IS OUT OF SERVICE, use 2) Commercial 1-301-816-5100 or 1-301-951-0550 or 1-301-415-0550 or 1-301-415-0553 NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK:

CRYSTAL RIVER CRYSTI L33OrRIER ENS# # 700-821-0027 1-352-795-6958 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER I MODE BEFORE POWER / MODE AFTER

• EVENT-CLASIFICATIONSW- I-HOUR NON-EMERGENCY 50.72 (b)(1) El (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability El GENERAL EMERGENCY El TS Deviation 0l (v)(B) RHR Capability El SITE AREA EMERGENCY :4-HOUR NON-EMERGENCY 50.. (b)(2) El (v)(C) Control of Radiological Release 0l ALERT 0l (i) TS Required S/D El (v)(D) Accident Mitigation 0l UNUSUAL EVENT El (iv)(A) ECCS Discharge to RCS El (xii) Offsite Medical El 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next El (iv)(B) RPS Actuation El (xiii) Loss Comm/Asmt/Resp column)

El PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) [E (xi) Offsite Notification 60-DAY OPTIONAL 50:73 (a)(1) . , ,

El MATERIAL/EXPOSURE (20.2202) 8-HOUR NONWEMERGENCY 501.2(§)(3). El Invalid Specified System Actuation El FITNESS FOR DUTY El (ii)(A) Degraded Condition 'Other.Unsibecified Requirement (Identify) . .

EOTHER UNSPECIFIED REOMT (see last column) El (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition El El INFORMATION ONLY [E Specified System Actuation El EVENT DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations & their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on Plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (Continue on back)

NOTIFICATIONS 2 YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR NOT UNDERSTOOD? El YES (Explain above) El NO NRC RESIDENT STATE DID ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTION AS REQUIRED? El YES [E NO (Explain above)

LOCAL OTHER GOVT AGENCIES MODE OF OPERATION ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK UNTIL CORRECTED: RESTART DATE:_ E YES El NO MEDIAJPRESS RELEASE EM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 78 of 85

ATTACHMENT 3 Page 2 of 4 REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (Cont'd)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NOTIFICATION TIME RADIOLOGICALRELEASES. Ceck or FiIljn.Applicable I.tems (specific drtails/explanations should~be6coveredlin bevent description)

El LIQUID RELEASE El GASEOUS RELEASE [I UNPLANNED RELEASE [3 PLANNED RELEASE El ONGOING [I TERMINATED El MONITORED El UNMONITORED 0l OFFSITE RELEASE El TS EXCEEDED El RM ALARMS El AREAS EVACUATED

[I PERSONNEL EXPOSED OR CONTAMINATED [I OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED State release path in description Release Rates/Limi".its Release Rate . %ODCM Limit o... Total Activity.  % ODCM Limit ..

(Fxror DosieA s t Team  ; (Ci/sec)

Noble Gas Iodine Particulate Liquid (excluding tritium & dissolved noble gases)

Liquid (tritium)

Total Activity

.RAD MONITOR'READINGS&;:" W" PlantStack C.ndenserIAlr Ejector: , Main Steam Line Other (List)

_., ___..._. .. __... ___........_"_._' ° (RMA-2) (RMA-,2) (RMG-25,26,27,28)

RAD MONITOR READINGS:

ALARM SETPOINTS:

% ODCM LIMIT (IF APPLICABLE)

RCS ORSG TUBE LEAKS CHECK OR FILL2IN APPLICABLE ITEMS. (SPECIFICDETAILS/EXLANATIONS SHOULD BE COVERED IN EVENTDESCRIPTION) ..*.. .

LOCATION OF THE LEAK (E.G., SG#. VALVE, PIPE. ETC.)

LEAK RATE: UNITS: GPM/GPD T.S. Limits: El Sudden or [I Long Term Development LEAK START DATE: TIME: COOLANT ACTIVITY: PRIMARY __ lCI/ML SECONDARY __ pCI/ML LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL:

EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued from front)

EC INITIALS DATE:

IEM-202 I Rev. 102 1 Page 79 of 85

ATTACHMENT 3 Page 3 of 4 REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (Cont'd)

NRC Operations Center Notification Protocols NOTE: The initial NRC notification may be performed using the information from Items 4 through 7 and Item 11 of the FLORIDA NUCLEAR PLANT EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM, in order to expedite notification from the Control Room. Use the form for subsequent notifications, unless continuous communication is established. Do NOT use EAL number(s) from Item 6 and instead use the paraphrased EAL from Enclosure 4 or provide a status of the Fission Product Barriers.

NOTIFY the NRC as soon as practicable after the State of Florida, but NO later than sixty minutes from declaration of an emergency condition.

NOTE: The NRC automatically records communications on the NRC Event Notification System (ENS).

USE the ENS telephone as primary means of communication and Commercial telephones as secondary means of communication.

The ENS number is located on a sticker affixed to the telephone. The Commercial numbers are located on the REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET.

ENSURE the appropriate sections of the REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET are completed and SM / EC approval has been granted before making the notification.

The communicator making the notification ensures the person receiving the report has an adequate understanding of the event and the related safety significance to ensure appropriate NRC response.

Include insight if known to the following: (information source)

• Is there any change to the classification of the event? If so, what is the reason? (Accident Assessment Coordinator)

• What is the ongoing / imminent damage to the facility, including affected equipment and safety features? (Accident Assessment Coordinator or Repairs Coordinator)

" Have toxic or radiological releases occurred or been projected, including changes in the release rate? If so, what are the projected on-site and off-site releases, and what is the basis of assessment? (Radiation Controls Coordinator)

• What are the health effect / consequences to on-site / off-site people? How many on-site / off-site people are / will be affected and to what extent? (Radiation Controls Coordinator)

" Is the event under control? When was control established or what is the planned action to bring the event under control?

What is the mitigative action underway or planned? (Accident Assessment Coordinator)

• What on-site protective measures have been taken or planned? (Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form)

• What off-site protective actions have been recommended to State / County officials? (Florida Nuclear Plant Emergency Notification Form)

" What is the status of State / County / other Federal agencies responses, if known? (EOF Staff)

" If applicable, what is the status of public information activities, such as siren, broadcast, or press releases? Has the Emergency News Center been activated? (ENC Staff)

RESPOND to any request for additional information that you can answer; otherwise, state that the information is NOT yet available and will be provided in a follow-up message. Any questions asked by the NRC and the associated responses given should be documented in writing and attached to the REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET.

NOTE: For Alert or higher classifications, the Headquarters Operations Officer will be attempting to patch the Region II Administrator and other Region II personnel into the call concurrent with recording your message. You may be interrupted by patch-ins and / or requested to repeat information, and you should comply with these requests. If the Regional Administrator or deputy has NOT been patched in by the time you have completed your message, the Headquarters Operations Officer will probably request additional information.

Upon declaration of an Alert or higher, the NRC Operations Center will most likely request the communicator stay on the line. If the notification originates from the Control Room, tell the NRC you are signing-off ENS. If requested to maintain an open communications line, notify the SM / EC to provide an alternative communicator or take other action.

REPORT any lower classification(s) declared before the initial notification to ensure the NRC is aware of previous Plant conditions and implementation of the E-Plan.

Upon arrival of the NRC Site Response Team and with the concurrence of or at the request of the Headquarters Operations Officer, face-to-face communication begins between the PE NRC Liaison and the lead NRC representative at the TSC. This information includes emergency classification changes, Protective Action Recommendations changes, and the non-emergency reporting requirements including invoking 10CFR50.54 (x) (y).

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 80 of 85

ATTACHMENT 3 Page 4 of 4 REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET (Cont'd)

Guidance for Completing the Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet If an open communications channel is established, routine use of the form is NOT required, provided that verified changes in Plant / equipment status are communicated to the NRC verbally and a summary of the communications with the NRC is maintained in the log.

NOTE: The following items are completed at the time of the notification.

• Print the first and last name of the Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) in the NRC Operations Center Communicator space provided.

• Print the Event Notification number (EN #) provided by the HOO in the space provided.

• Enter the notification time (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> clock) provided by the HOO when communication is established.

" Provide the Call Back numbers as applicable.

NOTE: The following items are completed before the notification.

" Enter the first and last name of the person making the notification in the "Name of Caller" space.

" Enter the "Event Time and Zone (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> clock and Eastern Time)," "Event Date (MM/DD/YY)," "Power / Mode Before," and "Power / Mode After."

" Enter the "Mode of Operation Until Corrected (numeric)" and "Estimated Restart Date (MM/DD/YY)" at the bottom of page 1.

Event Classifications Section 0 Check the applicable block for the current emergency classification.

1-Hour. 4-Hour, and 8-Hour Non-Emergency Sections

• Check all blocks that apply and are separate reportability items from the reason CR3 has declared an emergency condition. The determination of these items is the responsibility of the TSC Accident Assessment Team Operations Support Representative when the TSC is operational.

Event Description Section (additional space is provided on page 2 of form)

" Provide a clear and concise description of the event. Avoid using Plant-specific acronyms or abbreviations.

" Discuss each reportable event, as necessary.

" Report the failure of significant components.

" Include those Plant specific systems or components, which were available to perform the same function as any system or component that failed during the event.

" Include information which will promote understanding of the report, such as any extenuating circumstances (good or bad) or any related generic concerns within the industry.

" If the "Other" block was checked in the Event Classifications Section, provide amplifying information to explain this choice.

Notifications Section

• Check the appropriate box based on the notifications made before the notification to the NRC Operations Center.

All are normally checked "Yes", except "Media / Press Release" for the initial notification.

• "Other Govt Agencies" is Department of Health - Bureau of Radiation Control during a declared emergency.

Questions Posed by the Headquarters Operations Officer Section

" Be prepared to answer these questions based on the event and provide explanations in the "Description" section as applicable.

" Check appropriate box for "Additional Information on Back."

Radioloqical Releases Subsection

• Check or fill-in applicable items based on information from the Radiation Controls Coordinator, logs, SWO notification forms, and status boards and provide specific details / explanations in "Description" section.

RCS or SG Tube Leak Subsection

" Check or fill-in applicable items based on information from the Accident Assessment Coordinator, logs, SWO notification forms, and status boards and provide specific details / explanations in "Description" section.

" After the Emergency Coordinator or designee approves the REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET, any information added to or any changes to existing information requires re-approval before transmittal off-site unless continuous communication is established where the form is NOT required.

• To correct an error on the form, draw a single line through the error, enter the correct information, and initial and date.

• Obtain SM / EC approval of the NRC form before transmittal of the information unless continuous communication is established when the form is NOT required.

EM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 81 of 85

ATTACHMENT 4 Page 1 of 1 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FOR UNITS 1/2 & 4/5 USE Enclosure 2, Evacuation Planning Guide to determine Protective Action Recommendations for Energy Complex personnel. (NONE for Unusual Event or Alert)

Unit 1/2 (extension 2120 or 563-4454) Contact Time Unit 4/5 (extension 8-245-5283 or 352-501-5283) Contact Time GIVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO THE FOSSIL UNITS:

1. Your name and position:

2. State that CR3 is in a(n) [] Emergency FII Drill

3. State CR3 has declared a(n) ] Unusual Event L] Alert L] Site Area Emergency LI General Emergency

4. Briefly explain Plant conditions using basic facts:

5. STATE if conditions are:

F-1 "IMPROVING" (Plant conditions are improving in the direction of a lower emergency classification or termination of the event)

F- "STABLE" (Plant conditions are NOT degrading and the emergency is under control)

F- "DEGRADING" (Plant conditions continue to degrade and it is evident that the situation will worsen or a higher classification is imminent)

6. STATE one of the following based on Plant conditions:

F- "NO RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL HAS BEEN RELEASED."

[I "RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IS BEING RELEASED AT LOW LEVELS" (when N.O fuel is damaged)

FI "RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IS BEING RELEASED."

7. STATE one of the following based on declared emergency:

El (Unusual Event or Alert) "NO ASSEMBLY OR EVACUATION IS NECESSARY AT THIS TIME."

(Unless Security has determined actions are required in a security event.)

El (Site Area Emergency; see Enclosure 2) "BEGIN STANDARD ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY. REFER TO THE CRYSTAL RIVER COAL PLANT SITE ACCOUNTABILITY/EVACUATION MANUAL. ONCE ACCOUNTABILITY IS COMPLETE, NOTIFY CR3 SECURITY AT EXTENSION 3258 OR 795-5078, AND STANDBY FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS."

El (General Emergency, NO release and release NOT likely within 3 hrs; see Enclosure 2) "BEGIN STANDARD ASSEMBLY AND ACCOUNTABILITY. REFER TO THE CRYSTAL RIVER COAL PLANT SITE ACCOUNTABILITY/EVACUATION MANUAL. ONCE ACCOUNTABILITY IS COMPLETE, NOTIFY CR3 SECURITY AT EXTENSION 3258 OR 795-5078, AND EVACUATE NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL.

STANDBY FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTION."

EL (General Emergency, release has occurred or is imminent AND the release duration projected to be less than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />; see Enclosure 2) "ALL PERSONNEL TAKE SHELTER IN CLOSEST BUILDING. STANDBY FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS."

EL (General Emergency, release has occurred or is likely to occur within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> AND the release duration is unknown; see Enclosure 2) "SECURE THE PLANT AND EVACUATE.", "DO NOT PERFORM ASSEMBLY."

8. If time permits and you feel qualified, ask for questions.

9. STATE: "WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED."

EM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 82 of 85

ATTACHMENT 5 Page 1 of 2 INITIATION OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) 1 The ERDS activation application may be launched by one of the following methods:

OPEN the DAE window on the Desktop.

o SELECT the Shortcuts tab.

o TYPE "ERDS" into the search box and CLICK "Search."

o CLICK "ERDS Shortcuts Nuclear CR3 (RUN)."

o CLICK "Run Application." N/AD ((]

OR CLICK the Start Button.

o CLICK "All Programs."

o SELECT "PI System."

o SELECT "PI ProcessBook."

o SELECT "File", "Open."

o Navigate to: P:\Corp\NGG PI Displays\Qualified\CR3_QPIM.PIW o DOUBLE-CLICK to start.

o CLICK the "OPS" tab.

o DOUBLE-CLICK "ERDS Activation." N/A

/A NOTES: 1. The ERDS window will display a series of messages such as "Waiting for Connect" and "Waiting for Accept". Once a connection with the NRC has been established, the message will indicate "Transmitting". If connection is broken ERDS will attempt to reconnect automatically and the same ..... l series of m essages w ill be displayed ...........................................................

2. A "wait" period of approximately one (1) minute is required before an

] .....

ERDS reconnect attem pt will be successful .................................................

3. After ERDS is transmitting data, buttons at the bottom of the activation screen may be used to close the window or transition to the ERDS Data she e t to view the d a ta .................................................................................. ....................

] .....

2. SELECT the "Click to Activate" button on the ERDS Status Control S c re e n .. .................................................................................................................. El

3. SELECT "Yes" to activate ERDS ............................................................................. El EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 83 of 85

ATTACHMENT 5 Page 2 of 2 INITIATION OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE DATA SYSTEM (ERDS) (Cont'd)

NOTE: NCS should be contacted if either the Mode or ERDS Status lights remain yellow for a period exceeding five (5) minutes.

4. VERIFY the following:

a. The light beside the Mode selection transitions from red to green ................

b. The ERDS status transitions to "Transmitting Data" with the initiation time and date stamp with a green indicating light ........................... EL

c. The "Messages Sent" parameter begins to increment within a minute of the transition to the "Transmitting Data" status (indicating data sets are being sent to the NRC.) ......................................... EL

5. IF either Mode or ERDS Status lights remain yellow for a period exceeding 5 minutes, THEN PERFORM the following ............................... N/A EI lI

a. SELECT the "Click to Deactivate" button ...................................................... L]

b. DEC LARE ERDS to be inoperable ............................................................... n

c. NO T IF Y NIT .................................................................................................. El

6. INFORM SM/CRS that the ERDS transmission has been activated ........................

NOTE: Closing the ProcessBook display does NOT terminate the connection with the NRC. Termination will only occur if the NRC disconnects or if the "Click to Deactivate" button on the display is selected.

7. WHEN informed by the NRC that data transmission is no longer required, THEN TERMINATE the connection as follows:

a. IF the NRC Operations Center has terminated the connection, THEN VERIFY that "Disconnected" is displayed in the status win d o w ............................................................................................. N/A D FLI

b. IF CR3 will terminate the connection, THEN PERFORM the fo llow ing: ................................................ .......................................... N/A [ L]

F

1) SELECT the "Click to Deactivate" button ........................................... El

2) SELECT "Yes" to reaffirm ERDS deactivation ...................................

3) VERIFY that "Disconnected" is displayed in the status win d o w. ..............................................................................................

8. INFORM SM/CRS that the ERDS transmission has been te rm in a te d ................................................................................................................

EM-202 I Rev. 102 Page 84 of 85

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES Rev. 102 (PRR 664303)

NOTE Writers and Reviewers: Changes to this procedure may impact EPIPs listed below.

EM-202 EAL Bases Manual Section 3.0 Section 3.1 Enclosure 1 Attachment 1 Ensure DRRs are initiated as needed.

EM-202 Ection CHANGE REASON, REFERENCES Section Revise Definition of OWNER CONTROLLED This corrects the definition of OWNER AREA to read: "The area of land CONTROLLED AREA to agree with the FSAR (approximately 4738 acres ) that is owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by DEF, situated between the mouths of the Withlacoochee and Crystal Rivers and Page 7, bounded to the north by woodlands, to the Step 24 east by Highway 19, to the south by medium to dense woodlands and to the west by marshlands and the Gulf of Mexico. The OWNER CONTROLLED AREA is indicated in Figure 2-3 of the FSAR and encompasses both the PROTECTED AREA and the SITE BOUNDARY."

Delete "Also referred to as the Owner Correct incorrect definition; The OWNER Page 9, Controlled Area" from definition of SITE CONTROLLED AREA and the SITE Step 35 BOUNDARY. BOUNDARY are not the same.

Add new Limit and Precaution: "All This step provides further clarification emergency declarations shall be made within concerning the already existing 15 minute 15 minutes following information becoming requirement to 'assess, classify and delare" EAL available to Control Room personnel that condiabletoContions have rhedanneAl thr l conditions. This addition institutes no new conditions have reached an EAL threshold re u em ns Page 14, New based upon VALID indications, reports or requirements.

Step 3. With conditions. The expectation is that renumbering of emergency classifications are to be made as following steps. soon as conditions are present for the classification, but within 15 minutes in all cases. The 15 minute time period allows adequate time to assess, classify and declare events."

EM-202 Rev. 102 Page 85 of 85

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 PLANT OPERATING MANUAL EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE EM-206 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION NOTIFICATION REVISION 110

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1 .0 P UR PO S E ....................................................................................................................... 3 2 .0 R EF E R E NC E S ................................................................................................................ 3 2.1 Developmental References ............................................................................. 3 3 .0 DE F INIT IO NS .................................................................................................................. 4 4 .0 R E S P O NS IB ILIT IE S ................................................................................................. .. 5 4.1 Emergency Coordinator ................................................................................. 5 4.2 Emergency Preparedness Staff ....................................................................... 5 4 .3 S ecurity P e rsonne l .......................................................................................... . .5 5.0 PREREQUISITES .................................................................................................... 6 6.0 PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND NOTES ............................................................ 6 7.0 SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT ......................................................................... 8 8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ........................................................................................... 8 9 .0 INS T R UC T IO NS ...................................................................................................... 8 9.1 Instructions for Notifying the ERO [R3][R4] ..................................................... 8 9.2 ERO Notification Methods [R3][R4] .................................................................. 9 9.3 ERO Emergency Response Team Rosters [R2] ............................................ 11 9.4 Location of Emergency Rosters and Phone Directories [R2] .......................... 11 9.5 Viewing Individual and Team Qualifications on the PC Screen [R2] ............... 12 9.6 Printing Individual and Team Qualifications [R2] ............................................. 12 1 0 .0 R E C O R D S ..................................................................................................................... 12 ATTACHMENTS 1 CR3 Emergency Notification Scenarios .................................................................. 13 2 ERONS Using a LAN Computer to Activate the ERO ......................................... 15 3 ERONS Using the EverBridge Interactive Voice Response to Activate the ERO...16 4 ERONS Using the Live EverBridge Operator to Activate the ERO ..................... 17 5 ERONS Using the Internet Launch Process to Activate the ERO ...................... 18 6 ERONS Using the IVR Launch Process to Activate the ERO ............................. 19

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES .................................................................................................. 20 EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 2 of 23

1.0 PURPOSE

1. To provide instructions for various methods of notification to Emergency Response Organization (ERO) personnel designated to report to the Technical Support Center / Operational Support Center (TSC/OSC), the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the Emergency News Center (ENC) and as needed, the Remote Technical Support Center (RTSC), during declared Plant emergencies. Methods for notifying Emergency Response Teams are also part of this procedure.

2. To identify locations of the following materials:

• Emergency Response Personnel Roster

• Off-Site Support Directory (Local, State, Federal and Private Sector) 0 Emergency Facility Telephone Directory 0 Violent Weather CommitteeNolunteer phone directory

3. To provide instructions to obtain Emergency Response Team Rosters from the PassPort Personnel Qualification Data system (PQD).

4. This procedure is an Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure. Any revisions must be carefully considered for Emergency Plan impact.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Developmental References

1. 10 CFR 50.47, Emergency Plans

2. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities

3. NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants

4. CR3 Radiological Emergency Response Plan

5. Emergency Planning Staff Guide (EPSG)-025, Maintaining ERO Personnel in Everbridge (ERONS-1)

6. EPSG-026, Maintaining ERO Personnel in CodeRED (ERONS-2)

7. AI-4000, Conduct of Emergency Preparedness and Schedule for Radiological Emergency Response Plan Maintenance

8. [R1] NOCS001954

9. [R2] NOCS009819

10. [R3] NOCS100521

11. [R4] NOCS100533 I EM-206 I Rev. 110 Page 3 of:23]

3.0 DEFINITIONS

1. Activate: To provide notification to ERO personnel of the need to respond to the TSC/OSC, EOF, ENC, or RTSC for staffing and operation.

2. Aware: Notification software application used by EverBridge.

3. ERONS-1: Primary Emergency Response Notification System in use at CR3. The system vendor is EverBridge; a company that hosts the software and website that comprise this system.

4. ERONS-2: Back-up Emergency Response Notification System in use at CR3. The brand name of the product, "CodeRED", which is made available through the company, Emergency Communications Network (ECN), hosts the software through the CodeRED website.

5. Group: Set of defined personnel to be notified.

6. Interactive Voice Response (IVR):An option that can be used in the notification of ERO personnel using EverBridge (ERONS-1). The system provides a series of prompts for an individual to respond to via telephone. Once the responses are validated by EverBridge and the correct emergency notification scenario is provided, the notification will be transmitted as directed.

7. Live EverBridge Operator: An option that can be used in the notification of ERO personnel using EverBridge (ERONS-1). Using a telephone, CR3 requests an EverBridge Operator activate the ERO. The EverBridge Operator will request member identification and scenario information from the CR3 caller to initiate the notification process.

8. Operational: The minimum functions and communication links are established, required equipment is in proper working order, and the TSC Emergency Coordinator or EOF Director has assumed responsibility and authority for the emergency condition.

9. Password Card: Document which contains the site specific member IDs and passwords required to activate the ERO using the EverBridge notification system.

10. Scenario: Collection of message combinations used to notify the ERO. A group of messages sent to the ERO to activate in an emergency.

EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 4 of 23

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Emergency Coordinator

1. The Emergency Coordinator (EC) is responsible for determining:

• When the ERO is to be notified

• Which facilities are to be activated, unless the decision is made by the EOF Director

• The preferred method of notification:

o LAN/Computer o Interactive Voice Response (IVR) o Live EverBridge Operator

• The emergency notification scenario title and number to be provided as part of the notification

2. The EC is responsible for notifying CR3 Security to activate emergency facilities (TSC/OSC, EOF, Remote TSC/OSC, etc.) during the declared emergency condition at CR3. [R3]

4.2 Emergency Preparedness Staff

1. The Emergency Preparedness Staff is responsible for the interface with the ERONS vendors and providing maintenance and oversight of the ERONS systems.

2. The Emergency Preparedness Staff provides data entry, verification, and generation of emergency team rosters and directories. [R1]

3. The Emergency Preparedness Staff is responsible for developing and maintaining the scenarios and content of pre-scripted messages.

4. The Emergency Preparedness Staff ensures the Emergency Response Personnel Roster and the Off-Site Support Directory are reviewed, updated and distributed quarterly in accordance with Subsection 9.3, Emergency Response Team Rosters, of this procedure. [R1]

4.3 Security Personnel

1. Security personnel are responsible for activating ERONS as directed by the EC in accordance with this procedure, unless the event is related to a security condition.

2. IF Security is unable to activate ERONS due to the nature of the event (i.e.,

security events, large area fire, etc.), THEN Operations will perform the necessary ERO notifications. [R3]

IEM-206 Rev. 110 Page 5 of23

5.0 PREREQUISITES

1. An emergency requiring activation of the ERO.

2. A drill, exercise or functional test is being conducted which involves notification of the ERO.

6.0 PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND NOTES NOTES: 1. ERONS-1 is used to describe the ERO notification system provided by EverBridge.

2. ERONS-2 is used to describe the ERO notification system provided by the Emergency Communications Network product CodeRED.

3. Consequently, the terms ERONS-1 and EverBridge are interchangeable, as are the terms ERONS-2 and CodeRED.

1. ERONS-1 (EverBridge), is the primary method of ERO notification and should be used if available. It uses pre-programmed messages to contact pre-established ERO personnel groups. These messages cannot be modified without the permission of the Emergency Preparedness Staff.

2. ERONS-2 is the back-up to ERONS-1.

3. A LAN or wireless internet connection is required only if notification is made via the EverBridge website. It is not needed if IVR or a Live EverBridge Operator is used.

4. IF notification occurs using a Live EverBridge Operator, THEN the Operator will ask a series of questions concerning the notification. These questions may vary from the script provided in Attachment 4, ERONS Using the Live EverBridge Operator to Activate the ERO. However, the intent and the critical responses will remain consistent.

5. Passwords will not be provided in this procedure to ensure the information cannot be accessed inappropriately. Instead, passwords are provided to responsible personnel.

6. The EC should indicate the preferred method of notification. The ERONS-1 options are:

• LAN Computer Activation

• EverBridge IVR Telephone Activation

• Live EverBridge Operator Telephone Activation

7. Acronyms and abbreviations will be spoken as words by the IVR. Listen closely to ensure the correct option is selected.

I EM-206 Rev. 110 1 Page 6 of 23

6.0 Precautions, Limitations, and Notes (Cont'd)

8. Once the TSC or EOF is operational, the TSC EC or EOF Director determines the number of additional personnel needed to cope with the emergency and ensures appropriate calls are made for additional emergency support personnel.

Any properly trained personnel may utilize applicable portions of this procedure to call-out Emergency Team members.

9. Certain events (i.e., Security events, large area fire, etc.) may preclude the EC or designee from being able to formally notify Security to activate the ERO.

In such an event, if it is apparent to Security that the ERO should be activated, Security should activate the ERO per the provisions of this procedure without notification from the EC or designee. [R3]

10. Certain events (i.e., Security events, large area fire, etc.) may preclude Security from being able to activate the ERO.

ERONS-1 and ERONS-2 can be activated from any telephone and/or from any computer (or other device) with internet access.

In such an event, Security or Operations should direct personnel to initiate the ERO activation from the most appropriate location.

Members of the CR3 EP staff can also initiate ERO activation from any location with a telephone or internet-capable device. [R3]

11. Certain events (i.e., Security events, large area fire, natural disasters, etc.) may require activation of the Remote Technical Support Center (RTSC) located in the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) on W. Venable St. in Crystal River, instead of the on-site Technical Support Center (TSC).

