A self-revealing
NCV of
TS 5.7.1 was identified for the failure of the licensee to barricade, conspicuously post, and adequately control access to a
high radiation area (
HRA). Specifically, on September 17, 2009, a crane flagman on a Radiation Work Permit (
RWP) that did not allow access to a
HRA, inadvertently entered an unposted but guarded
transient HRA and recorded an electronic dosimeter (
ED) dose rate alarm at 128 mrem/hr. The worker was unable to hear the alarm due to wearing a headset and not wearing an auxiliary alarm device as specified in station procedures for
HRA entries. The worker had been briefed to not enter the area when an irradiated instrument was on the floor and that the guard would prevent his entering the area. The guard was not positioned to prevent entry into the area and did not detect the flagman entering the area until he had already passed the source. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as
PIP M-10-05506. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the cornerstone attribute of exposure control and affected the
Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation because it resulted in unplanned or unintended radiation dose. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not an
ALARA finding or
overexposure, did not have a
substantial potential for overexposure, and did not compromise the ability to assess dose. The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of radiological safety in the work control component of the Human Performance area because the licensee did not adequately control the areas as a
HRA.
H.3(a) (Section 2RS1).
