ML18041A058

Forwards Rev 15 to NMPNS Unit 1 Updated Fsar,Including Changes to QA Program Description & Annual 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation Summary Rept

ML18041A058
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	11/07/1997
From:	TERRY C D NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML18041A059	List: ML18041A058
References
NMP1L-1265, NUDOCS 9711170030
Download: ML18041A058 (225)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY1I~"REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)'IVACCESSION NBR:9711170030 DOC.DATE: 97/11/07NOTARIZED: YESDOCKETFACIL-50-220 NineMilePointNuclearStation,Unit1,NiagaraPowe0500022(AUTH;NAME AUTHORAFFILIATION TERRY,C.D. NiagaraMohawkPowerCorp.RECIP..NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DocumentControlBranch(Document Controlesk)

SUBJECT:

.Forwards rev15toNMPNSUnit1updatedFSAR,including changestoQAprogramdescription &annual10CFR50.59 safetyevaluation summaryrept.DISTRIBDTION CODE:A053DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR 1ENCLjSIZE:(268TITLE:ORSubmittal: UpdatedFSAR(50.71)andAmendments NOTES:RECIPIENT ZDCODE/NAME PD1-1PDILECENTER0EXTERNAL: IHSNRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL10102211'1RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME HOOD,DAEOD/DOA/IRB RGN1NOAC-COPIESLTTRENCL11111111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS: PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LIS'.ORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTRCDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED: LTTR10ENCL8 tl'-' NIACARA.MOHAWK 6ENER'ATIONBUSINESS-CROUPCARLD.TERRYVicePresident NuclearSafetyAssessment andSupponNINEMILEPOINTNUCLEARSTATIONAAKE ROAO.P.O.BOX63.LYCOMING. NEWYORK13093/TELEPHONE (315)349.7263FAX(315)349-4753November7,1997NMP1L1265U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, DC20555RE:NineMilePointUnit1DocketNo.50-22010C.F.R.$50.71(e)10C.F.R.$50.54(a)(3) 10C.F.R.$50.59(b)(2)

Subject:

Submittal ofRevision1$tothe¹ineMilePointNuclearStationUnit1EinalSafetyAnalysisReport(Updated), Including ChangestotheQualityAssurance ProgramDescription, andtheAnnual10C.F.R.5$0.$9SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportGentlemen: Pursuanttotherequirements of10C.F.R.$50.71(e), 10C.F.R.550.54(a)(3),.and 10C.F.R.g50.59(b)(2), NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation herebysubmitsRevision15to)theNineMilePointNuclearStationUnit1FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(Updated), including changestotheNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation QualityAssurance TopicalReport,andtheannualSafetyEvaluation SummaryReport.One(1)signedoriginalandten(10)copiesoftheUnit1FSAR(Updated), Revision15,areenclosed. CopiesarealsobeingsentdirectlytotheRegionalAdministrator, RegionI,andtheSeniorResidentInspector atNineMilePc.'nt.TheUnit1FSAR(Updated) revisioncontainschangesmadesincethesubmittal ofRevision14inJune1996.Inaddition, ChapterXVIIoftheUnit1FSAR(Updated) hasbeenreformatted initsentiretytoeliminate blankpages,establish auniformleft-margin justification format,andtoreorganize theinformation into"Text/Table/Figure" order.Also,manychaptershavebeenreissuedtochangetheheaderfrom"NineMilePointUnit1FSAR"to"NineMilePointUnit1UFSAR."Thecertification requiredby10C.F.R.$50.71(e)isattached. 97fif70030'gI7ii07PDRADOCK05000220KPDR~itrIIIIIIIIIII!IIIIIIIIIJIIII!HIIIIIIIIII '4Iw1fpI'=s~'II'4ii44 aUNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION PIntheMatterof=NiagaraMohawkPoweiCorp'oration V(NineMilePointUnit1)))+Is~))DocketNo.'0-220 CERTIFICATION CarlD.Terry,beingdulysworn,statesthatheisVicePresident NuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportofNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation; thatheisauthorized onthepartofsaidCompanytosignandfilewiththeNuclearRegulatory Commission thiscertification; andthat,inaccordance with10C.F.R.$50.71(e)(2), theinformation contained intheattachedletterandupdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportaccurately presentschangesmadesincetheprevioussubmittal necessary toreflectinformation andanalysessubmitted totheCommission orpreparedpursuanttoCommission requirement andcontainsanidentification ofchangesmadeundertheprovisions of$50.59butnotpreviously submitted totheCommission. CarlD.TerryVicePresident NuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportSubscribed andsworntobeforeme,aNotaryPublicinandfortheStateofNewYorkandCountyof,this&dayof<<~~<<,1997.NotaryPublicinandforCounty,NewYorkMyCommission Expires:8ekzMIblI9UNAN.tANEfmOAryPubtc,SteteotXewYo4Registretion No.i908015CuaMied4Jefferson CountyCoorroission ExpiresOctoberl3.19lt' 'tI1 Page2Enclosure A-provides'the identification, reason,andbasisforeachchangetothequalityassurance programdescription,'nit iFSAR(Updated) AppendixB,in,accordance with10C.F.R.$50.54(a)(3)(ii). Theenclosedannual'Safety Evaluation Summa'ryReport.(Enclosure'B) containsbrief-.-descriptions ofchangestothefacilitydesign,piocedures, tests,andexperiments. NoneoftheSafetyEvaluations involvedanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10C.F.R.$50.59(a)(2). Verytrulyyours,CarlD.TerryVicePresident NuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportCDT/LWB/cmk Enclosures xc:Mr.H.J.Miller,RegionalAdministrator Mr.D.S.Hood,SeniorProjectManager,NRRMr.B,S.Norris,SeniorResidentInspector RecordsManagement ~ppcpe,A'4\4n~h ,ENCLOSURE A'.TONMP1L1265Q~'IDENTIFICATION OFCHANGES,REASONSANDBASESFORNMPC-QATR-1 (UFSARAPPENDIXB)' J,~1(,~f4r ENCLOSUREA IDENTIFICATION OFCHANGES,REASONS,ANDBASESFORQhPROGRAMDESCRIPTION CHANGES(UMTIUFSARAPPENDIXB)-UFSARAppendixB=,;"..:."Pa"Section'.'