05000373/FIN-2013004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Procedures Led to Pin Hole Leaks in High Pressure Core Spray Piping |
| Description | A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for the failure to have procedures adequate for the circumstances during long-term operation of the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system on minimum flow. Specifically, three small holes developed in the Unit 2 HPCS minimum flow line elbow due to cavitation and other flow-related wear caused by inconsistent procedural guidance regarding operation in the minimum-flow mode. The licensee promptly repaired the system leak and entered the issue into its CAP as ARs 1503825 and 1530682, which included the performance of an apparent cause evaluation. Further corrective actions included the revision of the affected procedures. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems and Barrier Integrity cornerstone attributes of Procedure Quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objectives of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the procedural guidance given to operate the HPCS system was inadequate to prevent long-term operation of the system in the minimum flow mode of operation, which led to cavitation and flow-induced wear, causing the failure of the Unit 2 HPCS minimum flow line and inoperability of the HPCS system as well as the primary containment boundary. The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination for Findings At-Power, and Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. Further, it was determined that a phase two risk assessment was necessary because the finding impacted suppression pool integrity, and through that process, this issue screened as Green. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding. |
| Site: | LaSalle  |
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| Report | IR 05000373/2013004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Phillips D Chyu G Roach I Hafeez K Carrington M Kunowski M Ziolkowski R Ruiz T Go |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - LaSalle - IR 05000373/2013004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (LaSalle) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (LaSalle)
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