05000254/FIN-2009004-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure of Licensee to Properly Translate TS OPERABLE-OPERABILITY |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the failure to declare a system, structure, or component inoperable when a required support system was inoperable on August 12, 2009, when the Unit 1 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and core spray (CS) room watertight door was breached for maintenance. Because this room was only separated from the Unit 2 RCIC and CS room by a nonwatertight door, the Unit 2 RCIC and CS systems were also affected. This finding was also an NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to provide a procedure appropriate to the circumstances for an activity affecting quality. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly translate the Technical Specification (TS) Operable-Operability definition into procedures to establish operability of systems affected by a hazard barrier that had been disabled for maintenance. This resulted in the operators disabling an internal flooding barrier without identifying that the affected systems were inoperable. Corrective action included immediate restoration of the barrier and the issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program. Subsequently, the procedure was revised to require operators to identify the system as inoperable or employ appropriate compensatory measures to maintain operability when a flooding barrier is impaired. This issue is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could become a more significant safety concern, in that the unit could continue to operate at power for longer than allowed by TS with more than one required emergency core cooling system (ECCS) system exposed to internal flooding from a single failure of a non-Class 1 system and challenging safe shutdown assumptions. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 SDP evaluation and answered No to all of the Mitigating Systems questions in IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Table 4a. The issue, therefore, screened as Green or very low safety significance. The incorrect procedural guidance was the principal contributor to the operators failure to identify that the affected systems were inoperable, and the inspectors determined that the event is cross-cutting in Human Performance, Resources, Procedures (H.2(c)) |
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000254/2009004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Matthews W Slawinski M Ring J Benjamin J Mcghee B Cushman |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Quad Cities - IR 05000254/2009004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Quad Cities) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Quad Cities)
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