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The following report was received via fax: Description: GE BWXT, acting on behalf of Ontario Power sent five valves back to the Flowserve facility for evaluation of the spring which could spread apart when the flapper rotates open and wedge between the valve body and flapper, creating the potential for the valve flapper to stick open. Evaluation: Shop inspections of the returned valves confirmed the potential for the spring legs to rotate outwards and potentially wedge between the flapper and seat retainer. Of the five valves evaluated, two of the valves had the spring legs rotate outward and after repeated cycles got caught between the flapper and disc; on one of the instances the spring legs prevented full closure of the flapper. If the valves have a safety-related function to isolate flow and must transfer closed, then the springs could prevent the valve from performing its safety related function. The evaluation determined the cause is an inadequate spring design which allows the spring to deflect and permit the legs to move outward. Extent of Condition: In discussion with the customer, it is believed the problem did not exist with valves originally supplied from the Worcester, Scarborough Canada facility; although this cannot be confirmed by Flowserve. It is believed the extent of condition resides with valves and replacement springs supplied from the Flowserve Raleigh, NC facility when the product line was transferred and the spring vendors changed; even though it has been confirmed that the springs supplied out of the Raleigh, NC facility comply with the product drawing requirements. The springs were first sold in valve assemblies or as replacement parts from the Raleigh facility starting in 2008. Valve Scope: The scope of impacted valves is the Worcester series 44 swing check valves. (Please note Worcester also has a series 44 three piece ball valve, which is not in the scope.) The Raleigh facility has supplied parts or valves for four Worcester series 44 swing check valves assemblies which use these springs. The drawings numbers for these valve assemblies are listed below:

   Drawing                  Valve Size             Customer
   KN44-0590             1.5 X 1 X 1.5         Bruce Power, GE BWXT & Ontario Power 
   KN44-0630             2                            Comanche Peak
   14-107362-001      1.5 X 1 X 1.5          GE BWXT
   16-118733-001      1.5 X 1 X 1.5          GE BWXT

Corrective Actions: 1) Owner's may remove the springs. The valves will check-off and seal under low pressure conditions without the assistance of the spring; this was demonstrated in shop tests using tap water pressure (approximately 60 psig) and will initiate closure when full open without the assistance of the spring.

2) Flowserve is evaluating alternate spring designs along with the possibility of adding guides to prevent the undesired spring movement. Any new design will be proof tested.

Respectfully submitted, Mark Rain, PE Product/Design Engineering Specialist Flowserve Corporation Flow Control Division 1900 S. Saunders St. Raleigh, NC 27603

EN Revision Text: FITNESS FOR DUTY A non-licensed employee disclosed that he had previously used illegal drugs. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION FROM ETHAN HAUSER TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1456 EDT ON 5/21/2019 * * *

The following event notifications are retracted: EN 53822 reported on 1/11/2019 and EN 53982 reported on 4/5/2019. Subsequent to the initial notification, further investigation revealed that no new information was discovered that would meet the criteria for reporting under RG 5.62 or NUREG-1304. Further the events were also determined to be limited to an act of personal deception by those applying for unescorted access, without intent to commit or cause events identified in paragraphs I (a) and (d) of Appendix G to Part 73, and is not a programmatic breakdown. Based on this information, and consistent with the NRC memorandum dated May 19, 1995, 'Access Authorization Reportability and Enforcement Issues,' this event does not meet the threshold for reporting. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Cameron) and via E-mail the FFD E-mail group.

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE SOURCE FAILS LEAK TEST The following report was received via e-mail: A routine leak test at the Swedish Cancer Institute found a leaking Cs-137 e-vial source in the Physics Lab. The initial leak test was taken 12/19/2018 and analyzed on 12/20/2018. It revealed an activity of approximately 10 nanoCuries, and additional confirmation tests found contamination above the regulatory threshold for a leaking source. The source was immediately removed from service, contained within multiple non-permeable barriers, and placed into a larger pig while it is being held for disposal. Surveys of the original storage pig and the hot lab where the source was utilized found no removable contamination and there was no personnel contamination detected. The RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) was notified of the positive results the morning of 12/21/2018 and provided notification to DOH (Washington State Department of Health) at 1114 PST on 12/21/2018.

• * * UPDATE ON 01/17/2019 AT 1201 EST FROM ANDREW HALLORAN TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

The following report was received via e-mail: A leaking sealed source was discovered at The Swedish Cancer Institute during periodic leak tests performed by the health physics staff. The source (MED3550 Gamma Reference Standard, SN 11345, Cs-137, initial activity 209.6 micro-Ci, reference date 8/1/2001) was used in the A Level Physics Lab as part of routine radiation oncology operations. The source was initially received by Swedish 12/6/2007. The sample was collected on 12/19/2018 using an alcohol wipe, and analyzed on 12/20/2018 using a Ludlum 261 single channel analyzer coupled with a NaI well detector. The system was set to detect the 662 keV photon energy for Cs-137, with a calculated efficiency of 11.71 percent. The result of the wipe test analysis was a removable activity of 9.92 Nano-Ci, above the 5 Nano-Ci threshold for a leaking source. After the RSO was notified of the positive result on 12/21/2018, the source was immediately removed from service, contained within multiple non-permeable barriers, and placed into a lead pig. The pig is currently being stored in the Radiation Safety Office Lab awaiting disposal. Wipes of the A Level Physics Lab source storage cabinet and all surfaces of the pig used to house the source when it was in service yielded no detectable removable contamination. After reviewing the final report of the licensee, this event is now closed as of 1/3/2018. DOH will verify that the source has been disposed of during the next routine inspection of the licensee. Washington Event Report ID: WA-18-031 Notified R4DO (Drake) and NMSS Event Notification (e-mail).

