05000353/FIN-2016001-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | Main Turbine Digital Electrohydraulic Control System Modification Failed to Revise the Plant Startup Procedure |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of LGS Unit 2 technical specification 6.8.1 was identified because Exelon failed to maintain a plant startup procedure. Specifically, the implementing procedure for normal plant startup from hot shutdown or cold shutdown to rated power was not maintained when a modification to the Unit 2 turbine electrohydraulic control system was performed and required changes to the plant startup procedure were not identified and implemented. Exelon initiated issue report (IR) 2602637, revised the startup procedure to properly incorporate the software changes made at the factory acceptance test, validated the software changes that were made were technically correct, trained all operators on the new procedural changes, and reviewed operating procedures for extent of condition. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and affected the objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability during power operations. Specifically, the procedure directed actions intended in the software for rapid reactor depressurization that resulted in a reactor trip. Using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, Exhibit 1, Initiating Events Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not cause both a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. Specifically, although the finding caused a Level 8 trip of the feedwater pumps followed by a reactor trip, the rate of water injection from the condensate pumps was sufficient when the reactor was tripped to safely shutdown and operators were able to reset the feedwater pumps. The inspectors determined that this finding has a cross-cutting in the area of Human Performance, Change Management, because leaders did not use a systematic process for implementing the modification so that nuclear safety remained the overriding priority. |
| Site: | Limerick  |
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| Report | IR 05000353/2016001 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2016 (2016Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Schroeder J Furia J Richmond M Fannon R Nimitz S Barber S Rutenkroger J Schussler |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.3, Change Management |
| INPO aspect | LA.5 |
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Finding - Limerick - IR 05000353/2016001 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Limerick) @ 2016Q1
Self-Identified List (Limerick)
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