05000259/LER-2009-004, High Pressure Core Injection Found Inoperable During Compensate Header Level Switch Calibration and Functional Test

High Pressure Core Injection Found Inoperable During Compensate Header Level Switch Calibration and Functional Test

ML092940240
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	10/14/2009
From:	West R Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LER 09-004-00
Download: ML092940240 (7)

LER-2009-004, High Pressure Core Injection Found Inoperable During Compensate Header Level Switch Calibration and Functional Test

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2592009004R00 - NRC Website

text

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 October 14, 2009 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR 50.73 ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Dear Sir:

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. DPR-33 NRC Docket No. 50-259

Subject:

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 50-259/2009-004 The enclosed report provides details of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system being inoperable due to a tear in the diaphragm of 1-PCV-073-0018C causing an oil leak from the HPCI control oil system.

On July 24, 2009 at 1750 CDT, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) made an eight hour notification (45227) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). On September 22, 2009 at 1600 CDT, BFN submitted a retraction of the ENS Event Number 45227. BFN Engineering evaluated the oil leak and determined that there was no impact on HPCI operation during its mission time for the Design Basis accidents and transients for which HPCI is credited. The NRC Resident Inspector subsequently identified concerns with the engineering evaluation. While these concerns are being resolved, BFN is submitting the attached report for the HPCI July 24, 2009 event.

TVA is reporting this in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and (D), as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident.

There are no commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact F. R. Godwin, Site Licensing and Industry Affairs manager, at (256) 729-2636.

Sectfl 4

R. G. West Vice President bcc: See page 2

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 October 14, 2009 Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 08/31/2010 (9-2007)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information digits/characters for each block) collection.

3. PAGE Browns Ferry Unit 1 05000259 1 of 5

4. TITLE: High Pressure Core Injection Found Inoperable During Compensate Header Level Switch Calibration and Functional Test

6. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MOYA ER NMBR N.DY Y

AR ILTYNonE DOCKET NME SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR N

E NUMBER MO T A

Y A E R NUMBER NO.

N n

/

FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 07 24 2009 2009 004 00 10 14 2009 None N/A

9. OPERATING MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply) o 20.2201(b)

El 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)

[I 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 10 20.2201(d)

E0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 01 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) o 20.2203(a)(1)

El 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 0] 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

El 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL Dl 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0l 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

El 50.73(a)(2)(x) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

El 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

El 73.71 (a)(4)

El 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

El 50.46(a)(3)(ii)

[

50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

El 73.71 (a)(5) 100 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) 0l OTHER El 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

Speafr in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

B.

Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence The corrective actions are being managed by BFN's corrective action program.

1.

BFN will verify that spare diaphragms on site are not from the same lot as the diaphragm that failed.

2.

If any spare diaphragms on site are found from the same lot as the diaphragm that failed BFN will quarantine them and order new spares to replace them.

3.

BFN will verify that diaphragms from the same lot as the failed diaphragm are not currently installed on Units 1, 2, or 3, PCV-073-0018C, HPCI Turbine Stop Valve Mechanical Trip Hold Valve.

VII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A.

Failed Components HPCI Turbine Stop Valve Mechanical Trip Hold Valve, 1-PCV-073-0018C B.

Previous LERs on Similar Events None.

C.

Additional Information

Corrective action document for this report is PER 177206 D.

Safety System Functional Failure Consideration:

This event does involve a safety system functional failure according to NEI 99-02.

E.

Scram With ComPlications Consideration:

This event was not a complicated scram according to NEI 99-02.

VIII. COMMITMENTS

None.