Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | TS 3.6.3 specifies that each containment isolation valve be operable in Modes 1, 2,3, and 4. TS 3.6.3, Condition A specifies if one containment isolation valve is inoperable, the flow path must be isolated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and verified isolated once per 31 days. TS 3.6.3, Condition B specifies if two containment isolation valves are inoperable, the affected penetration flow path shall be isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. TS3.6.1 specifies that the containment shall be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. TS3.6.1, Condition A specifies that if the containment is not operable, it should be returned to operable status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Condition B specifies that if Condition A is not met, the plant shall be shut down to Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 with 36hours. Contrary to the above, from October 3, 2005, to March 22, 2007, containment isolation valve 1WL-65B was not operable and the licensee failed to isolate the flow path within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, failed to restore the containment to an operable condition, and failed to shut down the reactor within the prescribed time limits. In addition, on ten occasions between October 3, 2005, and March 22, 2007, two containment isolation valves, 1WL-65B and 1WL-64A, were inoperable and the affected containment penetration flow path was not isolated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the screening criteria found in MC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, approach for assessing Type B findings at power. The issue was screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the failure of 1WL-65B to fully close did not affect the likelihood of core damage and did not represent a contributor to the large early release frequency (LERF). This violation was documented in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-07-02178. |
| Site: | McGuire  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000369/2009004 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | H Gepford J Brady R Eul B Collins A Vargas R Monk J Heath J Bartley E Stamm A Nielsen L Carlson R Hamilton W Loo |
| INPO aspect | |
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