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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 53924 | 11 March 2019 10:00:00 | On 03/11/2019 planned maintenance activities will be performed on the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 Digital Radiation Monitoring System's (DRMS) Communications System. The work includes upgrades to the DRMS hardware, software and computer peripherals. Components to be upgraded under this planned maintenance include: Redundant Servers, Operator Console, Health Physics Office Console/Workstation, Printers and Portable Mass Storage/Backup and Computer peripherals necessary to interface with the computer system. This planned upgrade on the Unit 2 DRMS Communications System will result in the loss of Unit 2 radiological monitoring capability in the Control Room and on the Plant Computer System (PCS). Neither the Emergency Response Facilities nor the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will receive radiological data. No actual radiation monitors are affected. The scheduled work duration is approximately three weeks. When the DRMS is out of service for the upgrade, compensatory actions will be in place. Radiation monitors will be continuously monitored for any increases in radiation levels. The Unit 2 Shift Manager will be notified of any increase in radiation monitor readings, including exceeding Emergency Action Levels (EAL). This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the upgrade to the DRMS Communications System will result in the loss of the Unit 2 radiological monitoring capability in the Control Room and to the Unit 2 Plant Computer System that affects the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee is currently in a Technical Specification Action Statement, Limiting Condition for Operation for spent fuel pool radiation monitor and leakage rate monitor. |
| ENS 49116 | 14 June 2013 09:20:00 | Beaver Valley Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event (EAL HU.5, Toxic Gas Release) at 0835 EDT hours due to a CO2 (Toxic Gas) discharge in the turbine building. No report of fire and no injuries resulted from discharge. At 0851 EDT, the turbine building was clear of any detectible CO2. There was no operational impact from the CO2 discharge. The cause of the CO2 discharge is under investigation. The required states and counties were notified. The Resident NRC inspector was notified. The inadvertent CO2 discharge was from the turbine fire protection system which now isolated while troubleshooting is in progress. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA via email.
Beaver Valley Unit 2 has terminated the Unusual Event at 0955 EDT * * * Notified R1DO (Dentel), NRR EO (Chernoff), IRD (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA via email. |
| ENS 48210 | 20 August 2012 17:30:00 | At 1432 EDT on 08-20-2012, the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Shift Manager was notified by the Beaver County 911 call center that some sirens in the Beaver County area were activated at 1417 EDT. Investigation revealed that approximately 94 of the 120 sirens in the Beaver County area had been inadvertently activated for approximately 20 seconds in a Fire Alert mode during siren maintenance activities. All States and Counties within the Beaver Valley Emergency Planning Zone have been notified. This event is reportable as a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'Any event resulting in notification to other government agencies that has been or will be made.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 47852 | 19 April 2012 17:47:00 | At approximately 1156 EDT on 4/19/2012, a craft contractor worker was transported to an off-site medical facility due to a work-related injury. The injured individual was partially surveyed by a Health Physics technician in their anti-contamination clothing prior to leaving the site and no radioactive contamination was detected. The injured individual was then transported by ambulance accompanied by a Health Physics technician to the local hospital for medical treatment. At the hospital, the individual and applicable areas and equipment were surveyed by the Health Physics technician and no radioactive contamination was detected. The individual's anti-contamination clothing was returned to the site. This notification is being made under the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) reporting requirements since a complete survey of the injured individual was unable to be made and he was considered to be potentially contaminated prior to being transported offsite. The site NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The worker was in containment on a polar crane platform when injured. He was subsequently released from the hospital and cleared to work. |
| ENS 46744 | 10 April 2011 06:40:00 | On April 09, 2011, at 2349 (EDT), Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 2 was operating at 15% power while preparing to synchronize the main unit generator to the grid. At that time, the 'A' Auxiliary Feedwater Injection Header was declared inoperable due to a water leak identified from a vent valve fillet weld between the inside and outside Containment Isolation Valves (outside of containment) for containment penetration X-79. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, Condition D, at 0345 (EDT), April 10, 2011, BVPS Unit 2 commenced a Reactor Shutdown to Mode 3. Required action is to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours. This event is being reported as a Technical Specification required shutdown pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), 4 hour notification. Repairs are in progress. The following additional shutdown actions may be required from the time the Injection Header/Containment Penetration was declared inoperable: Technical Specification 3.7.5, Condition D, Mode 4 in 18 hours and Technical Specification 3.6.1, Condition A, Mode 5 within 37 hours. This event is also being reported as a degraded condition for Containment pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), 8 hour notification. Additionally, at 0357 (EDT), during the Reactor Shutdown, at 4.6% Reactor Power, the BVPS Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped due to reaching a pre-established manual trip criteria of 25% Steam Generator Level for the 21A Steam Generator. This was conservative criteria set above automatic actuation setpoint of 20.5% level. This event is being reported as a RPS Actuation pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 4 hour notification. Control room personnel entered Emergency Operating Procedure E-0, 'Response to Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.' Safety systems and equipment functioned as designed following the manual reactor trip. Due to the cooldown and subsequent shrink of level in the 21A Steam Generator, an automatic start of the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2FWE-P22) occurred at 20.5%. This event is being reported as an Auxiliary Feedwater System Actuation pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 8 hour notification. All control rods fully inserted into the core. The plant electrical system is aligned to normal offsite power sources. Decay heat from the reactor coolant pumps is being directed to atmospheric dump valve. There is no primary to secondary leakage. There was no impact on Unit 1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45517 | 24 November 2009 03:40:00 | Beaver Valley Unit 2 declared an unusual event due to reactor coolant system unidentified leakage greater than 25 GPM into the pressurizer relief tank. Leakage occurred during shutdown of the residual heat removal system Train-A. The Train-A suction relief valve lifted due to pressure from the in-service Train-B residual heat (removal) system. The leakage has been stopped by isolating Train-A RHR from Train-B RHR. The duration of relief valve lifting was about 9 minutes. The pressurizer relief tank remained intact. All other systems functioned as designed and the plant is stable. Containment was closed at time of the event. No radioactive release occurred. The licensee terminated the unusual event at 0404 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Licensee clarified that the event was due to identified leakage not unidentified leakage as stated in the paragraph above. Notified R1DO. |
| ENS 45022 | 26 April 2009 13:46:00 | On April 26, 2009 at approximately 1000 hours during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 (BVPS-1) refueling outage, ultrasonic (UT) examinations were performed on pipe base material per the Materials Reliability Project (MRP) MRP-146 recommendations. The MRP recommendations were to address industry operating experience for similar indications identified by other utilities. Two circumferential UT indications approximately 3/8 inches in length were recorded in the base material adjacent to a socket weld on the horizontal portion of line BV-1 RC-41 which is a two (2) inch drain line that connects to the 'A' Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg. The function of this piping is to drain the applicable loop during maintenance periods. The indications are not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage. Similar 2 inch drain lines on the other loops have been inspected satisfactorily. The plant is currently shutdown and in Mode 6. The affected RCS loop is not required to be Operable and is currently isolated and drained. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup. This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 44487 | 15 September 2008 12:45:00 | At approximately 0800 on 09/15/2008, it was determined that 55 of 119 Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Emergency Offsite Sirens were inoperable. The apparent cause is loss of power to the sirens due to numerous power outages in the surrounding area. High winds from the remnants of Hurricane Ike passed through the surrounding area overnight. The weather has since returned to normal conditions. BVPS has validated that backup route alerting capability is in place for Columbiana County, Ohio and Hancock County, West Virginia. Beaver County, Pennsylvania is in process of verifying backup route alerting capability for the affected areas. This event is being reported as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC resident inspector has been notified. Updates on the status of siren restoration will be provided to the NRC resident inspector on an ongoing basis. Periodic updates to the NRC Headquarters' Operations Center will also be provided.
As of 1450 hours on 09/16/2008, 23 of the 119 Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Emergency Offsite Sirens remain inoperable. There may be some variability of the number of inoperable sirens due to ongoing storm restoration activities. Backup route alerting capability remains in effect for the areas served by the inoperable sirens, Updates on the status of siren restoration will be provided to the NRC resident inspector on an ongoing basis. Periodic updates to the NRC Headquarters' Operations Center will also be provided. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Update to EN# 44487. As of 1330 hours on 09/18/2008, 8 of the 119 Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Emergency Offsite Sirens remain inoperable. The remaining 8 inoperable sirens no longer represent a major loss of emergency preparedness capabilities. Backup route alerting capability remains in effect for the areas served by the inoperable sirens and the licensee will continue to monitor restoration status. Updates on the status of siren restoration will be provided to the NRC resident inspector on an ongoing basis. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local officials. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis). |
| ENS 42162 | 21 November 2005 18:54:00 | On November 21, 2005, continued engineering evaluation determined that the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 (BV-1) charging pump used to provide make-up to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) may not perform its credited safety function during all postulated fire scenarios. This potential issue was first identified by a condition report on November 18, 2005. The BV1 Primary Plant Component Cooling Water System (CCR) is not credited during any postulated fire scenario. However, two postulated fire scenarios were identified where the absence of CCR could lead to elevated temperature of the water entering the charging pump suction, which could result in pump cavitation and subsequent pump damage. One scenario involves continued normal letdown entering the Volume Control Tank (VCT) at elevated temperatures raising VCT outlet water temperatures above 250 degree Fahrenheit which then goes to the charging pump suction. Another scenario involves elevated suction temperatures during a minimum flow scenario when charging flow to the RCS may be normally isolated by procedure. Hourly fire tours were immediately initiated as interim measures on November 18, 2005 in applicable areas to reduce the risk of an initiating fire to support continued plant operation. Plant procedure changes are being developed which will address these two scenario issues. These plant procedure revisions, expected shortly, will return the plant into compliance with the current fire protection licensing and design bases. Preliminary engineering evaluation also determined that the complete loss of RCS make-up during the two identified scenarios will not lead to core damage. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) since the make-up function to the RCS may not be available during a postulated fire event which is credited for maintaining the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. The Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BV-2) Component Cooling Water System is credited and evaluated in its fire design bases. BV-2 operator action currently exists to protect the BV-2 charging pump during a fire event. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |