05000382/FIN-2016004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Ensure Appropriate Post-Maintenance Testing on Essential Chiller B |
| Description | Green. A self-revealed, non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, occurred because the licensee did not assure that the procedures for post-maintenance testing of activities affecting quality included appropriate quantitative or qualitative acceptance criteria for determining that maintenance activities were satisfactorily accomplished. Specifically, the licensee did not assure that post-maintenance testing of essential chiller B would identify inappropriately assembled guide vanes, following maintenance on April 11, 2016, resulting in the unexpected inoperability of essential chiller B on August 12, 2016. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2016-05155. The corrective action taken to restore compliance was to issue work instructions for post-maintenance testing of the essential chillers that ensures the guide vanes respond to load changes. The performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to perform maintenance with procedures appropriate to the circumstances resulted in the inoperability of essential chiller B. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because all the screening questions in Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, were answered No. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, teamwork, because the licensee did not ensure that individual and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety was maintained. Specifically, electrical and mechanical maintenance personnel did not communicate and coordinate work to ensure that the guide vane arm and actuator linkage were assembled appropriately [H.4]. |
| Site: | Waterford  |
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| Report | IR 05000382/2016004 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2016 (2016Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Speer E Simpson F Ramirez G Miller M Davis |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
| INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2016004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2016Q4
Self-Identified List (Waterford)
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