EN Revision Text: AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA LOST BY COMMERCIAL CARRIER The following report was received from the state of Florida via e-mail: Received a call from Versa Integrity Group to report a missing Ir-192 radiography camera. The device was shipped from Sanford, Florida via (commercial carrier) on 11-29-18 in route to Corpus Christi, Texas, but never arrived. The last location that (the commercial carrier) can confirm the location of the package was Memphis, Tennessee. (Source information - model: A424-9, S/N: 62109G). The camera had a 330 GBq Ir-192 source. The licensee contacted the commercial carrier on 12-10-18, to inquiry about the shipment and was told it was delayed. The licensee recontacted the commercial carrier on 12-13-18 and was told the package could not be located. Florida Incident: FL18-153

• * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1556 EST ON 12/13/18 * * *

The state of Texas also reported the same event since their licensee was the intended recipient. The Texas Department of State Health Services will be contacting the state of Florida about this event.

Texas Incident: 9645 Notified R4DO (Taylor) and NMSS Events Notification group (email).

• * * UPDATE AT 1345 EST ON 12/21/2018 FROM ART TUCKER TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The following information was received via fax: At 12:39 PM (CST) on December 21, 2018, the licensee contacted the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) and stated they had received an email from (the commercial carrier) stating the exposure device would be delivered to the facility in Corpus Christi by 1645 (CST) hours today. Texas Incident: I-9645 Notified the R1DO (Jackson), R4DO (Alexander) and NMSS (via e-mail).

• * * UPDATE AT 1703 EST ON 12/21/2018 FROM ART TUCKER TO TOM KENDZIA * * *

The following information was received via fax: The licensee contacted the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) at 1550 hours and reported they had received the exposure device. The licensee stated they would provide additional information after they completed their investigation. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident: I-9645 Notified the R1DO (Jackson), R4DO (Alexander) and NMSS (via e-mail). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9)

The following information was received via e-mail: On December 2, 2018, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that they had admitted a patient at 2210 hours (CST) on December 1, 2018, complaining about a sickness. At 0000 hours on December 2, 2018, the patient gave the treatment nurse a piece of paper from a hospital in Houston, Texas, stating this individual had received a thyroid treatment with iodine-131 on November 29, 2018. At this time the patient was moved to an appropriate room. At this point the patient had been in four different rooms. The four rooms were surveyed for contamination. No contamination was found in the first room surveyed. In the second room, only paperwork was found to be contaminated and the paperwork was disposed of. The third room was a bathroom. Seven tiles in the bathroom were found to be contaminated and were removed. The fourth room was also a bathroom. In this room, the toilet was found to be contaminated. The RSO stated the first survey performed with a 14C rate meter with a pancake GM probe read greater than 20 millirem per hour (mR/hr) (maximum reading on the instrument, i.e. pegged high). A second survey performed with a second instrument indicated a dose rate of 60 mR/hr (on scale reading). The RSO was asked if the reading was in mR/hr or microrem per hour. The RSO confirmed the reading was 60 mR/hr at one foot from the top of the bowl. The RSO stated the room has been isolated and posted. The RSO stated all contaminated laundry had been removed from the areas and placed in the appropriate storage location. The RSO stated the second bathroom would be isolated for an extended period of time. The RSO had been at the facility since 0000 hours so he was headed home for rest. The RSO stated he would provide additional information on Monday December 3, 2018. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident: 9641

• * * UPDATE ON 12/03/18 AT 1843 EST FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The following update was received from the State of Texas via e-mail: The licensee's RSO informed the Agency that during its follow-up survey of the bathroom in which they had removed contaminated floor tiles, a single spot was found with readings of 5 mR/hr on the toilet near its water supply line. Therefore, access to this bathroom will also remain restricted. The patient was released from the emergency room late in the day on 12/02/2018. More information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Notified R4DO (Gaddy) and NMSS Event Notification Group (by email).

EN Revision Text: UNANALYZED CONDITION FOR TORNADO GENERATED MISSILES On February 12, 2018, during evaluation of protection for Technical Specifications (TS) equipment from the damaging effects of tornado generated missiles, Dresden Station identified a non-conforming condition in the plant design such that specific TS equipment is considered to not be adequately protected from tornado generated missiles. Tornado generated missiles could strike the Unit 2, Unit 2/3, and Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator main fuel oil tank vents. This could result in crimping of the vents, which would affect the ability of the main fuel oil tanks to perform their function if a tornado would occur. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being addressed in accordance with NRC enforcement guidance provided in Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' and DSS-ISG-2016-01, 'Clarification of Licensee Actions in Receipt of Enforcement Discretion' per Enforcement Guidance Memorandum EGM 15-002, 'Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance,' Revision 1. Compensatory measures have been implemented in accordance with these documents. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification.