12. ERONS may not be activated for all Security events. The decision to activate ERONS is made by the EC and the Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) on-duty.

13. In the event that ERONS-1 and ERONS-2 are both inoperative/unavailable, the "Weekly ERO On-Call List" should be used to call the individuals whose names are listed as being on-call for that week.

There are typically ten (10) names on the list which makes up the minimum staffing for the TSC and EOF.

The list is updated weekly by EP staff and is posted on the CR3 Emergency Preparedness website as a link titled, "Weekly ERO On-Call List" under the heading "Emergency Preparedness Information." The address for the link is:

http://nqqweb/cr3emerqencyprepared ness/out/eof%20&%20tsc%20weeklv%20on-call%201ist.pdf The link can be saved and made readily available to PC users who may be required to initiate ERO call-in.

EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 7 of 23 1

7.0 SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT

1. Working telephone.

2. Computer (or other device) with internet access.

8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA None 9.0 INSTRUCTIONS 9.1 Instructions for Notifying the ERO [R3][R4]

CAUTION The Scenario Title must correspond to the Scenario Number provided by the EC, otherwise the incorrect notification will be activated. Scenario numbers are provided in Attachment 1.

1. The EC, or a designee will direct CR3 Security to activate the ERO.

The ERONS Scenario number will be provided to Security by the EC. Scenario numbers are listed in Attachment 1. IF Security is unable to perform this function, THEN Operations should perform th e a c tiva tio n............................................................................................................

NOTE: Activation of the ERO is a time critical process. Operations and/or Security personnel must perform these duties in a most expeditious manner.

2. WHEN requested by the EC or a designee to activate the ERO, THEN IMMEDIATELY ACTIVATE ERONS in accordance with Steps 9.2.1 through 9.2.2, as appropriate ................................................................

3. WHEN notified to activate the ERO, THEN Security should CHECK, and if needed, UNLOCK the entrance doors to the TSC/OSC, unless TSC/OSC personnel are being sent to the RTSC ......................................... I EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 8 of 23

9.2 ERO Notification Methods [R3][R4]

9.2.1 ERO Activation Using ERONS-1 (EverBridge)

NOTES: 1. The terms ERONS-1 and EverBridge (or EverBridge notification system) are synonymous.

2. ERONS-1 is the primary ERO notification method and should be used if available.

3. Based on the nature of the emergency condition, the EC will determine the appropriate ERONS-1 "Scenario Number" to use.

• In the event that ERONS-1 is unavailable, the corresponding ERONS-2 "Scenario" should be used.

" In the event that both ERONS-1 and ERONS-2 are unavailable, manual calling of the on-call ERO is initiated in accordance with step 9.4.2 of this procedure.

1. IF ERONS-1 is available, THEN CONTINUE to Step 9.2.1.3 and/or the Emergency Response Organization Notification System A ctivation G uidelines ................................................................................... N/A 0 E]

2. IF ERONS-1 is unavailable or directed by the EC to use ERONS-2 to activate the ERO, THEN CONTINUE to Step 9.2.2 and/or the Emergency Response Organization Notification System Activation G uidelines to activate ERO NS-2 ................................................................. N/A El El

3. IF ERONS-lwebsite is locked, THEN INITIATE system using alternate notification methods described in this procedure (IVR or Live Operator) or immediately transition to ERONS-2 ................................. N/A L] LI

4. REFER to Attachment 2 to activate the ERO using a LAN Computer.

5. REFER to Attachment 3 to activate the ERO using the EverBridge IVR Telephone Activation.

6. REFER to Attachment 4 to activate the ERO using Live EverBridge Operator Telephone Activation.

I EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 9 of 23

9.2.2 ERO Activation Using ERONS-2 (CodeRED)

NOTES: 1. Detailed instructions (including phone numbers, PINs, Scenario ID Numbers, Launch Codes, generic user log in and password, etc.) for ERONS-2 activation are located in Emergency Response Organization Notification System Activation Guidelines. These guidelines are maintained by Emergency Preparedness and are distributed for ready access to authorized CR3 Security and Operations personnel.

2. Attachment 5 and Attachment 6 detail two (2) separate methods of launching ERONS-2 Scenarios. Attachment 5 is the preferred method and Attachment 6 is the alternate method.

3. Step 9.2.3 is used following completion of either Attachment 5 or Attachment 6, assuming internet availability.

1. IF ERONS-2 is available, THEN CONTINUE to step 9.2.2.3 and/or the Emergency Response Organization Notification System A ctivation G uidelines ................................................................................... N/A ED El

2. IF ERONS-2 is unavailable, THEN CONTINUE to Step 9.4.2 and/or the Emergency Response Organization Notification System Activation Guidelines to activate the ERO ................................................... N/A LI FI

3. REFER to Attachment 5 to activate the ERO using the Internet Launch Process

4. REFER to Attachment 6 to activate the ERO using the IVR Launch Process 9.2.3 ERONS-2 Scenario Launch Verification Process (Assumes internet availability)

1. LO G IN to the E R O NS-2 website .............................................................................

2. From "Start Page", CLICK ON "Quick Statistics" ..................................................... L1

3. CLICK ON magnifying glass to the left of "Launch #"............................................. El

4. VIEW "Contacts" to see records called and disposition ............................................

5. SELECT "Messages" icon to play voice file and view text and email m e s s a g e s .................................................................................................................

6. REFRESH the screen and REVIEW results of the launch to determine if call, texts, and emails were successfully launched ...............................

I EM-206 Rev. 110 1 Page 10 of 23 1

9.3 ERO Emergency Response Team Rosters [R2]

1. Emergency Response Teams consist of the Emergency Sampling Team (EST),

Radiation Monitoring Team (RMT), HP Responders, the Emergency Repair Team (ERT), and the Fire Brigade.

2. Current hard copies of the ERO Emergency Response Team rosters are located in the Control Room and in the Operational Support Center.

9.4 Location of Emergency Rosters and Phone Directories [R2]

1. Emergency rosters and phone directories identify current ERO members and outside emergency contacts.

Hard copies of the emergency rosters and phone directories are reviewed quarterly and updated as needed in accordance with Emergency Preparedness Staff Guideline-005 (EPSG-005).

2. In the event that ERONS-1 and ERONS-2 are both inoperative/unavailable, the "Weekly ERO On-Call List" should be used to call the individuals whose names are listed as being on-call for that week. The following links can be used to access emergency rosters and phone directories:

0 Weekly ERO On-Call List (N:\NGGWeb\CR3\Departments\Emerqency Preparedness\out\eof & tsc weekly on-call list.pdf)

• Emergency Response Personnel Roster (N:\NGGWeb\CR3\Departments\Emerqency Preparedness\out\emergency response directory.pdf) 0 ERO Emergency Roster by Last Name (N:\NGGWeb\CR3\Departments\EmerqencV Preparedness\out\responders lastname.pdf) 0 Emergency Response Facility Telephone Directory (N:\NGGWeb\CR3\Departments\Emerqency Preparedness\out\facility directory.pdf)

• Off-Site Support Directory (N:\NGGWeb\CR3\Departments\EmerqencV Prepared ness\out\offsite directory.pdf)

3. The emergency rosters and phone directories are also maintained on the CR3 Emergency Preparedness Web page.

EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 11 of 23 1

9.5 Viewing Individual and Team Qualifications on the PC Screen [R2]

1. OPEN PQD from a Network computer on Duke Energy web (http://webapp/ptn-pp-rpt/) or from Start>All Programs>DAE>Shortcuts Tab>Search for "Passport"

>Select Passport Information Web Portal and Run Application ............................... L

2. SELECT "Personnel Qualifications" from the left hand column ................................

3. SELECT "ERO" from the left hand column ...............................................................

4. SELECT "ERO Emergency Response Team by Team by Duty Area" from the "Personnel Qualifications/ERO" heading/"Prompted R e p o rts " ta b .............................................................................................................

5. CLICK on the desired emergency team Duty Area in the "map" tab o n the left, O R ............................................................................................. N/A D R

6. SEARCH for a specific Duty Area by number or key word or phrase using the "binocular" search button, OR ...................................................... N/A El RI

7. SEARCH for an individual by name using the "binocular" search b u tto n .......................................................................................................... N/A [] LI 9.6 Printing Individual and Team Qualifications [R2]

1. SELECT the "print" icon button on the tool bar to print the entire re p o rt, O R ................................................................................................... N/A LI LI

2. IDENTIFY the page number(s) of the report that is required for p rin tin g . ....................................................................................................... N/A EL L]

3. PRINT by selecting "File" then "Print" from the Windows menu tool bar .L.................

4. SELECT "Pages" AND ENTER the page numbers desired .....................................

5. S E LE C T "O K". ..................................................... .................................................... EL 10.0 RECORDS No Records are generated by this procedure.

EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 12 of 23

ATTACHMENT 1 Sheet 1 of 2 CR3 Emergency Notification Scenarios

[R3] [R4]

SCENARIO NO. SCENARIO TITLE APPLICABILITY 1 Notification Error Retraction of any activation message sent in error Unusual Event - ERO Unusual Event declared. Notify ERO to

2. Standby assume a heightened state of awareness in anticipation of emergency escalation.

Discretionary - TSC/OSC At the discretion of the EC, activate the

3. following facilities:

• Technical Support Center

• Operational Support Center Discretionary - At the discretion of the EC, activate the TSC/OSC/EOF/ENC following facilities:

4. Technical Support Center

• Operational Support Center

• Emergency Operations Facility

• Emergency News Center Alert Alert declared. Activate the following (Refer to Scenario 8 if facilities:

activation of remote facilities

• Technical Support Center is required.)

• Operational Support Center

• Emergency Operations Facility

• Emergency News Center Site Area Emergency Site Area Emergency declared. Activate the following facilities:

(Refer to Scenario 9 if

• Technical Support Center

6. activation of remote facilities

• Operational Support Center is required)

• Emergency Operations Facility

• Emergency News Center EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 13 of 23

ATTACHMENT 1 Sheet 2 of 2 SCENARIO NO. SCENARIO TITLE APPLICABILITY General Emergency General Emergency declared. Activate the following facilities:

(Refer to Scenario 10 if

• Technical Support Center activation of remote facilities

• Operational Support Center is required)

• Emergency Operations Facility

• Emergency News Center Alert (Remote Facilities) Alert declared. Activate the following facilities:

8.

• Remote Technical Support Center

• Remote Operational Support Center

" Emergency Operations Facility

• Emergency News Center Site Area Emergency Site Area Emergency declared. Activate (Remote Facilities) the following facilities:

9

• Remote Technical Support Center

• Remote Operational Support Center

• Emergency Operations Facility

" Emergency News Center General Emergency (Remote General Emergency declared. Activate the Facilities) following facilities:

10.

• Remote Technical Support Center

• Remote Operational Support Center

• Emergency Operations Facility

• Emergency News Center Fire Brigade Support to SAB Event requiring off-shift Fire Brigade

11. support to report to the Site Administration Building. (Example: Large-area fire)

Fire Brigade Support to EOF Event requiring off-shift Fire Brigade

12. support to report to the EOF. (Example:

Large-area fire)

Event Termination Plant conditions no longer require ERO to

13. stand by or to report as determined by EC or EOF Director.

EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 14 of 23

ATTACHMENT 2 Sheet 1 of 1 ERONS Using a LAN Computer to Activate the ERO NOTE: This method is used to activate the ERO using the EverBridge website and any available LAN computer.

1) LOG onto the Emergency Response Organization Notification System, EverBridge using one of the following options:

a. Go to the internet and type "www.everbridge.net".

b. IF using a Windows 7 Desktop, THEN SELECT Start>All Programs>DAE>Shortcuts Tab>Search EverBridge>Select EverBridge and Run Application.

2) TYPE the "CR3activation" (not case sensitive) in the "Member ID" field of the initial login screen.

3) ENTER site specific Password from the "Password Card."

4) SELECT "GO" OR PRESS "Enter" on the keyboard.

5) SELECT "Scenario Manager" from left side of the screen.

6) SELECT "Send Scenario" under "Scenario Manager."

7) LOCATE AND CONFIRM the "Scenario Number" and "Scenario Title" provided by the SEC on the "Send Scenarios" screen, use the "Previous" and "Next" cursors to scroll through the scenario list as needed.

8) CLICK the desired "Scenario Title" in EverBridge once you have located and confirmed that the "Scenario Number" and "Scenario Title" provided by the SEC are in alignment.

NOTE: A satellite dish animation will appear on the screen to indicate transmission of the message.

9) SELECT "Send Message" at the bottom of the "list unscheduled messages" screen.

I EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 15 of 23

ATTACHMENT 3 Sheet 1 of 1 ERONS Using the EverBridge Interactive Voice Response to Activate the ERO NOTE: The following steps can be used to activate EverBridge mass communications system via telephone. The automated system will require the following information to activate and ask for responses to the following queries.

1) DIAL EverBridge at 9-1-888-440-4911

2) LISTEN to the IVR command AND FOLLOW the instructions:

a) "Pleaseenter your Member ID followed by the "#"sign."

i) ENTER "132528221" "#"

b) "Pleaseenter your Passwordfollowed by the "#" sign."

i) ENTER site specific password. See Password Card for site password.

CAUTION ERO will occur.

Upon completion of the following steps, activation of the

3) To launch a broadcast scenario now, PRESS the number "3".

4) To select your scenario by number, PRESS the number "1".

5) "Pleaseenter your scenario number followed by the "#"sign."

a) For example; "10" "#'.

6) Voice will state title of the scenario. VERIFY this is the correct entry.

7) To select this scenario, PRESS "#" key, otherwise press

8) "To launch this scenario now, PRESS the number "1"."

9) END call EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 16 of 23

ATTACHMENT 4 Sheet 1 of 1 ERONS Using the Live EverBridge Operator to Activate the ERO NOTE: The following steps can be used to activate the EverBridge mass communications system via telephone and the Live EverBridge Operator.

1.) CALL the live EverBridge operator at 9-1-877-220-4911. You will hear, "Thank you, an EverBridge Operatorwill be with you momentarily."

NOTE: The EverBridge Operator may use variations of the questions below.

2.) QUESTION: The agent will ask for your Organization Name:

ANSWER: SEE PASSWORD INFORMATION 3.) QUESTION: The agent will ask for your Member ID:

ANSWER: SEE PASSWORD INFORMATION 4.) QUESTION: For authentication purposes, the agent will ask you your Hint Question: "What is your city of birth?"

ANSWER: SEE PASSWORD INFORMATION 5.) QUESTION: The agent should then ask, "How may I help you?"

NOTE: Ensure that the scenario number provided by the EC and scenario name listed in this procedure are in alignment.

ANSWER: "NWOULD LIKE TO SEND AN EMERGENCY SCENARIO USING THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO NUMBER:" Provide the Live EverBridge Operator with the scenario number that has been provided to you by the SEC.

6.) QUESTION: The Live EverBridge Operator will then CONFIRM the Scenario Number (and Scenario Name) provided, "Is this the correct Scenario Number?"

ANSWER: IF the Scenario Number and Name are correct - "YES."

IF the scenario number and name are incorrect - "NO."

Provide the Live EverBridge Operator with the correct scenario number that has been provided to you by the SEC before proceeding.

7.) QUESTION: The Live EverBridge Operator will then confirm, "Would you like to send the notification now?"

ANSWER: "SEND NOTIFICATION NOW." The Live EverBridge Operator will then provide you with the Message Broadcast ID number for tracking purposes.

IEM-206 I Rev. 110 1 Page 17 of 23

ATTACHMENT 5 Sheet 1 of 1 ERONS Using the Internet Launch Process to Activate the ERO

1. LOG onto the Emergency Response Organization Notification System, Code Red using one of the following options:

a. GO TO the internet and type "https://Ioqin.coderedweb.com". ........................................................... E

b. IF using a Windows 7 Desktop, THEN SELECT Start>All Programs> DAE>Shortcuts Tab>Search Code Red>Select Code Red and Run Application ..............................................

2. LO G IN to the E R O NS-2 w ebsite . ............................................................................ 0

3. From the "Quick Launch" panel, SELECT desired Scenario from d ro p d o w n m e n u . ......................................................................................................

4. S E LE C T "Launch". .......................................................................................... . ... .

5. ENTER "Launch Code" (xxxx) into the pop-up ......................................................... M

6. S E LEC T "Launch Now" ............................................ ........................................... El

7. G O T O S te p 9 .2 .3 ............................................................................................. . ... l EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 18 of 23

ATTACHMENT 6 Sheet 1 of 1 ERONS Using the IVR Launch Process to Activate the ERO

1. DIAL the Primary phone number (use Alternates if necessary) ................................

Primary: 1-888-xxx-xxxx Alternates: 1-800-xxx-xxxx or 1-888-xxx-xxxx

2. FOLLOW the "instructionsand prompts" as they are given AND PERFORM the following actions:

NOTE: If there is delay before entering any number, the system may state, "We did not get a valid entry." The system will then ask for the entry again.

a. "Pleaseenter your access PIN Number."

ENTER access PIN Number "xxxxx" on the telephone key pad ......... D

b. "Welcome to the IVR; please enter your Scenario ID to start the launch process."

ENTER Scenario ID on the telephone key pad ................................... ED

c. "ScenarioID "x" has "x" email, "x" text message, "x'"phone call. To continue with the launch of this Scenario press PRESS "1" on the telephone key pad .................................................

d. "JobNumber "xxxxx" has approximately "xxx" records to be called."

e. "A voice file exists and has been approved. Enter your Launch Code to initiate contacts, or press the pound key to re-record the voice file."

ENTER Launch Code "xxxxx" on the telephone key pad (do not press the pound key) ....................................................... ED

f. "Your approvalcode has been accepted. To automaticallyre-launch to non-connects when the connection rate is less than 60%, press 1. Press any other key to launch without an auto recall."

PRESS "1" on the telephone key pad to ensure auto recall is e n a b le d ........................................................................................... ED

g. "Contactsfor Scenario ID "x" have been initiated. To start another launch, enter the Scenario ID, press the pound key to select a Scenario, or press the star key to record a message for a future launch. To exit, simply, hang up."

• HA NG UP the phone to exit ................................................................ El

3. GO TO Step 9.2.3 and COMPLETE if internet is available ...................................... FD EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 19 of23

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES PRR 610438 NOTES: 1. Writers, Reviewers, and Procedure Sponsors: Ensure that any changes to this procedure that affect information contained in ERF posters, Enclosures, briefing cards, guidelines, etc. are made to those items as well.

2. Writers, Reviewers, and Procedure Sponsors: Changes to certain parts of this procedure may impact other EPIPs. Ensure appropriate PRRs are initiated as needed.

Section/Step Changes adRao Note: The purpose of this Procedure Revision is to remove CR3 from Fleet procedure EMG-NGGC-0005. All revisions documented below were made to incorporate applicable information from EMG-NGGC-0005, unless otherwise noted.

None of the changes listed below reduce the effectiveness of this procedure or the CR3 Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

Throughout Changed revision number to 110.

Removed reference to SSRO as this title will be changing.

1.0 Editorial changes throughout section.

2.1.5 Delete reference to EMG-NGGC-0004 and replace with reference to EPSG-025 2.1.6 Delete reference to EMG-NGGC-0005 and replace with reference to EPSG-026 2.1.7 New reference to AI-4000, Conduct of Emergency Preparedness and Schedule for Radiological Emergency Response Plan Maintenance Renumber References accordingly.

3.0.2 Add Definition for "Aware." Incorporated from EMG-NGGC-0005.

3.0.5 Add Definition for "Group." Incorporated from EMG-NGGC-0005.

3.0.6 Add Definition for "Interactive Voice Response (IVR)." Incorporated from EMG-NGGC-0005.

3.0.7 Add Definition for "Live EverBridge Operator." Incorporated from EMG-NGGC-0005.

3.0.9 Add Definition for "Password Card." Incorporated from EMG-NGGC-0005.

3.0.10 Add Definition for "Scenario." Incorporated from EMG-NGGC-0005.

EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 20 of 23

Section/Step Changes and Reason 4.0 Revise Section 4.1 to include subsections describing the responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator (4.1), Security Personnel (4.2), and Emergency Preparedness Staff (4.3) incorporating information from EMG-NGGC-0005.

4.1 New Subsection. Add description of responsibilities for the EC from EMG-NGGC-0005 to existing description.

4.2 New Subsection. Add description of responsibilities for Security Personnel from EMG-NGGC-0005 to existing description.

4.3 New Subsection. Add description of responsibilities for the EP Staff from EMG-NGGC-0005 to existing description.

5.0 Add Prerequisites from EMG-NGGC-0005.

6.0 Notes 1, 2 and 3: Editorial changes. Because this is a CR3 procedure, there is no need to use the term, "At CR3."

6.0.1 Remove reference to EMG-NGGC-0005 and incorporate descriptive language from EMG-NGGC-0005.

6.0.2 Remove reference to EMG-NGGC-0005.

6.0.3 New Item. Add language describing LAN from EMG-NGGC-0005.

6.0.4 New Item. Add language describing notification using a Live EverBridge Operator from EMG-NGGC-0005.

6.0.5 New Item. Add language describing passwords from EMG-NGGC-0005.

6.0.6 New item, Add language describing preferred method of notification as indicated by EC from EMG-NGGC-0005.

6.0.7 New item. Add language describing acronyms and abbreviations spoken by the IVR from EMG-NGGC-0005.

6.0.8 Editorial change. Use acronym "EC." All steps impacted by new steps are renumbered.

6.0.8 Editorial change.

First Bullet 6.0.9 Editorial change. Use acronym "ERO."

6.0.10 Delete "can be activated from any computer (or other device with internet First Bullet access" following "ERONS-1 ." ERONS-1 and ERONS-2 can both be activated using telephone or computer (or other device) with internet access.

As written, the procedure does not make it apparent that ERONS-1 can be EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 21 of 23

SectionlStep Changes and Reason activated using telephone.

6.0.10 Revise bullet to indicate that EP staff can initiate ERO activation anywhere Third Bullet telephone or an internet-capable device is available.

7.0 Editorial changes.

9.1 Add "Caution" note prior to Step 9.1.1. This note is identical to a Caution note contained in EMG-NGGC-0005.

9.1.1 Change "typically notifies" to "will direct". Scenario numbers are provided in Attachment 1" as new third sentence. These changes ensure consistency with EMG-NGGC-0005.

9.1.2 Add "Steps" before "9.2.1 through 9.2.3...".

9.2.1 Change section title from "ERONS Activation Protocol" to "ERONS Activation Using ERONS-1 (EverBridge)"

9.2.1.1 Note 1: Remove reference to EMG-NGGC-0005.

9.2.1.1 Note 3: Editorial change - use of acronyms.

9.2.1.1 Note 3, 2 nd Bullet: Change step "6.0.8" to "9.4.2."

9.2.1 Remove reference to EMG-NGGC-0005 and instead direct reader to Step Step 1 9.2.1.3 9.2.1 Add "or directed by the EC to use ERONS-2 to activate the ERO." Delete Step 2 "follow the applicable steps of this procedure" and replace with "Step 9.2.2."

9.2.1 Add Steps 3 - 6 using information from Steps 9.3 through 9.6 of EMG-NGGC-0005.

9.2.2 Notes preceding section.

Note 2: Revise Steps 9.2.2 and 9.2.3 to Attachment 5 and 6, respectively.

Note 3: Change Step 9.2.4 to 9.2.3 and update Steps 9.2.2 and 9.2.3 to Attachment 5 and 6, respectively.

9.2.2 Change Section title from "ERONS-2 (Internet Launch Process) (Preferred Method)" to "ERO Activation Using ERONS-2 (CodeRED)" and add instructions for use of ERONS-2 or alternate method if ERONS-2 is unavailable.

9.2.2 Existing information relocated to Attachments 5 (Internet Launch Process) and 6 (IVR Launch Process)

EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 22 of 23

Section/Step Changes and Reason 9.2.2 Deleted Step 9.2.2.1 Note 4 that listed ERONS-2 Scenario ID numbers and descriptions as the EC will provide the appropriate information.

9.2.4 (old) Renumbered to 9.2.3 9.4.1 Delete reference to EMG-NGGC-0005 2 nd Bullet 9.4.2 Replace "In the event that ERONS-1 and ERONS-2 are unavailable" with "In the event that ERONS-1 and ERONS-2 are both inoperative/unavailable, the "Weekly ERO On-Call List" should be used to call the individuals whose names are listed as being on-call for that week." Add "Weekly ERO On-Call List" (hyperlinked) to the bulleted documents.

9.5.1 Replace "START-PROGRAMS-Business Apps-PassPort Production-PassPort Information Web Portal" with "Start>All Programs>DAE>Shortcuts Tab>Search Passport>Select Passport Information Web Portal and Run Application." Add EMG-NGGC-0005, Attachment 2 Add EMG-NGGC-0005, Attachment 5 Add EMG-NGGC-0005, Attachment 6 Add EMG-NGGC-0005, Attachment 7 New Attachment. Information moved from old step 9.2.2 Added new Step 1 to clarify options for connecting to Code Red. New Attachment. Information moved from old step 9.2.3 EM-206 Rev. 110 Page 23 of 23

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 PLANT SECURITY PROCEDURE EM-211 DUTIES OF THE CR3 NUCLEAR SECURITY ORGANIZATION REVISION 28

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1 .0 P UR P O S E ....................................................................................................................... 3

2.0 REFERENCES

................................................................................................................ 3 2.1 Im plementing References ................................................................................. 3 3.0 DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................................. 4 SECTION 3.0, DEFINITIONS (CONT'D) ............................................................................... 5 SECTION 3.0, DEFINITIONS (CONT'D) ............................................................................... 6 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES ................................................................................................... 7 5.0 PREREQUISITES .................................................................................................... 7 6.0 LIM ITATIONS, PRECAUTIONS, AND NOTES ............................................................ 8 7.0 SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPM ENT ......................................................................... 8 8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ........................................................................................... 8 9.0 INSTRUCTIONS ...................................................................................................... 9 9.1 Unusual Events ................................................................................................. 9 9.2 Alerts, Site Area Em ergencies and General Em ergencies ................................ 9 9.3 On-Site Protective Actions and Evacuation Guidelines .................................... 9 9.4 Security Force ................................................................................................. 12 10.0 RECORDS ..................................................................................................................... 12 ENCLOSURES

1. Suggested Notes ................................................................................................. 13 ATTACHMENTS

1. Security Coordinator's Suggested Action Checklist ............................................. 14 2 Security Shift Supervisor's (or Designee's) Suggested Action Checklist ............. 17 Sum mary of changes ................................................................................................................ 22 IEM-211 I Rev. 28 1 Page 2 of 22

1.0 PURPOSE

1. This procedure is an Emergency Plan implementing procedure.

2. This procedure provides guidance to the CR3 Nuclear Security Organization in the event of a radiological or other Plant emergency situation.

3. Any revisions must be carefully considered for Emergency Plan impact

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 Implementing References

1. CR3-PSP, Duke Energy Florida - Crystal River Unit 3 (CR3) Nuclear Plant Physical Security Plan, Security Training and Qualification Plan, And Safeguards Contingency Plan (SECURITY PLAN)

2. CR3 Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP)

3. NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-based Events"

4. SEC-NGGC-2120, "Use, Storage, and Protection of Safeguards and other Limited Access Information"

5. SEC-NGGC-2141, "Fitness for Duty Unscheduled Work Call Outs"

6. SEC-92166, "Site Access Controls"

7. SEC-92147, "Reporting Of Safeguards And Fitness-For-Duty Events"

8. EM-1 02, "Operation of the Technical Support Center"

9. EM-205, "Personnel Emergency Responsibilities Regarding Discovery, Assembly, Evacuation and Accountability within the Protected Area"

10. EM-206, "Emergency Plan Roster Notification"

11. EM-91 1, "Security Threats"

12. SS-206, "Security Safeguard Contingency Events"

13. SS-212, "Defensive Strategy Procedure"

14. [R1] NOCS 014050

15. 10 CFR 73.71, "Reporting of Safeguard Events" EM-211 Rev. 28 Page 3 of 22

3.0 DEFINITIONS

1. Accountability: The process of identifying personnel remaining inside the Protected Area (PA) and ascertaining the names of missing individuals.

