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Welcome to www.kanterella.com Wiki site! The goal of this site is to apply semantic elements to Nuclear information.

If you would like to discuss this site or if you have cool ideas please visit the Community page.

Number of Pages: 174,166

Generic Adams

An Adams import was set up so that new correspondence will be imported periodically. If we can add context then we could better organize the letters into relevant groups. Ie groups around project codes.


Findings

Plants undergo inspections by the NRC. A series of pages have been uploaded representing the findings that resulted from those inspections. This is a good data set because it helps show a practical interpretation of regulation. In other words, who knows what it really means but this is how it was done wrong.

Scrams

One of the bigger events for a plant is a Scram. The occurrence of which are reported to the NRC via the ENS system. By extracting that information you can get lists of data. Please see the main page Scram.

 Start dateSiteScram
ENS 5401622 April 2019 03:07:00BrunswickAutomatic Scram
ENS 5401220 April 2019 10:07:00Duane ArnoldManual Scram

Mapping

Recently Mapping has been incorporated to the wiki. Mostly its about plant locations and can show corporate owner icons. It is feasible to overlay a set of data with locations (ie you can see where ENS occurred on a Map).

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Emergency Notification System

First successfully integrated database is the Emergency Notification System. It is a database which holds all the short-term notifications made by nuclear power plants (10 CFR 50.72). If you visit the Emergency Notification System you can see how digitizing the ENS can lead to a variety of customized reports and notifications.

Enjoy --StriderTol (talk) 15:09, 14 July 2014 (EDT)

Since Yesterday: 04-20-2019

 SiteSystemEvent descriptionTopic
ENS 54016BrunswickShutdown Cooling
Reactor Water Cleanup
Secondary containment
Control Room Emergency Ventilation
Primary Containment Isolation System
Reactor Coolant System
At 2307 EDT on April 21, 2019, in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent reactor power, Unit 1 automatically tripped due to a Main Turbine Trip. The Main Turbine Trip was a result of two out of three level instruments sensing a false high reactor water level. All control rods inserted as expected during the scram. Safety Relief Valves G and K lifted per design. The same level instruments that failed also tripped both Reactor Feed Pumps. As a result, reactor water level dropped below the Low Level 1 and 2 actuation setpoints. Per design, the Low Level 1 signal resulted in Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The Low Level 2 signals resulted in Group 3 (i.e. Reactor Water Cleanup) isolation, a secondary containment isolation signal, and an auto start of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. Also, the Low Level 2 resulted in (high pressure coolant injection) HPCI and (reactor core isolation cooling system) RCIC automatically starting and injecting into the vessel.

All systems responded as designed. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Decay heat is currently being removed via the turbine bypass valves. Condensate and feed water are maintaining water level. The reactor is still at saturation temperature and 475 psi, lowering slowly. The reactor is still in a normal electrical lineup. There was no impact to Unit 2 as a result of this event.

  • * * UPDATE ON 04/22/19 AT 0220 EDT FROM ALAN SCHULTZ TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *
The licensee updated the event report to include a 4-Hr Non-Emergency Notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) for Emergency Core Cooling System, HPCI, Discharge to the Reactor Coolant System.
ENS 54015LimerickEvent of Public Interest performed to notify State and Local agencies for emergency vehicle response required due to an on-site non-work related illness. The individual was unresponsive and was unable to be resuscitated due to the medical issue. The individual was outside the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA) and no radioactive material or contamination was involved. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 54014LimerickPrimary containmentThis 60-Day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of Limerick Generating Station Unit 1 containment isolation logic.

On February 22, 2019, while performing work on the 1C Main Seam Line Rad Monitor a partial containment isolation occurred due to a blown fuse. The blown fuse caused a single channel 'C' isolation signal for the Refueling Area Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation and the Reactor Enclosure Ventilation Exhaust-High Radiation logic. The following systems had components that actuated due to the partial isolation: - Plant Process Radiation Monitoring System - Nuclear Boiler System - Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System - Containment Atmospheric Control System - Primary Containment Instrument Gas System This event resulted in partial Group VIC and partial Group VIIIB isolations. All the components that would actuate on a single 'C' isolation signal responded as designed.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 54012Duane ArnoldAt 0507 (CDT on April 20, 2019), the DAEC (Duane Arnold Energy Center) experienced a trip of both reactor feed pumps. Operators inserted a manual scram. All control rods inserted, as required. As a result of the feed pump trips and scram, HPCI and RCIC automatically injected. Also, containment isolations occurred, as expected for this event. All systems responded as designed.

Operators are currently taking the unit to cold shutdown conditions. Vessel level is being controlled by RCIC with Condensate System available. Pressure is being controlled using Main Steam Line drains and the Main Condenser is available. Normal electrical lineup remains. The cause of the reactor feed pumps tripping is believed to be an instrument air leak to flow control valves, causing loss of suction to both feed pumps.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.