An apparent violation was identified, in that, an operator action that was described in the Oconee licensing basis was not appropriately implemented in procedures. The licensing basis stated that, upon confirmation of a fire in the plant, operating personnel would be dispatched to the standby shutdown facility (SSF) and would establish communication with the main control room (
MCR). However, plant procedures did not dispatch an operator to the SSF until a loss of function occurred. This finding had a credible impact on safety, in that, during a cable spreading room (CSR) fire that required activation of the SSF, delaying manning of the SSF, could increase the amount of time during which the unit was vulnerable to the effects of spurious actuations. Spurious actuations could disable the SSF by causing a loss of inventory greater than the capability of the SSF
reactor coolant (RC) makeup pump. The safety significance of this finding is unresolved pending further NRC evaluation.