Accountability is normally performed via the use of card readers and the Plant Security Computer System (PSCS) during a Site Area or General Emergency, when a site evacuation has been called, or anytime accountability is requested by the Emergency Coordinator. In the event card readers and/or the PSCS are unavailable, exiting personnel can be logged off site manually by Security personnel posted at the exit portal(s), which may include the retrieval of badges of exiting personnel, or attendance can be taken at the Main Assembly Area.

Depending on the nature of the event, Protected Area vehicle and/or personnel gates may be utilized to expedite personnel egress from the PA.

2. Authorized Personnel: Those individuals whose entrance to the CR3 PA during emergencies has been approved by the Emergency Coordinator (EC), and coordinated with the Manager- Nuclear Plant Security or designated representative in the Technical Support Center/Operations Support Center (TSC/OSC).

3. Emergency Classification Levels

a. Unusual Event: Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the Plant or indicate a Security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

This classification brings the operating staff to a state of readiness if escalation to a more severe action level classification occurs

b. Alert: Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potentially substantial degradation of the level of safety of the Plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of hostile action. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

The TSC/OSC is staffed and assembly and accountability are performed at Local Assembly Areas. The EOF is also staffed at an Alert.

c. Site Area Emergency: Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of Plant functions needed for the protection of the public or hostile actions that result in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

The TSC/OSC and EOF are staffed and radiation monitoring teams may be dispatched. PA evacuation and Accountability is performed.

I EM-211 I Rev. 28 1 Page 4 of 22

SECTION 3.0, DEFINITIONS (CONT'D)

d. General Emergency: Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or hostile action that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Release can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels off-site for more than the immediate site area.

This classification initiates predetermined protective actions for the public, provides continuous assessment of information from on-site and off-site measurements, initiates additional measures indicated by the event, and provides current information and consultation with off-site authorities and the public. The Emergency Coordinator (EC) may decide to evacuate the Energy Complex.

4. Emergency Response Organization Notification System (ERONS):

The total of the primary, back-up and alternate systems / methods available to activate the ERO in the event of a Plant emergency. The primary system is ERONS-1 and is capable of sending voice and text messages to ERO members based on user commands to the system. ERONS-2 has similar capabilities as the primary system and is the back-up system should ERONS-1 be unavailable. In the event that both ERONS-1 and -2 are unavailable, a process for manually calling ERO members would be used.

5. Hostile Action: An act toward a Nuclear Power Plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included.

"Hostile Action" should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the Nuclear Power Plant.

Non-terrorism- based EAL's should be used to address such activities (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area.

6. Hostile Force: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

7. Missing Individual: An unaccounted for person remaining in the PA following an evacuation or when the EC requests accountability, and is not in, or dispatched from the Control Room, TSC/OSC or Nuclear Security Operations Center (NSOC).

8. Security Condition: Any Security event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A Security Condition does not involve a Hostile Action.

I EM-211 1 Rev. 28 1 Page 5 of 22 1

SECTION 3.0, DEFINITIONS (CONT'D)

9. Security Event: Any incident representing an attempted, threatened, or actual breach of the security system or reduction of the operational effectiveness of that system. A Security Event can result in either a Security Condition or Hostile Action.

10. Site- Wide Emergency Alarms

a. Reactor Building Evacuation Alarm - High pitched steady tone

b. Auxiliary Building Evacuation Alarm - Pulsing tone

c. Site Evacuation Alarm - Yelping sound

d. Site Fire Alarm - Siren EM-211 I Rev. 28 1 Page 6 of 22

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Manager- Nuclear Plant Security controls CR3 access, performs Accountability, and interfaces with Local Law Enforcement Agencies as warranted. Provides information to the EC as required and directs the Security Force through the CR3 Security Supervisor(s) and/or the on-duty Security Shift Supervisor(s) (SSS). The Manager- Nuclear Plant Security has the authority to use the Security Organization or any other available personnel to control access to the Plant or to implement and enforce the evacuation and accountability of personnel as directed by the EC

2. CR3 Security Specialists report directly to the Manager- Nuclear Plant Security and individually may act as an authorized designee of the Manager- Nuclear Plant Security as needed.

3. Security Coordinator is a position filled by the Manager- Nuclear Plant Security or designee. The Security Coordinator is positioned in the TSC to advise and assist the EC in accordance with EM-1 02.

4. Security Shift Supervisor (SSS) controls the CR3 Security Force and implements the actions directed by the Manager- Nuclear Plant Security or designee. In the absence of the Manager- Nuclear Plant Security or designee, the SSS would act as the Security Coordinator.

5. CR3 Security is responsible, under the direction of the Manager-Nuclear Plant Security, for Security measures required within the CR3 PA and the Owner Controlled Area (OCA). During a Plant emergency situation, Security shall expand the day-to-day operations to include the activities required to maintain personnel safety and Plant Security under emergency conditions. If the emergency is a Security related event, the Security Coordinator on-site will provide periodic updates to the EC and Shift Supervisor. Additionally, CR3 Security controls and directs the activities required to maintain physical security of personnel and property (at the Crystal River Energy Complex and EOF), and directs the evacuation of personnel from the Energy Complex.

a. During Plant emergencies requiring Security response, Health Physics directives or procedures will be complied with.

b. During certain emergencies (i.e., Security related events, Large Area Fire).

The Crystal River Energy Complex Emergency Response Coordinator may establish an Incident Command Post (ICP). In the event an ICP is established, Security Coordinators who are not assigned to the TSC or EOF may be assigned to staff the ICP to support its function and to provide liaison between CR3 Security and off-site response agencies (i.e., local law enforcement, fire/rescue, emergency medical, etc.).

5.0 PREREQUISITES None IEM-211 I Rev. 28 1 Page 7 of 22

6.0 LIMITATIONS, PRECAUTIONS, AND NOTES NOTE: The requirement for conducting PA Accountability is stated in 6.0 (1), however; Accountability may be requested by the TSC Emergency coordinator at anytime during an event.

1. Protected Area (PA) Accountability must be completed within thirty (30) minutes of sounding the Site Evacuation Alarm.

2. During Plant evacuations that must be conducted expeditiously (i.e. those associated with an imminent threat to CR3) consideration should be given to allow Plant personnel to exit the PA via the Primary or Alternate Vehicle Gates.

Individuals' badges can be collected by Security at either of these locations so that Accountability may be performed. See Subsection 9.3, On-Site Protective Actions and Evacuation Guidelines for additional guidance.

3. As a result of a Security related event, log and note sheets must be carefully reviewed to ensure they do not contain any Safeguards Information in accordance with SEC-NGGC-2120, Use, Storage, and Protection of Safeguards and other Limited Access Information.

4. During Security related events, discretion must be used in discussing/communicating information that may contain Safeguards. The provisions of SEC-NGGC-2120 must be followed at all times regardless of conditions/events.

5. During Security related events, consideration must be given with regard to establishing and maintaining crime scene integrity.

6. If a Security related Condition or Hostile Action should occur, refer to SS-206, SS-212 and/or the CR3 Safeguards Contingency Plan.

7.0 SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT None 8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA None EM-211 Rev. 28 1 Page 8 of22

9.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE: These INSTRUCTIONS are to be FOLLOWED by the Security Coordinator whether that position is being filled by the Manager- Nuclear Security or a designee.

9.1 Unusual Events

1. No formal requirements are levied upon Security once notified that an Unusual Event has been declared. The Unusual Event classification is designed to bring the Plant staff to a state of readiness in the event of an escalation to a more severe emergency level classification.

2. REFER to Attachments 1 and 2 for "Suggested Actions" upon notification that an Unusual Event condition has been declared.

9.2 Alerts, Site Area Emergencies and General Emergencies

1. REFER to Attachments 1 and 2 for "Suggested Actions" upon notification that an Alert, Site Area Emergency or General Emergency condition has been declared.

9.3 On-Site Protective Actions and Evacuation Guidelines

1. Per the provisions of EM-91 1, "Security Threats", CR3 Security may be directed by the Shift Supervisor (SS) to take actions associated with personnel evacuation of the Protected Area and/or Owner Controlled Area (OCA).

2. Imminent threat warnings are divided into three (3) specific categories as follows:

a. Informational: > 30 minute warning

b. Urgent: 5- 30 minute warning

c. Immediate: <5 minute warning It is the responsibility of the SS (with possible assistance from Security and /or other sources as applicable) to determine the appropriate response.

EM-211 Rev. 28 Page 9 of22]

Subsection 9.3, On-Site Protective Actions and Evacuation Guidelines (Cont'd)

3. EM-91 1, "Security Threats", outlines protective actions and associated pre-scripted PA announcements for the NSM to utilize. Since PA/OCA evacuation and accountability are responsibility of the Security Force during an imminent threat scenario, all Security personnel must be aware of the measures they may need to implement depending on the imminent threat warning issued by the NSM as follows:

Informational: > 30 minute warning

• IF during an outage or other period of higher than normal Plant population, Security will consider opening Visitor Gate (AG-16) to expedite egress, will continue use of the normal Exit Turnstiles, and will perform accountability.

IF utilizing the Exit Turnstiles, Security will instruct evacuees to walk through the exit portal radiation monitors (exiting personnel DO NOT need to "stand and count") and instruct the SAS Operator to NOT lock out the Exit Turnstiles during this time.

IF during non-outage time, egress can be through the Exit Turnstiles only. (Exiting personnel DO NOT need to "stand and count" and the SAS Operator DOES NOT need to lock-out the Exit Turnstiles during this time.)

The NSM may instruct Security to activate the Remote TSC (at EOF) and the EOF.

Following accountability, the NSM may consider instructing Security to send TSC/OSC and EOF staff to the Remote TSC (at EOF) and evacuate non-essential personnel from the OCA.

IF during hours of darkness, Security will consider extinguishing all exterior lights under their control.

IEM-211 I Rev. 28 1 Page 10of22I

Subsection 9.3, On-Site Protective Actions and Evacuation Guidelines (Cont'd)

Step 9.3.3 (Cont'd)

• Urgent: 5-30 minute warning IF < 15 minutes before threat arrival or during an outage or other period of higher than normal Plant population, Security will consider opening Visitor Gate (AG-16) and/or utilize the Exit Turnstiles and/or the Vehicle Gate as necessary for rapid egress and will perform accountability.

IF utilizing Exit Turnstiles, Security will instruct evacuees to walk through the exit portal radiation monitors (exiting personnel DO NOT need to "stand and count") and instruct the SAS Operator to NOT lock out the Exit Turnstiles during this time.

IF > 15 minutes or during non-outage time, egress can be through AG-16 and the Exit Turnstiles (exiting personnel DO NOT need to "stand and count" and the SAS Operator DOES NOT need to lock-out the Exit Turnstiles during this time.)

The NSM may instruct Security to activate the Remote TSC (at EOF) and the EOF.

If during hours of darkness, Security will consider extinguishing all exterior lights under their control.

Immediate: <5 minute warninq The NSM will notify Security to expedite PA evacuation and to perform accountability. In addition to utilizing the Exit Turnstiles and AG-16, Security may consider opening the Vehicle Gate and collecting badges of exiting personnel.

If during hours of darkness, Security will consider extinguishing all exterior lights under their control.

I EM-211 1 Rev. 28 1 Page 11 of221

9.4 Security Force

1. The Security Force should be advised to increase their level of alertness and attention to duty upon notification that an Unusual Event condition has been declared.

2. During declared Alerts, Site Area Emergencies and General Emergencies, the Security Force will be directed by the SSS, who will receive direction from the Security Coordinator.

3. During occurrences requiring response by any CR3 Emergency Response Team (Fire, Medical, etc.), Security personnel dispatched to the scene will report to the appropriate Team Leader to assist with scene access control and/or perform other duties as requested.

4. In the event Security is directed to activate the Technical Support Center (TSC) during off-hours, ensure the Access Control Point (ACP) is notified and appropriately staffed in order to process incoming personnel in an expeditious manner.

5. In the event Security is directed to activate the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and /or the Remote Technical Support Center (RTSC), ensure the ACP is notified and directed to conduct turn-around of any personnel who may need to be re-directed to the EOF and/or RTSC.

6. FOLLOW the provisions of SEC-NGGC-2141, Fitness For Duty Unscheduled Work Call Outs, and SEC-92166, Site Access Controls, for those Plant employees who have been contacted to report to the Plant.

10.0 RECORDS

1. Checklists that are completed during actual emergencies are kept for the life of the plant.

I EM-211 1 Rev. 28 1 Page 12 of 22:]

ENCLOSURE 1 Page 1 of 1 SUGGESTED NOTES Below are the items that should be logged by the Security Coordinator in the TSC:

1. Notification of any change in Emergency conditions from the Control Room.

2. Assumption of duty (Security Coordinator)

3. Transfer of command from the Control Room to the TSC

4. Transfer of command from the TSC to the EOF.

5. Pertinent items regarding updates from the EC.

6. Information on injuries or causalities.

7. Accountability

8. Any notes desired by the Security Coordinator or designee.

9. Suspension of safeguards and reason why for support.

10. Evacuation report delivery.

11. Communication to shift.

12. Support and justification for decisions being made.

I EM-211 I Rev. 28 1 Page 13 of 22

ATTACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 3 SECURITY COORDINATOR'S SUGGESTED ACTION CHECKLIST NOTES: 1. The EC has the authority and responsibility to invoke 10CFR 50.54 (x) and (y) or Section 24 of the CR3-PSP, Duke Energy Florida - Crystal River Unit 3 (CR3) Nuclear Plant Physical Security Plan, Security Training and Qualification Plan, And Safeguards Contingency Plan (SECURITY PLAN),

as applicable, for suspension of Safeguards. The Security Coordinator must determine the reason for the suspension of Safeguards and if it is to be full or partial suspension.

2. Casualty identification is the responsibility of Security. Any information concerning Site casualties will only be transmitted to the EC.

3. Following this Attachment through completion is strongly recommended. As designated, include the time completed on the line provided.

4. Nuclear Security ensures emergency response personnel are notified in accordance with EM-206, Emergency Plan Roster Notification.

5. Notification must be made in accordance with SEC-92147 when reasonable suspicion of a 1 hr. reportable event has occurred.

1.0 UNUSUAL EVENT

1. NOTIFY CR3 Security Specialists as appropriate ...................................... __ (time) 2.0 ALERT

1. O BTA IN S ecurity radio ............................................................................................. ED

2. REPORT to the TSC (or RTSC if applicable) ............................................ _ (time)

3. REFERENCE the applicable section(s) of EM-102 upon arrival at the T S C ...................................................................................................... _ (tim e )

4. RECEIVE pass-along brief from the SSS on-duty ...................................... _ (time)

5. COORDINATE PA accountability (if performed) with the SSS ................... _ (time)

6. NOTIFY the SSS or designee of changing events in the TSC/OSC ........... _ (time)

7. EVALUATE the need to call in additional Security personnel ................................... El

8. WHEN TSC/OSC is operating and the EC takes over, CONTACT AND INFORM SSS of the change. ASSUME command of S ecurity ...................................................................................................... __ (tim e )

9. DOCUMENT actions (See Enclosure 1 for suggested notes) .................................. [j EM-211 Rev. 28 1 Page 14 of 22

ATTACHMENT 1 Page 2 of 3 SECURITY COORDINATOR'S SUGGESTED ACTION CHECKLIST (Cont'd) 3.0 SITE AREA EMERGENCY - If an Alert was not declared prior to the Site Area Emergency declaration, COMPLETE actions listed under the Alert stage (Section B) prior to continuing.

1. AFTER the EC makes the decision to evacuate all non-essential personnel, CALL for the evacuation of all non-essential Security pe rso nne l ................................................................................................... _ (tim e )

2. INITIATE Accountability; REPORT Accountability results (with a list of missing individuals) to the EC within thirty (30) minutes ........................ __ (time)

3. INFORM the SSS of the change in emergency conditions ......................... _ (time)

4. In the event Security evacuates from the PA (10CFR50.54 (x) and (y) or Section 24 of the SECURITY PLAN are invoked for suspension of Safeguards, ENSURE the Security Coordinator has, or has access to Security keys prior to the evacuation being com pleted ................................................................................................... _ (tim e )

5. ENSURE any remaining (essential) Security personnel are assembled in a safe location (i.e., 143' Control Complex, TSC) ................ _ (time)

6. DOCUMENT actions (See Enclosure 1 for suggested notes) .................................. n IEM-211 I Rev. 28 1 Page 15 of 22

ATTACHMENT 1 Page 3 of 3 SECURITY COORDINATOR'S SUGGESTED ACTION CHECKLIST (Cont'd) 4.0 GENERAL EMERGENCY - If an Alert and Site Area Emergency were not declared prior to the General Emergency declaration, REVIEW actions listed under the Alert stage (Section B) and Site Area Emergency Stage (Section C) prior to continuing

1. NOTIFY the SSS of the change in emergency conditions .......................... _ (time)

2. If order to evacuate the Energy Complex is given INFORM:

a. CR3 Security Specialist (as appropriate) .......................................... N/A E D

b. S S S ........................................................................................ tim e )

3. In the event Security evacuates from the PA (10CFR50.54 (x) and (y) or Section 24 of the SECURITY PLAN are invoked for suspension of Safeguards, ENSURE the Security Coordinator has, or has access to Security keys prior to the evacuation being co m pleted ................................................................................................... _ (tim e )

4. DOCUMENT actions (See Enclosure 1 for suggested notes) .................................. [1 EM-211 Rev. 28 Page 16 of 22]

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 1 of 5 SECURITY SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S (OR DESIGNEE'S) SUGGESTED ACTION CHECKLIST NOTES: 1. The EC has the authority and responsibility to invoke 1 OCFR50.54 (x) and (y) or Section 24 of the CR3-PSP, Duke Energy Florida - Crystal River Unit 3 (CR3) Nuclear Plant Physical Security Plan, Security Training and Qualification Plan, And Safeguards Contingency Plan (SECURITY PLAN),as applicable, for suspension of Safeguards. The SSS must determine the reason for the suspension of Safeguards and if it is full or partial suspension.

2. Casualty identification is the responsibility of Security. Any information concerning Site casualties will only be transmitted to the EC.

3. Following this Attachment through completion is strongly recommended. As designated, indicate the time completed on the line provided.

4. Nuclear Security ensures emergency response personnel are notified in accordance with EM-206, Emergency Plan Roster Notification.

5. If the Security Shift Supervisor is acting as the Security Coordinator he/she should transition to Attachment 1. The SSS designee will complete Attachment 2.

1.0 UNUSUAL EVENT

1. NOTIFY the Manager- Nuclear Plant Security or designee(s) .................... _ (time)

2. NOTIFY Security Project Manager (PM) .................................................... _ (time)

3. NO TIFY Security on call ............................................................................. _ (tim e)

4. ADVISE the Security Force of the event .................................................... _ (time)

5. NOTIFY personnel at the Nuclear Security Training Building (STB) and/or Site Administration Building (SAB) of the event (if applicable) ........ _ (time)

6. PREPARE to cordon off affected area(s) surrounding the e m e rg e n c y ...............................................................................................................

7. CONSIDER requesting a dose rate instrument be placed in CAS by HP .................

8. If directed, ACTIVATE Crystal River Energy Complex Siren System located in the Site Administrative Bldg (SAB) ............................................. _ (time)

I EM-211 Rev. 28 1 Page 17 of 22

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 2 of 5 SECURITY SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S (OR DESIGNEE'S)

SUGGESTED ACTION CHECKLIST (Cont'd) 2.0 ALERT

1. As directed, ACTIVATE the ERO Notification System (ERONS) in accordance with EM -206 ............................................................................ _ (tim e)

2. NOTIFY ACP of ERO activation and ensure adequate staffing .................. _ (time)

3. In the event of EOF and/or RTSC activation, ensure the ACP conducts turn-around for those responders that may need to be redirected to the EOF and/or RTSC ........................................................... _ (time)

4. NOTIFY all Security personnel to remain on assigned posts and aw ait further instructions ............................................................................ _ (tim e)

5. NOTIFY the Manager- Nuclear Plant Security or designee(s) of change in em ergency conditions ................................................................ _ (tim e)

6. EVALUATE the need for additional Security support and advise the Superintendent, Security or designee(s) .................................................... - (tim e)

7. If directed, ACTIVATE Crystal River Energy Complex Siren System located in the Site Administrative Bldg (SAB) ............................................. _ (time)

NOTE: Ensure all call-ins are directed to muster at the Nuclear Security Operations Center (NSOC) or designated alternate assembly area.

8. CALL-IN additional Security personnel as warranted ................................. __ (time)

9. ENSURE SEC-NGGC-2141 and SEC-92166 are complied with ................ _ (time)

10. NOTIFY PM of change in emergency conditions ....................................... _ (time)

11. PREPARE to transfer all duties to the TSC including a pass-a-long brief to the Security Coordinator in the TSC ............................................................. L]

12. CO NSIDER Security staffing of the EOF .................................................................. R I EM-211 Rev. 28 1 Page 18 of 22 1

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 3 of 5 SECURITY SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S (OR DESIGNEE'S)

SUGGESTED ACTION CHECKLIST (Cont'd) 3.0 SITE AREA EMERGENCY - If an Alert was not declared prior to the Site Area Emergency declaration, COMPLETE actions listed under the Alert stage (Section B) prior to continuing. [R1]

1. As directed, ACTIVATE the ERO Notification System (ERONS), in accordance w ith EM -206 ............................................................................ _ (tim e)

2. NOTIFY ACP of ERO activation and ensure adequate staffing .................. _ (time)

3. In the event of EOF and/or RTSC activation, ensure the ACP conducts turn-around for those responders that may need to be redirected to the EOF and/or RTSC ........................................................... _ (time)

4. CONFER with EOF Security Coordinator (if available), the EOF Director and/or EP personnel as to whether Security can provide access control at the EOF with a Security Officer(s). If not, EOF Security Coordinator (if available), the EOF Director and/or EP personnel should make arrangements with CCSO to provide access controls for the EO F ....................................................................... _ (tim e)

5. EVACUATE the PA (upon order from the EC) including non-essential on-duty Security personnel. (Essential Security personnel should be assembled in a safe location, i.e., 143' Control C o m p le x , T S C .) .......................................................................................... - (tim e )

6. Per EM-205, DESIGNATE a Main Assembly Area Supervisor (MAAS) to be located at the Main Assembly Area (MAA) in the Site Adm inistration Building (SAB) Auditorium .................................................. - (tim e)

7. ACTIVATE Crystal River Energy Complex Siren System located in the Site Administrative Building. (Reference SS-209) ............................... _ (time)

8. PERFO RM Accountability .......................................................................... _ (tim e)

9. NOTIFY the Security Coordinator in the TSC of accountability results within thirty (30) m inutes ................................................................. _ (tim e)

10. INFORM the PM of the change in emergency conditions .......................... - (time)

11. Have on-duty non-essential Security personnel REPORT to the NS O C ....................................................................................................................... El

12. PREVENT any unauthorized personnel from entering the PA ................................. 1:

I EM-211 I Rev. 28 1 Page 19 of 22

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 4 of 5 SECURITY SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S (OR DESIGNEE'S)

SUGGESTED ACTION CHECKLIST (Cont'd)

13. Be PREPARED to enhance Access Control Point operations.

a. Items needed:

1) List of CR3 badged personnel ............................................................ ED

2) List of company dignitaries .................................................................

3) Current Energy Complex phone book (Hard copy if ava ila ble ) .................................................................................... ... El

4) R a d io s ................................................................................................ 0

5) F la s h lig hts ...........................................................................................

6) W eapons and ammunition ..................................................................

7) Ha nd cuff s ............................................................................................ E]

8) Intermediate weapons ........................................................................

14. All movement within the PA should be made using the Protected Area map and contamination data available in the TSC ............................ - (time)

15. PREPARE Security Vehicle(s) for possible departure - must have se ve ra l ra d io s ........................................................................................................... EL

16. DOCUMENT actions in appropriate logs and reports (See Enclosure 1 for suggested notes) ............................................................................. E]

I EM-211 I Rev. 28 1 Page 20 of 22 1

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 5 of 5 SECURITY SHIFT SUPERVISOR'S (OR DESIGNEE'S)

SUGGESTED ACTION CHECKLIST (Cont'd) 4.0 GENERAL EMERGENCY - If an Alert and Site Area Emergency were not declared prior to the General Emergency declaration, REVIEW actions listed under the Alert stage (Section B) and Site Area Emergency stage (Section C) prior to continuing. [R1]

1. If an Energy Complex evacuation order is issued, ENSURE all non-essential (including Security) personnel evacuate per the provisions in S S-209 .................................................................................. _ (tim e)

2. ENSURE any remaining (essential) Security personnel are assembled in a safe location (i.e., 143' Control Complex, TSC.) ............... _ (time)

3. ACTIVATE Crystal River Energy Complex Siren System located in the Site Administrative Building. (Reference SS-209) ............................... (time)

4. REPORT Accountability to the Security Coordinator in the TSC (SSS or designee is last to depart the PA) ................................................. _ (time)

5. R EM O V E Facility Access Logs ................................................................................ R

6. OBTAIN a list of all CR3 badged employees ............................................................ ED

7. ASSEMBLE all necessary health and comfort items ............................................... R

8. DEPART to designated Security Assembly Point ....................................... _ (time)

9. NOTIFY TSC and EOF of your departure .................................................. _ (time)

10. DOCUMENT all actions in appropriate logs and reports (See Enclosure 1 for suggested notes) ............................................................... _ (tim e)

11. NOTIFY TSC/EOF when you have set up at the alternative Security A sse m bly P o int .......................................................................................... - (tim e )

I EM-211 I Rev. 28 1 Page 21 of 22 1

Summary of changes The following changes were made in this revision (incorporates PRR 649998):

NOTE: Writers and reviewers; ensure that any changes to this procedure that affect information contained in ERF posters, Enclosures, briefing cards, guidelines, etc... are made to those items as well.

NOTE: Writers and reviewers: changes to certain parts of this procedure may impact other EPIPs.

SECTION/STEP CHANGES Cover page Replaced logo with new Duke Energy logo.

2.1.1; ATTACHMENT 1, Replaced security plan title with new Duke Energy title.

note 1; & ATTACHMENT 2, note 1 2.1.6, 9.4.6, & Changed procedure number for SEC-NGGC-2166 to SEC-92166, new ATTACHMENT 2, step site specific procedure for Site Access Controls. (PRR 638740) 2.0.9 2.1.7 (new) Added reference to SEC-92147, Reporting Of Safeguards And Fitness-For-Duty Events (PRR 649998) 2.1.16 (new) Added reference to 10 CFR 73.71 for information regarding 1-hour security notifications for sabotage. (PRR 649998) 4.0.5, 9.3.1, & 9.3.2 Changed Nuclear Shift Manager to Shift Supervisor and NSM to SS, to match DTO organization titles. Added more suggested notes that should be logged by the Security Coordinator in the TSC, as suggested by Security Coordinators.

ATTACHMENT 1, page Added direction for Security Coordinator to identify information 1 of 3, NOTE 5 regarding 10CFR73.71, 1-hour security notifications for sabotage and ensure the EC is aware and the ENS Communicator characterizes it properly. (PRR 649998)

Added statement in "DOCUMENT" steps to "See Enclosure 1 for suggested notes".

ATTACHMENT 2, step Added notification of" Security on call" at the suggestion of Security 1.0.3 (new) Coordinators.

Added statement in "DOCUMENT" steps to "See Enclosure 1 for suggested notes".

