05000366/LER-2004-003, Edwin 1. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 2, Regarding Failure to Restore Caution Tag on Service Air System Resulted in Primary Containment Inoperability
| ML043410064 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/2004 |
| From: | Sumner H Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-04-2353 LER 04-003-00 | |
| Download: ML043410064 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 3662004003R00 - NRC Website | |
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H. L Sumner, Jr.
Southern Nuclear Vice President Operating Company, Inc.
Hatch Project Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham. Alabama 35201 Tel 205.992.7279 SOUTHERNAN December 1, 2004 COMPANY Energy to Serve Your orld Docket No.: 50-366 NL-04-2353 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Edwin 1. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Licensee Event Report Failure to Restore Caution Tag on Service Air System Resulted in Primary Containment Inoperability Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Southern Nuclear Operating Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning failure to restore a caution tag on a service air system which resulted in the primary containment being inoperable.
This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please advise.
Sincerely, 1-1. L. Sumner, Jr.
))LS/il/sdl Enclosure: LER 2-2004-003 cc:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. J. T. Gasser, Executive Vice President Mr. G. R. Frederick, General Manager - Plant Hatch RTYPE: CIIAO2.004 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Dr. W. D. Travers, Regional Administrator Mr. C. Gratton, NRR Project Manager - Hatch Mr. D. S. Simpkins, Senior Resident Inspector-Hatch 42ib
Abstract
On 10/03/2004 at 0530 ET, Unit 2 was in the Run Mode at an approximate power level of 561 CMWT (20 percent rated thermal power). At that time, Primary Containment was declared inoperable upon realizing that both manually operated Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) 2P5 1 -F651 and 2P5 I -F513 were open for penetration 21. Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 Condition B was entered because both manually operated PCIVs for one penetration were open in Mode 1. Required Action Statement (RAS) 2-04-197 was initiated at 0530 on 10/03/2004 which required closing at least one PCIV within I hour. With Maintenance support, the shift was able to close PCIV 2P51-F513 at 0655 on 10/03/2004.
RAS 2-04-197 continues to remain active because 2P51 -F651 located inside the drywell is open. Valve 2P5 I -F513 is confirmed closed once every 31 days. Clearance process controls were inadequately addressed by the procedures associated with startup and drywell closeout. The procedures for startup and drywell closeout will be revised to strengthen the controls established for the clearance process. Procedure 34GO-OPS-003-2, "START-UP SYSTEM STATUS CHECKLIST" and procedure 34GO-OPS-028-2, "DRYWELL CLOSEOUT" will be revised to ensure that the tagouts related to the clearance process database are checked prior to startup.
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) building and would have been controlled and filtered through the safety related SBGT system. For these reasons, it may be concluded that this event did not adversely impact nuclear safety or the health and safety of the public.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The appropriate procedures will be revised as necessary to state the requirement to add clearance process tagouts to the appropriate RAS. This action will be completed by February 2005.
Procedures 34GO-OPS-003-1/2 will be revised to include the need to check all clearance process tagouts prior to startup. These revisions will be completed prior to the next drywell closeout or by February 2005, whichever is first.
Procedures 34GO-OPS-028-1/2 will be revised to: 1) Confirm all manual valves are in the correct position;
- 2) Clarify the requirement to address clearance process tagouts) 3) Add signoff steps. These revisions wvill be completed prior to the next drywell closeout or by February 2005, whichever is first.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Other Systems Affected: No systems other than those already mentioned in this report were affected by this event.
Failed Components Information
No failed components directly caused or resulted from this event.
Commitment Information: This report does not create any permanent licensing commitments.
Previous Similar Events
There has not been any previous similar event in the past two years in which the unit started or operated with its primary containment inoperable.