.". 'ageB.1-2,SectionB.1.2.1.1 secondandthirdparagraphs PageB.14,SectionB.1.2.1.1.4.b ,Identi6catioiiofC "e-"Changed"ManagerHumanResourceDevelopment" toDirectorHumanResourceDevelopment". Deleted"andtheGeneralSupervisor LaborRelations". DeletedpreviousItemb.:....Reistonfor, ~'e",",'<<~6+>7~Reorganization thatestablished thepositionDirectorHumanResourceDevelopment. ThispositionreportstotheChiefNuclearOQicerandhasresponsibility forEmployeeandLaborRelations, Occupational SafetyandHealth,QualityFirstProgram(QIP)administrative issues,andtheFitnessforDutyProgram.TheDirectorQ1Pcontinues toreporttotheChiefNuclearOfficeronmattersrelatedtoQlPconcerns. ThesechangesimpmveNMPC'sabilitytomaintainasafetyconscious worklace.Reorganization. Thefunctions weremovedtotheotherQAsupervisors. -,-'.Hasii for.'Conciik "ButflIieRiVised 'heassiyunent oftheserespoaaMities totheDirectorHumanResourceDevelopment pmvidesdearmanagement contmloverrelatedfunctional, areas.Therqiorting,of thefuncttons totheChief,-"NudearOIBcerensureseffectivi: 1mesofcommunication.'hc Jobfunctions andresponaMities assignedtothediffeient groups'-" remainthesame.'Zlienfore, the'revised pmgram-continues tosatisfy'the criteriaof10CFR50'ppendixBandthe'QAIRcommitments previously acceptedbytheNRC.Reorgmization iaipmvesQualityAsstnance 'ffectiveness andvaluetotheNudearDivision. AllreslensiMities associated withthepositionoftheSupervisor QualityVeri6catioa/Safety Assessment wereassumedby'tboSupervisor QualityAssessment and/orGeneralSupemsorQualityServices. The--sameqmdi6edindividuals continuetoperformthosefunctions. Also,thequali6cations'nece.mry to'erform thosefunctfons'remain thesame. W.It'0tWtwv%plwprlwrr!IrI4l4prIfIr.r'!I0T4aP\t~4"ae~4f.rI'IgH~t~Ir '-:.:<UFSAR AppendixB'-'.';';.".::i:-'.Pa e/Section.. PageB.14,SectionsB.1.2.1.1.4.b andB.1.2.1.1.4.c PageB.14,SectionB.1.2.1.1.4.d PageB.24,SectionB.2.2.11.1 PageB.24,SectionB.2.2.11.2 PageB.5-2,SectionB.5.2.6.3

,".'."-,'.Identification ofChari"'.-"-:":.:..

'cnumbezed ItemctobandItemdtocChanged"Supervisor QualityAssurance Audits"to"Supervisor QualityAssessment." Added"andconducting performance-basedsuzveillances" after"QAaudits".Rcnumbcrcd Itemetod.Added"assessments determining applicability ofindustryandin-plantoperating experience, assisting inmotcauseevaluations whenrequested, DERtrendanalysis," after"document contml".Changed"Engineering" to"Implementing". Changed"Appendix B"to"SafetyClassification". Deleted"emergency planimplementing pzoccdllfes .Added"full"between"A"and"revision". ':"..."':Reason for.CIiaii'* K~.>;-.~'~Reorganization. Combinedsurveillance andauditfunctions intothesinglefunctional area"QualityAssessment". Combinedallplantsupportandadministrative functions underQualityServices. Clarification. Thecriteriausedtoidentifystructures, systemsandcomponents forwhichtheQAPmgramapplieswaschangedtoaNuclearImplementing PmcedurefmmaNuclearEngineering Pmccduze. ThetitleoftheprocesschangedfmmAppendixBDetermination toSafetyClassiTication Determination. Clarification. Movedtheemergency planimplementing pmccdures tothenextparagraph. PeriodicreviewsrequireafullIevlsloIL ~Pghsis'for,,CoJic}u'di .thetheRevised.Pmgtasa-.-@ .+Conthiucs.to'Satisfy,'10 -O~ihx'8'i'(44 Reorganization impmvesQualityAssurance effcctivcziess andvaluetotheNuclearDivision. SuzveiHance responsibilities associated withthepositionoftheSulervisor QualityVerification/Safety Assessment wereassumedbytheSupervisor QualityAssessmeat. Thesamequaiificd individuals continuetoperformthosefunctions. Also,thequalifications necessary topezfozmthosefunctions remainthesame.Reorganization impmvesQualityAssurance effectiveness andvaluetotheNuclearDivision. Plantsupportandadministz3&e responsibilities associatol withthcpositionoftheSupervisor QualityVerification/Safety Asscssmeat wereassumedbytheGeneralSupervisor QualityServices. Thesamequalificd individuals contimietoperformthosefunctions. Also,thequalifications necessary toormthosefunctions remainthesame.Thepmceduretodetermine thesafetyclassification remainedessentially thesameaadcontinues tomeetNMPCand10CHt50Appczuiix BcriteriaThepmceduzetodhteraiine thesafetyciassification remaiaedessentially thesameandcontinues tomeetNMPCand10CFR50AdixBcriteriaTheperiodicfrequency wasshortened; therefore, thelevelofcommitmeat previously acceptedbytheNRCwasnotreduced.Afullrevisionismoierestrictive andisrequiredbyNMPCprocedures toqualifyasaperiodicreview. 'ttwwkMAO taataattta~KBL&l~t IMttt'wAwt, Jtahtthal~,I7Ija~I4agea44I6<<~\P'lI4LI-tI4.IpgI'II~<<4Ir4Rj'ghhrI4l4I~hl~"~~I','>>C~.ptItt'.tmay1ttI4I<<'tgg,II,If<<I47P1~\:rr7rhati')rgfCtlIaj4,~ i'<<<<-*-"',UFSARAppendIx B.':".'. .;.;-::<<::.-':Pa'/Section".:.'-.";:"', ~','..',:.Identlficatiori'of Chan':,;'.,,.',';'.:ReaseiforChaiic":".'