IEM-211 I Rev. 28 1 Page 22 of 22

DUKE I DUKE Information ENERGY. Use CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 PLANT OPERATING MANUAL EM-500 EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE REVISION 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPO SE ....................................................................................................................... 3 2.0 REFERENC ES ................................................................................................................ 3 3.0 DEFINITIO NS/ABBREVIATIO NS ............................................................................... 4 4.0 RESPO NSIBILITIES ................................................................................................... 6 4.1 Engineering .................................................................................................... 6 4.2 Radiation Control .............................................................................................. 6 4.3 Maintenance ................................................................................................... 6 4.4 O perations ..................................................................................................... 6 4.5 O utage and Scheduling .................................................................................... 6 4.6 Nuclear Plant Security ....................................................................................... 6 4.7 Digital Process System s .................................................................................. 6 4.8 Em ergency Preparedness (EP) ....................................................................... 6 4.9 Licensing/Regulatory Program s ....................................................................... 6 4.10 Telecom m unications ........................................................................................ 7 4.11 Chem istry and Environm ental ........................................................................... 7 5.0 PREREQ UISITES .................................................................................................... 7 6.0 PRECAUTIO NS, LIM ITATIO NS, AND NOTES .......................................................... 7 7.0 SPECIAL TO O LS AND EQ UIPM ENT ......................................................................... 7 8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ........................................................................................... 7 9.0 INSTRUCTIO NS ...................................................................................................... 8 9.1 G eneral Inform ation .......................................................................................... 8 9.2 Planned or Unplanned loss of an EIER ............................................................ 9 9.3 Reportability Determ ination G uidance .............................................................. 9 10.0 RECO RDS ....................................................................................................................... 9 ATTACHMENTS

1. Planned or Unplanned Loss of Equipment Important to EP ........................... 10

2. EIER list and Com pensatory Actions .............................................................. 11

3. Reactor Coolant System Leakage Instrum entation ........................................ 20 Sum m ary of Changes ............................................................................................................... 21 I EM-500 Rev. 1 1 Page 2 of 21

1.0 PURPOSE

1. This procedure includes a description of the plant equipment and emergency response facilities needed to implement the Crystal River 3 Radiological Emergency Response Plan and delineates compensatory measures to be used when the equipment is unavailable.

2.0 REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.47(b), Emergency Plans

2. 10 CFR 50.54(q), Conditions of Licenses, Emergency Plans

3. 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors

4. 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System

5. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, GDC 3, Fire Protection

6. 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities

7. 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979

8. ADMO104, Work Implementation and Completion

9. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)

10. INPO 10-007, Equipment Important to Emergency Response

11. NUREG-0654, Revision 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants"

12. NUREG-0696, "Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities"

13. NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements

14. NUREG-1 022, "Event Reporting Guidelines", 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73

15. NUREG-1394, "Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) Implementation"

16. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM)

17. CP-0151, External Reporting Requirements

18. RERP, Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP)

19. WCP0300, Work Request Initiation, Screening, Prioritization and Classification

20. EM-204A, Off-site Dose Assessment During Radiological Emergencies(Control Room Method)

21. EM-401, Set-up of the Emergency Operations Facility (Includes Set-up of the Emergency News Center).

22. HPP-409, Inventory and Availability of Emergency Supplies/Equipment

23. EM-21 1, Duties of the CR3 Nuclear Security Organization EM-500 Rev. 1 1Page3of2

24. OPS1000, Conduct of Operations During Decommissioning

25. EM-202, Duties of the Emergency Coordinator

26. EM-206, Emergency Response Organization Notification 3.0 DEFINITIONS/ABBREVIATIONS

1. AARD: Accident Assessment Ringdown

2. AEF: Alternate Emergency Facility

3. Alternate Indication: A backup means of monitoring a parameter or condition that should approximate the primary indication it is replacing.

4. Category A (1) Equipment: Equipment that provides the sole indication, or very little redundancy, for a parameter used to assess an Emergency Action Level (EAL) threshold.

5. Category A (2) Equipment: Equipment that provides a sole means of fulfilling an emergency response function.

6. Category B Equipment: Equipment that has redundant components or trains that fulfill an emergency response function or redundant indications for a parameter used to assess an Emergency Action Level (EAL) threshold.

7. Commercial Phone system: The Commercial phone system connects to offsite lines via transfer codes or use of outside line.

8. Compensatory Measure: A temporary means of mitigating the degradation or loss of an emergency response function or of maintaining the emergency response function until the equipment is restored to a fully functional condition.

9. CR: Control Room

10. DARD: Dose Assessment Ringdown System

11. Degraded Condition: A condition of a Structure, System, or Component (SSC) in which there has been any reduction in the qualification or functional capability.

Examples include failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, and defective material and equipment. Aging, erosion, corrosion, improper operation and maintenance are examples of conditions that can reduce the capacity of a system.

12. EMnet: Florida Emergency Management Network

13. Emergency Response Facility (ERF): Facilities, buildings, and structures which are identified in the emergency plan and include systems and equipment that are used for emergency response during declared emergency plan events.

14. ENC: Emergency News Center

15. EOF: Emergency Operations Facility

16. EP: Emergency Preparedness (Unit or Staff)

17. EPZ: Emergency Planning Zone I EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 4 of 21 1

18. Equipment Important to Emergency Response (EIER): Systems, structures and components, as well as essential tools and equipment, are necessary to implement the emergency plan. The level of detail used in tracking these items should be sufficient to allow the user to identify any loss or degradation of function that supports the emergency plan.

a. Essential tools and equipment include, but are not limited to, such items as facility computer links to the plant computer, dedicated telephone lines, hand-held radiation survey meters, and air samplers.

b. In contrast, non-essential tools and equipment are those items which, although useful, would not result in a loss of function or diminish the emergency response capability and are not considered equipment important to emergency response.

19. ERDS: Emergency Response Data System

20. ERO: Emergency Response Organization

21. Operable / Operability: As defined in the plant Technical Specifications.

22. OSC: Operational Support Center

23. PAX: Public Address Exchange System

24. PE Telephone System: Consists of equipment utilized to contact on-site extensions. The system is used to communication to on-site specific locations.

25. SGI: Safeguards Information

26. SHRD: State Hot Ring Down System

27. Timely Restoration: Actions taken by site personnel to return degraded or out-of-service equipment to service commensurate with the significance of the associated emergency response function.

28. TRM: Technical Requirements Manual

29. TSC: Technical Support Center EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 5 of 21

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 Engineering Responsible for ensuring that Engineering support is provided in the planning and execution of work on equipment essential to the ERO.

4.2 Radiation Control Responsible for implementing the program that tests and inventories Radiological Emergency Kits, and Environmental Survey Vehicles in accordance with HPP-409, Inventory and Availability of Emergency Supplies/Equipment.

4.3 Maintenance Responsible for ensuring that Maintenance support is provided for the following:

Testing and maintaining the on-site EIER in a timely manner 4.4 Operations Responsible for ensuring that applicable actions, including identification, tracking, and compensatory measures, are taken when EP equipment or emergency response facilities are degraded or removed from service.

4.5 Outage and Scheduling Responsible for ensuring that O&S support is provided for work on EP-related equipment within the scope of the work management program and that work is appropriately prioritized and scheduled (including corrective and preventive maintenance and testing).

4.6 Nuclear Plant Security Responsible for ensuring that Security support is provided for testing and maintaining operability of the following:

• Security Fences

• Security Camera Systems

• Security Computers

• Security Communications 4.7 Digital Process Systems Responsible for ensuring that Engineering support is provided for all process computers related to EIER 4.8 Emergency Preparedness (EP)

Responsible for maintaining oversight of EP facilities and equipment; having an awareness of the operational status of equipment essential to the ERO; and for ensuring that work and change-related processes include appropriate screening requirements to identify impacts on the EP program.

4.9 Licensing/Regulatory Programs Responsible for providing guidance on compliance with the plant licensing basis and related reportability issues.

EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 6 of 21

4.10 Telecommunications Responsible for ensuring that Telecommunications support is provided for the communications equipment classified as EIER.

4.11 Chemistry and Environmental Responsible for maintaining oversight and availability of lab analysis equipment for DEI and Count Room instrumentation; and for ensuring compensatory action are completed for equipment unavailability.

5.0 PREREQUISITES When conducting a planned loss of an EIER ensure required redundant components are available and any applicable compensatory actions are in place prior to removing the EIER from service.

6.0 PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND NOTES The Emergency Response Facilities, i.e., Control Room, Technical Support Center/Operational Support Center (TSC/OSC), Nuclear Security Operations Center (NSOC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the Emergency News Center (ENC),

are described in the Emergency Response Plan (RERP) and supporting plant emergency procedures. All emergency facilities, including the AEF, must be maintained in a state of readiness and contain equipment required to respond to an emergency. Due to the broad scope of EP functions conducted from the emergency facilities, the loss of an ERF can have a significant impact on emergency plan implementation. Restoration of nonfunctional or degraded ERF's requires prompt management attention, and degraded or nonfunctioning equipment associated with these facilities will be restored in a timely manner.

7.0 SPECIAL TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT None 8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA None EM-500 I Rev. 1 Page7of21l

9.0 INSTRUCTIONS 9.1 General Information

1. CR-3 is required to follow and maintain an emergency plan that meets the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10CFR 50, Appendix E. Equipment required to meet these regulations must be capable of functioning at all times. If there is a loss of function, compensatory measures must be taken to restore the function, until the equipment is repaired.

2. Regulations that govern EP equipment (i.e., 10 CFR 50.47(b); 10 CFR 50, Appendix E; NUREG-0654; and NUREG-0696) may require more timely restoration than technical specification or other administrative controls and therefore, may require a higher priority work order.

3. There are specific reportability requirements in 10 CFR 50.72 for the loss of equipment important to EP. If there is a loss of function of equipment important to EP, the Supervisor-Licensing/Regulatory Programs (or designee) and Supervisor-Emergency Preparedness (or designee) will review the requirements, evaluate the loss of equipment, and make a determination regarding reportability.

4. The EP staff should be informed of the planned removal from service of equipment important to EP in order to ensure contingency plans are in place to satisfy the function while the equipment is out of service.

5. Attachment 2 includes a list of equipment important to emergency response, compensatory measures, the bases for the equipment, and the name of the group responsible for the equipment.

6. Attachment 1 provides flowchart guidance for a planned or unplanned loss of EP equipment.

7. Details of security systems and other equipment important to EP are considered safeguards information and are not described in this procedure. Instead, they are described in the Security Plan and supporting security procedures.

I EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 8 of 21

9.2 Planned or Unplanned loss of an EIER Note Use Attachment 1 as an aid to implement the Loss of EIER Process.

1. If an EIER listed in Attachment 2 is to be removed from service or is discovered to be inoperable Then,

a. Inform the Shift Supervisor and duty EP Manager

b. Refer to Attachment 2 to determine EIER Category and redundant components as appropriate:

1) Insure redundant components or indications are available to assure ERF or emergency plan function is not impacted.

c. If redundancy has been lost or an emergency plan function is impacted upgrade category and priority of restoration.

d. EP Duty Manager determines impact on ERO and communicates compensatory actions to applicable ERO as needed.

e. Shift Supervisor evaluates reportability in accordance with CP-151 External Reporting Requirements

f. Implement compensatory actions as shown in Attachment 2.

9.3 Reportability Determination Guidance Refer to CP-151 External Reporting Requirements for reportability determination when an unplanned loss of an EIER occurs. Reportability for loss of emergency preparedness capabilities is defined in NUREG-1022, Revision 2, Event Reporting Guidelines, as "Any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of Control Room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system)."

10.0 RECORDS None I EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 9 of 21

ATTACHMENT 1 Page 1 of 1 Planned or Unplanned Loss of Equipment Important to EP EM-500 I Rev. 1 1 Page 10of2l I

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 1 of 9 EIER list and Compensatory Actions Equipment Category Basis IEAL Compensatory Action State Hot Ring Down System (SHRD) B NUREG-0654 (II.) Use alternate communications equipment in NUREG-0696 accordance with EM-202 Duties of the Emergency Coordinator to make notifications via Commercial phone system or EMnet.

Florida Emergency Management Network B NUREG-0654 (lIF) Use alternate communications equipment such as (EMnet) NUREG-0696 commercial phone systems, SHRD system, or cellular phones Public Address Exchange System (PAX) B NUREG-0654 (IL.F) Use alternate communication system such as PE NUREG-0696 telephone system, handheld radios, cellular telephones Commercial phone system B NUREG-0654 (lIF) Use alternate communication system such as NUREG-0696 cellular phone, satellite phones, handheld radios, PAX system PE Telephone system B NUREG-0654 (lI.F) Use alternate communication systems such as NUREG-0696 cellular phones, or commercial telephone system FTS-2001 Phone system including: B NUREG-0654 (IF) Use commercial phone system as an alternate Emergency Notification System (ENS), NUREG-0696 communication system.

Health Physics Network (HPN), Reactor Safety Counterpart Link (RSCL), Protective Measures Counterpart Link (PMCL),

Management Counterpart Link (MCL)

Portable UHF Radios B NUREG-0654 (II.F) Use alternate communication system such as PE NUREG-0696 Telephone system, cellular telephones, PAX extensions EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 11 of 21]

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 2 of 9 Equipment Category Basis /EAL Compensatory Action Accident Assessment Ringdown B NUREG-0654 (II.F) Use PE telephone system, cellular telephones, (AARD) NUREG-0696 handheld radios, PAX extensions, or satellite phones Dose Assessment Ringdown System B NUREG-0654 (II.F) Use PE telephone system, cellular telephones, (DARD) NUREG-0696 handheld radios, PAX extensions, or satellite phones Satellite Phones B NUREG-0654 (II.F) Use PE telephone system, cellular telephones, NUREG-0696 handheld radios, PAX extensions, or commercial; phone system.

State Law Enforcement Radio B Use cellular phones or commercial phones systems.

System (SLERS), Citrus County 800 MHz radio system Crystal River Energy Complex Sirens A (2) Use alternate notification system such as PAX notifications, Security sweeps of affected areas, notifications to Units 1/2 and 4/5 Control Rooms Off Site Siren Notification System B Notify Citrus EOC to implement pre-planned alternative notification strategies Plant Integrated Computer B NUREG 0696 (4.7) 1. Manually collect data and System(PICS) and OSI/PI communicate to specific ERF as needed.

Emergency Response Data System B 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9); 10 2. Verbally transmit data to the NRC (ERDS) CFR 50, Appendix E using the following communication (IV.E.2); NUREG-0696 lines:

(1.3.5; 6) 0 ENS 0 Commercial telephones EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 12 of 21]

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 3 of 9 Equipment Category Basis /EAL Compensatory Action Safety Parameter Display System A (2) NUREG-0696 (1.3.4; Manually acquire SPDS data and communicate (SPDS) 2.9; 4.7; 4.8; 5) this information as needed to various ERF NUREG 0737, Supplement 1 Dose Assessment Software B 10 CFR 50.47(b) (9); 10 Relocate to another Duke Energy computer and (RASCAL) CFR 50, Appendix E perform dose assessment via accessing the (IV.E.2); NUREG-0654 RASCAL program.

(11.1.9); NUREG-0696 If Rascal program is unavailable perform offsite (4.8). dose assessment in accordance with EM-204A Off-site Dose Assessment During Radiological Emergencies (Control Room Method)

TSC Emergency Diesel Generator B NUREG-0696 (2.6; If ERO is activated and a loss of normal power and Transfer Switch. (MEDG-1, 4.2); NUREG-0737 occurs consider relocating the TSC to either the MEXS-2) (ll.B.2); GDC-19; GL- Alternate or Remote TSC location. This decision 91-014 should be based on existing event conditions; coordinated with the Radiation Controls Coordinator; and approved by the EC.

TSC Ventilation System A (2) NUREG-0696 (2.6; If ERO is activated, consider relocating the TSC to 4.2); NUREG-0737 either the Alternate or the Remote TSC location.

(ll.B.2); GDC-19; GL- This decision should be based on existing event 91-014 conditions; coordinated with the Radiation Controls Coordinator; and approved by the EC ERONS 1 and ERONS 2 - ERO B Use redundant system if one of the ERONS fail or notification systems are not available. If both systems are not available, ERO notifications can be performed manually using commercial telephone systems.

EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 13 of 21]

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 4 of 9 Equipment Category Basis /EAL Compensatory Action Meteorological Monitoring System B Use data from the alternate meteorological tower (MET Tower) (MPP-3) (MPP-1).

EOF facility including emergency B Emergency Diesel generator: Provide portable power and ventilation equipment temporary power source or consider selecting an alternate location if normal power is lost to EOF.

EOF Ventilation: Use portable ventilation equipment and open doors, or consider alternate location if habitability is not sustainable Environmental Survey Vehicles B Use available Duke Energy vehicles Assembly Areas: NAB, NSOC, B Designate an alternate assembly area if a particular PAB, Rusty Bldg, SAB, Shops assembly area is not available.

Access Control Point (ACP)

Equipment:

a. Back-up diesel-generator B Ensure normal power supply available; provide temporary back up power supply for planned outage.

b. ACP Readers B Use phone verification EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 14 of 21

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 5 of 9 Equipment Category Basis /EAL Compensatory Action Access Control Point (ACP)

Equipment (Continued):

c. Patriot Barriers (PSPG) and ACP Wedges GAT-PSVG-OC- B Take actions in accordance with SS0208 2A, GAT-PSVG-OC-2C, GAT- Compensatory Measures (SGI).

PSVG-OC-5A, GAT-PSVG-OC-7A, GAT-PSVG_OC-8A, GAT-PSVG-OC-2B, GAT-PSVG-OC-2D, GAT_PSVG-OC-5B, GAT-PSVG-OC-7B, GAT-PSVG-OC-8B, GATPSPG-OC-1, GAT-PSPG-OC-2, GAT-PSPG-OC-3, GAT-PSPG-OC-4, GAT-PSVG-9 NSOC Turnstiles Egress (Minimum of 1 B Take actions in accordance with EM-211 Duties of required) DOR-AG21A, DOR-AG21A the CR3 Nuclear Security Organization NSOC Egress Portal Monitors (Minimum B Set up manual frisking stations at the direction of of 1 required) Health Physics.

NSOC Turnstiles Ingress (Minimum of 2 B Take actions in accordance with SS0208 required) DOR-AG25A, DOR-AG25B, Compensatory Measures (SGI).

DOR-AG24A, DOR-AG24B EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 15 of 21

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 6 of 9 Equipment Category Basis /EAL Compensatory Action Search Train Equipment: ED-PSED-1, ED- B Take actions in accordance with SS0208 PSED-2, ED-PSED-3, ED-PSED-4, Compensatory Measures (SGI).

MD-PSMD-1, MD-PSMD-2, MD-PSMD-3, MD-PSMD-4, XRA-PSPX-1, XRA-PSPX-2 ALL Security Readers B Take actions in accordance with SS0208 Compensatory Measures (SGI).

Primary Gates and Barriers GAT-PSVG-1, B Take actions in accordance with SS0208 GAT-PSVG-5 Compensatory Measures (SGI).

Plant Security Computer (PSCS) CPU- A (2) Take actions in accordance with SS0208 PSCS-3C, CPU-PSCS-1S, CS-PSCS-1 Compensatory Measures (SGI).

Security Printers: PRT-PSLP-1, PRT- B Use redundant equipment PSLP-2 (1 of 2 required)

Computer work station SAS/CAS 1 of 2 B Use redundant equipment required RM-A1 Reactor Building Purge Exhaust A (1) 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 Use Sample analysis, or field survey to evaluate EAL RM-A2 Auxiliary and Fuel Handling A (1) 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 Use Sample analysis, or field survey to evaluate Building Exhaust Duct monitor EAL EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 16 of 21

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 7 of 9 Equipment Category Basis /EAL Compensatory Action RM-L2 SW/RW Plant Discharge A (1) 1.5, 1.6 Use grab sample analysis to evaluate EAL monitor RM-L7 Station Drain Tank Discharge A (1) 1.5, 1.6 Use grab sample analysis to evaluate EAL monitor RM-G1 Control Room area radiation A (1) 1.8 Use local area survey data to evaluate EAL monitor RM-G3 Auxiliary Building Sample A (1) 1.7, 1.8 Use local area survey data to evaluate EAL Room RM-G4 RCA Entrance Corridor A (1) 1.7, 1.8 Use local area survey data to evaluate EAL RM-G5 Gas Decay Tank Area A (1) 1.7, 1.8 Use local area survey data to evaluate EAL RM-G9 Auxiliary Building near the A (1) 1.7, 1.8 Use local area survey data to evaluate EAL Personnel Access Hatch RM-G10 Makeup Pump Area A (1) 1.7, 1.8 Use local area survey data to evaluate EAL RM-G14 Fuel Storage Pool area A (1) 1.7 Use local area survey data to evaluate EAL monitor RM-G15 Fuel Handling Bridge Auxiliary A (1) 1.10 Use local area survey data to evaluate EAL Building RM-G16 Fuel Handling Bridge Reactor A (1) 1.10 Use local area survey data to evaluate EAL Building RM-G17 Reactor Building Near A (1) 1.7, 1.8 Use local area survey data to evaluate EAL Personnel Hatch EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 17 of 211

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 8 of 9 Equipment Category Basis /EAL Compensatory Action RM-G29, RM-G30 Reactor Building Hi B 5.1, 6.1, 7.2 Use redundant instrument if available, otherwise use Range Radiation Monitors local field surveys to evaluate EAL Reactor Coolant System Leakage B 3.12 Calculate RCS leakage using alternate instrumentation as listed on Attachment 3 instrumentation as specified in the manual method in accordance with SP-317 RC System Water Inventory Balance Radio-Chem Lab analysis equipment for B 3.9, 5.1 Use redundant analysis equipment to process DEI samples 1 of 3 detectors required samples for DEI determination, Use RM-G29 or 30 reading or ICC curves for Fuel Clad integrity determinations Nuclear Instrumentation NI-1, NI-2, NI-3, B 3.14 Use redundant instrumentation to evaluate the EAL NI-4, N1-14, NI-15 RCS Temperature indication - RC-171- B 3.13, 3.15, 3.16, Use indications on redundant instrument panel or TR, RC-172-TR with 8 inputs each 4.4, 7.2 SPDS to evaluate EAL.

(IM-9H-TE, IM-5G-TE, IM-6C-TE, IM-9E-TE, IM-13G, IM-100, IM-3L, IM-60, IM-7F, IM-2G, IM-10C, IM-11G, IM-10M, IM-13L, IM-4N, lM-6L) (Indications also available on SPDS)

DH-2-TE1, DH-2-TE2 DHHE-1A (1B) B 3.15 Use redundant temperature indications to evaluate Outlet Temperature EAL Seismic Instrumentation-(Sl-1-MAT, SI B 2.1, 2.2 Use redundant instrumentation if available, MAS, SI-1-MR, SI-2-MAT, SI-2-MR, SI otherwise contact the US Geological Survey at 303-MAT, SI-3-MR) 273-8500 to obtain data to evaluate EAL EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 18 of 21

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 9 of 9 Equipment Category Basis /EAL Compensatory Action Reactor Building Pressure-BS-90-PI, B 7.1, 7.2 Use redundant instrumentation to evaluate EAL BS-91-PI Reactor Building Sump Level, WD-303- B 7.1, 7.2 Use redundant instrumentation to evaluate EAL LI, WD-304-LI Reactor Building Hydrogen Monitor, B 7.2 Use redundant instrumentation or Hydrogen analysis WS-1O-CE, WS-11-CE data from Reactor Building atmosphere sample to evaluate EAL Pressurizer Level: RC-1-LT1, RC-1-LT2, B 6.2 Use redundant instrumentation to evaluate EAL and RC-1-LT3 Pressurizer Relief Safety Valve Acoustic B 6.2 Use alternate indications such as Pressurizer Code Elements: RC-160-ME1, RC-160-ME2, Safety Valve Temperature and RCDT level to determine RC-160-ME3 valve position to evaluate EAL RC Wide Range T-Cold Temperature: B 6.2 Use redundant instrumentation to evaluate EAL RC-5A-TE2, RC-5A-TE4, RC-5B-TE2, RC-5B-TE4 RC Wide Range Pressure: RC-3A-PT3, B 6.2, 7.2 Use redundant instrumentation to evaluate EAL RC-3A-PT4, RC-3B-PT3 Pressurizer Code Safety Valve B 6.2 Use alternate indications such as RCDT level and Temperature: RC-17-TE1, RC-17-TE2, acoustic elements to determine valve positions to and RC-17-TE3 evaluate EAL EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 19 of 21

ATTACHMENT 3 Page 1 of 1 Reactor Coolant System Leakage Instrumentation Description Recall/Computer Point Description Recall/Computer Point RCDT Pressure U3RECL-68 T-Hot (A loop) U3R226 RCDT Temperature U3RECL-69 T-Hot (A loop) U3R227 RCDT Level U3X368 T-Hot (B loop) U3R228 MUT Pressure U3X401 T-Hot (B loop) U3R229 MUT Temperature U3X208 T-Cold (A loop) U3R214 MUT Level U3X359 T-Cold (A loop) U3R215 PZR Temperature U3R203 T-Cold (B loop) U3R216 PZR Level U3R874 T-Cold (B loop) U3R217 RC Pressure (A loop) U3R222 RCP-1A CBO Flow U3X922 RC Pressure (A loop) U3R223 RCP-1B CBO Flow U3X923 RC Pressure (B loop) U3R224 RCP-1C CBO Flow U3X924 RC Pressure (B loop) U3R225 RCP-1D CBO Flow U3X925 EM-500 Rev. 1 Page 20 of 21

Summary of Changes PRR 00616624 SECTI6N/STEP CHANGE' Throughout Revision 01 of EM-500 incorporates information from EMG-NGGC-007, Equipment Important to Emergency Preparedness and Response, and incorporates various human factor changes and formatting changes.

Title page Changed logo to Duke Energy logo (editorial)

Table of Contents & Changed titles of sections to the department versus the supervisor or manager of the department, Section 4.0 due to changing titles. (editorial) 2.0 References Changed fleet references to site-specific procedures for ADMO104, WCP0300, & OPS1000.

(editorial). Removed references to fleet procedures EMG-NGGC-0004, EMG-NGGC-0005, and EMG-NGGC-0007 that no longer are used or apply to CR3. Added new procedure EM-206, Emergency Response Organization Notification Note at 3.0 Deleted note for reference to EMG-NGGC-0007 that no longer applies at CR3 3.0 Added definition for Alternate Indication, as it applies to backup indication for monitoring from EMG-NGGC-0007).

Added definitions for Degraded Condition and Timely Resolution from EMG-NGGC-0007.

Deleted ERFIS definition as this does not apply to CR3.

Added definition for SGI (safeguards information) as it is used in Attachment 2 but not spelled out.

New 3.0.18 Expanded definition of Equipment Important to Emergency Response (EIER) from EMG-NGGC-0007.

Old section 7.0, Created attachment and moved EIER information in its entirety from section 7.0 and reformatted for human factoring. Clarified relocation area(s) for recommendation for Remote or Alternate TSC (PRR 616624). Corrected title for Radiation Controls Coordinator per request of RP dept.

9.1 Incorporated General Information items from EMG-NGGC-0007 9.1.6 Added the word "flowchart" to better define the guidance in Attachment 1. (editorial)

Section 9.2 (old 9.1.2 & Combined instructions for "Planned" and "Unplanned" Loss of Equipment Important to EP, for 9.1.3) human factoring.

9.2.1.a & e. Changed the title of Shift Manager to Shift Supervisor for consistency with other EM procedures 9.2 and 9.3 Corrected sub-section and step numbering throughout section 9.0, Instructions, and updated table of contents. and old Revised flowchart and incorporated two attachments into one for "Planned" and "Unplanned" Loss of Equipment Important to EP, for human factoring. Created new Attachment to better capture for human factoring, the equipment list for Reactor Coolant System Leakage Instrumentation (moved in its entirety from old section 7.15.16).

