05000260/LER-2010-002, Regarding Failure to Meet the Requirements of Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation Due to Inoperable Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

Regarding Failure to Meet the Requirements of Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation Due to Inoperable Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

ML101810071
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry  (DPR-052)
Issue date:	06/25/2010
From:	Polson K Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 10-002-00
Download: ML101810071 (7)

LER-2010-002, Regarding Failure to Meet the Requirements of Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation Due to Inoperable Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
2602010002R00 - NRC Website

text

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 June 25, 2010 10 CFR 50.73 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 NRC Docket No. 50-260

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 50-26012010-002 The enclosed Licensee EventReport (LER) provides details of a failure to meet the requirements of a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation due to inoperable primary containment isolation instrumentation. The Tennessee Valley Authority is submitting this report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact Dan Williamson, Acting Site Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager, at (256) 729-2636.

Respectfully, KJ.P(on Vice President cc: See page 2

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 June 25, 2010 Enclosure cc (w/ Enclosure):

NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 08/31/2010 (9-2007)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information (See reverse for required number of collection.

3. PAGE Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2 05000260 1 of 5

4. TITLE: Failure To Meet The Requirements Of Technical Specifications Limiting Condition For Operation Due To Inoperable Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED M

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MNH DY YA YER SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR N/A N/A MOT A

YA ER NUMBER NO.N/NA FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 26 2010 2010 002 00 06 25 2010 N/A N/A

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

El 20.2201(b)

E] 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

El 20.2201(d)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

[] 20.2203(a)(1)

E] 20.2203(a)(4)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

Dl 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL [I 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(x)

[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.36(c)(2)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

El 73.71(a)(4)

[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71(a)(5) 100 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

[E OTHER E] 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

[

50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) epecfnY3Abstrac beloworinNRC

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)

Steve Austin, Licensing Engineer

' 256-729-2070CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENTREPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION El YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

Z NO DATE N/A N/A N/A ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On April 9, 2010, from 0218 hours0.00252 days <br />0.0606 hours <br />3.604497e-4 weeks <br />8.2949e-5 months <br /> Central Daylight Time (CDT) to 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> CDT, Maintenance personnel performed Surveillance Procedure 2-SR-3.3.6.1.6(4), Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Time Delay Relay Calibration. On April 26, 2010, at approximately 1115 hours0.0129 days <br />0.31 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.242575e-4 months <br /> CDT, contact boots were discovered on relay 2-RLY-071-13A-K32, RCIC High Steam Flow Relay. Operations immediately declared the B Channel of the RCIC Steam Line Flow - High Isolation Function inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.6.1 Action A, which requires that with one or more required channels inoperable, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, place the channel in trip. On April 26, 2010, at approximately 1140 hours0.0132 days <br />0.317 hours <br />0.00188 weeks <br />4.3377e-4 months <br /> CDT, after verifying there was no testing or maintenance activities in progress that required the contact boots to be in place, Operations personnel removed the contact boots from contacts of relay 2-RLY-071-13A-K32 and declared the B Channel of the RCIC Steam Line Flow - High Isolation Function operable, exiting TS 3.3.6.1 Action A. Operations personnel verified that the A Channel remained operable during the time the B Channel was inoperable, which would have isolated RCIC on a valid Steam Flow -

High signal. TVA will review and revise applicable procedures to incorporate independent verification requirements for the steps associated with restoring the correct configuration when removing contact boots.

NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)

(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

D.

Safety System Functional Failure Consideration:

This event is not classified as a safety system functional failure according to NEI 99-02.

E.

Scram With Complications Consideration:

This event was not classified as a complicated scram according to NEI 99-02.

VIII. COMMITMENTS

None