05000259/LER-1917-002, Regarding Unauthorized Firearm Introduced Into the Protected Area
| ML17118A010 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 04/27/2017 |
| From: | Bono S Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 17-002-00 | |
| Download: ML17118A010 (8) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| 2591917002R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000 April 27, 2017 10 CFR 73.71 (a)(4)
ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
Subject:
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 NRC Docket No. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 Licensee Event Report 50-259/2017-002-00 The enclosed Licensee Event Report provides details of an unauthorized firearm introduced into the protected area. The Tennessee Valley Authority is submitting this report in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 73.71 (a)(4) for the reporting of a safeguards event.
There are no new regulatory commitments contained in this letter. Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact M. W. Oliver, Nuclear Site Licensing Manager, at (256) 729-2636.
Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 50-259/2017-002 Unauthorized Firearm Introduced into the Protected Area cc (w/ Enclosure):
NRC Regional Administrator - Region II NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant NRC Director, Division of Security Policy, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
ENCLOSURE Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 50-259/2017-002-00 Unauthorized Firearm Introduced into the Protected Area See Enclosed
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2017) the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 13. PAGE Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000259 1 OF6
- 4. TITLE Unauthorized Firearm Introduced into the Protected Area
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR REV MONTH DAY YEAR Browns Ferry Nuclear, Unit 2 NUMBER NO.
05000260 03 02 2017 2017
- - 002
- - 00 05 01 2017 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER Browns Ferrv Nuclear Unit 3 05000296
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR &: Check all that applv!
D 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 D 20.2201 (d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D so.73(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A )
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A )
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A )
1:81 73. 71 (a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D so.36(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71(a)(S) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D so.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 73.77(a)(2)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 73.77(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT
~ELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
Ryan Coons, Licensing Engineer 56-729-2070 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
- 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR D YES (ff yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
(g] NO SUBMISSION DATE N/A N/A N/A
!ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On March 2, 2017, an unauthorized firearm was introduced into the protected area (PA) after passing through the search process undetected. This led to the declaration of a Notification of an Unusual Event for a security condition that does not involve a hostile action. This event is reportable due to the actual introduction of a contraband firearm into the PA Immediate actions include the following: The individual who introduced the firearm was removed from the PA, their badge was disabled, their access was revoked, and their personal vehicle searched for additional contraband. A post-event fitness for duty test was attempted but the individual declined after numerous failed attempts to provide a sample. The Nuclear Security Officers (NSOs) on-duty when the individual entered the PA were disqualified. The Search Lane where the individual entered was closed for Maintenance to inspect its x-ray machine, which was found to be working as designed.
Two NSOs are now assigned to each lane's search monitor to view the items being processed through the x-ray machine, and any unidentifiable items are physically searched. A fleet-wide policy of random physical searches of personnel and packages has been implemented. Additionally, over 800 lockers, cubicles, and other areas, were searched for contraband.
No other contraband or unauthorized items were found The cause was determined to be that the training provided to NSOs drove the identification of contraband instead of driving the NSO to conduct a physical search when they cannot positively identify all materials using the x-ray image. The corrective action to prevent recurrence is to revise task practical evaluation training and the Personnel Access Control procedure to include acceptance criteria for performing successful material searches.
NRC FORM 366 (04-2017)
I.
Plant Operating Conditions Before the Event
At the time of discovery, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Units 1 and 3, were in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. Unit 2 was in Mode 5 to support a refueling outage.
II.
Description of Event
A. Event Summary On March 2, 2017, at 1215 Central Standard Time (CST), a firearm was found and confiscated in the protected area (PA). This resulted in an unauthorized firearm in the PA, which led to the declaration of a Notification of an Unusual Event (NOUE) based on Emergency Action Level (EAL) 6.7-U, a security condition that does not involve a hostile action. Required actions for the NOUE were taken in accordance with the stations emergency plan implementing procedures. An unauthorized weapon in the PA is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55, the BFN Security plan, and procedure SSl-7.6, Personnel Access Control. The actual introduction of contraband into the PA constitutes a reportable safeguards event, in accordance with NSDP-1, Safeguards Event Reporting Guidelines, and 10 CFR 73.71 (a)(4).