EM-500 Rev. 1 Page21 of21

Revision 17 Effective Date EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL BASES MANUAL PROGRESS ENERGY CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 APPROVED BY: Manual Owner (SIGNATURE ON FILE)

DATE:

RESPONSIBLE UNIT:

Emergency Preparedness

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE 1.0 PURPO SE ............................................. 1

2.0 REFERENCES

......................................... 1 3.0 PERSONNEL INDOCTRINATION .......................... 1 3.1 DEFINITIO NS ..................................... 1 3.2 RESPONSIBILITIES ............................... 4 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS ........................................ 5 4.1 USE OF THE MANUAL ............................. 5 4.2 MAINTENANCE OF THE MANUAL .................. 5 ATTACHMENT 1 Emergency Action Level Bases ............................. 6 2 Development of Parameters and Values Used in Selected EALs.. 82 3 EC 76363 RM-A1 & RM-A2 Interim Replacement Compensatory Actions.. 85 Revision Sum mary ............................................. 88 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page i

1.0 PURPOSE This manual provides basis information for the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) contained in the Radiological Emergency Response Plan and implementing procedures. For each EAL, specific assumptions and background information are listed along with rationale explaining why the condition requires the declaration of an emergency.

Any revision to this manual must be carefully considered for impact on the Radiological Emergency Response Plan.

This manual also provides administrative control guidance for distribution and revision.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 DEVELOPMENTAL REFERENCES 2.1.1 NEI 97-03, Draft Final Revision 3, October 1998 (formerly NUMARC/NESP-007),

Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels 2.2.2 Improved Technical Specifications 2.2.3 PRO-NGGC-204, Procedure Review and Approval 2.2.4 Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) 2.2.5 REG-NGGC-0010, 10 CFR 50.59 Reviews 2.2.6 NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2003-18, Use of NEI 99-01, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,' Revision 4, Dated January 2003.

2.2.7 NEI 99-01, "Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,' Revision 5, Dated February 2008 2.2.8 NCR 67029 assignment 24 documents calculation of Fission Product Barrier Matrix 5.1 sample line dose rate indication of coolant activity.

2.2.9 NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-based Events".

2.2.10 EMG-NGGC-0010, Emergency Plan Change Screening and Evaluation 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) 2.2.11 EMG-NGGC-1000, Fleet Conduct of Emergency Preparedness 2.2.12 Gilbert/Commonwealth Evaluation, "Internal Flooding of Power Plant Buildings", FCS-9852, October 12, 1988 2.2.13 Engineering Evaluation EC 86189 3.0 PERSONNEL INDOCTRINATION 3.1 DEFINITIONS

3.1.1 AIRCRAFT

Aircraft smaller than an AIRLINER.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 1

3.1.1.1 AIRLINER: A large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the Plant.

(The NRC notification should designate aircraft vs. airliner.)

3.1.2 BOMB: An explosive device suspected of having sufficient force to damage Plant systems or structures. (See EXPLOSION.)

3.1.3 CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site. A civil disturbance is considered violent when force has been used in an attempt to injure site personnel or damage Plant property.

3.1.4 COMMITTED DOSE EQUIVALENT (CDE): Dose to an organ (e.g., thyroid) due to the intake of radioactive materials.

3.1.5 CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC SECURITY THREAT NOTIFICATION - A threat specifically to CR3 confirmed and validated by Site Security or received over the Emergency Notification System (ENS) from the (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) NRC. Notification may be received from recognized law enforcement or governmental agencies (e.g. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), Division of Emergency Management (DEM), NRC.)

3.1.6 EXPLOSION

A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components.

3.1.7 EXTORTION

An attempt to cause an action at CR3 by threat of force. Bomb threats that are unsubstantiated are NOT included in this definition.

3.1.8 FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

3.1.9 HOSTAGE

A person or object held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by CR3.

3.1.10 HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power Plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the destructive intent may be included. Hostile action should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the nuclear power Plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used address such activities (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA).

3.1.11 HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

3.1.12 IDLH LEVEL: Level of toxic gas Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 2

3.1.13 INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual (outsider) present in the Protected Area without authorization. An intruder also includes a badged employee (insider) attempting to commit or providing assistance to others in committing sabotage. These activities may occur while the insider is either physically inside or outside the Protected Area. Upon identification, the insider's authorization is immediately revoked by Site Security.

3.1.14 MODES: The ITS based designator of Plant status based on Reactivity, Temperature and RCS status and includes operating modes 1 through 6 and defueled (no mode) as applicable. The term "MODES:ALL" applies to MODES 1-6 and defueled (no mode).

3.1.15 OWNER-CONTROLLED AREA: The area of land (approximately 4738 acres) that is owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by DEF, situated between the mouths of the Withlacoochee and Crystal Rivers and bounded to the north by woodlands, to the east by Highway 19, to the south by medium to dense woodlands and to the west by marshlands and the Gulf of Mexico. The OWNER CONTROLLED AREA is indicated in Figure 2-3 of the FSAR and encompasses both the PROTECTED AREA and the SITE BOUNDARY.

3.1.16 PROTECTED AREA: All areas within the CR3 security perimeter fence that require badged authorization for entry.

3.1.17 RCS BARRIER: The RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves. An isolable leak in an interfacing or connecting system that contains reactor coolant (MU, DH, SF, WD, etc.) is NOT an "RCS leak."

3.1.18 SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of Plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment unavailable. Equipment found tampered with or damaged due to malicious mischief may NOT meet the definition of SABOTAGE until this determination is made by Site Security.

3.1.19 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT: Equipment necessary to achieve and maintain the reactor subcritical with controlled decay heat removal to bring the Plant to the ITS applicable shutdown condition/mode.

3.1.20 SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

3.1.21 SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following:

(1) Automatic turbine trip at >25% reactor thermal power (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load (3) Plant runback (4) Reactor trip (5) Safety injection system actuation (6) >10% thermal power oscillations (7) Loss of decay heat removal in Mode 4 ("Significant Transient" is NOT used in any Mode 5 or 6 EALs.)

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 3

3.1.22 SITE BOUNDARY: That area, including the PROTECTED AREA, that extends 4400 feet or 0.83 miles in a circle around the Reactor Building 3.1.23 STRIKE ACTION: Is a work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made. The strike actions must threaten to interrupt normal Plant operations.

3.1.24 TOTAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT (TEDE): The sum of external dose (DDE) and the equivalent amount of whole body dose due to individual organ uptakes.

3.1.25 UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is NOT the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

NOTE: With specific regard to radioactive releases, a release of radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release is NOT authorized by a Release Permit or exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints, etc.) on the applicable permit.

3.1.26 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by Plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed.

Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment (e.g., within 15 minutes).

3.1.27 VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.

Example system/component damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering due to fire. Example structure damage includes exposed and/or broken rebar, failed supports/pipe hangers, etc. Surface blemishing (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, concrete spalling) should NOT be included.

3.1.28 VITAL AREA: Any area, normally within the PROTECTED AREA, that contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

3.2 RESPONSIBILITIES 3.2.1 The Emergency Planning Coordinator (EPC) has the responsibility for interpretation and maintenance of this manual.

3.2.2 The Emergency Coordinator has the responsibility to use this manual as necessary to classify emergency conditions and identify to the EPC corrections, clarifications, or the need for additional information.

3.2.3 Document Services has the responsibility to control issue and distribution of this manual.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 4

4.0 INSTRUCTIONS 4.1 USE OF THE MANUAL 4.1.1 LOCATE the desired EAL basis in Attachment 1 using the EAL number in the upper right corner or the title of the Fission Product Barrier.

4.1.2 IF a transient event condition is corrected before a declaration is made, AND analyses of the event is NOT required to determine whether further Plant damage occurred while corrective actions were being taken, THEN a declaration is NOT warranted but the event is reported and notification made to the NRC Operations Center via ENS within one hour of the event, AND ENSURE the Emergency Preparedness staff is notified to NOTIFY the State and Local Governments on the next working day (e.g., the PORV (RCV-1 0) develops a leak or fails open with a leak rate of >25 gpm and the block valve (RCV-1 1) is closed and successfully isolates the leak to less than the EAL threshold) 4.2 MAINTENANCE OF THE MANUAL 4.2.1 MAINTAIN controlled copies of this manual in the Main Control Room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the Simulator Control Room.

4.2.2 IDENTIFY potential revisions to the manual to the EPC and document in a Document Revision Request (DRR).

4.2.3 DETERMINE if the changes decrease the effectiveness of the RERP by completing REG-NGGC-0010 (10 CFR 50.54(q)).

4.2.4 ENSURE changes comply with the requirements of EMG-NGGC-0010, Emergency Plan Change Screening and Evaluation 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) and EMG-NGGC-1000, Fleet Conduct of Emergency Preparedness.

4.2.5 REVISE EM-202 as necessary and issue concurrently with the EAL Bases Manual.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 5

ATTACHMENT I PROGRESS ENERGY CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL BASES EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS FISSIO N PRO DUCT BARRIER MATRIX BASIS ........................................................................................... 8 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ........................................................................... 16 Gaseous Effluents (1.1-1.4)

Liquid Effluents (1.5-1.6)

Unexpected Radiation Levels (1.7-1.8)

Fuel Handling/Spent Fuel Pool or Transfer Canal Water Level (1.9-1.10)

NATURAL/MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT ......................................................................... 29 Earthquake Experienced (2.1-2.2)

External Flooding (2.3-2.4)

Hurricane (2.5)

Tornado/High Winds (2.6-2.7)

Accidental AircraftNehicle Crash (2.8-2.9)

Toxic or Flammable Gas (2.10-2.11)

Explosions/Catastrophic Pressurized Equipment Failure (2.12-2.13)

Fire (2.14-2.15)

Control Room Evacuation (2.16-2.17)

Security Event (2.18-2.21)

Internal Flooding (2.22-2.23)

Emergency Coordinator Judgment (2.24-2.27)

S Y S T E M MA LF U NC T IO N ................................................................................................................................ 56 Loss of Communication (3.1)

Failure of Reactor Protection (3.2-3.4)

Inability to Reach Required Mode Within ITS Time Limits (3.5)

Loss of Alarms/Indications (3.6-3.8)

Fuel Clad Degradation (3.9)

Turbine Failure (3.10-3.11)

RCS Leakage (3.12)

Inability to Maintain Hot Shutdown (3.13)

Inadvertent Criticality (3.14)

Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown (3.15)

Loss of Water Level in Reactor Vessel that Has Uncovered or Will Uncover Fuel (3.16)

LO S S O F P O W E R ............................................................................................................................................ 72 Loss of AC Power (4.1-4.4)

Loss of AC Power (Shutdown) (4.5)

Loss of Vital DC Power (4.6)

Loss of Vital DC Power (Shutdown) (4.7)

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 7

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX BASIS The Fission Product Barrier Matrix determines an emergency classification by assessing the status of fuel cladding, the Reactor Coolant System, and Containment. For each barrier, the matrix provides a list of symptoms of loss and a list of symptoms of potential loss. If one or more of the loss symptoms exists, the barrier is considered lost. If NO loss symptoms are present, but one or more of the potential loss symptoms exists, the barrier is considered potentially lost. Emergency classification based on barrier status is shown below.

GENERAL EMERGENCY:

- Loss of all three barriers

- Loss of two of three barriers with a potential loss of the third SITE AREA EMERGENCY:

- Loss of any two barriers

- Loss of any barrier with potential loss of the other two

- Loss of any barrier with potential loss of another

- Potential loss of any two barriers ALERT:

- Loss or potential loss of fuel clad

- Loss or potential loss of RCS UNUSUAL EVENT:

- Loss or potential loss of containment The Matrix simplifies the determination of the emergency classification by assigning points based on the loss or potential loss of each barrier. The sum of the points for all three barriers corresponds to an emergency classification.

Fuel Clad: Loss = 4 Potential Loss = 3 RCS: Loss = 4 Potential Loss = 3 Containment: Loss = 2 Potential Loss = 1.5

>0 BUT < 2 Unusual Event

>2 BUT < 4 Alert

>4 BUT < 8.5 Site Area Emergency

>8.5 General Emergency EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 8

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX BASIS (Continued)

FUEL CLAD LOSS INDICATIONS 5.1 LOSS OF FUEL CLAD If any item is checked, barrier is lost.

1. CORE CONDITIONS IN REGION 3 OR SEVERE ACCIDENT REGION OF ICC CURVES

2. RCS ACTIVITY >300 pCi/gm 1-131 DOSE EQUIVALENT

3. RM-G29 OR 30 >100 R/hr FOR 15 MINUTES OR LONGER

4. EC DEEMS FUEL CLAD BARRIER IS LOST

1. CORE CONDITIONS IN REGION THREE OR SEVERE ACCIDENT REGION OF INADEQUATE CORE COOLING CURVES (REFER TO EOP-07)

The initial core damage assessment curve is used to relate the observable parameters of incore temperature and RCS pressure to clad temperature. In region three or the severe accident region, elevated clad temperatures may exceed temperatures that will lead to zirc/water reactions and rapid failure of the clad will occur if NOT halted.

2. RCS ACTIVITY >300 pICi/gm 1131 DOSE EQUIVALENT This amount of coolant activity is well above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to about 2% to 5% fuel clad damage. This amount of clad damage indicates significant clad heating and thus the Fuel Clad Barrier is considered lost. In the absence of sample results, this coolant activity may be determined indirectly by measuring dose rates on sample lines. 100 mR/hr as measured by RM-G3 or portable instrument at two feet from the sample lines in the Nuclear Sample Room or 50 mR/hr measured by portable instrument two feet from sample lines in the PASS sample room are a conservative indication of this coolant activity.

3. RM-G29 OR 30 >100 R/HR FOR 15 MINUTES OR LONGER Monitor readings have increased and are sustained, NOT spikes. Readings of >100 R/hr(l) on these monitors indicate activity in the Reactor Building above what would be expected for normal reactor coolant. The 15 minutes will aid in accounting for spikes and uneven mixing that occurs in the initial phases of an RCS leak in the RB. High initial concentrations that accumulate in the upper portion of the RB may lead to erroneous fuel damage assumptions.

4. EC DEEMS FUEL CLAD BARRIER IS LOST Based on Emergency Coordinator judgment.

NOTE (1): Information on the selection of this value is inAttachment 2.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 9

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX BASIS (Continued)

FUEL CLAD POTENTIAL LOSS INDICATIONS 5.2 POTENTIAL LOSS OF FUEL CLAD If any item is checked, barrier is potentially lost.

1. ENTRY INTO EOP-07 BY PROCEDURAL DIRECTION 1

2. CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLES >700'F

3. EC DEEMS FUEL CLAD BARRIER IN JEOPARDY

1. ENTRY INTO EOP-07 BY PROCEDURAL DIRECTION EOP-07 is the "Inadequate Core Cooling" procedure which indicates that there are superheated conditions in the core which may lead to clad degradation.

2. CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLES >700°F 700'F is a good indicator of an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core. Temperatures are determined using guidance in EOP-07.

3. EC DEEMS FUEL CLAD BARRIER IN JEOPARDY Based on Emergency Coordinator judgment.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 10

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX BASIS (Continued)

RCS LOSS INDICATIONS 6.1 LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Ifany item is checked, barrier is lost

1. RCS LEAK OR OTSG TUBE LEAK RESULTING IN LOSS OF ADEQUATE SUBCOOLING MARGIN

2. RM-G29 OR 30 > 10 R/hr FOR 15 MINUTES OR LONGER

3. EC DEEMS RCS BARRIER IS LOST

1. RCS LEAK OR OTSG TUBE LEAK RESULTING IN LOSS OF ADEQUATE SUBCOOLING MARGIN (SCM)

A loss of adequate SCM resulting from RCS leakage would indicate that the rate of leakage from the RCS is exceeding the rate of addition from the injection system. In addition, with a loss of SCM, accurate RCS inventory cannot be determined. Therefore, the RCS boundary should be considered lost any time adequate SCM is lost due to leakage, including HPI/PORV or HPI/safety valve cooling. If SCM is regained during HPI/PORV or HPI/safety valve cooling, refer to RCS Potential Loss Factor #4.

NOTE: The momentary loss of subcooling margin that occurs with some trips from reduced pressure does NOT meet the intent of the loss of SCM and loss of RCS.

2. RM-G29 OR 30 > 10 R/hr FOR 15 MINUTES OR LONGER The reading of > 10 R/hr(1) is a value, which indicates the release of reactor coolant to the containment. The reading is based on RCS activity in normal operation concentrations.

3. EC DEEMS RCS BARRIER IS LOST Based on Emergency Coordinator judgment.

NOTE (1): Information on the selection of this value is in Attachment 2.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 11

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX BASIS (Continued)

RCS POTENTIAL LOSS INDICATIONS 6.2 POTENTIAL LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM If any item is checked, barrier is potentially lost.

1. RCS LEAK OR OTSG TUBE LEAK REQUIRING ONE OR MORE INJECTION VALVES

2. RCS LEAK OR OTSG TUBE LEAK RESULTS IN ES ACTUATION ON LOW RCS PRESSURE

3. RCS PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE RELATIONSHIP VIOLATES NDT LIMITS

4. HPI/PORV OR HPI/SAFETY VALVE COOLING IS IN PROGRESS

5. EC DEEMS RCS BARRIER IN JEOPARDY

1. RCS LEAK REQUIRING ONE OR MORE INJECTION VALVES By procedure, the HPI injection valves will be used to increase RCS inventory if pressurizer level CANNOT be maintained greater than 50 inches with letdown isolated. Thus, the use of one or more injection valves would indicate leakage in excess of the normal makeup capability and therefore a potential loss of the RCS barrier. If an injection valve is being used for normal makeup, then the use of a second valve would constitute an RCS potential loss.

OR OTSG TUBE LEAK REQUIRING ONE OR MORE INJECTION VALVES By procedure (EOP-06), the HPI injection valves will be used to increase RCS inventory if pressurizer level CANNOT be maintained at 200 inches during a tube leak event. Thus, the use of one or more injection valves would indicate leakage in excess of the normal makeup capability and therefore a potential loss of the RCS barrier. If an injection valve is being used for normal makeup, then the use of a second valve would constitute an RCS potential loss.

2. RCS LEAK OR OTSG TUBE LEAK RESULTS IN ES ACTUATION ON LOW RCS PRESSURE Should the injection system fail or the operator fail to open the injection valves upon a failure of the Makeup system to maintain RCS inventory, RCS pressure will decrease to the ES actuation setpoint. This potential loss factor in addition to number one (above) will ensure that the RCS barrier will be considered potentially lost for any inability of the makeup system to maintain adequate inventory during a loss of coolant or OTSG tube leak event.

3 RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE RELATIONSHIP VIOLATES NDT LIMITS.

RCS conditions of high pressure accompanied by low temperature increase the potential for Reactor Coolant System brittle failure. This potential loss factor will ensure that the RCS barrier is considered potentially lost whenever the system is at risk of a non-ductile failure.

4. HPIIPORV OR HPIISAFETY VALVE COOLING IN PROGRESS.

This method of cooling represents a failure of the OTSGs to remove heat from the core. The PORV must be opened to initiate cooling though the high pressure injection system. In effect, a self-imposed loss of coolant is established. The magnitude of this Plant condition is appropriately classified as an ALERT.

5. EC DEEMS RCS BARRIER IN JEOPARDY Based on Emergency Coordinator judgment.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 12

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX BASIS (Continued)

CONTAINMENT LOSS INDICATIONS 7.1 LOSS OF CONTAINMENT If any item is checked, barrier is lost.

1. RAPID UNEXPLAINED RB PRESSURE DECREASE FOLLOWING INITIAL INCREASE

2. CONTAINMENT PRESSURE OR SUMP LEVEL RESPONSE NOT CONSISTENT WITH LOCA CONDITIONS

3. AN OTSG HAS > 10 GPM TUBE RUPTURE WITH PROLONGED STEAMING TO THE ATMOSPHERE FROM THE AFFECTED OTSG OR AN UNISOLABLE STEAM LEAK OUTSIDE RB FROM THE AFFECTED OTSG

4. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION IS INCOMPLETE AND RELEASE PATH TO THE ENVIRONMENT EXISTS

5. EC DEEMS CONTAINMENT BARRIER IS LOST

1. RAPID UNEXPLAINED RB PRESSURE DECREASE FOLLOWING INITIAL INCREASE During a loss of coolant event, RB pressure should rise to some value determined by the size of the leak and the response of the RB cooling systems. Following the initial peak, RB pressure should exhibit a steady decreasing trend. Any deviation from this should be the result of a known change in Plant status. A rapid decrease of unknown cause is therefore indicative of possible containment failure.

2. CONTAINMENT PRESSURE OR SUMP LEVEL NOT CONSISTENT WITH LOCA CONDITIONS Sump level or containment pressure NOT increasing indicates containment bypass and a loss of containment integrity.

3. AN OTSG HAS >10 GPM TUBE RUPTURE WITH PROLONGED STEAMING TO THE ATMOSPHERE FROM AFFECTED OTSG OR AN UNISOLABLE STEAM LEAK OUTSIDE RB FROM THE AFFECTED OTSG This condition is met by any of the following:

a) Intermittent or continuous use of the Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV) (such as during a Loss of Off-Site Power) on the OTSG with the > 10 gpm tube rupture.

b) Open Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSV) on the OTSG with the > 10 gpm tube rupture that is not reseated within 15 minutes.

c) Failure of a pipe, valve, etc. on the OTSG with the > 10 gpm tube rupture that results in a direct steam path to the environment and is not isolated within 15 minutes.

NOTE:

" Lifting of an MSSV during a Plant Trip is NOT prolonged steaming if it is reseated within 15 minutes.

" If an OTSG has been successfully isolated in accordance with EOPs, then prolonged steaming NO longer exists.

" Steaming the faulted OTSG to the condenser is NOT considered prolonged steaming to the atmosphere even though there may be minor unmonitored release pathways through vents and other normal flow paths.

• If EFP-2 is running, it is NOT considered prolonged steaming if the associated steam supply valve (MSV-55 or -56) from the faulted OTSG is closed in accordance with EOPs.

There is no time frame associated with the closing of the steam supply valve. If the valve cannot be closed in accordance with EOPs, then prolonged steaming exists.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 13

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX BASIS (Continued)

CONTAINMENT LOSS INDICATIONS (Continued)

4. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION IS INCOMPLETE AND RELEASE PATH TO THE ENVIRONMENT EXISTS This factor should be used any time an incomplete RB isolation results in a direct path from the RB atmosphere to the environment. The conditions expected for this EAL would be a known path or a visual indication of the failure or path. Confirmation may be from elevated radiation readings in areas adjacent to the RB (e.g. Aux. Bldg., Intermediate Bldg., Berm). Entry into this EAL is NOT intended to be made solely due to the Plant's inability to meet the acceptance criteria for penetration surveillances.

5. EC DEEMS CONTAINMENT BARRIER IS LOST Based on Emergency Coordinator judgment. Entry into this EAL is NOT intended to be made solely due to the Plant's inability to meet the acceptance criteria for penetration surveillances.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 14

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX BASIS (Continued)

CONTAINMENT POTENTIAL LOSS INDICATIONS 7.2 POTENTIAL LOSS OF CONTAINMENT If any item is checked, barrier is potentially lost.

1. RB PRESSURE >54 psig

2. RB HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION >4%

3. RB PRESSURE >30 psig WITH NO BUILDING SPRAY AVAILABLE

4. RMG-29 OR 30 READINGS >5000 R/hr

5. CORE CONDITIONS IN SEVERE ACCIDENT REGION OF ICC CURVES FOR >15 MINUTES

6. EC DEEMS CONTAINMENT BARRIER IN JEOPARDY

1. RB PRESSURE >54 psig RB design pressure is 54.4 psig. Internal pressure greater than this value has the potential to exceed design leakage values.

2. RB HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION >4%

Hydrogen concentrations > 4% are above the lower explosive limit.

3. RB PRESSURE >30 psig WITH NO BUILDING SPRAYAVAILABLE The RB spray actuation setpoint is 30 psig. With RB pressure above this value and NO spray available, the potential exists to exceed the RB design values.

4. RMG-29 OR 30 READINGS >5000 R/hr (1)

This monitor reading is indicative of severe core damage conditions. Monitor readings have increased and are sustained, NOT spikes. Regardless of whether containment is challenged, this amount of activity in containment, if released, could have such severe consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of containment, such that a General Emergency declaration is warranted.

5. CORE CONDITIONS IN SEVERE ACCIDENT REGION OF ICC CURVES FOR GREATER THAN 15 MINUTES Core conditions in the Severe Accident Region represent imminent melt sequence which, if NOT corrected within 15 minutes, could lead to vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. The Emergency Coordinator should make the declaration as soon as it is determined that the restoration procedures have been, or will be ineffective.

6. EC DEEMS CONTAINMENT BARRIER IN JEOPARDY Based on Emergency Coordinator judgment. Entry into this EAL is NOT intended to be made solely due to the Plant's inability to meet the acceptance criteria for penetration surveillances.

NOTE (1): Information on the selection of this value is in Attachment 2.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 15

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT IEA. 1.1]I Gaseous Effluents Initiatinq Condition:

An UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM noble gas release setpoint for 60 minutes or longer Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

1.1 MODES

ALL VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered VALID when it I1or 2) is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct

1. AVALID reading on RM-A1 or RM-A2 observation by Plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's Normal Range monitor exceeds the high alarm setpoint for 60 minutes or operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is longer removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment ORR (e.g., within 15 minutes).

2. Sample analysis confirms gaseous effluent being released exceeds 5.OE-4 pCi/cc for 60 minutes or longer Basis:

Releases in excess of the high alarm setpoint or sample results in excess of 5.OE-4 pCi/cc continuing for 60 minutes or longer represent an uncontrolled situation and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. The final integrated dose is NOT the primary concern here; it is the degradation in Plant control implied by the fact the release was NOT isolated within 60 minutes. Therefore, it is NOT intended for the release to be averaged over 60 minutes. For example, a release of 1.OE-3 pCi/cc for 30 minutes does NOT exceed this initiating condition. Further, the Emergency Coordinator should NOT wait until 60 minutes elapses, but declare the event as soon as it is determined the release duration will likely exceed 60 minutes. This is identified by an increasing trend in monitor readings. This does NOT include spikes or other erroneous instrument readouts.

The high alarm setpoint is set at 5.OE-4 pCi/cc on the Normal Range. It is based on extended shutdown conditions and is conservative for on-line operations. The monitor measures the Noble Gas component of a release only. In extended shutdown, particulates dominate the dose contribution, lowering the proportional concentration of Noble Gas needed to reach Protective Action Guideline doses. Since the ODCM deals exclusively with Noble Gases, the standard ODCM methodology using an annual limit of 500 mRem per year would yield an ODCM setpoint for a Noble Gas concentration that when multiplied by 200 for the Alert, would be greater than the Site Area Emergency threshold value. This necessitates administratively lowering ODCM setpoint. The ODCM setpoint was set arbitrarily to 10% of the Alert threshold value to produce a logical progression from Unusual Event to Alert to Site Area Emergency.

EALs 1.1-1.4 represent increasingly significant degradation in Plant conditions. The high alarm setpoint is conservative compared to two times the ODCM limit, but was chosen for the UNUSUAL EVENT EAL to create a logical, easily discernible progression.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 1.1 NEI 97-03

Reference:

AU1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 16

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Gaseous Effluents Initiating Condition:

An UNPLANNED release of gaseous radioactivity to the environment that exceeds 200 times the ODCM noble gas release setpoint for 15 minutes or longer Emergency Action Level:

ALERT

1.2 MODES

ALL (1or 2)

1. A VALID reading on RM-A1 or RM-A2 VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered VALID when it is exceeds 5.OE-3 pCi/cc for 15 minutes conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on or longer. related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by Plant personnel, ORR such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or

2. Sample analysis confirms gaseous the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely effluent being released exceeds assessment (e.g., within 15 minutes).

