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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 55962 | 24 June 2022 16:28:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone: At 1257 EDT on June 24, 2022, it was discovered the Low Pressure Core Spray System (LPCS) was INOPERABLE. At Perry, the Low Pressure Core Spray System is considered a single train system in Modes 1, 2, and 3; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Inoperability of the Low Pressure Core Spray system was caused by a loss of power to the LPCS Minimum Flow Valve during surveillance activities. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55172 | 6 April 2021 04:32:00 | At 2149 EDT on April 5, 2021, with the power plant in Mode 2 at zero percent power, an actuation of the RPS system occurred following the decision to abort plant start-up. The reason for the RPS actuation was to align the plant to Mode 3, from Mode 2, following manually inserting all control rods using the Rod Control System. The RPS system initiated as designed when the mode switch was taken from 'Start-up' to 'Shutdown' to align the plant to Mode 3 from Mode 2. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
This is a retraction of an event notification made on 4/6/2021 at 0432 EST (EN#55172). This event was initially reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS System. This event was later determined to be pre-planned, in accordance with Technical Specifications, and not the result of a significant event, therefore not meeting the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). On the evening of April 4, 2021, while commencing reactor start up, it was determined that control rod withdrawal to add positive reactivity for the start-up would not overcome the negative reactivity of plant heat up. The control room team determined that the proper course of action would be to insert all control rods . The control room briefed and notified the Outage Control Center about its decision, then proceeded to insert all control rods. The control room manually inserted all control rods using the control rod hydraulic system. Following insertion of all control rods, the mode switch was taken to the shutdown position to meet the prerequisites of the procedure for maintaining hot shutdown. This action establishes Mode 3 in accordance with Technical Specifications and aligns the plant to perform the necessary work prior to a plant restart. By placing the mode switch in the shutdown position, a scram signal is generated for 10 seconds. NUREG-1022 offers guidance that states 'Actuations that need not be reported are those initiated for reasons other than to mitigate the consequences of an event.' The actions the operating crew took that night are accurately described by this statement in NUREG-1022 'shifting alignment of makeup pumps or closing a containment isolation valve for normal operational purposes would not be reportable.' In this situation, the Mode switch was taken to shutdown to align the plant to mode 3 for normal operational purposes, and not to mitigate a significant event. When the mode switch was taken to shut-down, RPS initiated as designed, there was no mis-operation or unnecessary actuation. This actuation was determined to be pre-planned, in accordance with Tech Specs, and not the result of a significant event, therefore not meeting the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident has been notified. Notified R3DO (McGraw). |
| ENS 54507 | 1 February 2020 16:29:00 | EN Revision Imported Date : 3/17/2020 LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY INOPERABLE At 1150 EST on 2/1/2020, it was discovered that the Low Pressure Core Spray System was inoperable due to a divisional battery voltage being out-of-specification. Therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The Low Pressure Core Spray is a single train safety system in Modes 1, 2, and 3. Low Pressure Core Spray was restored to operable, restoring function at 1230 on 2/1/2020. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
On February 01, 2020, event notification (EN-54507) was made to the NRC for Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) inoperability. This notification was made due to high DC bus voltages resulting in LPCS being declared inoperable which resulted in a loss of safety function. An Engineering Evaluation Request (EER) was performed to determine an upper limit for DC bus voltage. This EER determined that LPCS could perform its required functions with a voltage increase of up to 150V DC if the duration was not greater than two hours. The elevated voltage was experienced for approximately 59 minutes. The maximum voltage experienced was 147.07V DC. Therefore, LPCS remained operable and no loss of safety function existed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the evaluation results and informed of this retraction. Notified R3DO (Hanna). |