The inspectors identified that lifting heavy loads with the polar crane in the containment building was controlled by procedures which did not limit the maximum vertical height that the reactor vessel head could be raised above the reactor vessel during refueling maintenance. The inspectors reviewed St. Lucie?s response to
NUREG 0612,
Control of Heavy Loads, transmitted in
FPL to NRC Letter 81-428, dated September 30, 1981. The
FPL response stated that St. Lucie would not perform a load drop analysis since they felt it was not justified since they adhere to the general requirements and guidelines of
NUREG 0612 to limit the likelihood of a load drop accident and their procedures limit the ?worst case? load drop accident height of the reactor vessel head to no higher than the 62\' elevation of containment. The inspectors toured the Unit 1 containment building and noted that the reactor vessel head was stored on the 62\' elevation next to a fixed handrail surrounding the upper refueling cavity. The inspectors realized that the reactor vessel head would have to be lifted above the handrail which was approximately 6 feet above the 62\' elevation floor level when following the safe load path to and from the reactor vessel
flange. This observation was in contrast to the
FPL response dated September 30, 1981. The inspectors then reviewed applicable load handling procedures and noted there were no limits in place that would restrict lifting the reactor vessel head above a prescribed height to limit the likelihood of a load handling accident as communicated to the NRC in
FPL response dated September 30, 1981. This issue is unresolved pending additional inspections to review the licensee?s investigation and corrective actions. This item is identified as unresolved item
URI 05000335, 389/2007003-01, Reactor Vessel Head Lift Practices
