05000237/FIN-2010002-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Meet Regulatory Commitment to Maintain Contingency Plans for Post-Accident Sampling |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the failure to meet a regulatory commitment to maintain a contingency plan for obtaining highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, the suppression pool, and drywell atmosphere for post-accident plant recovery planning. Specifically, the licensees contingency plan was not adequately maintained to ensure the High Radiation Sampling System (HRSS) functioned adequately or otherwise was demonstrated to be in a state of readiness to allow samples to be obtained within a two-week window. No violations of regulatory requirements were identified related to this finding. Corrective actions were being developed to ensure the licensees contingency plan commitments would be met. Those actions included a means to improve system ownership and establishment of an effective process for HRSS equipment maintenance and repair at a priority consistent with its intended use. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the facilities and equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring capability to implement adequate measures to protect health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, equipment intended to obtain highly radioactive samples that are used to assess reactor core condition as part of post-accident recovery activities was not demonstrated to be in a readiness condition consistent with the licensees contingency plan. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it involved equipment, which supplements the licensees emergency plan for reentry and recovery activities as provided in the planning standard of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), and represented a planning standard problem associated with demonstrating functional readiness of that equipment. The finding was determined to be associated with a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance in the resources component, in that, the licensee failed to ensure that equipment to support its emergency plan was functional or otherwise was demonstrated to meet a defined status of operational readiness. H.2(d |
| Site: | Dresden  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000237/2010002 Section 2RS5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Emergency Prep |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71124.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Phillips D Melendez-Colon E Coffman J Draper M Ring R Krsek R Russell W Slawinski |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Dresden - IR 05000237/2010002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Dresden) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Dresden)
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