05000440/LER-2011-003, For Perry Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1, Regarding Switchyard Configuration During Startup Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications
| ML11356A089 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  (NPF-058) |
| Issue date: | 12/15/2011 |
| From: | Kaminskas V FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-11-380 LER-11-003-00 | |
| Download: ML11356A089 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 4402011003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
FENOCT FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company Perry Nuclear Power Plant 10 Center Road Perry, Ohio 44081 Vito A. Kaminskas Vice President 440-280-5382 Fax: 440-280-8029 December 15, 2011.
L-1 1-380 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
ATTN: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001.
SUBJECT:
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Docket No. 50-440, License No. NPF-58 Licensee Event Report Submittal Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 2011-003, Switchyard Configuration During Startup Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications. There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal.
If there are any questions or if additional information is required, please contact Mr. Robert Coad, Manager - Regulatory Compliance, at (440) 280-5328.
Sincerely, Vito A. Kaminskas
Enclosure:
LER 2011-003 cc:
NRC Project Manager NRC. Resident Inspector NRC Region III
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 10/31/2013 (10-2010)
, the NRC may digits/characters for each block) not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 05000-440 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE Switchyard Configuration During Startup Results in Operation Prohibited by Technical Specifications
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SSEQUENTIAL REV I FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 10 18 2011 2011
- - 003
- - 00 12 15 2011 FACILITYNAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
El 20.2201(b)
Z 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
Z 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 2 E] 20.2201(d)
LI 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
E 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
E] 20.2203(a)(1)
E] 20.2203(a)(4)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
E] 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
E] 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[
50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
[
20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
[] 50.36(c)(2)
E] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
E] 73.71 (a)(4) 000 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[] 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
[L 73.71 (a)(5)
LI 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
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LI 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
El OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)oSpecify in Abstract below El LI 5073(a(2)()(D)or in
EVENT ANALYSIS
During plant startup on October 18, 2011, with the plant in MODE 4, the unit one startup transformer [XFMR] [EA] was INOPERABLE. For operation in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the two required qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1 E AC Electric Power Distribution System were the unit 2 startup transformer and the backfeed lineup through the unit one auxiliary transformer (delayed access circuit). Use of the delayed access circuit was allowed by approved License Amendment No. 160 until December 12, 2011.
On October 18, 2011, at 0351 hours0.00406 days <br />0.0975 hours <br />5.803571e-4 weeks <br />1.335555e-4 months <br />, the plant entered MODE 2. At 1619, it was discovered that the manual disconnects for yard breakers S610 and 5611 were open. The license amendment considers specific manual actions necessary to align the delayed access circuit to the plant's safety buses. These actions are contained in ONI-SPI F-i, "Off-Site Power Restoration," and ONI-SPF F-2, "Yard Inspection." These procedures do not provide direction on restoration of the manual disconnects for yard breakers S610 and S611. Therefore, the delayed access circuit was not OPERABLE when the plant entered MODE 2.
On October 18, 2011, at 1711 hours0.0198 days <br />0.475 hours <br />0.00283 weeks <br />6.510355e-4 months <br />, the four disconnects for yard breakers S610 and S61 1 were closed. SVI-R10-T5227 was completed by 1730 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.58265e-4 months <br /> and the delayed access circuit was declared OPERABLE.
OPERABILITY requirements for two qualified offsite circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC Electric Power Distribution System were not met for TS LCO 3.8.1 when the plant transitioned from MODE 4 to MODE 2. This was an operation prohibited by TS LCO 3.0.4 which prohibits MODE changes under certain conditions when an LCO is not met. In addition, between 0351 hours0.00406 days <br />0.0975 hours <br />5.803571e-4 weeks <br />1.335555e-4 months <br /> and 1711 hours0.0198 days <br />0.475 hours <br />0.00283 weeks <br />6.510355e-4 months <br /> on October 18, 2011, TS LCO 3.8.1 Required Action F.1 (be in MODE 3, Hot Shutdown, in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) was not met.
This event has no quantitative change in the current core damage frequency as the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model does not model the availability of the backfeed lineup for power restoration purposes.
From the qualitative probabilistic risk perspective, the additional time that would have been required to re-establish this backfeed alignment is viewed to have a non-risk significant effect as re-establishment of the offsite power through this source would not have prevented the transient or would have been utilized as part of the initial mitigating strategy. This alignment would most likely be utilized in the event of a loss of the remaining startup transformer. Had this failure occurred within the timeframe involved, all emergency diesel generators were available and would have been expected to provide onsite AC power. Re-establishment of offsite power in this event would not have been time critical or risk significant. Based on this analysis, this event is viewed as having low safety significance.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
A daily surveillance requirement check was established to check the position of the disconnect switches associated with the breakers in the yard. The check was performed twice per day when the delayed access circuit was relied upon as a qualified offsite source of power.
SVI-R10-T5227 was revised to add checks of components on the switchyard side of the main transformers when qualifying the auxiliary transformer as a delayed source.
Operations Night Order, "Switchyard Clearance and Switching Orders," was issued to ensure control
room personnel have a complete understanding of switchyard configuration.
Operations Administrative Instruction (OAI) OAI-1701, Tracking of LCOs, will be revised to provide specific guidance to generate an LCO if the alignment of switchyard components impacts (or has the potential to impact) the operability of an off-site power source.
Licensed operators and shift engineers will be trained to Nuclear Operating Procedure (NOP) NOP-OP-1003, Grid Reliability Protocol, as it relates to the importance of knowing the status of offsite power sources and related TS.
Licensed operators and staff that process mode restraints will be trained to this event and lessons learned to prevent the reoccurrence of closing a mode restraint prior to the issue being completely resolved.
Plant Equipment Rounds will be revised to include a daily inspection of the transmission yard.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
A review of Licensee Event Reports and the corrective action database for the past three years determined that two similar events had occurred.
LER 2010-002, Piping Leak Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications, documented a leak on the Emergency Closed Cooling Water subsystem B (ECCW B) [CC]. When ECCW B was declared INOPERABLE, the completion time for TS LCO 3.7.10 "ECCW System," Condition B had been exceeded. This was a condition prohibited by TS.
The corrective actions associated with this event focused on revision of the prompt operability determination process and training on the event. These corrective actions would not have reasonably been expected to have prevented the event documented in LER 2011-003.
LER 2011-002, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Plant Shutdown due to Unit 1 Startup Transformer Issues, documented two issues associated with the unit one startup transformer.
The issues were the inappropriate use of a delayed access circuit as a qualified source of offsite power and a transformer failure that resulted in a plant shutdown.
The corrective actions associated with these events focused on a license amendment and TS Bases revision to clarify available qualified sources of offsite power and replacement of the unit 1 startup transformer. These corrective actions would not have reasonably been expected to have prevented the event documented in LER 2011-003.
COMMITMENTS
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this report. Actions described in this document represent intended or planned actions, are described for the NRC's information, and are not regulatory
commitments