05000213/LER-1993-001, :on 930107,discovered That Fire Barrier Protecting Switchgear Room a from Turbine Bldg Open W/O Fire Watch Established.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Counseled on Procedural Requirements
| ML20128F126 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/04/1993 |
| From: | Kazukynas T, Stetz J CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| LER-93-001, LER-93-1, NUDOCS 9302110257 | |
| Download: ML20128F126 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 2131993001R00 - NRC Website | |
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CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER. COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT.
362 INJUN HOLLOW ROAD e EAST HAMPTON, CT 06424-3099 -
February 4, 1993 Re: 10CFR50. 73 (a ) (2 ) (1) (B) ~
U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk
- - Washington, D.
C.
20555 I
Reference:
Facility Operating License No. DPR-61 Docket No. 50-213 Reportable Occurrence LER 50-213/93-001-00 I
Gentlemen:
This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report 93-001-00, required to be submitted, pursuant to the requirements of the Haddam Neck Plant's Technical Specifications.
Very truly yours,
/ c tv John P.
Stetz Vice President JPS/dl
Attachment:
LER 50-213/93-001-00 cc:
Mr. Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator, Region I.
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~. w un, ~ n e, ABSTRACT On January 7, 1993, at 1039 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.953395e-4 months <br />, with the plant operating in Mode 1 at 100% power, a door in a Technical Specification fire barrier protecting the "A" Switchgear Room from the Turbine Building was found open for other than routine access without establishing the appropriate fire watch.
This door, which was opened so it could be painted by plant personnel, is covered by Haddam Neck Technical Specification 3.7.7, Fire Rated Assemblies.
The cause of the event was personnel error since the required administrative controls were not adhered to.
Since the door was opened without first implementing the required LCO Action, this event is judged to be reportable per the requirements of 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B) as a condition prohibited by 'lechnical Specifications.
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
The "A" Switchgear Room is one of the two switchgear roc:as utilized at Haddam Neck.
This rcom, located in the mid-level of.
the Service Building directly below the Control Room, provides power to "A" train safe shutdown equipment.
The "B" Switchgear Room, located in a separate building, provides power to.the "B" train of safe shutdown equipment.
In the event of a fire.in either switchgear room, there is equipment and/or methods available in the other switchgear room or in the plant areas outside the affected switchgear room to safely shut the plant down j
and maintain the plant in a shutdown condition.
Haddam Neck Technical Specification 3.7,7, Fire Rated Assemblies-states that fire barriers which separate safety related areas shall be operable when required by the mode of operation.
The "A"
Switchgear Room is a safety related arca which provides power to "A" train equipment needed for safe shutdown of the plant when the plant is operating in_ Modes 1 through 4.
- - The-fire barrier in question separates the "A"
Switchgear Room from the. Turbine Building.
As specified in the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.7, when the fire rated assembly is inoperable, an hourly fire-1 watch patrol that inspects both areas at least once per hour is required.
The action statement specifies that this; fire watch patrol must be established within one hour.
Haddam Neck Administrative Control Procedure ACP 1.2-2.32, Implementation and Control of Fire Protection Program Requirements, also provides this guidance.
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On January 7, 1993, at 1039 hours0.012 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.953395e-4 months <br />, with the plant in' Mode 1 at-l 100% power, an employee in the-Building Maintenance group opened an equipment access door (Fire Door T412)^in the barrier which separates the "A" Switchgear Room from the Turbine Building at the 37' 6' elevation, so that this_ door could.be painted. ~This is a-Technical Specification fire barrier, a gaseous suppression system barrier and a vital area barrier and is posted with signs which y
indicate all three requirements.- The' worker contacted Security and requested a guard respond to monitor-the. vital barrier door.
At this point, several inappropriate actions' occurred which were contrary to' Technical' Specifications and Administrative Control Procedures.
The worker misinterpreted the requirements for the Technical Specification fire door and felt that the door;couldfbe opened for one hour before the fire watch would be-needed.
