05000346/FIN-2016002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Use the Corrective Action Program to Evaluate and Document Degraded Condition with Auxiliary Feedwater Train 2 |
| Description | An NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, were identified for the licensees failure to have entered a degraded condition associated with Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Train No. 2 into their CAP until challenged by the inspectors. Specifically, a flow transient that occurred on May 7, 2016, and that caused damage to components in the AFW recirculation line during AFW Train No. 2 testing was not entered into the licensees CAP until May 8, 2016, following challenges from the inspectors. This omission on the part of the licensees staff had the effect of bypassing certain features of the licensees CAP associated with evaluating and documenting the operability of safety-related equipment. The physical event and equipment issues were entered into the licensees CAP as CR 201606515 on May 8, 2016, following prompting by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken by the licensee included repairs to all damaged equipment, detailed inspections of AFW Train No. 2, and an engineering analysis into why the event occurred. The matter of the licensees failure to enter the event into their CAP in a timely manner was documented as CR 201606516, with corrective actions including the coaching and counseling of personnel involved regarding the proper use of the CAP. This finding was of more than minor safety significance because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone of reactor safety and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the units AFW system. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system, structure, or component (SSC); it did not, in and of itself, represent a loss of system and/or function; it did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems being out-of-service for greater than their TS allowed outage times; and it did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as high safety significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution. The inspectors assigned the cross-cutting aspect of Identification to the finding because the licensees staff failed to identify the issue with AFW Train No. 2 within their CAP completely, accurately, and in a timely manner in accordance with program requirements. (P.1) |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2016002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Kimble J Cameron J Cassidy J Rutkowski N Valos T Bilik T Briley |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2016002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2016Q2
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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