05000213/LER-1986-001, :on 860107 & 12,discovered That Two Tech Spec Fire Doors Inoperable.Caused by Contractor Personnel Error. All Plant & Contractor Personnel Reinstructed in Station Procedures & Regulations

:on 860107 & 12,discovered That Two Tech Spec Fire Doors Inoperable.Caused by Contractor Personnel Error. All Plant & Contractor Personnel Reinstructed in Station Procedures & Regulations

ML20151S108
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	02/05/1986
From:	Graves R, Rogozinski R CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
LER-86-001, LER-86-1, SS-86-25, NUDOCS 8602060426
Download: ML20151S108 (4)

LER-1986-001, on 860107 & 12,discovered That Two Tech Spec Fire Doors Inoperable.Caused by Contractor Personnel Error. All Plant & Contractor Personnel Reinstructed in Station Procedures & Regulations

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)
2131986001R00 - NRC Website

text

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.-..,r...,..,~.r,-a,,,.>ne, While operating in the cold shutdown condition, two technical specification fire doors were discovered to be in an inoperable condition.

On 1-7-86 at 1230 Operations personnel noticed the double door leading from the Turbine Building into the Electrical Switchgear Room had been propped open to facilitate the bringing in of scaffolding materials for a plant mbdification project. No fire watch was posted so the door was immediately closed.

Subsequent investigation showed that the door had been open for approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

On 1-12-86 at 0245 Security personnel discovered tape covering the latching mechanism on the door leading from the Primary Auxiliary Building to the Waste Drumming Room. The tape was immediately removed and the door was properly latched. Subsequent investigation showed that the door had been in this inoperable condition for approximately I day.

Both events are considered separate incidents, however since both involve contractor personnel errors a single report is being issued. These incidents are reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(1) since both involved inoperable periods of time in excess of that specified in Technical Specification 3.22-F.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CENTINUATl3N

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<nx w -. -. m m c r.- a u,n m Switchgear Room Door On 1-7-86 at 1230 Operations personnel during a routine plant tour discovered the double door leading from the Turbine Building into the Electrical Switchgear Room propped open by contractor laborers to facilitate the transport of scaffolding materials into the room. This work was being performed in support of the NUREG 0737 modification for the Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation System. Security personnel were guarding the door opening, since it is a normally closed and alarmed security door in addition to being a Technical Specification fire door. A fire watch trained person however was not posted at the door. The Operations personnel discovering this situation immediately closed the door and notified the Control Room.

Work on bringing the scaffolding materials into the Switchgear Room had begun at approximately 0730 on the same day.

It was subsequently determined that the contractor personnel supervision involved were unfamiliar with the fire door restrictions and as a result failed to adequately address these concerns on the job work order. Therefore the work proceeded without the proper fire watch controls in place. Thus for a five hour period of time the door was open without the posting of a fire watch. During this time the security guard (not fire watch trained) was continually posted at the door and the fire detection and automatic suppression systems in the area were in service. At no time during this period did a fire condition exist that could have impacted the safety equipment in the area.

Drumming Room Door On 1-12-86 at 0245 Security personnel during a routine plant tour discovered tape covering the latching mechanism on the double door leading from the Primary Auxiliary Building into the Waste Drumming Room.

Security notified the Control Room and the tape was immediately removed and the door properly latched.

Investigation revealed that the door latch had been taped by a radioactive waste handling contractor performing work in the Drumming Room on 1-11-86.

He had taped the door latch to facilitate repeated exit and re-entry maneuvers from the room.

It is believed that the door was in the inoperable condition for less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before being discovered and remedied. During the time the door was incapable of latching and therefore inoperable. No fire conditions existed in the area and the fire dete,ction and suppression systems were in service during the incident.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION oeaoveo oMno uso-oio4 t u PtRis 8731 25 FactLITV NAME 414 DOCRET NUMBER (2)

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- 0l0l1 0 l0 0 l3 OF 0 l3 TEXT (Xmore spece a recured use N /W3C Form JfEA 'sA 11h Cause/ Corrective Action Both incidents were similar in nature in that contractor personnel on site to assist in maintenance and refueling activities were responsible for the non-conformances. These personnel were not aware of the exact requirements associated with fire doors. All Haddam Neck personnel and contractor personnel have since been reinstructed, via a written notice, of the station procedures and regulations regarding the use of fire doors. The licensee notes that the probability of occurrence of incidents such as this is increased substantially during a major outage when a large population of contractor personnel is on-site.

The licensee, however, feels that the existence of other fire protection equipment, coupled with the vigilance of station personnel (who discovered both of these discrepancies) will ensure that adequate fire protection is maintained for safety-related equipment. No further corrective action is planned.

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CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT RR#1

• BOX 127E

• EAST HAMPTON, CONN.06424 February 5, 1986 SS-86-25 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.

20555

Reference:

Facility Operating License No. DPR-61 Docket No. 50-213 Reportable Occurrence LER 50-213/86-001-00 Gentlemen:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report 86-001-00, required to be submitted within thirty days, pursuant to the requirements of Connecticut Yankee Technical Specificat!.ons.

Very truly yours, l

WW Richard H. Graves Station Superintendent RHG:RMR/ lac

Attachment:

LER 86-001-00 cc:

Dr. T. E. Murley, Region I Y o