05000387/LER-2005-002

LER-2005-002, R. A. Saccone PPL Susquehanna, LLC
Vice President - Nuclear Operations 769 Salem Boulevard
Berwick, PA 18603
Tel. 570.542.3959 Fax 570.542-1504
rasaccone@ pplweb.com PP
TM
ULU 21 2005
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Station OP1-17
Washington, DC 20555
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-387/2005-002-00
PLA-5997 Docket 50-387
Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-387/2005-002-00. This event was determined to
be reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) because the plant was shutdown as required
by Technical Specification action statements.
On October 28, 2005 at 1600 hours, Susquehanna operators began the process of shutting
down Unit 1 for a planned maintenance outage to address known control cell friction
issues. Four control rods had previously been declared inoperable because of excessive
rod to fuel channel friction. Other rods, previously known to exhibit slow settling
characteristics, would be inserted during the controlled shutdown. Rather than delay the
shutdown to perform operability testing if these rods again experienced long settling
times, it was conservatively determined that any slow settling rods would be declared
inoperable and that Technical Specification 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability, would be
entered when nine rods had been classified as such.
As anticipated, Technical Specification 3.1.3.f was entered at 2332 hours when the ninth
control rod was declared inoperable. Entry into this specification requires that the unit be
taken to Mode 3, Hot Shutdown, within 12 hours. The controlled shutdown continued
until 0805 hours on October 29, 2005, when insertion of all rods was completed and
Mode 3 had been entered by placing the mode switch to the Shutdown position.
There were no actual consequences to the health and safety of the public as a result of
this event.
�-2 Document Control Desk
PLA-5997
No new regulatory commitments have been created through issuance of this report.
1;0441
Sz. Robert A. Saccone
Vice Piesident - Nuclear Operations
Attachment
cc:�Mr. S. J. Collins
Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19408
Mr. B. A. Bickett
Sr. Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 35
Berwick, PA 18603-0035
Mr. R. Osborne
Allegheny Electric Cooperative
P. 0. Box 1266
Harrisburg, PA 17108-1266
Mr. R. R. Janati
Bureau of Radiation Protection
Rachel Carson State Office Building
P. 0. Box 8469
Harrisburg, PA 17105-8469

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1. FACILITY NAME Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE
05000387 1 OF 3
4. -mix TS Required Shutdown Due to Excessive Control Cell Friction

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station - Unit 1
Event date:	10-28-2005
Report date:	12-21-2005
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown
3872005002R00 - NRC Website

EVENT DESCRIPTION

for a planned maintenance outage to address known control cell (EIIS Code: AC) friction issues. The cell friction issues had manifested during Unit 1's 14th fuel cycle when multiple control rods (EIIS Code: JD) failed to settle into their targeted latched position within 30 seconds. At the time of the shutdown, four control rods had been declared inoperable because of excessive rod to fuel channel friction. Other rods, previously known to exhibit slow settling characteristics, would be inserted during the controlled shutdown. Although previous test data obtained during the operating cycle suggested that a majority of those control rods expected to exhibit slow settling would have passed operability testing, it was conservatively determined that any such rod would be declared inoperable so that the shutdown would not be slowed by additional testing necessary to prove operability. Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability, would be entered when nine rods had been declared inoperable.

As anticipated, TS 3.1.3.f was entered at 2332 hours0.027 days <br />0.648 hours <br />0.00386 weeks <br />8.87326e-4 months <br /> when the ninth control rod was declared inoperable. (Note: Entry into this specification was also satisfied shortly thereafter because four-control rods residing within one Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence group were declared inoperable.) Entry into TS 3.1.3.f requires that the unit be taken to Mode 3, Hot Shutdown, within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. At the time the ninth control rod was declared inoperable, Unit .1 had already been reduced to 18% power. The controlled shutdown continued until 0805 hours0.00932 days <br />0.224 hours <br />0.00133 weeks <br />3.063025e-4 months <br /> on October 29, 2005 when insertion of all rods was completed and Mode 3 had been entered by placing the mode switch to the Shutdown position.

There were no Emergency Core Cooling System (ENS Code: B) initiations and fno challenges to containment (EllS Code:

NH) experienced during the shutdown.

Even though the plant shutdown was planned and in-progress, the shutdown became a Technical Specification mandate at 2332 hours0.027 days <br />0.648 hours <br />0.00386 weeks <br />8.87326e-4 months <br /> on October 28 when the ninth control rod was declared inoperable. Accordingly, this event is being reported as a Tech Spec required shutdown per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A).

CAUSE OF EVENT

Entry into the shutdown TS was the result of a station strategy that emphasized timely shutdown progress. This strategy recognized the need to enter TS 3.1.3.f. Entry into the Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) did not impact the course of the shutdown in any way. Entry into TS 3.1.3.f was readily avoidable via manual RPS (ENS Code: JC) initiation before LCO control rod operability limits were threatened. Such action would have, however, defeated information gathering objectives of the controlled shutdown. It is believed that the subject control rods would have likely passed operability testing if initiated.

ANALYSIS I SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

There was no significance to the administrative entry to TS 3.1.3.f. The control rod drive system (ENS Code: AA) remained fully capable of performing its function throughout the shutdown. Efforts to perform operability testing, testing that would have likely avoided TS entry, would have slowed progress on a controlled shutdown that was already taking place.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

None required. Entry into the shutdown Technical Specification was the result of a non-impacting shutdown decision strategy.

ADDMONAL INFORMATION

An extensive fuel re-channeling effort was completed during the shutdown to address control cell friction issues. Cell friction, although not directly responsible for entry into the TS required shutdown LCO, was the primary initiator of the planned maintenance outage. The cell friction issue continues to be explored in Susquehanna's corrective action program.