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 Entered dateEvent description
ENS 5046718 September 2014 13:01:00During the performance of PT-Q89, Control Rod Exercise Test, Rod G-3 in Shutdown Bank 'B' misaligned (stepped in) to approximately 195-200 steps indicated with group demand at 217 steps. The movable gripper fuse was suspect, found not blown (so further) troubleshooting required. At 1150 (EDT), the decision was made to reduce power to approximately 70% within two hours per I.T.S. (Improved Technical Specification) 3.1.4.b.2.2. The plant is currently stable at 68% power. I.T.S. 3.1.5.b.1 was also entered for Shutdown Bank 'B' less than allowable insertion limits at time 1228 (EDT) to be in Mode 3 in 6 hrs. (1828 (EDT)). The licensee notified the New York Independent System Operator, the New York Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 473143 October 2011 05:25:00

Indian Point Unit 2 entered TS 3.0.3 (TS Required Shutdown) at 0345 EDT on 10/3/11 after declaring all three Containment Recirc Fan Coolers inoperable due to insufficient Service Water (SW) flow through SW Headers 1, 2, and 3 during the quarterly surveillance test. At 0438 EDT, Unit 2 commenced a controlled shutdown. The licensee has shifted SW flow to Headers 4, 5 and 6 and is in the process of re-performing the test. If the test is successful, they will exit TS 3.0.3. Unit 2 is currently stable at 99% reactor power. The licensee informed state agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN TAYLOR TO CHARLES TEAL ON 10/3/11 AT 0625 EDT * * *

Three trains of Fan Cooler Units (FCU) are inoperable due to insufficient flows during the flow test 2-PT-Q016. Entered ITS 3.0.3 at time 0345 EDT. At time 0438 EDT Unit 2 commenced a plant shutdown. At time 0515 EDT the plant was at 99% and stable under operator control. Service water headers were swapped from the 1,2,3 header to the 4,5,6 header. The plant is in the process of re-performing the FCU flow tests with the 4,5,6 as the essential Service Water header. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Doerflein).

  • * * UPDATE FROM STEVEN RADOMSKI TO CHARLES TEAL ON 10/3/11 AT 0752 EDT * * *

After swapping Essential Service Water headers from the 1,2,3 header to the 4,5,6 header, 2-PT-Q016 Containment Cooler Unit Cooling Water Flow Test was performed satisfactorily. At 0532 EDT LCO 3.0.3 was exited, and LCO 3.6.6 was met. All five Fan Cooler Units were declared operable. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Doerflein).

ENS 4480727 January 2009 12:41:00Calibrations of the 'A' Unit 4160V Switchgear metering were in progress when the 'A' Unit 4160V Bus tripped. This resulted in the loss of the 'A' Feedwater Booster Pump (FWBP) and 'A' Condensate Pump (CDP). The Operating crew identified the loss of the 'A' FWBP with increasing RCS pressure and manually tripped the reactor. There were no other safety system actuations and the plant is stable at normal post-trip temperature and pressure. All rods inserted during the trip. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the condenser. The electrical grid is stable with plant loads being supplied by offsite power via the startup transformer. Both vital busses are being powered from offsite. During the transient, main steam relief valves did lift but have been reseated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 440375 March 2008 22:20:00

On March 5, 2008, a volumetric ultrasonic examination of a Reactor Coolant to Decay Heat System pipe weld was analyzed and determined to identify an unacceptable indication. This dissimilar metal weld is located on the nozzle to the Decay Heat System drop line piping, which is the common suction line from the Reactor Coolant System and is a 12 inch outer diameter pipe. The indication is circumferential, is 15 inches in length, and reaches a maximum localized depth of 65 percent through-wall in one location. The weld was previously partially inspected during the November 2007 refueling outage using manual ultrasonic examination and no indications were identified. The current inspection was done using newly qualified phased array ultrasonic examination techniques in response to industry operating experience regarding dissimilar metal weld flaws. The indication has been found unacceptable per paragraph IWB 3514.4 of the 1989 Addenda of ASME Section XI without further fracture mechanics analysis and is therefore considered reportable. Preparations for a weld overlay repair and further confirmatory manual ultrasonic testing examinations are in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE FROM J. TAYLOR TO JOE O'HARA AT 1730 ON 3/10/08 * * *

On March 8, 2008, further fracture mechanics evaluation of the circumferential indication on the Decay Heat System Drop Line determined that the requirements of the ASME Section Xl pipe code were maintained. Specifically, the acceptance criteria of the 1989 Edition Section XI, Table IWB-3641-1, -2, were met with an allowable value for flaw depth / wall thickness (a/t) of 0.75. Consequently, the 65% through wall indication would be considered acceptable for operation and the Degraded Condition Reporting Criteria would not be exceeded. Therefore, this event is not reportable under any 10CFR50.72 criterion. However, due to industry operating experience with dissimilar metals welds, this notification is being made voluntarily. Confirmatory manual ultrasonic testing examinations were completed which validated the presence of the indication originally found via phased array UT examination techniques. A full structural weld overlay repair is in progress which will be completed before returning Crystal River 3 to power operation. The repair effort has already successfully deposited the first weld layer over the location of the flaw. No Licensee Event Report will be submitted for this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Hopper).

ENS 4160014 April 2005 17:49:00A contract employee had a positive test result for alcohol during a for-cause test. The employee's access to the plant was terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.