5.OE-3 pCi/cc for 15 minutes or longer Basis:

Unplanned releases in excess of 5.0E-3 pCi/cc continuing for 15 minutes or longer represent an uncontrolled situation and hence, a potential substantial degradation in the level of safety. The primary concern for the time factor here is the loss of control of radioactive material allowing the release to continue. The Emergency Coordinator should NOT wait until 15 minutes elapses, but declare the event as soon as it is determined the release duration will likely exceed 15 minutes.

The single threshold value of 5.OE-3 pCi/cc is based on extended shutdown conditions and is conservative for on-line operations. The monitor measures the Noble Gas component of a release only. In extended shutdown, particulates dominate the dose contribution, lowering the proportional concentration of Noble Gas needed to reach Protective Action Guideline doses. Since the ODCM deals exclusively with Noble Gases, the standard ODCM methodology using an annual limit of 500 mRem per year would yield an ODCM setpoint for a Noble Gas concentration that when multiplied by 200 for the Alert, would be greater than the Site Area Emergency threshold value. This necessitates administratively lowering ODCM setpoint and the threshold value. The threshold value is less than 200 times the ODCM setpoint. The threshold value was set arbitrarily to the transition point from the Normal Range to the Accident Range to produce an easily identifiable threshold and logical progression from Alert to Site Area Emergency.

EALs 1.1-1.4 represent increasingly significant degradation in Plant conditions.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 1.2 NEI 97-03

Reference:

AA1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 17

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT I EAL 1.3]

Gaseous Effluents Initiatinq Condition:

SITE BOUNDARY dose resulting from an actual or projected release of airborne radioactivity exceeding 100 mR TEDE or 500 mR Thyroid CDE Emergency Action Level:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1.3 MODES

ALL (1 or 2 or 3)

1. VALID RM-A1 or RM-A2 Accident Range VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered VALID when it is monitor reading exceeds the values on the conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on following Table for the current Stability related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by Plant Class for 15 minutes or longer:

personnel, such that doubt related to the indicators operability, the condition's Extended existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the On-Line Shutdown need for timely assessment (e.g., within 15 minutes).

Stability Class Operations or (pci/cc) SF Pools (PJCi/cc) SITE BOUNDARY: That area, including the PROTECTED AREA, that A, B, orC 5.1E-1 7.5E-2 extends 4400 feet or 0.83 miles in a circle around the Reactor Building D or E 3.3E-1 5.E-2 F or G 3.OE-1 I 4.5E-2 PROTECTED AREA: All areas within the CR3 security perimeter fence that OR require badged authorization for entry.

2. Dose Assessment results indicate SITE BOUNDARY dose >100 mR TEDE or >500 mR thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release OR

3. Field survey results indicate dosed windows dose rates >100mR/hr expected to continue for more than one hour; or analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE of 500mR for one hour of inhalation, at or beyond SITE BOUNDARY Basis:

TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent (external dose + equivalent amount of whole body dose due to individual organ uptakes)

CDE - Committed Dose Equivalent (dose to an organ due to the intake of radioactive materials)

Threshold values in item 1 above are provided for On-line Operations and Extended Shutdown/Spent Fuel Pools. IF the source of the release is unknown, THEN USE Extended Shutdown/Spent Fuel Pools.

"Extended Shutdown" as used in the right-hand column in item 1 above refers to all releases that occur in the unique period that began 9/26/09 (Refuel 16) and continuing through plant restart.

"SF Pools" as used in the right-hand column in item 1 above refers to releases that occur from the Spent Fuel Pools during the fuel cycle beginning at restart from the extended shutdown and continuing until additional irradiated fuel is off-loaded into the Spent Fuel Pools. When additional irradiated fuel is off-loaded, this EAL will be revised to revert back to a single column and no plant condition label will be needed.

(continued)

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 18

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT lEA. 1.

Gaseous Effluents, continued Basis, continued The threshold values in item 1 above are described in Calculation N12-0001. The monitor measures the Noble Gas component of a release only. In extended shutdown, particulates dominate the dose contribution, lowering the proportional concentration of Noble Gas needed to reach Protective Action Guideline doses.

Classification for items 2 & 3 above result from emergency response team input. For example, the Environmental Survey Team provides actual dose rates used to determine dose for the projected duration of the release. The Dose Assessment Team provides projected dose.

For Item 1 above, Stability Class groupings assume the most stable class in Groups "A, B, or C" and "D or E."

The "F or G" group was calculated using "F" Stability Class due to the very low percentage of time the "G" Stability Class exists (< 0.4% based on FSAR Table 12.2).

EALs 1.1-1.4 represent increasingly significant degradation in Plant conditions.

The 100 mR integrated dose in this initiating condition is based on the 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. It is deemed exposures less than this are NOT consistent with the Site Area Emergency class description. These values are 10% of the EPA 400 Protective Action Guidelines (PAG).

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 1.3 NEI 97-03

Reference:

AS1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 19

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Gaseous Effluents Initiating Condition:

SITE BOUNDARY dose resulting from an actual or projected release of gaseous radioactivity exceeding 1000 mR TEDE or 5000 mR Thyroid CDE Emer-gency Action Level:

GENERAL EMERGENCY

1.4 MODES

ALL (1 or2 or3) VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered VALID when it is

1. VALID RM-A1 or RM-A2Accident conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on Range monitor reading exceeds the related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by Plant personnel, values in the following table for 15 minutes or longer: such that doubt related to the indicators operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for Extended timely assessment (e.g., within 15 minutes).

On-Line Shutdown Operations or (pci/cc) SF Pools (Pci/cc) 3.OE+0 4.5E-1 SITE BOUNDARY: That area, including the PROTECTED AREA, that extends 4400 feet or 0.83 miles in a circle around the Reactor Building.

OR

2. Dose Assessment results indicate SITE PROTECTED AREA: All areas within the CR3 security perimeter fence BOUNDARY dose >1000 mR TEDE or

>5000 mR thyroid CDE for the actual or that require badged authorization for entry.

projected duration of the release AND core damage is suspected or has occurred OR

3. Field survey results indicate dosed windows dose rates >1000mR/hr expected to continue for more than one hour: or analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid CDE of 5000 mR for one hour of inhalation, at or beyond SITE BOUNDARY Basis:

TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent (external dose + equivalent amount of whole body dose due to individual organ uptakes)

CDE - Committed Dose Equivalent (dose to an organ due to the intake of radioactive materials)

Threshold values in item 1 above are provided for On-line Operations and Extended Shutdown/Spent Fuel Pools. IF the source of the release is unknown, THEN USE Extended Shutdown/Spent Fuel Pools.

"Extended Shutdown" as used in the right-hand column in item 1 above refers to all releases that occur in the unique period that began 9/26/09 (Refuel 16) and continuing through plant restart.

"SF Pools" as used in the right-hand column in item 1 above refers to releases that occur from the Spent Fuel Pools during the fuel cycle beginning at restart from the extended shutdown and continuing until additional irradiated fuel is off-loaded into the Spent Fuel Pools. When additional irradiated fuel is off-loaded, this EAL will be revised to revert back to a single column and no plant condition label will be needed.

(continued)

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 20

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Gaseous Effluents, continued Basis, continued The threshold values in item 1 above are described in Calculation N12-0001. The monitor measures the Noble Gas component of a release only. In extended shutdown, particulates dominate the dose contribution, lowering the proportional concentration of Noble Gas needed to reach Protective Action Guideline doses.

To achieve the dose for this initiating condition, core damage with a failure of all the fission product barriers is necessary. Protective Action Guideline limits cannot be reached without some amount of fuel damage. In classifying this event, verifying that core damage is suspected or has occurred precludes erroneous protective action recommendations based on incorrect or default dose assessments when Plant conditions clearly do NOT support the magnitude of the release.

Classification for items 2 & 3 above result from emergency response team input. For example, the Environmental Survey Team provides actual dose rates used to determine dose for the projected duration of the release. The Dose Assessment Team provides projected dose.

EALs 1.1-1.4 represent increasingly significant degradation in Plant conditions.

The 1000 mR TEDE and the 5000 mR Thyroid CDE are based on the EPA protective action guidance, which indicates that public protective actions are indicated if the dose exceeds 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem Thyroid CDE. This is consistent with the emergency class description for a General Emergency. Actual meteorology (including forecasts) should be used whenever possible.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 1.4 NEI 97-03

Reference:

AG1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 21

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Liquid Effluents Initiatinq Condition:

An UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to the environment exceeding 2 times the ODCM release setpoint for 60 minutes or longer Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

1.5 MODES

ALL (1 or 2)

1. AVALID reading on RM-L2, RM-L7, VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered VALID when it is or sample analysis confirms the conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on release exceeds 2 times the ODCM related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by Plant personnel, release setpoint for 60 minutes or such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or longer the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely OR assessment (e.g., within 15 minutes).

2. Release continued for 60 minutes or longer with no dilution flow Basis:

This EAL is based on failure of the monitor interlock to perform its function or loss of dilution flow. "No dilution flow" would indicate that NO raw water flow is available. If the interlock failed, a factor of 2 times the release setpoint as compared to actual readings, can be used to judge if the EAL is exceeded. For other conditions, an evaluation of liquid effluent radioactivity must be performed and compared against the ODCM release setpoint to determine entry conditions.

Releases in excess of 2 times the ODCM limits continuing for 60 minutes or longer represent an uncontrolled situation and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. The final integrated dose is NOT the primary concern here; it is the degradation in Plant control implied by the fact the release was NOT isolated within 60 minutes. Therefore, it is NOT intended for the release to be averaged over 60 minutes. For example, a release of 4 times the ODCM limits for 30 minutes does NOT exceed this initiating condition. Further, the Emergency Coordinator should NOT wait until 60 minutes elapses, but declare the event as soon as it is determined the release duration will likely exceed 60 minutes. An evaluation is necessary to compare monitor setpoint against the EAL limit.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 1.5 NEI 97-03

Reference:

AU1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 22

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT IEAL 1.6]

Liquid Effluents Initiating Condition:

An UNPLANNED release of liquid radioactivity to the environment exceeding 200 times the ODCM release setpoint for 15 minutes or longer Emergency Action Level:

ALERT

1.6 MODES

ALL VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on AVALID reading on RM-L2, RM-L7, or sample analysis confirms the release related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by Plant personnel, exceeds 200 times the ODCM release such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, setpoint for 15 minutes or longer or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for I __ I timely assessment (e.g., within 15 minutes).

Basis:

This EAL is based on failure of the monitor interlock to perform its function. If the interlock failed, a factor of 200 times the release setpoint as compared to actual readings, can be used to judge if the EAL is exceeded. For other conditions, an evaluation of liquid effluent radioactivity must be performed and compared against the ODCM release setpoint to determine entry conditions.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 1.6 NEI 97-03

Reference:

AA1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 23

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SEAL 1.7 ]

Unexpected Radiation Levels Initiating Condition:

An unexpected increase in radiation levels within the Plant Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

1.7 MODES

ALL One or more VALID radiation monitor readings unexpectedly exceed the values below for 15 minutes or longer: VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered VALID when it is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on RM-G3 RM-G4 == 400 600 mR/hr mR/hr related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by Plant personnel, RM-G5 = 3,000 mR/hr such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or RM-G9 = 100 mR/hr the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit inthis definition is the need for timely RM-G10 = 800 mR/hr assessment (e.g., within 15 minutes).

R(M-LG14 = 1,UUU mRJnr RM-G17 = 800 mR/hr Basis:

This EAL addresses unexpected increases in in-Plant radiation levels representing a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and a potential degradation in the level of safety of the Plant.

The values above represent approximately 1000 times normal monitor levels based on nominal historical data of the monitors during normal Plant operation. Portable surveys may be substituted for in Plant radiation monitors.

The specific area radiation monitors were chosen as they represent potential release areas within the Plant and/or access corridors to the Plant.

Assessment should be completed such that after the 15 minutes elapsed time of the monitor exceeding the values on the table, a classification decision should be made. This Initiating Condition is NOT intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

Monitor Locations:

RM-G3 (Primary Sample Room)

RM-G4 (Auxiliary Building entrance corridor)

RM-G5 (Waste Gas Decay Tank Area)

RM-G9 (Intermediate Building outside Reactor Building (RB) personnel airlock)

RM-G10 (Makeup Pump area)

RM-G14 (Spent Fuel Pool Storage Area - 143' elev. Aux. Bldg. general area)

RM-G17 (inside RB at personnel hatch)

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 1.7 NEI 97-03

Reference:

AU2 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 24

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Unexpected Radiation Levels Initiating Condition:

An unexpected increase in radiation levels within the Plant impeding operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown Emergency Action Level:

ALERT

1.8 MODES

ALL (1or 2)

1. VALID radiation reading greater than VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered VALID when it is 15 mR/hr for 15 minutes or longer in conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on the Control Room (RM-G1) or the related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by Plant personnel, Central Alarm Station (CAS) related tto indicators s opert thevcondit exstene, OR such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely

2. One or more VALID radiation monitor assessment (e.g., within 15 minutes).

readings unexpectedly exceed the values below for 15 minutes or longer:

RM-G3 = 5,000 mR/hr RM-G4 = 5,000 mR/hr RM-G9 = 5,000 mR/hr RM-G10 = 5,000 mR/hr RM-G17 = 5,000 mR/hr Basis:

This addresses increased radiation levels impeding necessary access to operating stations, or other areas containing equipment operated manually, in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. The specific area radiation monitors were chosen as they represent access corridors to the Plant. These monitors cover general areas that would require access to maintain safe operations or to establish and maintain safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the Plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the Plant. The cause and/or magnitude of the increase in radiation levels is NOT a concern of this initiating condition. The Emergency Coordinator must consider the source or cause of the increased radiation levels and determine if any other Initiating Condition is involved. For example, a dose rate of 15 mR/hr in the control room may be a problem in itself. However, the increase may also be indicative of high dose rates in the containment due to a LOCA. In this latter case, a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency may be indicated by the Fission Product Barrier Matrix Initiating Conditions.

Portable surveys may be substituted for in-Plant radiation monitors. A generic emergency action level at greater than 5,000 mR/hr has been chosen for those areas in the Plant that would need to be accessed for safe operation or safe shutdown of the unit.

Monitor Locations:

RM-G3 (Primary Sample Room)

RM-G4 (Auxiliary Building entrance corridor)

RM-G9 (Intermediate Building outside RB personnel airlock)

RM-G10 (Makeup Pump area)

RM-G17 (inside RB at personnel hatch)

(continued)

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 25

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS I RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Unexpected Radiation Levels, continued Basis, continued Assessment should be completed such that after the 15 minutes elapsed time of the monitor exceeding the values on the table, a classification decision should be made. This Initiating Condition is NOT intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

CAS dose rates are determined by portable monitors.

Areas requiring continuous occupancy include the control room and any other control stations that are manned continuously, such as the Central Alarm Station. The value of 15 mR/hr is derived from the GDC 19 value of 5 Rem in 30 days with adjustment for expected occupancy times. Although Section III.D.3 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," provides that the 15 mR/hr value can be averaged over the 30 days, the value is used here without averaging, as a 30 day duration implies an event potentially more significant than an Alert.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 1.8 NEI 97-03

Reference:

AA3 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 26

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT I EAL 1.9 ]

Fuel Handling Spent Fuel Pool or Transfer Canal Water Level Initiating Condition:

An uncontrolled water level decrease in spent fuel pool or transfer canal with fuel remaining covered Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

1.9 MODES

ALL (1 and 2)

1. (a or b)

a. Uncontrolled level decrease resulting in indications of -2.5 feet in spent fuel pool OR

b. Confirmed Plant personnel report of uncontrolled significant water level drop in spent fuel pool or transfer canal when Spent Fuel transfer tubes are open AND

2. Fuel remains covered with water Basis:

The "-2.5 feet" indication is relative to the normal "zero" reading for spent fuel pool level and represents the minimum 23 feet of water (156 feet Plant datum) over the top of the fuel as described in Improved Technical Specifications.

A level decrease that cannot be readily isolated is considered uncontrolled.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 1.9 NEI 97-03

Reference:

AU2 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 27

ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS / RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT Fuel Handling/Fuel Handling Pool Water Level Initiating Condition:

Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level has or will uncover irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel Emergency Action Level:

ALERT 1.10 MODES: ALL (1 or 2)

1. (a and b)

a. Plant personnel report damage of irradiated fuel AND VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered VALID when it is

b. VALID high alarm RM-G15 or RM-G16 as indicated on conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on OR related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by Plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or

2. Plant personnel report spent fuel pool the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely or transfer canal water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity such assessment (e.g., within 15 minutes).

that irradiated fuel will be uncovered Basis:

There is time available to take corrective actions, and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage if corrective actions are effective. Thus, an Alert classification for this event is appropriate. Escalation, if appropriate, would occur via other Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluents Initiating Conditions or Emergency Coordinator judgment.

Monitor Locations:

RM-G15 (Auxiliary Building Fuel Handling Bridge)

RM-G16 (Reactor Building Fuel Handling Bridge)

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 1.10 NEI 97-03

Reference:

AA2 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 28

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT I EAL 2.1]

Earthquake Experienced Initiatinq Condition:

Earthquake detected by seismic instrumentation and sensed by Control Room personnel Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

2.1 MODES

ALL (1 and 2)

1. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel AND

2. Confirmed earthquake causing Annunciator C-3-14 "Seismic System Trouble" alarm Basis:

Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should NOT affect ability of safe shutdown equipment to operate. Method of detection is based on instrumentation, validated by a reliable source, or operator assessment. As defined in the EPRI-sponsored, "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake,"

dated October 1989, a "felt earthquake" is:

"An earthquake of sufficient intensity such that: (a) the ground motion is felt at the nuclear Plant site and recognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control room operators on duty at the time, and (b) for Plants with operable seismic instrumentation, the seismic switches of the Plant are activated."

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.1 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HU1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 29

NATURAL I MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT I EAL 2.2]

Earthquake Experienced Initiating Condition:

Earthquake detected by seismic instrumentation and sensed by Control Room personnel greater than Operating Basis Earthquake Emergency Action Levels:

ALERT

2.2 MODES

ALL (1 and 2)

1. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel or confirmed Annunciator C-3-14 "Seismic System Trouble" alarm AND

2. (a or b)

a. Analysis confirms the earthquake at

>0.05g OR

b. Indications show degraded SAFE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT: Equipment necessary to achieve and SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT maintain the reactor sub critical with controlled decay heat removal to bring the performance due to the earthquake Plant to the ITS applicable shutdown condition/mode.

Basis:

Seismic events of this magnitude can cause damage to safety functions.

Analysis of earthquakes is completed using AP-961 and its supporting procedures. The analysis to determine the magnitude of an earthquake may take an extended period of time. If it is determined even after several hours that the earthquake was >0.05g, the event should be classified.

This EAL is intended to address an earthquake resulting in a Plant vital area being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage is assumed to have occurred to Plant safe shutdown equipment. Assessing SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance is NOT interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment before classification and NO attempt is made to assess the actual magnitude of the damage.

Additional information on the earthquake (confirmation and magnitude) can be obtained from the U. S.

Geological Survey - Golden, Colorado at (303) 273-8500.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.2 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HAI EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 30

NATURAL MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT lEA, 2.3I External Flooding Initiating Condition:

Flood being experienced Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT:

2.3 MODES

ALL Intake canal level or visual observation indicates flood water level > 98 feet Basis:

This EAL covers flooding due to natural phenomena. This EAL can be a precursor of more serious events. In particular, since CR3 may be subject to severe weather as defined in the NUMARC station blackout initiatives, this includes action based on activation of the severe weather mitigation procedures for flooding (e.g.,

precautionary shutdowns, diesel testing, staff call-outs, etc.).

Ninety-eight (98) feet is contained within the discharge and intake canal banks. The top of the concrete wall at the intake structure is 99 feet.

The highest water level recorded at CR3 was 99.5 feet during the 03/13/93 "No Name Storm."

At 98 feet, there is NO immediate impact on Plant equipment but heightened awareness is appropriate should the level increase.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.3 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HUI EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 31

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT External Flooding Initiating Condition:

Flood being experienced Emergency Action Level:

ALERT

2.4 MODES

ALL (1 and 2)

1. Intake canal level or visual observation indicates flood water level

> 98 feet AND SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT: Equipment necessary to achieve and

2. Indications show degraded SAFE maintain the reactor sub critical with controlled decay heat removal to bring the SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance due to the flooding Plant to the ITS applicable shutdown condition/mode.

Basis:

This EAL covers flooding due to natural phenomena.

This EAL is intended to address flooding that may have resulted in a Plant vital area being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage may be assumed to have occurred to Plant safety systems. Assessing SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance is NOT interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment before classification and NO attempt is made to assess the actual magnitude of the damage.

If damage from the flooding is clearly contained and localized to one train, and safe shutdown capability exists, then item 2 of the EAL is NOT met. If the extent of the damage is uncertain in terms of loss of safe shutdown capability, then entry into this EAL is required.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.4 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HA1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 32

NATURAL I MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT Hurricane Initiating Condition:

Hurricane Warning Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

2.5 MODES

ALL The Plant is within a Hurricane Warning area Basis:

This EAL can be a precursor of more serious events. In particular, since CR3 may be subject to severe weather as defined in the NUMARC station blackout initiatives.

This should include a notification from the National Hurricane Center via the State Warning Point.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.5 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HUI EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 33

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT I EAL 2.6 ]

Tornado Initiating Condition:

Tornado within the PROTECTED AREA Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

2.6 MODES

ALL Report by Plant personnel of a Tornado PROTECTED AREA: All areas within the CR3 security perimeter fence that striking within the PROTECTED AREA require badged authorization for entry.

Basis:

This EAL is based on the assumption a tornado strikes (touches down) within the protected area boundary and may have damaged Plant structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the Plant. If such damage is confirmed visually or by other in-Plant indications, the event may be escalated to an Alert.

Waterspouts remaining intact after coming onshore/land are classified as tornadoes.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.6 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HU1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 34

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT Tornado/High Winds Initiating Condition:

Tornado or High Winds or windborne object(s) strike structures and results in significant VISIBLE DAMAGE Emergency Action Level:

ALERT

2.7 MODES

ALL (1 or 2)

1. Tornado or High Winds or windborne VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily object(s) cause significant VISIBLE observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is structures, sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or

- Auxiliary Building, reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.

BWST, Example system/component damage includes: deformation due to Control Complex, Diesel Generator Building heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering (EGDG-1A/!B) due to fire. Example structure damage includes exposed and/or EFT-2 Building, broken rebar, failed supports/pipe hangers, etc. Surface blemishing Intermediate Building, Reactor Building (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, concrete spalling) should NOT be EFP-3 Building included.

OR

2. Indications show degraded SAFE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT: Equipment necessary to achieve and SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT maintain the reactor sub critical with controlled decay heat removal to bring performance due to the tornado or high winds or windborne objects the Plant to the ITS applicable shutdown condition/mode.

Basis:

This EAL addresses events that may have resulted in a Plant vital area being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage may be assumed to have occurred to Plant safety systems. Assessing SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance is NOT interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment before classification and NO attempt is made to assess the actual magnitude of the damage.

As an example, the highest recorded sustained wind speed at CR3 during the 03/13/93 "No Name Storm" was 56 mph and NO VISIBLE DAMAGE resulted.

Sheet metal damage to the Spent Fuel Floor walls or roof does NOT constitute significant damage to the Auxiliary Building.

Waterspouts remaining intact after coming onshore/land are classified as tornadoes.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.7 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HA1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 35

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT I EAL 2.8 ]

Accidental Aircraft/Vehicle Crash Initiating Condition:

Aircraft or Vehicle crash within the Protected Area potentially damaging Plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the Plant Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

2.8 MODES

ALL Report by Plant personnel of Aircraft or Vehicle Crash involving the following structures:

Auxiliary Building, BWST Control Complex Diesel Generator Building (EGDG-1A/lB)

EFT-2 Building Intermediate Building Reactor Building EFP-3 Building Basis:

This EAL is intended to address the accidental crash of a plane, helicopter, or vehicle potentially damaging Plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the Plant. Automobiles, trucks, and forklifts are vehicles within the context of this EAL. The intent is to address any vehicle large enough that can cause significant damage to Plant structures. This EAL is NOT intended to include cosmetic damage because of light contact between vehicles and listed structures. This EAL does NOT include purposeful attacks to these structures (refer to Security EALs).

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.8 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HU1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 36

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT SEAL 2.9]

Accidental Aircraft / Vehicle Crash Initiating Condition:

Aircraft or Vehicle strikes vital structures and results in significant VISIBLE DAMAGE Emergency Action Level:

ALERT

2.9 MODES

ALL (I or 2) VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily

1. Confirmed report of significant observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or following structures: reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example Auxiliary Building system/component damage includes: deformation due to heat or BWST impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering due to control complex fire. Example structure damage includes exposed and/or broken (EGDG-eA/!B) rebar, failed supports/pipe hangers, etc. Surface blemishing EFT-2 Building (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, concrete spalling) should NOT be Intermediate Building Reactor Building included.

EFP-3 Building ORR SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT: Equipment necessary to achieve and

2. Indications show degraded SAFE maintain the reactor sub critical with controlled decay heat removal to bring the SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance due to the Aircraft or Plant to the ITS applicable shutdown condition/mode.

Vehicle Crash Basis:

This EAL is intended to address an accidental crash of a plane, helicopter, vehicle crash damaging Plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the Plant. Automobiles, trucks, and forklifts are also vehicles within the context of this EAL. This EAL does NOT include purposeful attacks to these structures (refer to Security EALs).

This EAL is intended to address events that may have resulted in a Plant vital area being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage may be assumed to have occurred to Plant safety systems. Assessing SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance is NOT interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment before classification and NO attempt is made to assess the actual magnitude of the damage.

If damage from the vehicle or aircraft crash is clearly contained and localized to one train, and safe shutdown capability exists, then the EAL is NOT met. If the extent of the damage is uncertain in terms of loss of safe shutdown capability, then entry into this EAL is required.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.9 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HA1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 37

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT IEAL2.10 Toxic or Flammable Gas Initiating Condition:

Release of Toxic or Flammable Gas within, or potentially affecting the Protected Area Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT 2.10 MODES: ALL SITE BOUNDARY: That area, including the PROTECTED AREA, that extends (1 or 2) 4400 feet or 0.83 miles in a circle around the Reactor Building.

I. Report or detection of Toxic or Flammable Gas within the SITE IDLH: Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health BOUNDARY that could enter the Protected Area at levels > IDLH or

> 25% Lower Explosive Limits NORMAL OPERATION OF THE PLANT: Activities at the plant site Associated affecting NORMAL OPERATION OF with routine testing, maintenance, or equipment operations, in accordance with THE PLANT. normal operating or administrative procedures. Entry into Abnormal or OR Emergency Operating Procedures, or deviation from normal security or

2. Confirmed notification by PE, County, radiological controls posture, is a departure from normal plant operations.

or State personnel to evacuate or shelter site personnel based on an offsite event Basis:

This Initiating Condition is based on releases in concentrations within the Site Boundary that could; (1) affect the health and safety of Plant personnel; (2) affect the safe operation of the Plant; or (3) potentially put the Plant within an evacuation or sheltering area due to an offsite event.

Gases within the Site Boundary that are below life-threatening (< Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health

[IDLH]) or flammable concentrations are NOT applicable to this Initiating Condition. Concentrations at these levels would NOT affect Plant personnel or the safe operation of the Plant. Gases at the Site Boundary that are above life-threatening or flammable concentrations, yet have NOT exceeded those concentrations within a facility structure, would satisfy the first EAL and would require the declaration of an Unusual Event.

Toxic or Flammable gases which are released offsite (e.g., transportation accident) confirmed by Progress Energy, County, Local, or State personnel have the potential for requiring the evacuation or sheltering of the area within the Site Boundary.

A localized/small-scale event within the Site Boundary that may involve gases at life-threatening or flammable concentrations do NOT meet the intent of this Initiating Condition.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.10 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HU3 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 38

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT SEAL 2.

