22:50 Mar 30, 2006
Inadequate Operator Response Time for Component Cooling Water System Realignment During a Large Break Loca
At 1650 on March 30, 2006, a concern was identified where the operators in the training simulator could not complete realignment of the component cooling water (CCW) flow to the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger in a timely manner under certain accident scenarios. This could result in exceeding the maximum design temperature of the CCW system. In addition, assumptions made in the containment pressure and temperature analysis following a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) are non-conservative with respect to when CCW flow to the RHR heat exchangers is manually established in accordance with emergency operating procedures.
Callaway plant FSAR indicates CCW system flow is manually aligned to the RHR heat exchangers prior to the recirculation phase of emergency core cooling system (ECCS). If the automatic transfer of the RHR pumps to cold leg recirculation, which happens at the Lo-Lo-1 level of the refueling water storage tank (RWST), occurs before CCW flow has been manually aligned to the RHR heat exchanger, containment sump water at temperatures up to 270F can be circulated through the RHR heat exchanger without CCW flow on the other side of the heat exchanger. The CCW side of the heat exchanger would contain stagnant water. This water can heat up quickly with no established flow and exceed the design rated temperature of the system.
Recent simulator scenarios of large break LOCAs have shown that the CCW alignment is not reached before the Lo-Lo-1 RWST alarm level is reached. The CCW alignment is completed as part of procedure ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation. A review of two large break LOCA scenarios completed on 3-20-06 show that it takes between 1:00 and 1:30 minutes to initiate the step to align CCW to the RHR heat exchangers and takes between 3:00 and 4:30 minutes to complete the alignment.
In addition to CCW system temperature concerns, an assumption that CCW flow is established to the RHR heat exchanger prior to reaching the Lo-Lo-1 level in the RWST is made in the containment temperature and pressure response analyses. As a result, a failure to establish CCW flow to the RHR switchover would result in an adverse impact on the inputs used in the Licensing Bases Containment Analysis. However, preliminary sensitivity runs using containment analyses codes indicate that post-peak temperature and pressure are not significantly affected by this issue.
1711 Exited Technical Specification 3.0.3
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous notification made on 3/30/06 (EN# 42454). That report was made per 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - Accident Mitigation. An engineering evaluation has determined the RHR and CCW systems would have fulfilled their safety functions had they been necessary to respond to an event. Since the safety functions would have been performed there are no applicable reporting criteria under 50.72 or 50.73 and Event Notification 42454 is retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.Notified R4DO (Shaffer).
Missouri (NRC Region 4)
|10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident|
|Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-1.17 h-0.0488 days <br />-0.00696 weeks <br />-0.0016 months <br />)|
21:40 Mar 30, 2006
|NRC Officer:||Jeff Rotton|
|Last Updated:||May 22, 2006|
|42454 - NRC Website|
Power Operation (100 %)
Power Operation (100 %)