05000259/LER-2009-006, Regarding Inoperable High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Due to Emergency Core Cooling System Inverter Failure

Regarding Inoperable High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Due to Emergency Core Cooling System Inverter Failure

ML093130068
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	10/30/2009
From:	West R Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 09-006-00
Download: ML093130068 (7)

LER-2009-006, Regarding Inoperable High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Due to Emergency Core Cooling System Inverter Failure

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x)
2592009006R00 - NRC Website

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Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Ajabama 35609-2000 October 30, 2009 10 CFR 50.73 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. DPR-33 NRC Docket No. 50-259

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 50-259/2009-006 The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) provides details of the inoperability of the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump due to failure of the associated Emergency Core Cooling System Inverter.

The Tennessee Valley Authority is submitting this report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and (D), as any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident.

There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact F. R. Godwin, Site Licensing and Industry Affairs Manager, at (256) 729-2636.

7 spectfully, R. G. West Vice President cc: See page 2

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 October 30, 2009 Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 08/31/2010 (9-2007)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information (See reverse for required number of collection.

3. PAGE Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 05000259 1 of 5

4. TITLE: Inoperable High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump due to Emergency Core Cooling System Inverter Failure

9. OPERATING MODE 1

10. POWER LEVEL 100

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) 0]

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20.2201 (b) 20.2201 (d) 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) 0 0

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EJ 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A) 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A) 50.36(c)(2) 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0]

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50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

[o 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

[o 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

[o 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) ol 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) o 50.73(a)(2)(x) o 73.71(a)(4) o 73.71 (a)(5) 0 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 368A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

Steve Austin, Licensing Engineer 256-729-2070CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX X

FJ SPP A363 Y

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

16. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION El YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

NO DATE N/A N/A N/A ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewntten lines)

On September 1, 2009, at 1614 hours0.0187 days <br />0.448 hours <br />0.00267 weeks <br />6.14127e-4 months <br /> Central Daylight Time (CDT), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Operations personnel received indications that the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Division II 250V DC Inverter had tripped. The trip of the Unit 1 ECCS Division II 250V DC Inverter resulted in the inoperability of the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System. The HPCI System was declared inoperable and Technical Specifications (TS) 3.5.1 Actions, Condition C, was entered. The Unit 1 Core Spray (CS) System Loop II had previously been declared inoperable due to the inoperability of the associated air handling unit and TS 3.5.1 Actions, Condition A, had been entered. The combination of the HPCI System being inoperable and TS 3.5.1 Actions, Condition A, being entered also resulted in TS 3.5.1, Actions, Condition D being entered. Required Actions D.1 and D.2 of TS 3.5.1 Actions, Condition D, require either restoration of the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the HPCI System to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. On September 2, 2009, at 1741 hours0.0202 days <br />0.484 hours <br />0.00288 weeks <br />6.624505e-4 months <br /> CDT, following completion of required work activities, restoration, and post maintenance testing, Operations personnel declared CS Loop II operable and exited TS 3.5.1, Actions, Condition D. Following completion of the repair activities, restoration, and post maintenance testing on the Division II ECCS inverter, the HPCI System was declared operable and TS 3.5.1 Actions, Condition C, was exited on September 3, 2009, at 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> CDT. As a result of the HPCI System inoperability, Tennessee Valley Authority is submitting this report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and (D) as any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident.

NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)

(If more space is required, use additonal copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) evaluation of the design of the surge suppression features on the affected inverters and, if necessary, pursue a design change to the surge suppression network to prevent a shorted varistor from tripping the ECCS 250V DC inverter input.

VII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A.

Failed Components The metal oxide varistor installed as a surge suppressor on 250V DC power supply to the inverter.

B.

PREVIOUS LERS ON SIMILAR EVENTS None.

C.

Additional Information

Corrective action document for this report is Problem Evaluation Report 200863.

D.

Safety System Functional Failure Consideration:

This event is a safety system functional failure according to NEI 99-02.

E.

Scram With Comolications Consideration:

This event was not a complicated scram according to NEI 99-02.

VIII. COMMITMENTS

None.