The Security Guard failed to-follow security procedure SEC 1.3-41, Application _of Compensatory Safeguards Measures.
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Shift Supervisor for concurrence prior to opening any_ doors designated as Technical Specification doors, or doors associated
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with gaseous suppression systems for other than normal access.
The instructions on the sign for the Halon System-boundary indicated that the Control Room had to be contacted before opening the door.
The worker failed to follow this guidance and did not contact the Control Room.
The door was opened and painting was ongoing when a plant employee passed by and questioned having the door opened.
At that time, it was determined that the appropriate administrative controls were not being_ adhered to.
The door was.
closed at 1050 hours0.0122 days <br />0.292 hours <br />0.00174 weeks <br />3.99525e-4 months <br />, after being open for a total of 11 minutes.
The worker was instructed to contact the Control Room to explain what had occurred.
The Building Maintenance employee failed-to report the event to the Control Room.
It wasn't until-later that day at 1550 hours0.0179 days <br />0.431 hours <br />0.00256 weeks <br />5.89775e-4 months <br /> that the barrier breach was reported after a Security Department shift turnover occurred and the Shift-Lieutenant notified the Security Shift Supervisor that the door had been opened earlier.
The Security Shift Supervisor advised the Control Room of what had occurred and a determination was made that the Technical Specification LCO Action Statement had been violated.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The root cause of the event was the failure of the Building Maintenance and Security Department employees to take actions as
.noted on the door signs and in plant procedures.
The Building Maintenance employee failed to recognize that this door was covered by Technical Specifications and failed to initiate a fire watch.
The Security Guard failed to follow a Security Department procedure which controls the opening of vital' barrier-doors.
This procedure instructs the Security Department to contact the Control Room prior to opening any doors which are' Technical Specification fire doors or doors in gaseous suppression system barriers.
Had the Control Room been contacted, the work activity would have-been evaluated by Control Room operators and the fire barrier inoperability potential would have been noted.
SAFETY ASSESSMENT
This event is considered reportable under 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B).
I since it involved a condition prohibited by the Plant's Technical Specifications.
L With the fire door open and the "A" Switchgear Room fire barrier L
breached, it could be postulated that a fire-in the Turbine L
Building could have extended into the "A" Switchgear Room.
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- - Security Guard and Building Maintenance employees were in
- - attendance for the entire 11 minutes that the door was open, and it is reasonable to expect that they would have closed the door upon noting a fire in the turbine building.
With this action, the equipment in-the "A" Switchgear room would not have been damaged.
Assuming the worst case, if the door was not closed by the Security Guard or employee painting the door, a fire in the Turbine Building might extend into the "A" Switchgear-Room through the open door.
With the Halon barrier breached by this open door, the halon system might not be effective in extinguishing a fire within the "A"
Switchglar Room.
If this occurred, damage could have occurred to "A" train safety related and safe shutdown equipment.
However, this fire would not affect the ability of the plant to be safely shutdown.
The "B" train of equipment, including the "B" Switchgear Room, which is located remote from the "A" Switchgear Room, would be unaffected by this fire and would be available to provide safe shutdown of.the plant in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix R requirements.
Since it is likely that the door would have been closed upon-noticing a fire in the Turbine Building, and any fire in the "A"
Switchgear Room would be within the bounds of the Appendix R analysis for Haddam Neck, there is no safety significance to this-event.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
The initial condition was corrected by the. closing of the "A"
Switt hgear Room door.
Security and Building Maintenance personnel were counseled on the procedural requirements which govern Technical Specification fire doors and doors in gaseous-suppression system barriers.
An evaluation of corrective actions on previous similar LERS is ongoing to determine if the corrective actions were appropriate for-these events.
The results of this evaluation will be provided in a Supplemental Report to be issued by April 1, 1993.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
None
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
LER 92-19, 90-30, 89-15 l""f'0"" *
.u s opoissete24 64455