.;";:le~<'~yBasjs'for.'Concluding'thatOeNkiJ'sckProgaua%$ c~~~~~PageB.5-2,SectionsB.5.2.6.4 Added"Emergency planimplementing procedures arereviewedatleastannuallyandrevisedasappropriate. Afullrevisionofapmcedure, ordetailedscrutinyofaprocedure aspartofadocumented trainingprogram,drill,simulator exerciseorothersuchactivity, constitutes arocedurereview".Implementation ofthenquirements ofTheperiodic&xgzueywasslertcncd; therefore, theNUREG4654 Revision01andRegulatory levelofcommitmcnt previously acccI~bytheGuide1.101.NRCwasnotreduced.PageB.15-1,SectionB.15.1,secondparagraph PageB.15-1,SectionB.15.2.2PageB.15-2,SectionB.15.2.12 PageB.15-2,SectionB.15.2.13 PageB.16-1,SectionB.16.2.2Deletedentireparagraph. Deleted"departmental". Deleted"departmental". Changed"seniornucleardivisionandcorporate management" to"nucleardivisionmanaement".Deleted"departmental". Editorial. NMPCcurrently usesonlyonetypeofsystem(Deviation/Event Report)toidentify, contmlanddisposition nonconforming conditions inmaterials, artscornnentsorservices. Editorial. NMPCcurrently usesonlyonetypeofsystem(Deviation/Event Report)toidentify, contmlanddisposition nonconforming conditions inmaterials, cornnentsorservices. Editorial. NMPCcurrently usesonlyonctypeofsystem(Deviation/Event Report)toidentify, contmlanddisposition nonconforming conditions inmaterials, artscornnentsorservices. Reorganization. Tolincupwiththecurrentmanagement organization described inSectionsB.1andB.2.Editorial. NMPCcurrently usesonlyonetypeofsystem(Deviation/Event Report)toidentify, controlanddisposition nonconforming conditions inmaterials, parts,components orservices. NuclearImplementing Pnxedurcs weregenerated severalyearsago.MP-ECA41"Deviation/Event Report"(DER)wasdeveloped toincorporate thedifferendepartmental systems.Theretuimnents of10CFR50AdixBcontirmetobemet.NuclearImplementing Pmcolures weregenerated sevensyearsago.MP-ECA41"Deviation/Event Report"(DER)wasdeveloped toincorporate thedifferendepartmental sytNms.Therotuircruents ofIOCFR50AdixBcontinuetobemet.NuclearImplementing Pmcohreswercgenerated severalyearsago.NIP-ECA41 "Deviation/Event Report"(DER)wasdeveloped toincorporate thedifferent departmental systems.Therequirements of10CFR50AdixBcontinuetobemet.Rcorgaruzation appmvcdbyNRCviaUnit1LicenseAmendment 157andUnit2LicenseAmendment 71datedFeb201996.NuclearImplementing Pmcedures weregenerated severalyearsago.NIP-ECA41 "Deviation/Event Report"(DER)wasdeveloped toincorporate thedifferendepartmental systcrM.Therepnrements of10CFR50AppendixBcontinuetobemet f[f,Piaff'.->f'kv.f~~cf~f,b1%4I(5Wr.'ei~'C~fdfI~fggflfV'~3A~)~CC',ffIh~~4c~sff UFSARAppendixBPae/Section 'ageB.17-1,SectionB.17.2.2PageB.17-1,SectionB.17.2.3PageB.17-2,SectionB.17.2.8Identification ofClianAdded"QualityAssurance" between"considered" and"records". Deleted'Theserecordsinclude:1.Resultsof...calibration procedures andreports.Added"Additionally, theRecordsManagement Programincludesthoserecordsidentified inplantTechnical Specifications." Changed"permanent" to"lifetime". Changed"Exceptforrecordsthatarestoredasoriginals, suchasradiographs ...orfeaturesareused"to"Recordsarestoredinappropriate fireratedfacilities, orinremotedualfacilities topreventdamage,deterioration, orlossduetonaturalorunnatural causes.".Reason-for ChanClarification. Theadditionofthewords"QualityAssurance" providesamorepreciseandaccuratedescription ofwhatthesedocuments areconsidered uponcompletion. Thedescription ofwhattypesofdocuments becomerecordsuponcompletion iscontained inthefirstsentenceofSectionB.17.2.2. Thespecificlistofrecordswasremovedsinceitwasnotanall-inclusive list.Theadditionofthestatement "Additionally, theRecordsManagement ...inplantTechnical Specifications" ensuresthatthosexecordsidentified inTechnical Specifications asrequiring retention, butwhichdonotmeetthedefinition ofaQualityAssurance record,willbecapturedundertheRecordsManagement Pmgram.Clarification. Tobeconsistent withthetermsusedinNQA-1toavoidanytentialconfusion. ClariTication byeliminating redundant exception forrecordsstoredasoriginals. Whenonlyasingleoriginalcanberetained, itwillobviously notbestoredinaremote,dualfacility. .'-.-;.-~Basis:for-Coacludingth@iljeR'eviicKPxograxa~~ Adding"QualityAssmaace" between"considered" j,and"records" isconsistent withthewordingin10CHt50AppendixBSectionXVKThechangeisconsidered aclarification ofanexistiagcommitmeut'nd, therefore, doesaotcontradict oralteranycommitments previously apprmedbytheNRG/Theadditiontothesecondstatexaeat isconsistent with10CFR50AppendixBSectionXVIIandANSI/ASMB NQA-101983 (17,17S-I).Inclusion ofapartiallistofdocuments considered toMintothiscategoryallowsthereaderunaecessaxy momforuusintexpxetatioa. Whilea'readermayinterpret thatapaxticuhr documentneedaotbecoatmlled byprocedure becausethatdocumentdidnotappearonthelistofexamplespmvidedintheQATR,nosuchmisinterpretation canbemadeifthepaxtiallistiseliminated. Ifthelistisnotall~usive andstand-alone itshouldaotbeinchided. (IItThethirdstatement ensuxeithatthoserecordsidentified inplantTechnical Specifications asreqixiring retentioa, butwhichdonotmeetthedefinition ofaQualityAssuiaace record,willbecaundertheThetexns"lifetime" and"permanent," whenappliedtoQualityAsmaacerecords,are0ous.Theintentofthissectionwasaotaltered.Thisclarificati eliminates aredundant exception forrecordsstoredasoriginals. 4WW<*JF~~y~4aabSJUFFkk~R XhXFX'FX 'Ftt,Fi>~Cf1xxC".A>>iPNIVF'F5FF4">>LFxXFexFJF~~A* <~:;"-UFSAR-Appendix B',:::;TableB-3,Sheet4of8<...'::~,:..'Identification'of Chan'"-.'."';;"';;:ChangedException wordinginItem3.rto"Installed plantinstrumentation calibration statusistrackedthroughthePMSTdatabase. Calibration statusofportablemeasurement dttestequipment (MATE)maybelabeledonthecaseorattachedtothedevice.Forinstances wheresizeorapplication precludes attaching thecalibration labelsonthedevice,thedeviceshallbeuniquelyidentified andtraceable toitscalibration record.'"",';.";=:....;:"- ReasonforC~Ci"7:."".~$

~,"'2%Thiswaspartofthecorrectivefpreventive actionsfromaDERwrittenduringanISEGassessment.