The contract employee who introduced the firearm was removed from the PA, their badge was disabled, their access was revoked, and their personal vehicle searched for additional contraband. A post-event fitness for duty (FFD) test was attempted but the individual declined after numerous failed attempts to provide a sample.
B. Status of structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event and that contributed to the event There were no structures, systems, or components whose inoperability contributed to this event.
C. Dates and approximate times of occurrences
Dates & Approximate Times March 2, 2017, at 0913 CST Occurrence An individual processed through the electronic search equipment and gained access to the PA while unintentionally in possession of a firearm.
While processing through, the individual placed their backpack and coat into an x-ray machine bucket. The Nuclear Security Officer (NSO) on duty did not positively identify all items prior to granting PA access, which led to the unauthorized firearm inside the PA.
Page 2 of 6 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020 (04-2017)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. LER NUMBER YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000-259 2017
- - 002 Dates & Approximate Times March 2, 2017, at 1205 CST March 2, 2017, at 1215 CST March 2, 2017, at 1230 CST March 2, 2017, at 1242 CST March 2, 2017, at 1253 CST March 2, 2017, at 1500 CST Occurrence Nuclear Security was notified that an individual was in possession of a firearm.
During a search of the individual's locker, NSOs found and confiscated the firearm. The Shift Manager was notified of the firearm by Nuclear Security at this time.
The Shift Manager declared an NOUE based on EAL 6.7-U.
The Alabama Emergency Management Agency was notified.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was notified.
The NOUE was terminated, and the appropriate federal, state, and local agencies were notified.
D. Manufacturer and model number of each component that failed during the event
This event did not involve any equipment failure.
E. Other systems or secondary functions affected
No other systems or secondary functions were affected by this event.
F. Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error
REV NO.
- - 00 Nuclear security was notified that an individual brought a firearm inside the PA. After searching the individual's locker, a firearm was discovered on March 2, 201 7, at 1215 CST.
G. The failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component
This event did not involve an equipment failure.
H. Operator actions
There were no operator actions associated with this event. Page 3 of 6 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020 (04-2017)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. LER NUMBER YEAR Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000-259 2017 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- - 002 B. For events that occurred when the reactor was shut down, availability of systems or components needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident Safety system availability was not impacted by this event.
REV NO.
- - 00 C. For failure that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimate of the elapsed time from discovery of the failure until the train was returned to service This event did not involve any equipment failure. Safety system operability was not impacted by this event.
VI.
Corrective Actions
Corrective Actions are being managed by TVA's corrective action program under Condition Report (CR) 1268051.
A. Immediate Corrective Actions
The individual who introduced the firearm was removed from the PA, their badge was disabled, their access was revoked, and their personal vehicle searched for additional contraband. A post-event FFD test was attempted but the individual declined after numerous failed attempts to provide a sample.
- 1. The NSOs on-duty when the individual entered the PA were disqualified. The Search Lane where the individual entered was closed for Maintenance to inspect its x-ray machine, which was found to work as designed.
- 2. Two NSOs are now assigned to each lane's search monitor to view the items being processed through the x-ray machine, and any unidentifiable items are physically searched. A fleet-wide policy of random physical searches of personnel and packages has been implemented.
- 3. More than 800 lockers, cubicles, and other areas, constituting 50 to 60 percent of the PA, were searched for contraband. No additional contraband items or unauthorized items were found.
B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence or to reduce the probability of similar events occurring in the future The corrective action to prevent recurrence is to revise task practical evaluation training and procedure SSl-7.6, Personnel Access Control, to include acceptance criteria for performing successful material searches. Page 5 of 6 (04-2017)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. LER NUMBER YEAR Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 05000-259 2017 VII.
Previous Similar Events at the Same Site
SEQUENTIAL NUMBER
- - 002 REV NO.
- - 00 A search of the BFN Corrective Action Program identified no similar events have occurred at BFN.
VIII. Additional Information
There is no additional information.
IX.
Commitments
There are no new commitments. Page 6 of 6