05000237/FIN-2010002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Technical Specification 5.5.4 Implementing Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.5.4 for the licensee failing to follow Step I.2.a and b of Procedure DOS 1500-08, Discharge of Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) From Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Heat Exchanger (Hx) During CCSW Pump Operations, Revision 16. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform a tube leak test as required by DOS 1500-08 when activity exceeded 1.5E-6 microcuries/milliliter. The licensees corrective actions included a change to DOS 1500-08 to ensure personnel do not waive performance of the test procedure until tube leak checks are considered during non-routine samples of CCSW and revising the chemistry sampling procedure CY-DR-110-220, LPCI Service Water (CCSW) and Torus Water Sampling, to notify operations to evaluate performance of a tube leak check if activity exceeds 1.5E-6 microcuries/milliliter. The inspectors determined that the failure to perform a tube leak test or perform Calculated CCSW Sample Activity Limit and Canal Activity Calculations was contrary to DOS 1500-08, and was a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding, if left uncorrected, would become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, had there been an actual LPCI Hx tube leak radioactivity could have been released. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a for the Containment Barrier Cornerstone. All four questions on this table were answered no. There was no actual degradation of the containment barrier. Therefore, the issue screened as having very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision Making because the licensee did not demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that it was unsafe in order to disapprove the action. Specifically, the licensee assumed the activity in the sample was coming from the floor drain system with no valid proof that was the case. H.1(b |
| Site: | Dresden  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000237/2010002 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Phillips D Melendez-Colon E Coffman J Draper M Ring R Krsek R Russell W Slawinski |
| CCA | , |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Dresden - IR 05000237/2010002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Dresden) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Dresden)
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