Thesitewasnotimplementing theexception asitwaswritten.g.Basid;for';Conch'Hing. '"'Uk('ReRiiRPiogQik TheuseofthePMSTdatabaseforin~lantequipment allowsfor.bettertaichngandscheduling ofthecalibration ofthisequipmerit. Thisdatabase'saddressed intheprocertures andusedintraining." TheportableMkTBsti11arerequiredtomaintainthesametypeofcalibration hibelingastheoriginalexception. 'Hiereqmrenients ofANSI/ANS-3-2 and10CFR50Appendix; Bcontimietobemet.TableB-3,Sheet5of8ChangedException inItem4.cfrom"Personnel whoperformauditsfortheSRABarenotrequiredtobesoqualified, sincetheseauditsareoutsidethescopeoftheauditprogramdescribed inSectionB.18ofthisQATR"to"Personnel whoperformSRABauditsthatareoutsidethescopeof10CFR50AppendixBarenotuiredtobesoualified." Clarification. SomeoftheSRABraImredClarification. SomeoftheSRABrotuiredauditsareauditsareinthescopeofSectionB.18ofinthescopeofSectionB.18oftheQA'IKtheQATR.~\' ~I,4~~'.ValiCMW:x..crw14$9ih-~-~,~Ilf\P>rL~,r,,i~~p1~~4.f~~Qfrr~4't>kYs-Cs4I~yrml>~,~~s Enclosure BtoNMP1L1265~-iNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION SUMMARYREPORT1997DocketNo.50-220LicenseNo.DPR-63 '-II3b4fI4~tll'"iI"..IgtIhI SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage1of68.,-SafetyEvaluation No.:91:-'002'mplementation.Document No.-.'->....>;Mod;:N1-86-085~ ..-.~.~--.g;-,,> -,-=,.>--.; UFSARAffectedPages:N/A'~".-'1, g\QpSystem:4~~TitleofChange:600VACand480VACDistribution SystemsgAKBreakerOvercurrent TripDevice:Replacement TO&l~~~Description ofChange:gThismodification replacedtheGeneral.ElectricECelectromechanical overcurrent. tripdevicesintheAKbreakerswithWestinghouse solid-state Amptector overcurrent devices.DuetotheageoftheECdevicesandtheinherentdesignprinciple oftheelectromechanical typetripdevice,theseECdeviceshadexperienced anunusually highfailurerateduringtestingofapproximately 50percent.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theovercurrent tripfunctionalreadyexistsandthemodification onlychanges.themethodofperforming thefunction. Thefailuremodesandeffectswerefoundtobeidentical tothemodesandeffectsofthecurrently installed devices,andthenewovercurrent tripdevicesaremuchmorereliable. Thenewdevicesalsopermitgreaterflexibility intripsettings, allowingbetterachievement ofproperselectivity andcoordination inthelow-voltage distribution system.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. =-SafetyEvaluation --.-Summary Report'-'Page2of68-.~='=SafetyEvaluation No.:tg-Implementation Document9'2-041No-'"~--'IST Program.Plan'-"'.::"-'."'-~-'=-. -t:-"'<~i~....-.QFSARAffectedPages:'""X-'16System:TitleofChange:Contr'olRodDrive(CRD)UpdateofFSARtoReflectRevisedTesting'equirements ofCRDPumps011and012.'Description ofChange:'heCRDpumpsarenotsafetyrelated;therefore, theIn-Service TestingProgramdoesnotneedtotestandt'rendthesepumpsinaccordance withASMESection"XI.Theonlyrequirements fo'rthepumpswithrespecttoTechnical Specifications =-isthattheybecapableofdelivering 40gpmtothereactorvesselasmakeupflow.'ThischangeupdatedtheUFSARtostatethatmonitoring willbedoneunderthequarterly surveillance test.Thepurposeofthesurveillance test(N1-ST-02) istoassurethattheTechnical Specification requirement ismet.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thequarterly surveillance testwillprovideanopportunity todetermine ifandwhenpumpdegradation isoccurring. Also,itwillassureperformance inaccordance withTechnical Specification requirements. Thischangeinthemechanism usedfortrendinghasinnowayhadanyimpactonsystemavailability orcapability. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluatIon SummaryReport.Page3of68..',.,:.;,.SafetyEvaluation No.:-"P.',<"94-066~,'tmplementation DocumentNo:-"'-~:-'".'Procedures N1-RTP-31,.N1-OP-50A..',;.: ",";.'FSAR AffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:TableXll-8AreaRadiation Monitoring Justification forRemovalof,ARM-13 From-ServiceDescription ofChange:Arearadiation monitor(ARM)number13hasbeenretiredinplaceinRadwastePumpRoomEl.225'..The pumproomwasusedasa"drumming operation", wherebydrumswerefittedandelevatedtoaloadingdockfortransport;,All equipment associated withthatoperation hasbeenremovedaspartofthecleanupeffort.ThisARMhasnotbeenrequiredforservicesince1981whenEl.225'ftheradwastecontamination levelbecametoohighforfurtheruse.Allradwasteoperations wereceasedatthattime.Whenthedecontamination effortwascompleted in1993,anattemptwasmadetoreturnARM13tonormalservice,butitwasdiscovered thatthecablestotheARMwereseveredandthattheARMitselfwaspaintedover.SafetyEvaluation Summary:OnlytwoARMsarecreditedduringorfollowing anaccident; theyaretheControlRoomventandRefuelFloorhighrangemonitors. TheARMslocatedintheReactorBuildingareemployedinexecuting Emergency Operating Procedures tomonitorsecondary containment radiation levels.ThepurposeofARM13istodetecthighratesofexposureduringradwasteoperations (existing orplanned). SincetheRadwastePumpRoom(El.225')isnolongerusedforradwasteoperations andARM13isnotcreditedforanyaccident, thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobability ofanyaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. ,,SafetyEvaluation 'ummaryReport<.-'Page.4 of6895-007Rev.1&2.Safety.Evaluation No.:'Implementation'ocument No.~.:'<<.,Mod.N1-94-003l'"; -.*i:n;~:-0;:,:-;~i:-.;i.e~,,r;--., ~'UFSARAffectedPages:.."=<<'N/A,System:TitleofChange:ReactorVessel(RXVE)CoreShroudRepairInstallation Description ofChange:cgkl4'1.