The inspectors identified an
NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 (
10CFR50), Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for not correcting a
condition adverse to quality associated with safety-related motor operated valve motor control center auxiliary contact switches in a timely manner following the failure of the Unit 1
Core Spray Loop A test bypass
primary containment isolation valve (HV-052-1F015A) to close on August 3, 2006. As a result, the Unit 2
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (
RCIC) turbine exhaust line vacuum breaker outboard
primary containment isolation valve (HV-049-2F080) experienced a similar failure to close on June 4, 2008. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the structures, systems, and components and barrier containment performance attribute of the
Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents and events. The inspector assessed the finding using Phase 1 of
IMC 0609, Appendix A,
Significance Determination Process for Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. This finding has a crosscutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution because Exelon did not take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance and complexity (
P.1(d))
