05000250/FIN-2010005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Scaffold blocked access to fire areas used in a control room evacuation event |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Non-cited violation (NCV) of Turkey Point License Condition 3.D, Fire Protection, when scaffolding was placed as a barricade against personnel access to doors to fire zones 108B and 104. The barricade impeded access to the 3B and 3A DC Equipment rooms through doors that are used in the event of a control room evacuation event and may have delayed or prevented operator actions to mitigate a potential fire. When identified to the licensee, the scaffolding was promptly removed and the problem was documented in AR 594112594112 The issue was more than minor because the objectives of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone were affected. Using NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, the inspectors assigned a moderate degradation rating to the deficiency because of the likely inability of the plant operators being able to implement the procedural actions within the licensee stipulated time. A regional Senior Reactor Analyst evaluated the performance deficiency under the Phase 3 protocol of the Significance Determination Process. Based upon the results of that evaluation, the performance deficiency was characterized as of very low safety significance (Green) for both units. The evaluation was performed via hand calculation using elements of NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, NUREG-6850 as amended by Frequently Asked Questions under the National Fire Protection Association 0805 pilot program. A simplified Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) failure probability based upon Westinghouse high temperature seals was used. Key human failure probabilities were estimated using standard techniques. Conditional core damage probabilities, due to a spurious Safety Injection, were derived from the licensee\'s most current model results. Major assumptions and dominant accident sequence for Units 3 and 4 were discussed and included in analysis section of 1R05 in the inspection report. The cause of the finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance, Work Control (H.3(a)) when the scaffold-barricade was constructed without a planned contingency or compensatory measure to assure that the fire mitigation activity could be accomplished within design time constraints. |
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000250/2010005 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2010 (2010Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Kuzo R Aiello R Carrion M Barillas S Stewart D Rich A Vargas A Sengupta R Kellner |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Turkey Point - IR 05000250/2010005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Turkey Point) @ 2010Q4
Self-Identified List (Turkey Point)
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