05000373/FIN-2011002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Plant Barrier Control Process Caused Secondary Containment to Become Inoperable |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to follow steps 3.6 and 3.7 of procedure CC-AA-201, Revision 8, Plant Barrier Control Program. Specifically, two airlock doors were opened simultaneously for a period of time sufficient to allow reactor building air pressure to surpass the TS allowed value for operability of secondary containment. The licensee entered this issue into its CAP as action requests (ARs) 1182255 and 1195987, and, at the time of this report, was in the process of conducting an apparent cause evaluation to determine the causes of the occurrence and to develop corrective actions. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (secondary containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 SDP review of this finding using the guidance provided in IMC 0609, and a Region III SRA continued the risk assessment using IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. For Unit 1, since an open pathway existed to the environment from the secondary containment, the SRA performed a Phase 2 SDP analysis using the Appendix H guidance. For Unit 2, the SRA performed a Phase 1 SDP analysis using Figure 6.2, Road Map for LERF [Large Early Release Frequency]-based Risk Significance Evaluation for Type B Findings at Shutdown. The SRA concluded that the total risk associated with this finding is very low and best characterized as Green. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control, because the licensee did not appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the impact of the work on different job activities, and the need for work groups to communicate, coordinate, and cooperate with each other during activities in which interdepartmental coordination is necessary to assure plant and human performance (H.3(b)). |
| Site: | LaSalle  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000373/2011002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Shah R Ruiz F Ramirez K Riemer M Mitchell J Neurauter J Yesinowski J Bozga M Learn A Scarbeary R Edwards L Rodriguez |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - LaSalle - IR 05000373/2011002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (LaSalle) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (LaSalle)
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