05000260/LER-2009-009, Inadvertent Isolation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System During Testing Activities

Inadvertent Isolation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System During Testing Activities

ML100220455
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	01/19/2010
From:	Polson K Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 09-009-00
Download: ML100220455 (6)

LER-2009-009, Inadvertent Isolation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System During Testing Activities

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2602009009R00 - NRC Website

text

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 January 19, 2010 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Facility Operating License No. DPR-52 NRC Docket No. 50-260

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 50-260/2009-009 The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) provides details of inadvertent isolation of the high pressure coolant injection system during testing activities. The Tennessee Valley Authority is submitting this report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), as any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact F. R. Godwin, Site Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager, at (256) 729-2636.

Respectfully, K. J. Poison Vice President cc: See page 2

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 January 19, 2010 Enclosure cc (w/ Enclosure):

NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 08/31/2010 (9-2007)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information (See reverse for required number of collection.

3. PAGE Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2 05000260 1 of 4

4. TITLE: Inadvertent Isolation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System During Testing Activities

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEA SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR N/A N/A MOT A

YA ER NUMBER NO..NA

/

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 11 17 2009 2009 -

009 00 01 19 2010 N/A N/A

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)

El 20.2201(b)

[] 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

[1 20.2201(d)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

El 20.2203(a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL El 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

El 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x)

[I 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.36(c)(2)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0l 73.71(a)(4)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71(a)(5) 100 El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

[E OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

SpecifyinAstrct bel" or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

V. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

The safety consequences of this event were not significant. BFN TSs allow continued power operation for up to 14 days with the HPCI system inoperable provided that the RCIC system is operable. In this condition, the other required Emergency Core Cooling Systems were operable and remained capable of mitigating design basis accidents and transients assumed in the UFSAR.

In addition, the RCIC system was verified operable during this time as required by TC LCO 3.3.5.5.1, Action C, and would have automatically provided makeup water to the reactor if required.

Therefore, TVA concludes that there was no significant reduction in the protection of the public by this event,

VI. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A.

Immediate Corrective Actions

After verification that the HPCI system isolation was the result of the test equipment and not from a valid isolation, the HPCI system was declared operable and the TS 3.5.1 LCO action was exited.

B.

Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence - The corrective actions to prevent recurrence are being managed by BFN's corrective action program.

A new connector was installed on the HPCI Steam Line Space High test panel and SR-3.3.6.1.3(3DFT) was successfully completed.

VII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A.

Failed Components None B.

PREVIOUS LERS ON SIMILAR EVENTS None C.

Additional Information

Corrective action document for this report is Problem Evaluation Report 208627.

D.

Safety System Functional Failure Consideration:

This event is classified as a safety system functional failure according to NEI 99-02.

E.

Scram With Complications Consideration:

This event was not a complicated scram according to NEI 99-02.

VIII. COMMITMENTS

None