05000298/FIN-2012002-04

Finding

Title

Failure to Maintain Design Control of Standby Liquid Control System

Description

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, associated with the licensees failure to assure that the applicable design basis requirements associated with the standby liquid control system test tank were correctly translated into the plant design to ensure that the standby liquid control system would remain operable following a seismic event. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution as CR-CNS-2012-01214, CR-CNS-2012-01224, CR-CNS-2012-01232, and CR-CNS-2012-01651. The licensee subsequently performed station calculation NEDC 12-015 Standby Liquid Control Test Tank Seismic Evaluation that determined that the standby liquid control system would be operable following a seismic event with the standby liquid control system test tank full. The licensees failure to maintain design control of standby liquid control system was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences because there were questions as to whether or not the standby liquid control system would remain functional during a seismic event. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609.04 Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The inspectors determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) was not a design or qualification issue confirmed not to result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent an actual loss of safety function of system or train; (3) did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; (4) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or server weather initiating event. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance

04
Site:	Cooper
Report	IR 05000298/2012002 Section 1R15
Date counted	Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:	IP 71111.15
Inspectors (proximate)	C Henderson J Josey J Laughlin S Garchow V Gaddy
INPO aspect
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v • d • e

Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2012002

1(0)2(9)3(16)4(13)5(12)6(0)7(6)8(0)301(1)403(0)404(4)501(0)503(0)801(0)31(0)

IR 05000298/2012002: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1

Finding List (Cooper) @ 2012Q1

CCA Matrix: 2012Q1

	Q	CCA	Title
05000298/FIN-2011004-01	2011Q3	H.7	Failure to Place the Essential Service Water System Strainers in (a)(1)
05000298/FIN-2011004-02	2011Q3		Failure to Scope Reactor Building Drain Components and Steam Exclusion Doors that Affect Safety-related Systems in the Maintenance Rule Monitoring Program
05000298/FIN-2011004-03	2011Q3	H.8	Failure to Assess and Manage Risk for Maintenance Near Electrical Towers That Could Impact Initiating Events
05000298/FIN-2011004-04	2011Q3	P.3	Failure to Assess and Manage Risk for Maintenance Near an Operating Reactor Feed Pump That Could Impact Initiating Events
05000298/FIN-2011004-05	2011Q3	H.12	Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Personnel Contamination
05000298/FIN-2011004-06	2011Q3	P.2	Failure to Identify, Correct, and Prevent Recurrence of a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality
05000298/FIN-2011004-07	2011Q3		Inadequate Procedure Results in Inoperable Essential Pump
05000298/FIN-2011005-07	2011Q4	H.14	Failure to Perform Required 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations for Changes
05000298/FIN-2011202-02	2011Q4		Security
05000298/FIN-2011005-06	2011Q4	P.2	Failure to Correctly Translate Design Requirements into Installed Plant Configuration
05000298/FIN-2011005-05	2011Q4	P.1	Failure to Identify Deficient Performance During a Single-Facility Drill
05000298/FIN-2011005-03	2011Q4	H.12	Failure to Follow Procedures for Dose Rate Alarms Received by Two Individuals
05000298/FIN-2011005-02	2011Q4	H.2	Failure to Maintain Control and Continuous Coverage of a Posted Locked High Radiation Area
05000298/FIN-2011005-01	2011Q4	H.2	Failure to Conspicuously Post a High Radiation Area
05000298/FIN-2011005-04	2011Q4		Failure to Provide Complete and Accurate Solid Radwaste Shipment Information in Annual Reports
05000298/FIN-2012002-01	2012Q1	P.2	Failure to Maintain Design Control for Internal Flooding
05000298/FIN-2012002-02	2012Q1	P.2	Failure to Scope Required Components in the Stations Maintenance Rule Monitoring Program
05000298/FIN-2012002-03	2012Q1	H.12	Failure to Appropriately Manage Risk for Maintenance in the Stations Switchyard
05000298/FIN-2012002-04	2012Q1		Failure to Maintain Design Control of Standby Liquid Control System
05000298/FIN-2012002-05	2012Q1	H.7	Unevaluated Pre-conditioning for Core Spray Motor-operated Valves prior to Conducting As Found In-service Surveillance Testing
05000298/FIN-2012002-06	2012Q1	H.14	Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Requirements
05000298/FIN-2012002-07	2012Q1		Failure to Furnish Evidence of an Activity Affecting Quality
05000298/FIN-2012002-08	2012Q1	H.2	Failure to Follow Station Procedure Results in Inadequate Work Instructions

Self-Identified List (Cooper)

	Q	Title
05000298/FIN-2011005-08	2011Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000298/FIN-2011005-09	2011Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Cooper Findings full list]

05000298/FIN-2012002-04

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