LER-1917-008, Re Division 3 Shutdown Service Water Pump Start Failure |
| Event date: |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
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| 4611917008R00 - NRC Website |
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~- Exelon Generation Clinton Power Station 8401 Power Road Clinton, IL 61727 U-604667 A¥gust 11, 2017 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Subject:
Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 NRC Docket No. 50-461 Licensee Event Report 2017-008-00 10CFR50.73 SRRS 5A.108 Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 2017-008-00: Division 3 Shutdown Service Water Pump Start Failure. This report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this report.
Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Dale Shelton, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (217) 937-2800.
Respectfully, Theodore R. Stoner Site Vice President Clinton Power Station KP/cac Attachment: Licensee Event Report 2017-008-00 cc:
Regional Administrator-NRC Region Ill NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Clinton Power Station Office of Nuclear Facility Safety -
Illinois Emergency Management Agency
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2017)
, the htt(2://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)
NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 05000461 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE Division 3 Shutdown Service Water Pump Start Failure
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I
SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06 15 2017 2017 -
008 00 08 11 2017 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
D 20.2201 (d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 1 D
D D
20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4J 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.11 (a)(4l D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.36(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71 (a)(5)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a)(1) 097 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
[gJ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 73.77(a)(2)(il D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 73.77(a)(2)(iil D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D OTHER
'1:, ""
Specify in Abstract below or in
D. Safety Consequences
The purpose for the Division 3 SX system is to provide cooling water to Division 3 cooling loads including the HPCS pump room coolers [CLR], the Division 3 EOG and the Division 3 Switchgear Heat Removal System (VX). The Division 3 SX header is normally supplied by cooling water from the non-safety related Plant Service Water System (WS) [KG]. Under design basis event conditions such as Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) or Loss of Coolant Accidents (LOCAs), a Division 3 SX pump start signal is generated and the cross-tie valve [V] (1 SX014C) from the plant service water system closes. At this point the Division 3 SX pump would be providing cooling water flow from the lake to the Division 3 SX cooling loads.
Divisions 1 and 2 safety-related equipment are fully capable of mitigating the consequences of an accident and were available during the period of this event.
The failure of the Division 3 Shutdown Service Water Pump results in loss of Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator safety function and a loss of the High Pressure Core Spray System safety function.
The cause of the failure of the pump has not been determined. Once determined, this information will be provided.
E. Corrective Actions
In parallel with the testing described above, several component changes were made to the overall pump/motor assembly. A new motor with higher starting torque characteristics was approved and installed. The pump breaker and thermal overloads were replaced with new units. The pump shaft sleeves were replaced and the pump packing was replaced with a flexible style equivalent.
On June 23, 2017, following a successful uncoupled run of the new motor, a coupled run was performed with no abnormalities noted. All monitored points showed normal starting characteristics for the pump. The baseline and surveillance test procedures were performed without incident.
The Division 3 SX system, including the Division 3 EOG and HPCS system were declared operable at 2345 hours0.0271 days <br />0.651 hours <br />0.00388 weeks <br />8.922725e-4 months <br /> on 6/23/17.
Additional corrective actions for this event will be provided in the follow-up LER F. Previous Similar Occurrences SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 008 REV NO.
00 LER 2014-005-01 Failure of Shutdown Service Water Pump Results in Loss of Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator and High Pressure Core Spray Safety Functions On 9/16/14 at approximately 1905 hours0.022 days <br />0.529 hours <br />0.00315 weeks <br />7.248525e-4 months <br />, Operators were performing an operability test of the Shutdown Service Water (SX) system. The Division 3 SX pump (1 SX01 PC) was started to support the 2-year Comprehensive Pump Test and the motor thermal overload protection tripped off the pump after approximately 36 seconds. The cause of the event was that procedures used to develop plant modification change packages contained an inadequate process to identify the need for further reviews and the level of design detail required by those reviews. A new pump was installed and the pump was restored to operable status on 9/21/14. (ML16006A047)).
G. Component Failure Data
The Division 3 SX pump is a Sulzer model 8X14A VCM pump with a Siemens-Allis type RGV motor.
The pump is a vertical two-stage deep well pump that consists of a discharge head, six columns, and a bowl assembly to extend 30 feet below the floor elevation. The pump is driven by a 75 horsepower, 1800 RPM, 480-volt motor. Page _4_ of _4_
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| 05000461/LER-1917-002, Regarding Failure of the Division 1 Diesel Generator Ventilation Fan Load Sequence Relay Circuit During Concurrent Maintenance of RHR Division 2 Results in an Unanalyzed Condition | Regarding Failure of the Division 1 Diesel Generator Ventilation Fan Load Sequence Relay Circuit During Concurrent Maintenance of RHR Division 2 Results in an Unanalyzed Condition | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000461/LER-1917-003, Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (Egm) 11-003, Revision 3 | Regarding Implementation of Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (Egm) 11-003, Revision 3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000461/LER-1917-004, For Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Main Steam Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Test Limit Exceeded During Refueling Outage | For Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 Main Steam Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Test Limit Exceeded During Refueling Outage | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000461/LER-1917-005, Regarding Automatic Reactor Scram During the Performance of Scram Time Testing as a Result of an Invalid Oscillating Power Range Monitor Growth Rate Trip | Regarding Automatic Reactor Scram During the Performance of Scram Time Testing as a Result of an Invalid Oscillating Power Range Monitor Growth Rate Trip | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000461/LER-1917-006, Re Secondary Containment Inoperable During Mode Change Due to Doors Propped Open | Re Secondary Containment Inoperable During Mode Change Due to Doors Propped Open | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000461/LER-1917-007, Re Manual Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Feedwater Heating | Re Manual Reactor Scram Due to Loss of Feedwater Heating | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000461/LER-1917-008, Re Division 3 Shutdown Service Water Pump Start Failure | Re Division 3 Shutdown Service Water Pump Start Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000461/LER-1917-009, Regarding Trip of Emergency Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Static Var Compensator Causes Positive Secondary Containment Pressure Following Voltage Transient on 138 Kv Offsite Source | Regarding Trip of Emergency Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Static Var Compensator Causes Positive Secondary Containment Pressure Following Voltage Transient on 138 Kv Offsite Source | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000461/LER-1917-010, Regarding Division 1 Transformer Failure Leads to Instrument Air Isolation to Containment Requiring a Manual Reactor Scram | Regarding Division 1 Transformer Failure Leads to Instrument Air Isolation to Containment Requiring a Manual Reactor Scram | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) |
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