Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 55741 | 16 February 2022 16:59:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Offsite Communication Capability | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1159 EST, on 2/16/2022, the Watts Bar Nuclear, Shift Manager was notified that Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) attempted to notify Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) regarding routine siren testing at 0750 EST. TVA was unable to reach TEMA via telephone land line or the Emergency Communication and Notification System (ECNS). TEMA Watch Point staff were located at their back-up facility. TVA subsequently notified TEMA via cell phone that there were communication issues with the primary and backup notification methods. It was determined that the TEMA back-up facility was not able to receive incoming calls. At 0820 EST, TEMA positioned personnel at their primary facility in order to respond to notifications. This restored primary and backup means of notifying the state because the primary facility was not affected by the communication issues. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Offsite Communications Capability because it affected TVA's ability to notify the State of TN. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 54379 | 12 November 2019 12:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Operations Facility Out of Service | On November 12, 2019, the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) was removed from service for a planned facility upgrade project. The CECC is a common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for the TVA Nuclear sites (Browns Ferry / Sequoyah / Watts Bar). The duration of the upgrade project is approximately 75 days. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, an alternate CECC will be used. During this period, the alternate CECC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency procedures. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the CECC will be unavailable for more than 72 hours. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the CECC will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate CECC in the event of an emergency. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The CECC facility upgrade project is sufficiently complete such that the CECC was returned to a functional status at 1400 EST on January 31, 2020. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Baptist) | ||
| ENS 54277 | 13 September 2019 09:27:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | En Revision Imported Date 9/17/2019 | EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO ACCESS ISSUES This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting access to the Emergency Operating Facility, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex occurred on September 13, 2019 at 0527 EDT. Fire suppression capabilities for the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex are currently impacted by a water main failure rendering access to the facility unsafe for personnel. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, other emergency response centers will be activated and staffed using existing emergency planning procedures and have the capability to perform the functions normally performed by the CECC. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The condition does not affect the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Water lines impacting the Chattanooga Office Complex were repaired, and as of time 0734 EDT on 9/16/19, the CECC was returned to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event update. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt). | ||
| ENS 51885 | 27 April 2016 02:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Alert and Notification System Feedback System Inoperable | On April 26, 2016 at 2213 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant authorized notification of State agencies for the partial loss of the WBN Alert and Notification System (ANS) feedback system. The ANS feedback system provides monitoring capability of the off-site sirens surrounding the facility in the event of a plant Emergency. Without the feedback system in service, sirens may be activated remotely from State and local facilities but verification of successful activation is impaired. State agencies were notified to evaluate if other methods of alerting the public were warranted. No compensatory methods are required for this failure, as the ANS activation feedback systems remain fully functional at the State and local facilities. The cause for the loss of the ANS feedback system is under investigation. This is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.
The cause of the partial loss of WBN ANS Feedback System was determined to be an equipment failure. AT&T has completed the work and the modem has been reset. The Corporate TVA Operational Duty Specialist (ODS) has been monitoring (the system) and there have been no issues identified with the feedback system. Therefore, the issue has been repaired. In addition, further confirmation from the State of Tennessee and Rhea County was received that the sirens were fully functional at all times. The Feedback Monitoring System for the ANS was not available to the ODS only. Therefore, TVA Watts Bar is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) notification for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ehrhardt). | ||
| ENS 41049 | 17 September 2004 09:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Siren Capability and Notification of Offsite Agency | On Sept. 17, 2004, with Watts Bar Unit 1 at 100% power, the main control room was notified that the 99 sirens which make up the Public Prompt Notification System were not functional. The system uses two repeaters to control the sirens. As the remnants of Hurricane Ivan were passing through the Tennessee River Valley one of the repeaters (Pone Knob) was found to be without power around midnight. The siren system operators confirmed the second repeater (Grandview) was still functioning. Approximately 5:00 a.m., however, communications were lost with the second repeater. A maintenance crew was dispatched to the second repeater on loss of communications and they determined the radio transmitter was not functioning at 0955 and Watts Bar was immediately notified. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency preparedness capability. . As a result of the above siren loss, TVA notified the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) at 10:13a.m. Sept. 17, 2004. This government agency notification is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). No TVA press release is planned and TVA is not aware of any specific actions planned to be taken by TEMA. Maintenance activities to restore power to the first repeater station by the use of a portable generator are underway. The 99 sirens constitute 100% of the emergency siren capability. The licensee had no estimate for completion of repairs and restoration of the siren capability. The licensee informed the State of Tennessee and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Restoration of power by use of a portable generator has been completed, reducing the number of non-functional sirens to seven of ninety-nine. The licensee informed local and State authorities, and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2 DO (A. Boland). |