05000250/FIN-2007402-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Tampering with security weapons |
| Description | During an NRC inspection completed on February 24, 2006, and an investigation completed on August 23, 2006, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the NRC proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below: A. The Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) Physical Security Plan (PSP), Revision 0b, Section 4.1, states, in part, AThe armed responder is equipped with, or has readily available (if at a stationary post), a contingency weapon. Additionally, Section 5.4 states, in part, ASecurity officers are properly equipped to fulfill their assigned duties to implement the protective strategy, and security measures during normal operations. FPL Security Force Instruction (SFI) 2404, Target Set and Defensive Strategy, Revision 21, Section 2.3, states, in part, AResponse personnel are armed with a semi-automatic rifle. Contrary to the above, on or about August of 2005, the licensee failed to ensure that armed responders were equipped with contingency weapons in accordance with the PSP. Specifically, an FPL contract security lieutenant willfully removed and broke a firing pin from a contingency response weapon, rendering the weapon non-functional. As a result, an armed responder would not have been able to fulfill their assigned duties and effectively implement the licensee=s protective strategy. B. NRC Order and Interim Compensatory Measures, dated February 25, 2002, Section B.4(f), requires the licensee to Equip all armed responders with contingency weapons. FPL SFI 2404, Target Set and Defensive Strategy, Revision 18, Section 2.3, states, in part, AAll armed responders should be armed with a semi-automatic rifle. Contrary to the above, on or about April of 2004, the licensee failed to ensure that two armed responders were equipped with contingency weapons. Specifically, an FPL contract security officer willfully removed the firing pins from two contingency response weapons (Weapons # 8 and # 25), rendering the weapons non-functional. As a result, two armed responders would not have been able to fulfill their assigned duties and effectively implement the licensee=s protective strategy. C. 10 CFR 50.9 (a) requires that information provided to the Commission by a licensee or information required by statute or by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, the licensee maintained and provided to the Commission information that was not complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, the licensee, through the action of its on-site security contractor, documented information in Condition Report (CR) # 2004-13573, which inaccurately or incompletely characterized a recreation of events involving a damaged contingency response weapon firing pin. The CR was maintained by the licensee and provided to the NRC during a February 2006 on-site inspection at the licensees facility. This information was material to the NRC, in that the substance of the information was used to support the NRC=s inquiry into security concerns. D. 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix G, Paragraph 1.I.(a)(3) requires that an event involving the interruption of normal operation of a licensed nuclear power reactor through the unauthorized use of or tampering with its machinery, components, or controls including the security system is to be reported to the NRC within one hour of discovery, followed by a written report within 60 days. Contrary to the above, in approximately September-October 2005, the licensee failed to make a required report to the NRC, within one hour of discovery, followed by a written report within 60 days, of a tampering event involving the willful breaking of a firing pin from a contingency response weapon, which rendered the weapon non-functional. This is a Severity Level II Problem (Supplements III, VII). Civil Penalty - $ 208,000 (EA-07-110,113,116,119) |
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
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| Report | IR 05000250/2007402 Section 3S01 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2006 (2006Q1) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level II |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71130.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Casto J Munday J Shea V Mccree |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Turkey Point - IR 05000250/2007402 | |||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Turkey Point) @ 2006Q1
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