~I~Thissafetyevaluation evaluated theshroudrepairinstallation activities andsupplements SafetyEvaluations 94-080"CoreShroudRepairand96-018--':->-',"Modification tothe.CoreShroudRepairTieRodAssemblies." TheNRCissuedGenericLetter94-03duetoobservedcrackinginthecoreshroudsofseveralboilingwaterreactors. Thisgenericletterrequiredinspection of'theshroudand/orrepair,ifnecessary. Revision0ofthissafetyevaluation evaluated workperformed duringRFO13andRevision1evaluated workperformed duringRFO14.Revision2evaluated theuseofthe25-tonauxiliary hoist.NMPCperformed apreemptive repairoftheshroudduringRFO13.TheNMP1reactorcoreshroudrepairwasdesignedtostructurally replaceshroudweldsH1throughH8.Theinstallation oftheentirerepairinvolvedelectrical discharge machining (EDM)oftheshroudsupportconeandshrouditself,whichgenerated veryfineparticles calledswarf;theattachment ofatrolley/buggy totherefuelbridge;theadditionofanauxiliary bridgeonReactorBuildingEl.340;andotherspecialconsiderations fortheshroudrepair.DuringRFO14,the270azimuthal tierodassemblyinstalled duringRFO13wasremovedandreplacedwithamodifiedsparetierodassembly. Also,thelowerspringcontactagainsttheshroudwasmodifiedtoextendbeyondtheH6Aweldonallfourtierodassemblies. SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theinstallation ofthecoreshroudrepairrequiresthatspecialequipment andprocesses beusedtominimizethein-vessel debrisgeneration andprovideminimalimpactonotherworkbeingperformed onReactorBuildingEl.340.Thedesignandfunctionofthespentfuelpoolcooling(SFP)andthereactorwatercleanupsystemsarenotbeingalteredduringtherepairinstallation. Bothsystemshavebeenevaluated andwillcontinuetoperformasdesignedduringandaftertherepairinstallation. Ig-SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport."'Page5of68;,,;:-;SafetyEvaluation-No.: 'afetyEvaluation Summary:';=.;-95-;007Rev.18c2(cont'd.) ~:~....al(cont'.d.) 'gty~tt+~A~C'hAQQ/Pj.,Eral~&~',"The"SFP:system isdesignedtoremoveparticles assmallas1micron.Theswarfparticles fromtheEDMprocesswhichentertheskimmersfromthetankoverflowwillbealmostentirelyremovedinthefilters.Theremaining particles willbeless:'han1microninsizeandwillnotaffectthefunctionoftheSFPsystem.~~~IaThecleanupsystemisdesignedtomaintainhighreactorwaterpuritybycontinuously purifying aportionoftherecirculation flow.Thedebrissizeexpectedfromtheshroudrepairis1to50micron;therefore, anyparticles thatthecleanupsystemcannotremoveareassumedtobesmallenoughthataparticleofthatsizecouldcurrently beinthesystemandisnotaconcern.Thevolumeofparticles expectedtoremaininthevesselandSFPsystemfollowing therepair,after-filtering; isconsidered insignificant whencomparedtothetotalvolumeofwater-.in thevessel.Theauxiliary bridgeandrefuelbridgebuggywill,notbeusedformovingfuel.'Theauxiliary bridgehasbeenanalyzedandisacceptable foruseoverirradiated fuel.Therefuelbridgebuggywillnotbemovedoverfuelunlessitistiedofftotherefuelbridge.Therequirements ofNUREG-0612 willbemetthroughtheuseofN1-MMP-GEN-914, whichisreferenced intheGeneralElectricshroudrepairprocedures. Thetoolingfor"heavyloads"hasbeendesignedandwillbeusedinaccordance withNUREG-0612. DuringRFO14,theremovalandinstallation ofthe270'ierodmeetstherequirements ofNUREG-0612 byusingliftingdeviceswhichmeetNUREG-0612. Thedoseratesresulting fromtheremovalofthe270'ierodassemblyandtheinstallation ofextension pieceswillhaveminimalradiological impactandtheradiological controlsusedduringtheremovalandinstallation willensurethattherearenoadverseimpactsonthe10CFR20limits.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage6of68SafetyEvaluation No.:..-.I'=95-01'1Rev.13mplementatlon DocumentNo.:;N/A-'~UFSARAffectedPages:System:--,'.1-15, IV-12,IV-32,V-,21';XV-79""-~'~Various-TitleofChange:Operation ofNMP1.Reload 13/Cycle12>Iy~tDescription ofChange:Thischangeconsisted oftheadditionofnewfuelbundlesandtheestablishment ofanewcoreloadingpatternforReload13/Cycle12operation ofNMP1.Two,i"Hundred'(200) newfuelbundlesoftheGE11designwereloaded.All164oftheP8x8RbundlesfromCycle10,and36oftheGE8x8EBbundlesfromCycle11,.weredischarged tothespentfuelpool.Variousevaluations andanalyseswereperformed toestablish appropriate operating limitsforthereloadcore.Thesecycle-specific limitsweredocumented intheCoreOperating LimitsReport.Revision1ofthisSafetyEvaluation incorporated thechangesnecessary totheoperating limitsasaresultoftherevisedGeneralElectricSupplemental ReloadLicensing Report.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thereloadanalysesandevaluations areperformed basedontheGeneralElectricStandardApplication forReactorFuel,NEDE-24011-P-A-10 andNEDE-24011-P-A-10-US(GESTARII).Thisdocumentdescribes thefuellicensing acceptance criteria; thefuelthermal-mechanical, nuclear,andthermal-hydraulic analysesbases;andthesafetyanalysismethodology. ForReload13,theevaluations includedtransients andaccidents likelytolimitoperation becauseofMCPRconsiderations; overpressurization events;loss-of-coolant accident; andstability analysis. Appropriate consideration ofequipment out-of-service wasincluded. Limitsonplantoperation wereestablished toassurethatapplicable fuelandreactorcoolantsystemsafetylimitsarenotexceeded. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatNlVIP1canbesafelyoperatedduringReload13/Cycle12andthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. C'.-~SafetyEvaluation =--.==.-Summary ReportPage'7of68,;,,.;,;..';-: SafetyEvaluation No.:95-012>':-'-=Implementation DocumentNo'.:-=~'--".Procedure N'i-MMP-GEN-904 .;-..":::-.-.::;-;- ""UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:X-'38,XKO,X&2>-N/AReactorServicing PlatformThischangeremovedreferences intheUFSARregarding theuseofthereactorservicing platformfordisassembling/assembling the.steamseparator assemblyfromthecorestructure duringrefueling activities; Thereactorservicing platformwasprovidedbyGeneralElectricCompanytofacilitate refueling. activities duringtheoriginalconstruction oftheplant.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theabilitytoremove/install thesteamseparator withouttheuseofthereactorservicing platformwillnotbeaffected. Notusingtheplatformwillnotcontribute totheinitiation ofanyaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation. SummaryReportPage8of68r~<<<<<<,,SafetyEvaluation No.:-'95-024-:*-'.Implementation Docume'nt No.':"'~Mod::N1~95-003 -;~=,;:~;:<n~.'.-<a;=.".~; ~.'.UFSAB,Affected Pages:g~~System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:SewageTreatment ~<<<<-SewageTreatment SystemPlantr<<PlantDechlorination--

• <<e<<+w<<(,<<<<>~<<<<vvi<<<<<<i~t<<~ggi~<<slg"i,mqygl.P.5g~'jap

