05000306/FIN-2013011-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Steam Generator Blowdown (SGBD) Pipe Support Anchorages Failure to Meet Design Requirements |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the failure to provide adequate design control measures for the steam generator blowdown (SGBD) pipe supports 8D-2SGB-1A, 2-RBDH-5294, 2-RBDH-606, 2-RBDH-363, 2-RBDH-350, 2-RBDH-349, 2-RBDH-339, and 2-RBDH-358. Specifically the SGBD pipe supports design was non-conservative with respect to Class I requirements as defined in Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Section 12, Plant Structures and Shielding, and referenced specifications. The licensee documented the violation in its CAP as CAPs 1405404 and 1412225 and performed an evaluation to demonstrate that there was reasonable assurance that the SGBD pipe supports remained capable of performing their safety functions. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the finding adversely affected the barrier integrity cornerstone and the associated cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the licensees calculations were not sufficient to demonstrate that the pipe supports were capable of properly supporting SGBD piping and isolation valves during design basis events, and hence ensure containment integrity. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the Significance Determination Process (SDP) in accordance with IMC 0609, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Appendix A, Exhibit 3 (Section B). The inspectors determined that this finding was very low safety significance (Green) because each of the screening questions was answered no. Specifically, the SGBD pipe supports were subsequently determined to be capable of performing their safety function. The inspectors identified a Human Performance, Documentation (H.7) cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding for the licensees failure to ensure complete, accurate, and, up-to-date design documentation. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide adequate oversight of design calculations and documentation of as-built conditions during the SGBD pipe support re-analysis conducted to support the steam generators replacement (Section 4OA5.1). |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
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| Report | IR 05000306/2013011 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Shaikh D Hills E Sanchez J Bozga K Stoedter M Phalen |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| Finding closed by | |
| IR 05000282/2013011 (27 February 2014) | |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000306/2013011 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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