05200025/LER-2023-001, Manual Actuation of Reactor Protection System During Mode 3 Due to an Inadequate Procedure Step
| ML23073A380 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 03/14/2023 |
| From: | Martino P Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk |
| References | |
| ND-23-0140 LER 2023-001-00 | |
| Download: ML23073A380 (1) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation |
| 0252023001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
~ Southern Nuclear March 14, 2023 Docket No.:
52-025 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Patrick Martino Site Vice President, Vogtle Unit 3 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) - Unit 3 Licensee Event Report 2023-001-00 7825 River Road Waynesboro, Georgia 30830 706 848 6602 tel ND-23-0140 Manual Actuation of Reactor Protection System During Mode 3 Due to an Inadequate Procedure Step Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), Southern Nuclear Operating Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report for VEGP Unit 3.
This letter contains no regulatory commitments. If you have questions regarding the enclosed information, please contact Will Garrett at (706) 848-7154.
Respectfully submitted, Patrick A. Martino Site Vice President, Unit 3 PAM/KMS/sfr
Enclosure:
Unit 3 Licensee Event Report 2023-001-00 cc:
Regional Administrator, Region II VPO Project Manager Senior Resident Inspector - Vogtle 3 & 4 Director, Environmental Protection Division - State of Georgia
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant - Unit 3 Licensee Event Report 2023-001-00 Manual Actuation of Reactor Protection System During Mode 3 Due to an Inadequate Procedure Step Enclosure Unit 3 Licensee Event Report 2023-001-00
Abstract
On January 14, 2023, at 0721 EST with Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 in Mode 3 at O percent power, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) was manually actuated while conducting pre-criticality testing. The manual RPS actuation was in response to low gland steam pressure. The reactor trip breakers were in an open state prior to the RPS actuation. The cause of this event was an inadequate procedure step. This step was revised to require checking reactor trip breakers are not open prior to manually tripping the reactor in response to gland steam pressure below the procedural limit. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a condition that resulted in manual actuation of the RPS. VEGP Units 1, 2, and 4 were unaffected by this event.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
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- 2. DOCKET NUMBER
- 3. LER NUMBER 1 m*
SEQUENTIAL REV NUMBER NO.
00025 120231 -I 001 1-G On January 14, 2023, at 0721 EST with Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Unit 3 in Mode 3 at O percent power, the Reactor Protection System (RPS) [EIIS: JC] was manually actuated. A gland steam system [EIIS: TC] pressure transient occurred during pre-criticality testing. Operators responded in accordance with the applicable Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) 3-AOP-202, "Condensate System Malfunctions," which required initiation of a manual reactor trip. There were no structures, systems or components that were out of service at the beginning of the event that contributed to the event. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as a condition that resulted in manual actuation of the RPS.
EVENT CAUSE ANALYSIS
The cause of this event was determined to be an inadequate procedure step. The procedure 3-AOP-202 required a manual actuation of the RPS, when responding to low gland steam pressure, without first checking status of the reactor trip breakers. Since the reactor trip breakers were already open, the procedurally directed reactor trip was an unnecessary RPS actuation.
REPORTABILITY AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT
This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to manual actuation of the RPS. There were no safety consequences due to this event. When the reactor was manually tripped, the reactor trip breakers were already in an open state, there was no irradiated fuel in the core, and there was no decay heat present. VEGP Units 1, 2, and 4 were unaffected by this event.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Procedure 3-AOP-202, "Condensate System Malfunctions," was revised to require checking reactor trip breakers are not open prior to manually tripping the reactor when responding to gland steam pressure below the AO P's established limit.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
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