The following 60-day report is being made under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of the High Pressure Cory Spray pump that occurred at
0347 hours0.00402 days <br />0.0964 hours <br />5.737434e-4 weeks <br />1.320335e-4 months <br /> on March 26, 2006. As allowed by
10CFR50.73(a)(1) this notification is being made via telephone.
NUREG-1022, Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as follows:
(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
On March 26, 2006 at 0347, the Division 4 Nuclear System Protection System (NSPS) power was lost due to a loss of the Division 4 NSPS inverter. The High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) pump started automatically as a result of this failure. This response is identified in the Operations bus outage procedure as a potential impact of the loss of Division 4 NSPS and was considered expected. Immediate actions were taken to secure HPCS and declare it inoperable.
An Apparent Cause Evaluation was performed. The apparent cause of the loss of Division 4 NSPS Inverter was determined to be the age related failure of the Z111 voltage regulator on the 12 Static Switch logic card.
(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
The automatic start of High Pressure Core Spray was partial since the 1E22-F004 HPCS Injection Valve does not receive an open permissive when the Division 4 NSPS Inverter is deenergized.
(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
The start of High Pressure Core Spray pump was successful and functioned properly in the minimum recirculation flow mode.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