• 11]

Toxic or Flammable Gas Initiating Condition:

Release of toxic or flammable gases within a facility structure which jeopardizes operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain Cold Shutdown Emergency Action Level:

ALERT 2.11 MODES: ALL (I or 2 or 3)

1. Flammable Gas levels > 25% Lower Explosive Limit in areas required to maintain safe operations or establish and maintain cold shutdown OR

2. Toxic Gas levels > IDLH levels in areas that require continuous occupancy to maintain safe operation or establish or maintain cold shutdown OR

3. Toxic Gas levels > IDLH levels within the PROTECTED AREA such that PROTECTED AREA: All areas within the CR3 security perimeter fence that Plant personnel are unable to perform require badged authorization for entry.

actions necessary to maintain safe operations or establish and maintain cold shutdown using protective equipment Basis:

This Initiating Condition is based on gases that have entered a Plant structure affecting the safe operation of the Plant. This Initiating Condition applies to buildings and areas contiguous to Plant vital areas or other significant buildings or areas.

Concentrations at these amounts will restrict or prevent normal actions from being taken to operate the Plant.

This EAL is NOT intended to include precautionary general evacuation of personnel.

If personnel can safely enter areas NOT required to be continuously occupied using protective equipment, this Initiating Condition/EAL is NOT met.

IDLH - Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.11 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HA3 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 39

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT I 12 Explosions/Catastrophic Pressurized Equipment Failure Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED EXPLOSION or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment within the PROTECTED AREA Emer-gency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT 2.12 MODES. ALL VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily Report by Plant personnel of VISIBLE observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is DAMAGE to permanent structures or sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or equipment within the PROTECTED AREA due to an EXPLOSION or catastrophic reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example failure of pressurized equipment system/component damage includes: deformation due to heat or Referto Security Event impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering due to fire. Example structure damage includes exposed and/or broken rebar, failed supports/pipe hangers, etc. Surface blemishing (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, concrete spalling) should NOT be included.

PROTECTED AREA: All areas within the CR3 security perimeter fence that require badged authorization for entry.

EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components.

Basis:

For this EAL, only those explosions or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the PROTECTED AREA should be considered. NO attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment with reports of evidence of damage (e.g., deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. The concern is NOT with the pressurized equipment that catastrophically failed, but with the damage to the structures or equipment in the area caused by the release of energy.

This EAL is NOT intended to cover small pipe cracks or small steam/feedwater leaks.

The Emergency Coordinator also needs to consider security aspects of the explosion and, if applicable, refer to the Security EALs.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.12 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HUI EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 40

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT EAL 2.13 Explosions/Catastrophic Pressurized Equipment Failure Initiating Condition:

EXPLOSION or catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment within the Plant affecting the operability of SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT Emer-gency Action Level:

ALERT:

2.13 MODES: ALL (1or 2) EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to

1. EXPLOSION or catastrophic failure of potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components.

pressurized equipment causes significant VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following structures: VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily Auxiliary Building observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is BWST Control Complex sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or Diesel Generator Building reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example (EGDG-lA/!B) system/component damage includes: deformation due to heat or EFT-2 Building, Intermediate Building impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering due to Reactor Building fire. Example structure damage includes exposed and/or broken EFP-3 Building rebar, failed supports/pipe hangers, etc. Surface blemishing OR (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, concrete spalling) should NOT be

2. Indications show degraded SAFE included.

SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance due to the EXPLOSION or pressurized equipment failure SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT: Equipment necessary to achieve and maintain the reactor sub critical with controlled decay heat removal to bring the Plant to the ITS applicable shutdown condition/mode.

Basis:

This EAL is intended to address events that may have resulted in a Plant vital area being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage may be assumed to have occurred to Plant safe shutdown equipment.

Assessing SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance is NOT interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment before classification. NO attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The observation of damage to a structure is sufficient to make a declaration.

The concern is NOT with the pressurized equipment that catastrophically failed, but with the actual or potential damage to safe shutdown equipment caused by the release of energy.

A catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment does not include small lines or equipment that may cause only localized damage. A catastrophic failure of a steam line is of sufficient size that would be characterized by an uncontrolled depressurization of the secondary side.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.13 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HA2 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 41

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT EAL 2.14 Fire Initiatinq Condition FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA that could affect SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT 2.14 MODES: ALL FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as (1 and 2) slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires.

1. FIRE inor threateningoneofthe Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of following structures: smoke and heat are observed.

Auxiliary Building BWST Control Complex, Diesel Generator Building (EGDG-1A/!B)

EFT-2 Building Intermediate Building VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered VALID when it is Reactor Building conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on EFP-3 Building related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by Plant personnel, AND such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence,

2. FIRE not extinguished within or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit inthis definition is the need for 15 minutes from either Control Room timely assessment (e.g., within 15 minutes).

notification or receipt of a VALID fire alarm in the Control Room Basis:

This EAL is to address the magnitude and extent of fires that may be potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems. This excludes such items as fires within administration buildings, wastebasket fires, and other small fires of NO safety consequence. This Initiating Condition applies to buildings and areas contiguous to Plant vital areas or other significant buildings or areas.

Validation of the alarm in this context means those actions taken in the control room or other location to determine the control room alarm is NOT spurious. Fire in other areas adjacent to vital areas may warrant classification if the fire is of a magnitude that threatens vital areas.

The 15-minute time period begins with the time when a credible notification that a fire is occurring or the time a VALID fire detection system alarm is received. The intent of the 15-minute duration is to discriminate against small fires that are readily extinguished.

OP-880A, Appendix "R" Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Information contains additional information on fire damage assessment CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.14 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HU2 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 42

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT EAL 2.15 Fire Initiating Condition:

FIRE affecting the operability of SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT Emergency Action Level:

ALERT 2.15 MODES: ALL VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily Ior2) observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is (1 2n or sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or

1. Repor byPlantpersonnelof VISIBLE reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component. Example DAMAGE to SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT due to the FIRE system/component damage includes: deformation due to heat or OR impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering due to

2. Indications showdegradedSAFE fire. Example structure damage includes exposed and/or broken SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT rebar, failed supports/pipe hangers, etc. Surface blemishing performance due to the FIRE (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, concrete spalling) should NOT be included.

SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT: Equipment necessary to achieve and maintain the reactor sub critical with controlled decay heat removal to bring the Plant to the ITS applicable shutdown condition/mode.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

Basis:

The key to classifying fires as an Alert is the damage because of the incident. The fact that the equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or damaged because of the fire is the driving force for declaring the Alert.

If damage from the fire is clearly contained and localized to one train, and safe shutdown capability exists, then the EAL is NOT met. If the extent of the damage is uncertain in terms of loss of safe shutdown capability, then entry into this EAL is required.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.15 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HA2 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 43

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT EA'216 Control Room Evacuation Initiating Condition:

Evacuation of Control Room is Required Emer-gency Action Level:

ALERT:

2.16 MODES: ALL Control Room evacuation is required per AP-990, "Shutdown Outside of the Control Room" Basis:

With the control room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or the Emergency Operations Facility is necessary.

Declaration of an Alert may be delayed until the transfer to remote shutdown is completed. This is appropriate since establishing control of the Plant takes precedence.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.16 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HA5 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 44

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT I A217]

Control Room Evacuation Initiatinq Condition:

Evacuation of Control Room is Initiated and Plant Control cannot be established Emergency Action Level:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY 2.17 MODES: ALL (I and 2)

1. Control Room evacuation is required per AP-990, "Shutdown Outside of the Control Room" AND

2. Control of the necessary equipment not established per AP-990 within 15 minutes Basis:

The 15 minutes begins at the first attempt to turn the transfer switch to transfer control from the Main Control Room to the Remote Shutdown Panel.

The timely transfer of control to alternate control areas has NOT been accomplished. The failure to transfer control would be evidenced by deteriorating reactor coolant system or steam generator parameters.

The determination of whether control is established at the Remote Shutdown Panel is based upon the judgment of the Shift Manager. The Shift Manager is expected to make a reasonable, informed judgment within fifteen minutes of the transfer from the Control Room that the operating crew has control of the Plant from the Remote Shutdown Panel.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.17 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HS2 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 45

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT EAL 2.18]

Security Event Initiating Conditions:

Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the Plant Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT 2.18 MODES: ALL AIRCRAFT - Aircraft smaller than an AIRLINER.

(1 or 2 or 3) AIRLINER: A large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to Report by Security Shift Supervisor or the Plant. (The NRC notification should designate aircraft vs. airliner.)

NRC of one or more of the following events: CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC SECURITY THREAT NOTIFICATION - A threat

1. Avalidated notification from NRC specifically to CR3 confirmed and validated by Site Security or received over providing information of an AIRCRAFT the Emergency Notification System (ENS) from the Nuclear Regulatory orAIRLINER threat. Commission (NRC). Notification may be received from recognized law OR enforcement or governmental agencies (e.g. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), Division of Emergency

2. A CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC Management (DEM), NRC.)

SECURITY THREAT NOTIFICATION OR HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power Plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or

3. A SECURITY CONDITION that does intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Shift water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to Supervisor. deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the destructive intent may be included. Hostile action should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the nuclear power Plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used address such activities.

SECURITY CONDITION: Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

Basis:

Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

Security events which do not represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant are reported under 10 CFR 73.71 or in some cases under 10 CFR 50.72. Security events assessed as HOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under EALs 2.19, 2.20, and 2.21.

A higher initial classification could be made based upon the nature and timing of the security threat and potential consequences. The licensee shall consider upgrading the emergency response status and emergency classification level in accordance with the site's Safeguards Contingency Plan and Emergency Plan.

(continued)

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 46

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT I EAL 2.18 ]

EAL #1 The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the AIRCRAFT or AIRLINER threat are made in a timely manner and that offsite response organizations and CR3 personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat.

This EAL is met when CR3 receives information regarding an AIRCRAFT or AIRLINER threat from NRC.

Validation is performed by calling the NRC or by other approved methods of authentication.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to CR3 if the threat involves an AIRLINER.

The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

Escalation to Alert emergency classification level via EAL 2.19 would be appropriate if the threat involves an AIRLINER within 30 minutes of the plant.

EAL #2 This threshold is included to ensure that appropriate notifications for the security threat are made in a timely manner. This includes information of a credible threat. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Notification of an Unusual Event.

The determination of "credible" is made through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

EAL #3 Reference is made to security shift supervision because these individuals are the designated personnel on-site qualified and trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred. Training on security event classification confirmation is closely controlled due to the strict secrecy controls placed on the plant Safeguards Contingency Plan.

This threshold is based on site specific security plans. Site specific Safeguards Contingency Plans are based on guidance provided by NEI 03-12.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.18 NEI 99-01

Reference:

HU4 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 47

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT I I Security Event Initiating Condition:

HOSTILE ACTION in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat.

Emergency Action Level:

ALERT 2.19 MODES: ALL AIRLINER: A large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the Plant. (The NRC notification should designate aircraft vs. airliner.)

(1 or 2) HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power Plant or its personnel that

1. Avalidated notification from NRC of an includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or AIRLINER attack threat less than 30 intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or minutes away water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to OR deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the destructive intent may be included. Hostile action should not be construed to include acts of civil

2. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the has occurred within the OWNER nuclear power Plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used address such CONTROLLED AREA as reported by actes.

the Security Shift Supervisor. activities.

OWNER CONTROLLED AREA: The area of land (approximately 4738 acres ) that is owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by DEF, situated between the mouths of the Withlacoochee and Crystal Rivers and bounded to the north by woodlands, to the east by Highway 19, to the south by medium to dense woodlands and to the west by marshlands and the Gulf of Mexico. The OWNER CONTROLLED AREA is indicated in Figure 2-3 of the FSAR and encompasses both the PROTECTED AREA and the SITE BOUNDARY.

PROTECTED AREA: All areas within the CR3 security perimeter fence that require badged authorization for entry.

Basis:

Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

These EALs address the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. They are not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack or is an identified attack target with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires a heightened state of readiness and implementation of protective measures that can be effective (such as on-site evacuation, dispersal or sheltering).

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 48

(continued)

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT S29 EAL #1 This EAL addresses the immediacy of an expected threat arrival or impact on the site within a relatively short time.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the AIRLINER attack threat are made in a timely manner and that offsite response organizations and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat.

This EAL is met when CR3 receives information regarding an AIRLINER attack threat from NRC and the AIRLINER is within 30 minutes of the plant.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an AIRLINER. The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

EAL #2 This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

Note that this EAL is applicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA outside of the PROTECTED AREA. For events that affect the PROTECTED AREA, refer to EAL 2.20 or EAL 2.21.

Although nuclear plant security officers are well trained and prepared to protect against HOSTILE ACTION, it is appropriate for offsite response organizations to be notified and encouraged to begin activation to be better prepared should it be necessary to consider further actions.

If not previously notified by the NRC that the airborne HOSTILE ACTION was intentional, then it would be expected, although not certain, that notification by an appropriate Federal agency would follow. In this case, appropriate federal agency is intended to be NORAD, FBI, FAA or NRC. However, the declaration should not be unduly delayed awaiting Federal notification.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.19 NEI 99-01

Reference:

HA4 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 49

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT Security Event Initiatinq Condition:

HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA Emergency Action Level:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY 2.20 MODES: ALL HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power Plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or 1.A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Shift deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the destructive intent may be Supervisor. included. Hostile action should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the nuclear power Plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used address such activities.

HOSTILE FORCE: One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

OWNER CONTROLLED AREA: The area of land (approximately 4738 acres ) that is owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by DEF, situated between the mouths of the Withlacoochee and Crystal Rivers and bounded to the north by woodlands, to the east by Highway 19, to the south by medium to dense woodlands and to the west by marshlands and the Gulf of Mexico. The OWNER CONTROLLED AREA is indicated in Figure 2-3 of the FSAR and encompasses both the PROTECTED AREA and the SITE BOUNDARY.

PROTECTED AREA: All areas within the CR3 security perimeter fence that require badged authorization for entry.

Basis:

This condition represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert in that a HOSTILE FORCE has progressed from the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA to the PROTECTED AREA.

This EAL addresses the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. It is not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires offsite response organization readiness and preparation for the implementation of protective measures.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 50

(continued)

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT I EAL 2.20 This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the PROTECTED AREA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

Although nuclear plant security officers are well trained and prepared to protect against HOSTILE ACTION, it is appropriate for offsite response organizations to be notified and encouraged to begin preparations for public protective actions to be better prepared should it be necessary to consider further actions.

If not previously notified by NRC that the airborne HOSTILE ACTION was intentional, then it would be expected, although not certain, that notification by an appropriate Federal agency would follow. In this case, appropriate federal agency is intended to be NORAD, FBI, FAA or NRC. However, the declaration should not be unduly delayed awaiting Federal notification.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on actual plant status after impact or progression of attack.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.20 NEI 99-01

Reference:

HS4 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 51

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT 2 1 Security Event Initiating Condition:

HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility Emergency Action Level:

GENERAL EMERGENCY 2.21 MODES: ALL (1 or 2) HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power Plant or its

1. A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, such that plant personnel are unable take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This to operate equipment required to includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, maintain safety functions, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts OR that satisfy the destructive intent may be included. Hostile action should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or

2. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the nuclear failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and imminent fuel damage is likely, power Plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used address such activities.

VITAL AREA: Any area, normally within the PROTECTED AREA, that contains equipment, systems, components, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

Basis:

EAL #1 This EAL encompasses conditions under which a HOSTILE ACTION has resulted in a loss of physical control of a VITAL AREA or equipment required to maintain safety functions (reactivity control, reactor coolant system inventory, and secondary heat removal) and control of that equipment cannot be transferred to and operated from another location. If control of the plant equipment necessary to maintain safety functions can be transferred to another location, then the threshold is not met.

EAL #2 This EAL addresses failure of spent fuel cooling systems as a result of HOSTILE ACTION if imminent fuel damage is likely, such as when a freshly off-loaded reactor core is in the spent fuel pool. For the purposes of EAL 2.21, "imminent" means that mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not likely to be successful, and trended information indicates that fuel damage will occur.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.21 NEI 99-01

Reference:

HG1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 52

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT AL2221 Internal Flooding Initiatinq Condition:

Internal flooding affecting areas containing SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT 2.22 MODES: ALL (1 and 2)

1. Indication of uncontrolled flooding in the Auxiliary Building or Intermediate Building AND SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT: Equipment necessary to achieve and

2. Water level/flooding has the potential maintain the reactor sub critical with controlled decay heat removal to bring the toC-Ilaffect or immerse SAFE ITflCIuIWN ICNI ISPftIC T Plant to the ITS applicable shutdown condition/mode.

SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT Basis:

This addresses the possible effects of flooding from system malfunctions, component failures, or repair activity mishaps that could threaten the safe operation of the Plant. The flooding could affect equipment NOT designed to be submerged.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.22 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HUI EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 53

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT I AL223]

Internal Flooding Initiating Condition:

Internal flooding affecting SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT Emergency Action Level:

ALERT 2.23 MODES: ALL (1 and 2)

1. Water level exceed 5 inches in the Auxiliary Building or Intermediate Building AND

2. (a or b)

a. Indications show degraded SAFE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT: Equipment necessary to achieve and SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT due to the maintain the reactor sub critical with controlled decay heat removal to bring the flooding Plant to the ITS applicable shutdown condition/mode.

OR

b. Electrical hazards prevent Plant personnel normal access to areas of Plant containing SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT Basis:

This addresses the possible effects of flooding from system malfunctions, component failures, or repair activity mishaps that has either threatened the safe operation of the Plant or resulted in a complete loss of function required for cold shutdown.

The water value was selected to be consistent with the site's flooding analysis and mitigative strategy of abnormal procedures. A flooding hazard evaluation established 7 inches as the level in the Auxiliary Building which would begin to affect equipment (ref: Gilbert/Commonwealth FCS-9852, 10/12/88). The 5-inch value was selected for conservatism.

If damage from the internal flooding is clearly contained and localized to one train, and safe shutdown capability exists, then item 2a of the EAL is NOT met. If the extent of the damage is uncertain in terms of loss of safe shutdown capability, then entry into this EAL is required. If all Auxiliary Building 95-ft. elevation motor control centers are de-energized in accordance with abnormal procedures as a result of flooding, then SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT is deemed to be degraded and entry into this EAL is required.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.23 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HAI EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 54

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT Emergency Coordinator Judgment Initiatinq Conditions:

Other conditions existing, which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, warrant declaration of an Unusual Event Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT 2.24 MODES: ALL Other conditions exist which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the Plant Basis:

This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions NOT addressed explicitly elsewhere but warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator to fall under the Unusual Event emergency class.

This EAL should also be referenced if, in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, an Unusual Event should be classified if Plant symptoms are less than the threshold of an existing EAL.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.24 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HU5 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 55

NATURAL I MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT Emergency Coordinator Judgment Initiating Conditions:

Other conditions exist, which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, warrant declaration of an Alert Emergency Action Level:

ALERT 2.25 MODES: ALL Other conditions exist which indicate that events are in process or have occurred which involve potential or actual substantial degradation of the level of safety of the Plant Basis:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions NOT addressed explicitly elsewhere but warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator to fall under the Alert emergency class.

Any release is expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA plume Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels.

This EAL should also be referenced if, in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, an Alert should be classified if Plant symptoms are less than the threshold of an existing EAL.

It is NOT necessary to declare an ALERT if an Initiating Condition/EAL is NOT met and it is desirable to have TSC support, however, if support of the TSC staff is vital to mitigate an event, an Alert declaration should be considered CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.25 NEI-97-03

Reference:

HA6 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 56

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT S26 Emergency Coordinator Judgment Initiating Conditions:

Other conditions exist, which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency Emergency Action Level:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY 2.26 MODES ALL Other conditions exist which indicate actual or likely major failures of Plant functions needed for the protection of the public Basis:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions NOT addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator to fall under the emergency class description for Site Area Emergency.

A release is NOT expected to result in exposure levels exceeding EPA plume Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (1 Rem TEDE or 5 Rem Thyroid CDE).

TEDE - Total Effective Dose Equivalent CDE - Committed Dose Equivalent This EAL should also be referenced if, in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, a Site Area Emergency should be classified if Plant symptoms are less than the threshold of an existing EAL.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.26 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HS3 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 57

NATURAL / MAN-MADE HAZARDS AND EC JUDGMENT I AL227J Emergency Coordinator Judgment Initiating Condition:

Other conditions exist, which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator, warrant declaration of a General Emergency Emergency Action Level:

GENERAL EMERGENCY 2.27 MODES: ALL (1 or 2)

Other conditions exist which indicate:

1. Actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential loss of containment integrty SITE BOUNDARY: That area, including the PROTECTED AREA, that OR extends 4400 feet or 0.83 miles in a circle around the Reactor Building.

2. The potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases that can be PROTECTED AREA: All areas within the CR3 security perimeter fence that expected to exceed EPA Protective require badged authorization for entry.

Antiona flidelines Plume Fxnnsuire Levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see EAL 1.4)

Basis:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions NOT addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator to fall under the General Emergency class.

Releases can reasonably be expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines Plume Exposure Levels beyond the Site Boundary (1 Rem TEDE or 5 Rem Thyroid CDE).

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 2.27 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HG2 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 58

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION I EAL 3.1 ]

Loss of Communication Initiating Condition:

Unplanned loss of all In-Plant or all offsite Communication capability Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

3.1 MODES

ALL (1 or 2)

1. Loss of all the following in-Plant communications capability:

a. PE Internal Telephone System

b. PAX

c. Portable UHF Radios OR

2. Loss of all of the following Offsite Communication capability:

a. PE Telephone System

b. State Hot Ringdown (SHRD)

c. All FTS 2001 NRC phones (ENS, HPN, etc.)

d. State-Wide Emergency Management Network (EMnet)

e. Cellular Telephones Basis:

The purpose of this Initiating Condition and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of communications capability either defeating the Plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary for Plant operations or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities. The loss of offsite communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than the condition addressed by 10 CFR 50.72.

The onsite or offsite communications loss must encompass the loss of all means of routine direct communications with intended parties. This includes the ENS, Commercial lines, Cellular Phones, Microwave, and FAX transmissions. This EAL is used only when extraordinary means are used to make communications possible (relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.).

Credit is NOT taken for portable satellite phones located in the Technical Support Center due to the time it takes to establish a communications link. Once a link is established with a portable satellite phone, the event may be terminated.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.1 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SU6 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 59

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION Failure of Reactor Protection Initiating Condition:

Failure of Reactor Protection System (RPS) instrumentation to complete or initiate an automatic reactor trip once an RPS setpoint has been exceeded and manual trip was successful Emergency Action Level:

ALERT

3.2 MODES

1,2,3 (1 and 2)

1. RPS Trip setpoint exceeded and no Reactor trip occurred AND

2. Manual Reactor trip from Control Room was successful and reactor is shutdown Basis:

This condition indicates failure of the Reactor Protection System to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did NOT function in response to a Plant transient and thus the Plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded.

An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or RCS. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. A manual trip is any set of actions by the reactor operator(s) in the Control Room which causes sufficient control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core and brings the reactor subcritical (e.g., reactor trip button, de-energizing control rod power from the control room). Operator actions to drive rods or other actions taken or occurring outside the control room does NOT constitute a reactor trip because it does NOT meet the rapid insertion criterion.

An automatic reactor trip is considered as the RPS tripping the reactor.

Failure of the manual trip pushbutton when pressed in anticipation of an automatic trip does NOT constitute a failure of the RPS if it is certain that NO other trip setpoints have been exceeded AND de-energizing control rod power from the Control Room results in a subcritical reactor. An Alert declaration would NOT be required in this instance since design limits would NOT have been exceeded.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.2 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SA2 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 60

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION Failure of Reactor Protection Initiating Condition:

Failure of Reactor Protection System (RPS) instrumentation to complete or initiate an automatic reactor trip once an RPS setpoint has been exceeded and manual trip was not successful Emer-gency Action Level:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

3.3 MODES

1,2 (1 and 2)

1. RPS Trip setpoint exceeded and no Reactor trip occurred AND

2. Manual Reactor trip from Control Room was not successful in shutting down the reactor Basis:

Automatic and manual trips are NOT considered successful if action away from the Control Room was required to trip the reactor. Manual trip is successful if the trip push button or de-energizing control rod power in the Control Room results in shutting down the reactor.

An automatic reactor trip is considered as the RPS tripping the reactor.

The trip is considered successful when Control Room actions have inserted enough control rods to cause the reactor power to fall below that percent power associated with the ability of the safety systems to remove heat and continue to decrease. Subsequent actions necessary for the reactor to be prepared for a cooldown and depressurization are NOT to be considered.

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS. Although this Initiating Condition may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.3 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SS2 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 61

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION I EAL 3.4 1 Failure of Reactor Protection Initiating Condition:

Failure of the Reactor Protection System to complete an automatic trip and manual trip was NOT successful and there is indication of extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core Emergency Action Level:

GENERAL EMERGENCY

3.4 MODES

1,2 (1 and 2 and 3)

1. RPS Trip setpoint exceeded and no Reactor trip occurred AND

2. Manual Reactor trip from Control Room was not successful in shutting down the reactor AND (a or b)

a. Core exit thermocouple temperatures

> 700°F, as indicated on SPDS.

OR

b. Adequate Secondary Cooling not available Basis:

Under the conditions of this Initiating Condition and its associated EALs, the efforts to bring the reactor subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed. Although there are capabilities away from the reactor control console, such as emergency boration, the continuing temperature rise indicates that these capabilities are NOT effective. This situation could be a precursor for a core melt sequence.

700°F is a good indicator of an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core and is consistent with the

'potential loss" factor in the Fission Product Barrier Matrix.

Another consideration is the inability to initially remove heat during the early stages of this sequence. If emergency feedwater flow is insufficient to remove the amount of heat required by design from at least one steam generator, an extreme challenge should be considered to exist.

In the event either of these challenges exist at a time the reactor has NOT been brought below the power associated with the safety system design a core melt sequence exists. In this situation, core degradation can occur rapidly. For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the Fission Product Barrier Matrix declaration to permit maximum offsite intervention time.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.4 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SG2 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 62

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION I . IA Inability to Reach Required Mode Within Improved Technical Specification Time Limits Initiating Condition:

Inability to reach required operating mode within Improved Technical Specification limits Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT 3.5 MODESI 1,2,3,4 (1 and 2)

1. Entry into an Improved Technical Specification LCO statement requiring a mode reduction AND

2. The Plant is not in the required operating mode within the time prescribed by the LCO required action Basis:

Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) require the Plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the Improved Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. The Plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable required action time in the Improved Technical Specifications. An immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the Plant is NOT brought to the required operating mode within the allowable required action time in the Improved Technical Specifications.

Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the LCO-specified required action time period elapses under the Improved Technical Specifications and is NOT related to how long a condition may have existed.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.5 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SU2 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 63

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION Loss of Alarms/indications Initiatinq Condition:

UNPLANNED loss of most or all Control Room Annunciators for 15 minutes or longer Emer-gency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

3.6 MODES

1,2,3,4 (1 or 2)

1. UNPLANNED loss of Annunciator panels A-L and Annunciator printer UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is NOT the expected for 15 minuaen Aorlonger result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or OR emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

2. UNPLANNED loss of NNI-X and NNI-Y for 15 minutes or longer Basis:

This Initiating Condition and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing Plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment. Recognition of the availability of computer-based indication equipment is considered (SPDS, Plant computer, etc.). The Annunciator printer includes: 1) the far left overhead Annunciator CRT display; 2) the printer in the cabinet labeled "Sequential Events Recorder;" and 3) the computer behind the main Control Board labeled "Annunciator Monitor."