'4<<;IThismodification installed newmeteringpumps,flowcontrollers, tanksandmixerstoprovidesodiumsulfitetotheSewageTreatment Planteffluenttodechlorinate ~-.theeffluentandcomplywithSPDESpermitlevelsforchlorine. Thiswasrequiredduetothedecreaseinpermitted effluentchlorinelevelsasdelineated intherevisedSPDESpermitissuedDecember1994.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thedesignandoperation ofthenewequipment associated withtheinjection ofsodiumsulfitetoreducethetotalresidualchlorinelevelinthesewageplanteffluentisinaccordance withapplicable criteria. Themeteringpumpswillbeautomatically controlled bythetotalplanteffluentsignalandcoverthefullrangeofeffluentflowfrom0-120,000 gpd.Thesodiumsulfitesolutionconcentration andcalibrated flowratearedetermined bytheSewageTreatment PlantOperatortoproducethedesiredconcentration intheprocessstream.Thematerialusedtomanufacture thepumps,tubingandtanksisdesignedformildchemicalusage,whichincludeshypochlorite andsodiumsulfiteattheconcentrations usedinthefacility. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. ';-.-'=':~;:Safety Evaluation '".'=,:Summary Report-"-:>.Pigs9of68,,-,-,'"e!-,.:Safety'-Evaluation No.:I';;.','."-'-.::.. Implementation DocumentNo.=-'-:95-101

s'5-:"";-'-

DER-1-95-2151" ~'~<<~-..>;.(.".!'UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:I-'12,IX-22,IX-24,IX-26,10A-61'125'VDCSystemReclassification ofBattery14andBattery.Board14fromNon-Safety Relatedto0-Related forStationBlackoutDescription ofChange:~IIThecontrolroomdcemergency. lightingcircuit12andpagingsysteminverterareloadswhicharerequired.to copewithastationblackoutevent.Althoughtheseloadsarenonsafety related,theirpowersuppliesarerequiredtobequalityrelated(0).Thischangereclassifies Battery14andBatteryBoard14mainbreakers, bus,andfeederbreakerswhichfeedthesetwoloads,as0related.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thereclassification ofBattery14andBatteryBoard14fromnonsafety relatedto0relatedensuresthatthefutureprocurement ofreplacement components orpartsandtheinstallation, maintenance andtestingarecompleted inconformance withdesignrequirements. ThischangealsoassuresBattery14hassufficient capacitytocopewithastationblackouteventinaccordance withapplicable designcriteria. Thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobability, consequences orcreateadifferent typeofaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. -SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport"Page=10of'6895-103...,,,'.SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:.r-.'DER':1.-95-2643.-..: f:":t:>u':C":-,'--.;.-,'UFSARAffectedPages:'".t:.-FigureVill-14.i:.;;;m.-; ..~;;.;p",;..':',.:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:NeutronMonitoring tNMS)~APRMRodBlockCalibration UFSARFigureVill-14previously showed.theTechnical Specification rodblockasahorizontal linebetween100%and120%ofrecirculation coreflow.Thiswasbeinginterpreted torequirethattherodblocksetpointbedemonstrated tobecalibrated towithinthenominaltripsetpoint, asdescribed inSpecification E133,at100%and120%ofrecirculation flow.Inaddition, thehardwarewasnotcapableofproducing ahorizontal line(setpolnt). Thereisapositiveslope;i.e.,thesetpointincreases withincreasing recirculation flow.Becauseof'thisslope,thesetpointat100%flowwaslowerthannecessary, sothatthesetpointat120%flowcouldbesetwithinthetolerance described inthespecification. Hence,thesetpointat100%flowcausedunnecessary rodblocks.ThischangerevisedtheUFSARfiguretoallowforcalibration oftheAPRMrodblocksetpointat107.1%recirculation flow.Thiswasachangetothemethodofcalibration onlyanddidnotrequireahardwarechange.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheAPRMrodblockrespondstoaccidents andtransients and,therefore, bydesigncannotinitiateanaccidentortransient. TheAPRMrodblockisnottakencreditforinanyaccidents ortransients described intheUFSAR.Inaddition, thescramsetpointisnotaffected. TheAPRMrodblockwillstillprovidemargintoensurefueldesignlimitsaresatisfied. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. .SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage11of68:95-106Safety'Evaluation No.:implementation DocumentNo=..",.a>'~.'N/A" =;OFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:FigureIII-1N/ADemolition ofTemporary Structures InsidetheProtected Area,EastoftheUnit2Structures Description ofChange:a:~Thissafetyevaluation addresses thedemolition ofthefollowing buildings'located eastofthe.Unit2plantstructures. tCarpenter's shop2.Paintshop3.ElectricfabshopAllofthesebuildings werebuiltforuseastemporary buildings duringthe.construction ofUnit2.Thesebuildings havebeendemolished andactivities consolidated withintheremaining buildings. SafetyEvaluation Summary:Allofthebuildings tobedemolished arelocatedinanareathatwasnotusedasaflowchannelfortheProbableMaximumPrecipitation analysis. Removalofthesebuildings andtheconsequent reduction intherunoffcoefficient wouldmaketheanalysismoreconservative. Thesebuildings havenoimpactonthepreviously calculated X/Qvalues.Thedesignmarginsforthecontrolroomfreshairintakesarenotcompromised. Locationofdemolition activities areadequately separated fromsafety-related systemsandstructures toprecludeanyadverseimpactfromconstruction activities. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage12ef68-.,-.,SafetyEvaluation No.:.,Implementation DocumentNo.:.95-108wS'>(r~rgA4~Procedure,GAP.-.RPP.-01;:u- .....~~t>'~i:,-'FSAR AffectedPages:-..-';.N/A~~=.-.'ystem: N/A,~"~il;-10CFR19 RequiredTrainingForPersonnel OutsidetheRestricted Area1!'itleofChange:-~Description ofChange:<<ya~<~y~i'lW5~Thissafetyevaluation evaluated thechangeto.Procedure GAP-RPP-01.which nowrequirestrainingbeprovidedforallindividuals who,in.thecourseoftheiremployment, arelikelytoreceiveanoccupational dosein.excessof100mRemperyear.Thischangecomplieswiththerevisedrequirements identified in10CFR19.