05000237/FIN-2009003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Have a Procedure to Sample and Establish Administrative Controls for pH in the Torus |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the failure to include essential information in procedures CY-AB-120-310, Suppression Pool/Torus Chemistry, and CY-DR-120-31, Suppression Pool/Torus Chemistry, to ensure torus pH values were above 5.6 in support of the radiological consequence dose analyses as described in Regulatory Guide 1.183, Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors. As corrective actions, the licensee changed procedures CY-AB-120-310 and CY-DR-120-31 to include essential information for sampling the torus and revised the methodology for calculating torus pH. Using IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, issued on September 20, 2007, and Appendix B, Issue Screening, issued on December 4, 2008, the inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because there was reasonable doubt on the operability of the standby liquid control system and its ability to maintain torus pH above 7 following a loss of coolant accident and because of significant programmatic deficiencies in the licensees corrective action program. The inspectors also determined that this finding impacted the Barrier Integrity objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (i.e., containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The failure to maintain adequate procedures addressing torus pH sampling resulted in a condition where there was reasonable doubt of the operability of the standby liquid control system. The inspectors completed a Phase 1 significance determination on this issue using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Table 4a, dated January 10, 2008. The inspectors determined that this finding only represented a degradation of a radiological barrier function and therefore screened as Green. This finding was related to the cross-cutting issue of problem identification and resolution (corrective action program) because the licensee did not take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues in a timely manner. P.1(d) |
| Site: | Dresden  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000237/2009003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Melendez-Colon W Slawinski C Phillips M Bielby J Benjamin T Go J Draper S Edmonds |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Dresden - IR 05000237/2009003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Dresden) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Dresden)
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