A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (
NCV) of
Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.f,
Fire Protection Program Implementation, was identified for the licensees failure to follow a fire protection procedure. Specifically, the licensee failed to isolate the fire main from the cable spreading room (CSR)
header during testing as required by procedure. This resulted in pressurization of the fire
header to the cable spreading room which then caused a rupture of one of the sprinkler heads in the room. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (
CAP) as problem evaluation report (PER) 1001695. As immediate corrective actions, the licensee replaced the failed sprinkler head and conducted a formal review of the incident. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the
initiating events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the excessive amount of water sprayed in the CSR increased the likelihood of a plant
transient due to the potential impact on non-waterproof junction boxes located in the CSR as well as safety-related instrument racks located in the auxiliary instrument room (AIR) directly below the CSR. Using Appendix A, Exhibit 1,
Initiating Events Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the deficiency did not cause a
reactor trip nor a loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the avoid complacency component of the human performance area [H.12], because the technicians failed to properly implement appropriate error reduction techniques while performing a fire protection procedure.