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedchangeinvolvestrainingforpersonnel intheUnrestricted Areaofthesiteandwillmeettheintentoftherevised10CFR19andsatisfyapplicable portionsofregulatory guidelines. Trainingofpersonnel outsidetheRestricted Areawhoarelikelytoreceiveanoccupational doseof100m/Remwillnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanalreadyanalyzedintheSAR.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. Safety.Evaluation ,SummaryReportPage13of68:96-001Safety:.Evaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:.'-.t'.DER.1-94-0462; .,;.-,<~"... .:~ia"UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Xll-17,XII-18;FigureIIIXN/A'ChangestoRP-Facilities, SectionXIIandSectionIIIDescription ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation evaluated thefollowing changestotheUFSAR:-4~~~1~1.Theinstrument storageroom.isnow;intheadministration buildingnearthemainaccesspoint.=2.Anauxiliary countinglaboratory forportablecount-rate instruments isnowlocatedintheoldinstrument storageroom.3.a.Thecurrentinstrument storageroomisalsousedforanalysisofradiation protection samplesusingcount-rate andgammaspectroscopy instruments. Theauxiliary countingroomisnowbeingusedtohouseapanoramic irradiator forcalibration ofdosimetry devicesandtestingofradiation detection instruments. SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThechangestotheUFSARdescribethecurrentconfiguration ofradiation protection facilities intheTurbineBuilding. Storageofportableradiation protection instruments, calibration ofcount-rate instruments, analysisofradiation protection samples,andlocationofthepanoramic irradiator intheauxiliary countingroomdonotaffectanyequipment malfunctions orprocedural errorsthatinitiateanyoftheaccidents analyzedintheSAR,andthuswouldnotincreasetheirprobability ofoccurrence. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. Safety&valuation ..SummaryReport~Page14of68'afetyEvaluation No;:9&402-PImplementation DocumentNo.:.-'-"-.-- Procedure NIP-FPP-.01~:.. UFSARAffectedPages:--;.i->'-'=-X&6;~10A-13; 10A-%8plQA-'56,:10B-196.'='ystem: Titleof'Change: N/AilFireBrigadeMembership Requirements andRevisionofNlP-FPP-01 Description ofChange:\~Thisevaluation examinedtherequirements forFireBrigademembership-and thestaffwhichmaybequalified formembership intheFireBrigade.Previously, theFireBrigadeleaderandtwooftheFireBrigademembers.wererequiredtobepartofthefireprotection staff.Thischangeallowsplantstaffmemberswhoarequalified inaccordance withtheFireBrigadetrainingprogramtoserveasFireBrigademembersattheleveltowhichtheyareassigned. SafetyEvaluation Summary:NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation hastraditionally staffedtheFireBrigadeatNineMilePointwith"professional" firafighters, basedontheconceptthatpersonnel assignedtotheFireBrigadewerededicated tofireprotection duties.ln1994,thecomposition oftheFireBrigadewasmodifiedtoallowtwooftheFireBrigadememberstobenon-fireprotection staffpersonnel. Partofthephilosophy forthatmodification wasthateachfireattackteamcouldstillhaveonefull-time fireprotection staffmember,a"professional" firefighter, assignedtoleadthefirehoseattackinfiresuppression activities. Astheseteamsconsisting offireprotection andnon-fireprotection staffpersonnel havepracticed asteamsandmaturedasFireBrigademembers,ithasbecomeapparentthatnon-fireprotection personnel canperformfiresuppression activities effectively, givenadequatetrainingandpracticesessions(drills). Basedonthis,theFireBrigademembership requirements arebeingrevisedtoallowanyindividual receiving adequatetrainingandpracticetobeassignedtotheFireBrigade.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. 'SafetyEvaluation Summary.ReportPage'15of68'afetyEvaluation No:-implementation DocumentNo.:96-004'ER.1-'96-'0418. -:"..:,:,". ~'n":.;-.: Ž>")~-=.--,.<. UFSAR'Affected PagesSystem:N/Af74)8"~~LiquidRadwasteProcessing Systems(Thermex)TitleofChange:Treatment ofSanitaryWastebyRadwasteSystems*Description ofChange:Aftercompleting acitywateroutageforroutinemaintenance, waterwasdiscovered comingoutofthetopofthesewagelinelocatedonTurbineBuildingEl.250betweenthecablespreading roomandtheremoteshutdownpanel.Furtherinspection revealedthepipehaddeveloped acrackapproximately threefeetinlengthanduptothreeincheswideonthetopofthepipe.Duetotheinitialsurgeofwaterandcontinued waterusage(becauseoffixturevalvesnotclosing), thesanitarywasteleakedfromthepipeontothefloor.Thesanitarywaste/water mixtureenteredplantfloordrainsandwaspumpedfromtheturbinebuildingsumpsintotheutilitycollector tankintheradwastefacilitywhereradwasteoperators wereabletopreventitfromprocessing throughtheThermex'ystem.Thissafetyevaluation evaluated treatment ofthesanitarywastewhichenteredtheplantwithexistingradwasteequipment. SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thewater/sewage mixtureiscontained intheutilitycollector tank.Thetreatment schemewillbetoraisethepHofthetank'scontentsforthepurposeofdissolving theorganicandinorganic matterandforkillinganybiological organisms whichmaybegrowinginthetank.Thesolutionwillbemaintained atapHofapproximately 10-10.5.Thesolution's pHwillthenbeadjusteddownwardtoeliminate depletion ofradwasteresin.Anysolidswhichdonotdissolvewillberemovedbyfiltration. Solublematerialwillberemovedbyacombination offiltration bycharcoal, reverseosmosismembranes, andbydemineralization. Ultraviolet lightsareavailable andcanbeusedifnecessary tooxidizeorganicmaterialforeasierremoval.Theeffluentwaterwillbeevaluated usingexistingchemistry procedures beforethewaterisreleasedtothecondensate storagetanksforreuse. '--SafetyEvaluation -"Summary" Report"Page16'of68.-.-;-,.- -.,~=-"=- SafetyEvaluation '-SafetyEvaluation No.:::96-004..{cont d.)Summary:=-;.{cont.d.i: ..--'.""-.'i'."i~ -"",~.~~Qnou::-sr~arr,--';.<<=,', 'The'resulting wastewillbeinaformwhichwillallowfordisposalinaccordance-; withcurrentlicensebasisdocuments. ,<<rg<<iBasedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. IR>>~>><<$<<I<<~~'>>>>C>>~[~~ I'SafetyEvaluation Summary'Report Page17of68,~"..".;=.:"96-005 z...,--Safety EvaluatIon No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:;Procedut'e 'N1-STP.