• * * RETRACTION ON 10/11/19 AT 1031 EDT FROM SAMANTHA COSENZA TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The purpose of this notification is to retract event notification 53204 made on February 12, 2018, for Dresden Station. Additional review determined that the current design of all three Emergency Diesel Generators and associated Main Fuel Oil Storage Tanks Vents is consistent with the licensing basis for Dresden Station. There was no non-conformance of Dresden's tornado missile protection design, and the EDGs were operable at the time the event notification was made. Therefore, this event does not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The ENS 53204 report is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification." Notified R3DO (Hills).

The following report was received from the Maryland Department of the Environment Radiological Health Program via email: On February 8, 2018, the Maryland Department of the Environment - Radiological Health Program was contacted by Johns Hopkins Medical Institution (MD-07-005-03) of an incident in which one researcher had received a total effective dose equivalent exceeding 5 Rem and likely an extremity dose exceeding 50 Rem. The licensee received results of a researcher's 4th quarter 2017 radiation badge readings. The researcher was conducting tracer studies using PET isotopes C-11 and F-18 in animals. The researcher has been monitored since February 2012 and has frequently used F-18 in similar studies with no problems. Use of PET isotopes in the lab has been halted pending an investigation by the licensee. The Maryland Radiological Health Program will schedule a reactive investigation. The result of the whole-body radiation badge readings (monitoring period Oct 1 - Dec 31, 2017) was:

    Deep Dose:  12,818 milliRem
    Lens of the Eye:  28,280 milliRem
    Shallow Dose:  46,206 milliRem
    Beta Dose:  33,388 milliRem

The researcher's assigned extremity ring badge was not worn during the 4th quarter of 2017. The licensee will submit a written report as required within 30 days.

The following report was received from the State of Texas via e-mail: On February 2, 2018, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that a nuclear gauge shutter had failed to operate. The gauge is a Vega SHLG-2 gauge containing a 4,000 milliCurie Cesium-137 source. The source is a plunger type source and it is in the exposed position. The licensee stated the unit the gauge is installed on will be shutdown in the near future and the gauge will be repaired at that time. The licensee has contracted a service provider for the repairs. The Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) has requested additional information. Additional information will be provided as it is received. Texas Incident #: I-9537

• * * UPDATE ON 2/5/2018 AT 1714 EST FROM ART TUCKER TO DAVID AIRD * * *

The following report was received via e-mail: The inability to fully shield the source was discovered while they (the licensee) were making preparations for maintenance on the vessel the gauge is installed on. The licensee stated there is no additional risk of exposure to its workers or members of the general public. Notified R4DO (Deese) and NMSS Events Notification (via e-mail).

Nine Mile Point unit 2 experienced an unusual event due to a small fire in the turbine building that was immediately extinguished and then reflashed. The fire was declared out at 1119 (EST), 2/1/18. The fire was caused when steam leak repair injection equipment failed and leaked onto hot piping. There was no equipment damage or impact to plant operation. The fire was extinguished by the fire brigade. Offsite assistance was not required. The fire resulted from Furmanite repair of a Moisture Separator Reheater inlet flow control valve. The unusual event will be terminated when sufficient lagging is removed to verify the extent of leaked fluid. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and NNSA (via e-mail).

• * * UPDATE AT 1240 EST ON 2/1/2018 FROM ANTHONY PETRELLI TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The unusual event was terminated at 1211 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Janda), NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and NNSA (via e-mail).

During normal power operations at 100 percent power on Unit 2, both trains of Containment Air Return Fans (CARF) were declared inoperable at 19:28 (EST) on January 9, 2018 due to a common issue with control power fuses. The fuses potentially could not handle the in-rush current upon re-energizing the circuits. This condition resulted in a loss of a reasonable expectation that the Unit 2 Containment Air Return Fans would meet their design safety function and mitigate an accident. This loss of safety function is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 8 hour report. The site entered T.S. 3.0.3 at 19:28 and exited at 20:54 when repairs to 2B CARF were completed. 2A CARF repairs are complete. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee verified this problem does not affect unit-1.

• * * RETRACTION AT 0939 EST ON 03/08/2018 FROM JUSTIN BLACK TO TOM KENDZIA * * *

A subsequent evaluation determined that the fuses for the Containment Air Return Fans (CARFs) would be able to perform their safety function and were operable at the time of discovery. The limiting safety condition for the fuses is the return to power following a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). The evaluation determined that the fuses would satisfy their safety function upon re-energizing the circuits if a LOOP occurred and would not impact the ability of the CARFs to perform their safety function. The subject fuses were replaced on January 9, 2018." The Licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Musser).