A loss of Annunciators is considered a loss of the visual, as opposed to a loss of the audible portion of the Annunciator. Annunciator panels A-L contain the major control systems (RPS, ES, ICS, etc.).

Loss of NNI-X and NNI-Y will cause the loss of most or all safety system indication.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled modes, NO IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.6 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SU3 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 64

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION Loss of Alarms/Indications Initiating Condition:

UNPLANNED loss of most or all Control Room Annunciators for 15 minutes or longer with either a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or Plant Computer and SPDS unavailable Emergqency Action Level:

ALERT

3.7 MODES

1,2,3,4 UNPLANNED: An event or action is UNPLANNED if it is NOT the expected result of normal operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in (1 and 2) corrective or mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or

1. Ia or b) emergency procedures are UNPLANNED.

a. UNPLANNED loss of Annunciator panels A-L and Annunciator printer SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of for 15 minutes or longer the following:

OR (1) Automatic turbine trip at >25% reactor thermal power

b. UNPLANNED loss of NNI-X and (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load NNI-Y for 15 minutes or longer (3) Plant runback AND (4) Reactor trip

2. (a or b) (5) Safety injection system actuation

a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in (6) >10% thermal power oscillations progress (7) Loss of decay heat removal in Mode 4 ("Significant Transient" is NOT used in any Mode 5 or 6 EALs.)

b. Loss of Plant Computer and SPDS Basis:

This Initiating Condition and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing Plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a transient. Recognition of the availability of computer based indication equipment is considered (SPDS, Plant computer, etc.).

The Annunciator printer includes: 1) the far left overhead Annunciator CRT display; 2) the Rochester printer

("Sequential Events Recorder") in cabinet ANN/EVENT RCDC. CAB. #1; and 3) the computer behind the main Control Board labeled "Annunciator Monitor." A loss of both the Annuciator printer and computer-based indication is required to meet the IC.

A loss of Annunciators is considered a loss of the visual, as opposed to a loss of the audible portion of the Annunciator.

Annunciator panels A-L contain the major control systems (RPS, ES, ICS, etc.)

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling and defueled modes NO IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.7 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SA4 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 65

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION Loss of Alarms/Indications Initiatinq Condition:

Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress Emergency Action Level:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

3.8 MODES

1,2,3,4 (1 and 2 and 3 and 4)

1. (a or b)

a. Loss of Annunciator panels A-L and Annunciator printer for 15 minutes or longer OR SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of

b. Loss of NNI-X and NNI-Y for the following:

15 minutes or longer (1) Automatic turbine trip at >25% reactor thermal power AND (2) Electrical load rejection >25% full electrical load

2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in (3) Plant runback progress AND (4) Reactor trip

3. Loss of Plant Computer and SPDS (5) Safety injection system actuation AND (6) >10% thermal power oscillations

4. the Inability to directly monitor any one of following: (7) Loss used NOT of decay in anyheat Mode removal in Mode 4 ("Significant Transient" is 5 or 6 EALs.)

Subcnticality Core Cooling Containment RCS Inventory Basis:

This Initiating Condition and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the inability of the control room staff to monitor the Plant response to a transient.

The Annunciator printer includes: 1) the far left overhead Annunciator CRT display; 2) the Rochester printer

("Sequential Events Recorder") in cabinet ANN/EVENT RCDC. CAB. #1; and 3) the computer behind the main Control Board labeled "Annunciator Monitor." A loss of both the Annuciator printer and computer-based indication is required to meet the IC.

A loss of Annunciators is considered a loss of the visual, as opposed to a loss of the audible portion of the Annunciator.

Indications needed to monitor safety functions necessary for protection of the public must include control room indications, computer generated indications and dedicated annunciation capability. The specific indications should be those used to determine such functions as the ability to shut down the reactor, maintain the core cooled and in a coolable geometry, to remove heat from the core, to maintain the reactor coolant system intact, and to maintain containment intact.

Planned and unplanned actions are NOT differentiated in this EAL since the loss of instrumentation of this magnitude is of such significance during a transient, that the cause of the loss does NOT make the condition more tolerable.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.8 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SS6 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 66

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SEAL 3.9 Fuel Clad Degradation Initiatinq Condition:

Fuel Clad Degradation Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

3.9 MODES

1,2,3,4,5 (a or b)

Radiochemistry analysis indicates:

a. Dose Equivalent Iodine (1-131)

> 1.0 pCi/gm for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or longer OR

b. Specific activity >100/E-bar for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or longer Basis:

This Initiating Condition is included as an Unusual Event because it is considered a potential degradation in the level of safety of the Plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. This EAL addresses RCS samples exceeding Improved Technical Specifications for radioactivity levels in the RCS.

RCS purification will provide for Iodine and crud cleanup in the reactor coolant system and reduce activity to

< 1.0 pCi/gm within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

The EAL values are based on Improved Technical Specification Limits.

E-bar is the weighted average energy of RCS isotopes.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.9 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SU4 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 67

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION Turbine Failure Initiating Condition:

Turbine failure results in casing penetration Emer-gency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT 3.10 MODES: 1,2,3 Report by Plant personnel of main turbine failure causing penetration of the turbine casing 2r damage to main generator seals Basis:

This EAL is intended to address main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen) to the Plant environs. Actual fires and flammable gas build up are appropriately classified via Fire and Flammable Gas EALs. This EAL is consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment.

Escalation of the emergency classification is based on the potential damage done by missiles generated by the failure. It is NOT the intent of this Initiating Condition to declare an event based on damage discovered in a maintenance evolution. Generator seal damage observed after generator purge does NOT meet the intent of this EAL because it did NOT impact normal operation of the Plant.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.10 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HUI EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 68

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION I 1 Turbine Failure Initiatinq Condition:

Turbine failure generated projectiles cause significant VISIBLE DAMAGE to SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT Emergency Action Level:

ALERT 3.11 MODES: 1,2,3 (1 or2) VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment or structure that is readily

1. Report by Plant personnel of observable without measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is projectiles generated by a main sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or turbine failure causing significant VISIBLE DAMAGE any of the reliability of affected safety structure, system, or component.

following structures: Example system/component damage includes: deformation due to SAuxiliary Building heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint BWST blistering due to fire. Example structure damage includes exposed Control Complex Diesel Generator Building and/or broken rebar, failed supports/pipe hangers, etc. Surface (EGDG-eA/!B) blemishing (e.g., paint chipping, scratches, concrete spalling) should EFT-2 Building NOT be included.

Intermediate Building Reactor Building EFP-3 Building OR SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT: Equipment necessary to achieve and

2. Indications show degraded SAFE maintain the reactor sub critical with controlled decay heat removal to bring SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT the Plant to the ITS applicable shutdown condition/mode.

performance due to turbine generated projectiles Basis:

This EAL is intended to address the threat to safe shutdown equipment imposed by missiles generated by main turbine rotating component failures. The list of areas includes all areas containing safe shutdown equipment, their controls, and their power supplies. This EAL is, therefore, consistent with the definition of an Alert in that if missiles have damaged or penetrated areas containing safety-related equipment the potential exists for substantial degradation of the level of safety of the Plant.

This EAL is intended to address events that may have resulted in a Plant vital area being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage may be assumed to have occurred to Plant safety systems. Assessing SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT performance is NOT interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment before classification and NO attempt is made to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. This EAL is NOT intended to be used for temporary loss of Control Complex habitability where timely repairs can be affected.

If damage from the turbine failure is clearly contained and localized to one train, then safe shutdown equipment is NOT affected and the EAL is NOT met. If the extent of the damage is uncertain in terms of loss of safe shutdown equipment, then entry into this EAL is required.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.11 NEI 97-03

Reference:

HAI EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 69

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION EAL 3.1271 RCS Leakage Initiating Condition:

RCS leakage Emerqency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT..

3.12 MODES: 1,2,3,4 (1 or 2)

1. Unidentified Leakagea 10 gpm or Pressure Boundary Leakage a 10 gpm OR

2. Identified leakage a 25 gpm Basis:

The terms "identified," "unidentified," and "pressure boundary" leakage are as defined in Improved Technical Specifications. The intent of this EAL is that the loss of RCS inventory is due to a failure of equipment.

The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) barrier is the RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves. Any leakage in an RCS interfacing system containing reactor coolant (MU, DH, SF, WD, etc.) that can be readily located and isolated within 15 minutes of detection does NOT require entry into this EAL.

OTSG Tube Leaks are considered as part of "identified" RCS leaks and apply to this EAL.

NOTE: See section 4.1.2 of this Manual for Transient Event Classification (i.e. PORV Failed open, block valve closed).

This Initiating Condition is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as result, is considered a potential degradation of the level of safety of the Plant. The 10 gpm value for the unidentified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal control room indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests (e.g.,

mass balances). The EAL for identified leakage is set at a higher value due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.12 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SU5 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 70

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION I A3131 Inability to Maintain Hot Shutdown Initiating Condition:

Complete loss of core heat removal capability Emergency Action Level:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY 3.13 MODES: 1,2,3,4 (1 and 2)

1. Complete loss of Main, Emergency, and Auxiliary Feedwater and unable to establish HPI cooling AND

2. Loss of subcooling margin Basis:

This EAL addresses complete loss of functions, including loss of heat removal capability, required for hot shutdown. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public. Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.13 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SS4 EAL Bases Manuali Revision 17 Page 71

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION EAL 3.14]

Inadvertent Criticality Initiating Condition:

Inadvertent criticality Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT 3.14 MODES: 2,3,4,5,6 An extended and unplanned sustained positive startup rate monitored by nuclear instrumentation Basis:

This condition can be identified using the startup rate monitor. The term "extended" is used to allow for exclusion of expected short term positive startup rates from planned fuel bundle or control rod movements during core alterations. The short term startup rates are the result of the increase in neutron population due to subcritical multiplication.

This Initiating Condition/EAL is NOT intended to classify an early criticality during reactor startup. This type event is indicative of errors in reactivity data/calculations and/or mis-operation. The loss of the required shutdown margin can be quickly restored by manual actions or automatic reactor trip.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.14 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SU8 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 72

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION I I Inability To Maintain Plant In Cold Shutdown Initiating Condition:

Complete loss of functions required for core cooling during refueling and cold shutdown modes Emergency Action Level:

ALERT 3.15 MODES: 5,6 (1 or 2)

1. Inability to maintain reactor coolant temperature below 200°F OR

2. Uncontrolled reactor coolant temperature approaching 200°F Basis:

For PWRs, this Initiating Condition and its associated EAL are based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17 "Loss Of Decay Heat Removal." A number of phenomena, such as pressurization, vortexing, steam generator draining, RCS level differences when operating at a mid-loop condition, decay heat removal system design and level instrumentation problems can lead to conditions where decay heat removal is lost and core uncovery can occur. NRC analyses show that sequences can cause core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes, and severe core damage within an hour after decay heat removal is lost. The site-specific indicators for these EALs are those methods used by the Plant in response to Generic Letter 88-17, which include core exit temperature monitoring and RCS water level monitoring. In addition, radiation monitor readings may also be appropriate as an indicator of this condition.

"Uncontrolled" means that system temperature increase is NOT the result of planned actions by the Plant staff.

The EAL guidance related to uncontrolled temperature rise is necessary to preserve the anticipatory philosophy of NUREG-0654 for events starting from temperatures much lower than the cold shutdown temperature limit.

A momentary UNPLANNED excursion above 200 IF when the heat removal function is available is NOT intended to constitute an ALERT. For example, if the on line DH pump trips and if in the process of starting the alternate pump RCS temperature briefly exceeds 200 OF, an ALERT declaration is NOT required.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.15 NEI 97-03

Reference:

NEI-SA3 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 73

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION A3167 Loss of Water Level in Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel Initiating Condition:

Loss of water level in the reactor vessel that has or will uncover fuel.

Emergency Action Level:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY 3.16 MODES 5,6 (1 and 2 )

1. Loss of decay heat removal per AP-404 AND

2. (a or b)

a. Incores indicating superheated conditions OR

b. Incores unavailable and time to uncovery exceeded as specified in OP-103H Basis:

Under the conditions specified by this Initiating Condition, severe core damage can occur and reactor coolant system pressure boundary integrity may NOT be assured. OP-103H, "Reactor Coolant System And Spent Fuel Pool Decay Heat Tables And Figures," contains time to core uncovery without decay heat removal curves.

This Initiating Condition covers sequences such as prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat removal.

Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the Initiating Condition.

Incore indication is sufficient for this EAL since NO means of water level indication exist in the active fuel region.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 3.16 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SS5 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 74

LOSS OF POWER I EAL 4.1 "l Loss of AC Power Initiating Condition:

Loss of All Offsite Power for 15 minutes or longer Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

4.1 MODES

ALL (1 and 2)

1. Offsite Power Transformer (OPT) and Backup ES Transformer (BEST) and Auxiliary Transformer not available for 15 minutes or longer AND

2. EDGs supplying power to 4160V ES Busses Basis:

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the Plant by rendering the Plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). Fifteen minutes is used as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Available indicates transformers are capable of energizing ES busses.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 4.1 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SU1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 75

LOSS OF POWER I EAL 4.2 ]

Loss of AC Power Initiating Condition:

AC power capability to required 4160V ES busses reduced to a single source for 15 minutes or longer such that an additional failure would result in station blackout Emergency Action Level:

ALERT

4.2 MODES

1,2,3,4 AC power capability to the 4160V ES busses reduced to a single power source for 15 minutes or longer such that only one of the following is available:

"A"EDG "B"EDG Offsite Power Transformer (OPT)

Backup ES Transformer (BEST)

Basis:

This Initiating Condition and the associated EALs are intended to provide an escalation from "Loss of Offsite Power for Greater Than 15 Minutes." The condition indicated by this Initiating Condition is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that any additional single failure would result in a station blackout.

Available indicates transformers are capable of energizing required busses.

EDG = Emergency Diesel Generator CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 4.2 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SA5 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 76

LOSS OF POWER I EAL 4.3 ]

Loss of AC Power Initiating Condition:

Loss of All Offsite and required Onsite AC Power for 15 minutes or longer Emergency Action Level:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

4.3 MODES

1,2,3,4 Neither 4160V ES bus is capable of being energized within 15 minutes Basis:

Loss of all AC power compromises all Plant safety systems requiring electric power including ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core uncovering and may challenge containment integrity. The fifteen-minute time duration is to exclude transient or momentary power losses and begins at the time power is lost to the ES busses (NOT when repair efforts begin).

NOTE: In Modes 5 and 6, the same initiating condition/EAL is an ALERT classification.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 4.3 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SS1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 77

LOSS OF POWER I EAL 4.4 ]

Loss of AC Power Initiating Condition:

Prolonged Loss of All Offsite and Onsite AC power Emergency Action Level:

GENERAL EMERGENCY

4.4 MODES

1,2,3,4 (1 and 2)

1. Neither 4160V ES bus is capable of being energized AND

2. (a orb)

a. Restoration of 4160V ES Bus A or 4160V ES Bus B is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> OR

b. Core exit thermocouples > 700°F as indicated on SPDS Basis:

Loss of all AC power compromises all Plant safety systems requiring electric power including ECCS and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power will lead to loss of fuel clad, RCS, and may challenge containment integrity. The four hours to restore AC power is based on the CR3 station blackout coping analysis performed in conformance with 10 CFR 50.63 and Regulatory Guide 1.155, "Station Blackout." The four-hour time limit begins at the time power is lost to the ES busses (NOT when repair efforts begin).

Although this Initiating Condition may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response.

700'F is a good indicator of an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core and is consistent with the "potential loss" factor in the Fission Product Barrier Matrix.

This Initiating Condition is specified to assure that in the unlikely event of a prolonged station blackout, timely recognition of the seriousness of the event occurs and that declaration of a General Emergency occurs as early as is appropriate, based on a reasonable assessment of the event trajectory.

The likelihood of restoring at least one emergency bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 4.4 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SGI EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 78

LOSS OF POWER Loss of AC Power (Shutdown)

Initiating Condition:

Loss of All Offsite and Onsite AC Power to Required Busses During Cold Shutdown or Refueling Mode for 15 minutes or longer Emergency Action Level:

ALERT

4.5 MODES

5,6, No Mode Neither 4160V ES bus is capable of being energized within 15 minutes Basis:

Loss of all AC power compromises all Plant safety systems requiring electric power including ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the emergency busses, relative to that specified for the Site Area Emergency EAL. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses and begins at the time power is lost to the ES busses (NOT when repair efforts begin).

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 4.5 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SA1 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 79

LOSS OF POWER I EAL 4.6 ]

Loss of Vital DC Power Initiatinq Condition:

Loss of all Vital DC Power for 15 minutes or longer Emergency Action Level:

SITE AREA EMERGENCY

4.6 MODES

1,2,3,4 Standby Power Status Lights for BUS Al, A2, and BUS B1, B2 on the Main Control Board (SSF Panel) are out for 15 minutes or longer Basis:

Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control Plant safety functions. Prolonged loss of all DC power could cause core uncovery and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system. Fifteen minutes is used to exclude transient or momentary power losses and begins at the time power is lost to the DC busses (NOT when repair efforts begin).

NOTE: In Modes 5 and 6, the same Initiating Condition/EAL is an UNUSUAL EVENT classification.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 4.6 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SS3 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 80

LOSS OF POWER Loss of Vital DC Power (Shutdown)

Initiatinq Condition:

Loss of all Vital DC Power for 15 minutes or longer Emergency Action Level:

UNUSUAL EVENT

4.7 MODES

5,6, No Mode Standby Power Status Lights for BUS Al, A2, and BUS BI, B2 on the Main Control Board (SSF Panel) are out for 15 minutes or longer Basis:

Loss of required DC power compromises ability to monitor and control Plant safety functions. Prolonged loss of all DC power could cause core uncovery and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Unusual Event, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the emergency busses, relative to that specified for the Site Area Emergency EAL. Fifteen minutes is used to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

CR3 Matrix Reference Number: 4.7 NEI 97-03

Reference:

SU7 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 81

ATTACHMENT 2 Development of Parameters and Values Used in Selected EALs EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 82

TABLE OF CONTENTS FISSIO N PRO DUCT BARRIER MATRIX 5.1, 6.1, and 7.2 ............................................................................... 84 EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 83

Basis for RM-G29 and RM-G30 values used FPBM 5.1, 6.1, 7.2 FPBM 5.1: The 100 R/hr value listed in Fission Product Barrier Matrix (FPBM) 5.1 is based on the response of the containment monitors in the 2/26/80 event during which approximately 43,000 gallons of reactor coolant were released to the containment building. Response Technical Manual RTM-91 Workbook page 25 shows the CR3 containment monitor response graph peaking at about 80 R/hr. RTM-91 page 120 notes that due to uneven mixing, various containment locations may differ by several orders of magnitude and RTM-93 page B-8 notes that it may take several hours for uniform mixing. MicroShield calculations indicated that all normal coolant curies released to the containment and uniformly mixed would result in less than 1 R/hr. Since the 2/26/80 event did not involve gas gap damage, the peak monitor reading was due to uneven mixing. An arbitrary value of 100 R/hr was assumed as a conservative indication of the threshold of gas gap damage.

FPBM 6.1: As noted in the Emergency Action Level Bases Manual, the 10 R/hr value listed in FPBM 6.1 is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant to containment. RM-G29 and RM-G30 typically read about 1 to 2 R/hr in normal operation due mostly to insensitivity at the extreme low end of the seven decade high-range monitors scales. 10 R/hr represents the beginning of the second decade on the monitor scale and a reading that can fairly confidently be attributed to a release of reactor coolant, while fuel barrier remains intact.

FPBM 7.2: The development of the 5,000 R/hr value in FPBM 7.2 is documented in EC 86189 and represents 20% clad damage. It is based on the discussion of RM-G29 and RM-G30 indication of 100% fuel clad damage in Engineering Evaluation EEF-00-009. NEI 97-03 recommends this potential loss threshold correspond to 20%

gap release. Per Engineering Evaluation EC 86189, Vendor Manual 00506-000 states in section 2.2 that the monitor response is proportional (linear) over the range of concern. Therefore, 5000 R/hr corresponds to 20%

gap release.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 84

ATTACHMENT 3 EC 76363 RM-A1 & RM-A2 REPLACEMENT INTERIM COMPENSATORY ACTIONS EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 85

EC 76363 RM-A1 & RM-A2 Replacement Compensatory Actions Engineering Change 76363 has replaced RM-A1 and RM-A2. The new equipment was installed in the same locations as the previous equipment. However, due to problems with the new Accident Range detectors, only the RM-A1 and RM-A2 Normal ranges will initially be placed in service. There will be an interim period when the Accident Range exhaust duct (effluent) monitor will not be operational. RM-A1 is not required during the current extended shutdown since RB Purge operations will not be performed and therefore needs no compensatory actions.

Gaseous Effluent EALs 1.3 Site Area Emergency (SAE), and 1.4 General Emergency (GE) and emergency dose assessment continue to be impacted by the lack of RM-A2 Accident Range.

All significant radioactive sources are in the Spent Fuel Pools and decay heat and source term are significantly diminished. Only a release from a drained Spent Fuel Pool will reach Alert, SAE or GE dose levels (reference 520663-08). Compensatory actions for these emergency levels focus on Spent Fuel Pool level with the intent to make emergency declarations proactively, before a significant release is in progress.

Compensatory actions focus on the Gaseous Effluent EALs only. There are many other EALs that could require an Unusual Event or Alert declaration that are not related to a release and are unaffected by this EC. The Emergency Coordinator will need to evaluate those EALs normally.

EAL Compensatory Actions:

1. Two temporary redundant dose rate instruments have been installed on the Auxiliary Building effluent duct on the 143' elevation downstream of the filters (reference Engineering Evaluation 87296). These instruments (DMC-2000S) have specified range of 0.01 mRem/hr to 1000 Rem/hr. They do NOT replace RM-A2 EAL threshold values. They will provide additional information on release trending for the Emergency Coordinator to use for implementation of the Emergency Coordinator Judgment EALs.

Dose rates from these instruments are transmitted to the GEDDS system, which can be accessed on any business computer. Access: NGG OSI-PI Displays, CR3 General, O&S tab, All GEDDS Tags on PI

- Trend 1, scroll to 143FT AUXILIARY BUILDING EXH DUCT LOCATION 1 and 2 (U3GRP_OCB 101 and U3GRP_OCB 102).

2. A close-circuit TV (CCTV) camera is also available on the Spent Fuel floor, which may assist the Emergency Coordinator in monitoring Spent Fuel Pool level. A CCTV monitor is available in the Control Room.

3. EAL 1.3 Site Area Emergency while RM-A2A is out of service: (Spent Fuel Pool release with pool drained is the only source that can reach this level.)

• Use a continuing uncontrolled loss of Spent Fuel Pool level approaching uncovery of fuel assemblies as indicated by extremely high Spent Fuel Pool area dose rates (e.g., RM-G15 offscale) due to direct shine from unshielded fuel assemblies or use images from CCTV as indicators of actual or likely major failures of plant systems needed for protection of the public (EAL 2.26 Emergency Coordinator Judgment).

" IF Spent Fuel Pool level CANNOT be estimated, THEN use factor of 100 increase on the temporary Auxiliary Building effluent duct dose rate instrument (from the point RM-A4 or RM-A8 is offscale) OR a factor of 10 increase on the temporary instrument (from the point RM-A2N is offscale) as a further indicator of actual or likely major failures of plant systems needed for protection of the public (EAL 2.26 Emergency Coordinator Judgment). NOTE: If fuel remains covered, this level release is NOT credible.)

• Use EAL 1.3 option 2 dose assessment.

" Use EAL 1.3 option 3 field team readings.

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4. EAL 1.4 General Emergency while RM-A2A is out of service: (Spent Fuel Pool release with pool drained is the only source that can reach this level.)

• Use a continuing uncontrolled loss of Spent Fuel Pool level approaching draining of the pools as indicator of the potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases that can be expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline plume exposure levels beyond the site boundary (EAL 2.27 item 2 Emergency Coordinator Judgment). This may be indicated by increasing dose rates on RM-G14, estimated leak rates or images from CCTV.

" IF Spent Fuel Pool level CANNOT be estimated, THEN use factor of 1000 increase on the temporary Auxiliary Building effluent duct dose rate instrument (from the point RM-A4 or RM-A8 is offscale) OR a factor of 100 increase on the temporary instrument (from the point RM-A2N is offscale)as a further indicator of the potential for uncontrolled radionuclide releases that can be expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline plume exposure levels beyond the site boundary (EAL 2.27 item 2 Emergency Coordinator Judgment). NOTE: If fuel remains covered, this level release is NOT credible.)

• Use option 2 dose assessment

• Use option 3 field team readings Dose Assessment Compensatory Actions:

In the current plant condition, dose assessment is not expected to drive any emergency classifications with the possible exception of "what if" projections (before a release is in progress) contributing to Emergency Coordinator Judgment decisions.

Temporary Instruments - Two temporary redundant dose rate instruments have been installed on the Auxiliary Building effluent duct on the 143' elevation downstream of the filters. Dose rates from these instruments are transmitted to the GEDDS system, which can be accessed on any business computer (reference Engineering Evaluation 87296).

RASCAL - An EM-204B worksheet has been developed for using RM-A4, RM-A8 or the temporary Auxiliary Building effluent duct dose rate instrument to estimate source terms for entry into RASCAL. RM-A4 and RM-A8 ranges are limited and could not be used for Alert, SAE or GE dose levels.

Other Support Actions:

As a defence in depth:

1. No fuel assembly or component manipulations in the Spent Fuel Pools will be performed unless both RM-A2N AND RMA2A are operable. :

2. No Reactor Building purge or vent activities will be performed unless both RM-A1N AND RMA1A are operable.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 87

Revision 17 Change Summary:

DRR 664299 NOTE Writers and Reviewers: Changes to certain parts of this document may impact other EPIPs.

EAL Bases Manual EM-202 Section 3.1 Section 3.0 Attachment 1 Enclosure 1 Ensure appropriate PRRs are initiated as needed.

EALBM ectio CHANGE REASON, REFERENCES Section TOC Change Page# of 'Revision EDITORIAL CHANGE - typographical error Summary' from '89' to '88' Page 2, Capitalized 'owner controlled area' EDITORIAL CHANGE - as a defined term, Step 3.1.10 this should be capitalized Revise Definition of OWNER This corrects the definition of OWNER CONTROLLED AREA to read: CONTROLLED AREA to agree with the "The area of land (approximately FSAR 4738 acres ) that is owned, leased, or otherwise controlled by DEF, situated between the mouths of the Withlacoochee and Crystal Rivers and bounded to the north by Page 3 woodlands, to the east by Highway Step 3.1.15 19, to the south by medium to dense woodlands and to the west by marshlands and the Gulf of Mexico. The OWNER CONTROLLED AREA is indicated in Figure 2-3 of the FSAR and encompasses both the PROTECTED AREA and the SITE BOUNDARY."

Delete "Also referred to as the Correct incorrect definition; The OWNER Page 4, Owner Controlled Area" from CONTROLLED AREA and the SITE Step 3.1.22 definition of SITE BOUNDARY. BOUNDARY are not the same.

EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 88

EALBM ectio CHANGE REASON, REFERENCES Section Modify definition of SITE Consistency Pages 18, 20, BOUNDARY to be the same as 38 and 58 Step 3.1.22 Change "Owner Controlled Area Correct wording to agree with altered Page 38 (Site Boundary)" to "area within the definition Site Boundary" Modify definition of OWNER Consistency Pages 48 and CONTROLLED AREA to be the 50 same as Step 3.1.15 Add" outside of the PROTECTED Added to clarify that higher level EALs may be AREA. For events that affect the applicable if the HOSTILE ACTION is within Page 49 PROTECTED AREA, refer to EAL the PROTECTED AREA.

2.20 or EAL 2.21."

Change revision #from '16' to '17' EDITORIAL CHANGE -word processing Throughout change EAL Bases Manual Revision 17 Page 89