05000261/FIN-2009002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to meet the required actions of TS 3.8.1 for condition B |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 3.8.1, for the licensees failure to meet the required actions of TS 3.8.1 for one inoperable emergency diesel generator (EDG), which are, in part, that within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovering the inoperable EDG, the licensee must either verify that the other EDG starts from standby conditions and achieves acceptable steady-state conditions, or determine that the other EDG is not inoperable due to a common cause. The licensee has entered this finding into their corrective action program as Action Request 327363, and plans to insert into the appropriate procedure criteria to describe the required attributes of an adequate determination that an EDG is not inoperable due to a common cause. This finding is more-than-minor because if left uncorrected, this finding would become a more significant safety and regulatory concern, in that following a common-cause inoperability of both EDGs and the discovery of the inoperability of one EDG, if left uncorrected this violation could result in the licensee correcting the discovered inoperability of one EDG without correcting the undiscovered inoperability of the other EDG, such that the other EDG could remain inoperable for longer than its allowed outage time. Using Appendix A of IMC 0609, the significance of this violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (GREEN), because although the violation could degrade the Emergency AC power function in the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, the violation was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent actual loss of safety function of a single train, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-TS Trains of equipment designated as risk-significant, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe-weather initiating event. This finding has a cross cutting aspect of procedures, as described in the resources component of the Human Performance cross cutting area because the licensee did not ensure that procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety as it relates to the EDG common cause analysis procedure. (H.2(c)) |
| Site: | Robinson  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000261/2009002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen G Kuzo M Chitty R Aiello R Hagar R Musser N Griffis P Capehart E Morris |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Robinson - IR 05000261/2009002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Robinson) @ 2009Q1
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