05000254/FIN-2016001-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Identify Structures, Systems, and Components as Safety-Related |
Description | A finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, Quality Assurance, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to identify the structures, systems, and components to be covered by the quality assurance program, in that they did not properly classify a component of the control room emergency ventilation system as safety-related. The licensee documented the issue in their corrective action program under Issue Report 2596725. Immediate corrective actions included replacing Differential Pressure Switch (DPS) 0579550 and revising the control room ventilation procedure to allow operators to disable the interlock between the A and B trains of the control room emergency ventilation system. The procedure change eliminated the need for the DPS to be classified as safety-related (and therefore corrected the violation) because in the event of a failure of the DPS, the system would still be able to perform its safety function. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and a finding because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of Design Control and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the B train of the control room emergency ventilation system is a habitability system that is provided to ensure control room operators are able to remain in the control room and operate the plant safely and to maintain the plant in a safe condition under accident conditions. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, issued June 19, 2012. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, because the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the control room and did not represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against smoke or toxic atmosphere. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency was not indicative of current performance. |
Site: | Quad Cities |
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Report | IR 05000254/2016001 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | C Mathews C Norton G Hausman I Khan K Carrington K Stoedter M Garza M Holmberg M Jeffers R Murray |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion II |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Quad Cities - IR 05000254/2016001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Quad Cities) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (Quad Cities)
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