An NRC-identified Green
NCV of the McGuire Unit 1 and Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.4,
Fire Protection Program (
FPP), was identified for the licensees failure to adequately control fire ignition sources in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 exterior doghouses in accordance with the
FPP requirements of Nuclear System Directive (NSD)- 313, Control of
Transient Fire Loads. Specifically, temporary electric portable heaters were energized for several days without implementing required hourly fire watches, locating the energized heaters greater than prescribed separation distances from safety-related equipment, and preventing other
transient combustible materials from being located near the heaters. The licensee placed this issue into their corrective action program (
CAP) and took corrective actions to de-energize the heaters, distance the heaters away from safety related
feedwater isolation valve electrical cables, and remove unnecessary
transient combustibles from the area. The failure to control fire ignition sources in accordance with NSD-313 was a performance deficiency (
PD) . The
PD was more than minor because it was associated with the
mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that, a fire could have affected nearby safety-related
feedwater isolation valve electrical cables which provide a shutdown mitigation function. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain cold shutdown condition. This finding had a cross cutting aspect of teamwork in the human performance area because individuals failed to effectively communicate and coordinate their activities to ensure that the temporary heaters were energized following prescribed fire protection control measures and written instructions.
