05000321/FIN-2014004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Implement Fire Surveillance Procedure Resulted in Isolation of All Fire Water to the Station |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 5.4, Procedures, for the licensees failure to properly implement a valve lineup in a surveillance procedure for the fire protection system. On July 17, 2014 Hatch personnel isolated all fire suppression water during the performance of a valve lineup in accordance with surveillance procedure 42SV-FPX-015-0, System Flush Fire Protection Water. The licensee restored the fire protection system by implementing the correct valve lineup and suspended the use of the procedure until revisions can be made to enhance the procedures usability. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report 841493. The licensees failure to implement the correct valve lineup in accordance with procedure 42SV-FPX-015-0, System Flush Fire Protection Water, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because the performance deficiency was associated with the Protection Against External Factors (Fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the failure to implement the correct valve lineup of 42SV-FPX-015-0 resulted in total fire suppression water isolation. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, dated September 20, 2013. In Part 1: Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, this finding screened as requiring a Phase 3 analysis. The regional Senior Reactor Analyst performed a Phase 3 analysis using licensee input from their fire PRA. Because of the short exposure time of approximately one hour, the change in risk was below 1E-6. Therefore, this finding is Green. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of resources in the human performance area, because the licensee did not ensure that procedure 42SV-FPX-015-0 was adequate to support nuclear safety. |
| Site: | Hatch  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000321/2014004 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Hardage D Retterer M Franke T Su |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.1, Resources |
| INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2014004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hatch) @ 2014Q3
Self-Identified List (Hatch)
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