05000443/FIN-2014003-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement 4.3.1.2 requires verification of the response time of each reactor trip function every 18 months. During the 18 month surveillance testing of the RCP UV channels conducted on April 6, 2014, three of the four RCP UV relays exceeded their allowable maximum response time, resulting in their associated UV reactor trip channels exceeding the limit of 1.5 seconds. NextEra determined that the three channels were inoperable. TS 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, requires four channels of RCP UV instrumentation to be operable in Mode 1. With three RCP UV channels inoperable in Mode 1, the plant is required to initiate a shutdown within one hour in accordance with TS 3.0.3. NextEra determined that this condition existed from the time the relays were last calibrated in OR15 (September 20, 2012) until the plant entered OR16 (April 1, 2014). Contrary to TS 3.0.3, Seabrook station operated in Mode 1 with three of four RCP UV channels inoperable for approximately 17 months without taking the required TS actions. NextEra entered this issue into the CAP as AR 01964167 and performed a detailed analysis of the impact of the increased channel response time. NextEra, in consultation with Westinghouse, determined that the safety function of the RCP UV trip channel (prevention of departure from nucleate boiling) was maintained throughout the period of inoperability. NextEra planned to develop a maintenance procedure to allow for on-line re-calibration of the RCP UV relays. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations because the deficiency did not affect a single RPS trip signal to initiate a reactor scram and the function of other redundant trips or diverse methods of reactor shutdown, did not involve control manipulations that unintentionally added positive reactivity, and did not result in a mismanagement of reactivity by operators. |
| Site: | Seabrook  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000443/2014003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Dionne C Newport G Dentel P Cataldo T O'Hara |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Seabrook - IR 05000443/2014003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Seabrook) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Seabrook)
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