05000454/FIN-2013002-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Properly Scope All Pertinent External Flood Protection Features into Walkdown Lists in Accordance with Industry Guidance NEI 12-07 |
Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) when licensee personnel failed to develop inspection lists that included all external flood protection features credited in current licensing bases (CLB) documents as specified in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 12-07, Guidelines for Performing Walkdowns of Plant Flood Protection Features. Specifically, concrete flood barriers in the fuel handling building (FHB) that protected safety-related equipment in the auxiliary building and flood barriers for the spent fuel pool cooling pumps were not included in the licensees flooding inspection lists, although these passive components were a critical element of the licensees flood mitigation strategy. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 1466355. Corrective actions included plans to perform an inspection of the NRC-identified features that were omitted from the inspection lists and an extent-of-condition review. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors (Flood Hazard) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Because the finding did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event (e.g., seismic snubbers, flooding barriers, tornado doors), the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because licensee personnel failed to properly apply human error prevention techniques such as peer checking and proper documentation of activities. |
Site: | Byron ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000454/2013002 Section 4OA5 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
Type: | Finding: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | B Bartlett C Thompson E Duncan J Bozga J Robbins R Ng T Daun V Meghani V Meyers |
CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Byron - IR 05000454/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Byron) @ 2013Q1
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