05000424/LER-2006-003

LER-2006-003, Contract Employee Failure to Self-Disclose Material Information for Unescorted Access

Docket Number(S)
Event date:	10-11-2006
Report date:	12-06-2006
4242006003R00 - NRC Website

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

The report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 73.71 Section (b)(1) and Appendix G(I)(b).

B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At the time of this event, Unit 1 was defueled and Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at 100% rated thermal power.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

Personnel access authorization activities for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) are performed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) Nuclear Fleet Security located in Birmingham, Alabama.

As part of the background investigation, a Personnel History Questionnaire (PHQ) must be completed by an individual applying for unescorted access authorization (UAA). The PHQ requires the individual to list any criminal charges pending. All individuals granted UAA are also made aware of their continuing reporting responsibility through the "Plant Access Training" program.

A contract employee, charged with aggravated assault on June 26, 2005, failed to self-disclose this information prior to being granted unescorted access (UA) to VEGP in September 2005. The subject contract employee completed a PHQ and signed a SNC background investigation consent form on August 31, 2005. Since the subject contract employee had been badged at another nuclear plant less than 365 days before arriving at VEGP, he was not due for a background reinvestigation, which would have included a criminal history check. Rather, the approved, UAA self-screening contractor performed the background screening for reinstatement, and issued SNC a Certificate of Reliability on September 8, 2005, certifying that this individual met the UAA Reinstatement requirements. Upon review by SNC Nuclear Fleet Security, the individual was granted UAA on September 8, 2005, and VEGP site Security granted UA on September 16, 2005 to October 13, 2005.

On October 11, 2006, Turkey Point security personnel discovered that the subject contract employee had not self-disclosed material information regarding his assault charge prior to having UA to three nuclear facilities, two of which were SNC's VEGP and Hatch Nuclear Plant. In turn, SNC Nuclear Fleet Security conducted a detailed investigation on October 11, 2006, and determined that the subject contract employee failed, at both SNC nuclear facilities, to disclose the charge. Had this information been disclosed during the background screening process, UA to SNC's sites would not have been granted.

At approximately 1525 hours0.0177 days <br />0.424 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.802625e-4 months <br /> (EDST), on October 11, 2006, SNC Nuclear Fleet Security contacted VEGP site Security regarding the failure of the subject contract employee to self-disclose the material information. A one-hour telephone notification to the NRC was made on October 11, 2006, at approximately 1605 hours0.0186 days <br />0.446 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.107025e-4 months <br /> (EDST), in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1).

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The contract employee failed to disclose the criminal charge in order to gain UA. A review of SNC's and its approved contractor's access authorization process concluded that requirements and established processes were followed regarding the granting of authorization for UA in this case. The cause of this event was the omission or falsification of material information by the contract employee.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Based on investigation of this event, no plant equipment or systems were harmed due to the failure of the contract employee to self-disclose the charge. During the time the contract employee had UA, no aberrant behavior was observed. There was no safety significance associated with this event, as there were no releases of radioactive materials, no personnel injuries, and no reportable equipment or system failures resulting from this event.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The subject individual has been denied UA at all SNC nuclear plants and has been identified in the shared, industry-sponsored Personnel Access Data System (PADS).

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Since this event involved the action of an individual applicant, previous corrective actions involving individual employees would not have prevented this event.

A review of plant documentation revealed no previous similar events occurred in the past 3 years.

This event is not considered reportable under the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) program.