-56 q;~.....-..:>; -:='UFSARAffected'Pages:System:TitleofChange:.'N/A~".~Feedwater ~-Procedure N1-STP-56, Feedwater {Rhf)HeaterLeakTest-Descrlptlon ofChange:Tracertechnology hasbeenusedtocalibrate feedwater.flow venturisandtoconductsteampurityevaluations. Dueto.theradiological concernsassociated withtheuseoftheradioactive tracer,sodium-24, potassium nitrate(KNO,)wasselectedforuseatNMP1inordertoquantifythefeedwater heatexchanger tubeleaks;Potassium nitrateisaneutralsaltwhichissolubleinwaterandcompletely dissociates. Theuseofthisnonradioactive tracerprovidedthenecessary levelofdetection withouttheradiological challenges ofaradioactive tracer.Procedure N1-STP-56 determined theFWheaterswhichhadtubeleaks.Thetestalsowasabletoestimatethesizeofleaks.Thelocationandamountoftheleakwasneededtodetermine thebesteconomical solutiontotheproblem.Theinjection pointwasthroughsamplevalvesdownstream ofFWboosterpumps.Thesamplepointsaredownstream ofthesamplesystemheatexchangers. Coolingwaterwassuppliedfromservicewater,andmixingwaterwassuppliedfromdemineralized water.Thewastecoolingwaterandsamplewaterwasreleasedtothefloordrains.Theequipment requireda5gpmcoolingwaterflowrate.Thepowerrequirements weresuppliedby240VACweldingoutletforthevendor-supplied injection equipment and110VACforthevendor-supplied controlequipment. SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theplantwillnotbesignificantly affectedbythistestandthemarginofsafetyisunchanged. .SafetyEvaluation -.:Summary ReportPage=18of68,'.".,;..':;.'..-Safety Evaluation No.:-86-'.005 (cont'd.):."Fi:.ai'~ '~.,-.',...";SafetyEvaluation Summary!', ':=ll'r<~>"(cont-'4-) '.',~~n-.'.nua=~.n".lzr.-:-;ia~r.'i<..-.:. ~~Potassium nitrateisreadilyavailable Qrlthextremely lowchemicalcontamlnants.:-' Thlsmateriallsidealfortracerquantification sinceitisnonvolatile andformsno-harmfulby-products Inanuclearenvironment.~ Thistypeoftesthasbeendone.--successfully atotherboilingwaterreactorplants..~'Theinjection andsamplingequipment willbeattachedtononsafety-related sampleanddrainconnections. Ifanyproblemsoccur,theequipment canbeisolatedfromtheplantsystems.Theflowofcoolingwaterfromservicewatermaybe..:..::...approximately 5gpmandradwasteisabletoreceiveandprocessthiswater.Thereisnosignificant increased=risk totheplantsystemsfrominstallation ofthe-.:testequipment ortothefuelfrominjection ofthetracerchemical. Theabilityof:.-theplanttoshutdown,andremainshutdown,willnotbe'impacted byinjection ofthechemicaltracer.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport'age19of68Mod.N1-.95-006;;e~ ~~:=-..Safety,Evaluation No.:,.l.",';,;"; '96-007implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:~'..',N/A-:"."..;.:-', -=,".::---;. "-Ii.-~-~a<::~: ~::.~a~System:SpentFuelPoolSpentFuelStorageRack-8202-11tDescription ofChange:I~~'Thisdesignchangerelocated thecontrolrodblade(CRB)holderstothecaskdropprotection system(CDPS);removedtheworktable(WP1),1000-lb.testweight,.andseismicrestraints infrontofthespentfuelgates;installed the198-cellspent.fuelrack,8202-11,asafreestanding. structure inthislocation; andinstalled theHoltecoverheadplatform(HOP)ontopofthesouthwest cornerspentfuelrack.Engineering workscope includedtheseismicqualification oftherackasafreestanding uncoupled structure, evaluation oflocalized nucleate. boilingwithintherackandcalculation ofmaximumcladdingtemperature, andcalculation foralltheriggingrequiredtoensurecompliance withNUREG-0612. SafetyEvaluation Summary:InordertoremovetheworkplatformWP1,theCRBholderscurrently boltedt'othetableneedtoberelocated totheCDPStemporarily andasrequiredtosupportfuturebladeexchanges. TheCRBholdershavebeenevaluated inCalculation No.S10RX340SPRIG23 asfreestanding structures intheCDPS,eitherloadedorunloadedwithcontrolblades.Theanalysiscompleted inaccordance withtheapplicable criteriaconcludes thatnodamagewilloccurtothespentfuelpoolorCDPSduetoaseismiceventorotherabnormaltransient. NodamagetofuelorfuelrackswilloccurastheCDPSisisolatedfromtheremainder ofthespentfuelpool.TheCRBholdersintheCDPSwillbeusedasrequiredtosupportcontrolbladeexchanges toandfromthereactorandtoandfromthesinglebladeholdersonthespentfuelpoolcurb.ThedurationthatcontrolbladeswillactuallybestoredintheCRBholdersintheCDPSissmall,andtheconsequences ofatransient oraccidentinvolving controlbladesisinsignificant. Calculation No.S10RX340SPRIG23 demonstrates thattheCRBholderswillnotoverturnduringaseismiceventandnodamagetotheCDPScanoccur.Theworktable,restraints andtestweightwillbepressurewashedduringremovalfromthepooltominimizecontamination andexposure. Theequipment willbe SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport'Page20of68w-liIf\ifpj'LM~'li~i'96-007(cont'd.) +v<ZeDAWpiwisgttP6wi3fi%3ifi~1...:-.:,-.SafetyEvaloaSon No.:\a1Safety-Evaluation Summary':-~-""'-"'-=---'-'-'<(corit'd )placedinthedesignated laydownareaandwrapped'atthedirection ofRadiation=.".: Protection. Theaccidents relevanttoaspentfuelrackandthespentfuelpoolinclude'a fuelbundle.drop,anInadvertent criticality, andalossofspentfuelpoolcooling.Heavyloadswillnotbehandledoverspentfuelwiththeexception oftheHOP.TheHOPwillbeinstalled utilizing the125-toncrane.Inaddition, allheavyloads.'illbehandledinaccordance withNUREG-0612 andapplicable NMPCprocedures. Assuch,aheavyloaddropishighlyimprobable, anddoesnotincreasetheprobability ofanaccidentevaluateddn'the-UFSAR. Thespentfuel poolactivities;., requiredtoinstall.'the~198-cell spentfuelrackandHOPincludetherelocation oftheCRBholders,theremovalof.theexisting'work table;seismic'restraints and1000-lb.testweight,andassociated preoperational testingrequirements forthe'rack.Noneoftheseactivities areinitiators oftheaccidents described intheUFSAR.Whilespentfuelwillberelocated priortoandaftertheinstallation ofthisdesignchange,thiswillbecompleted inaccordance withtheapplicable fuelhandlingprocedures andhasbeenpreviously evaluated. Thedesigncodes,calculations, materials, installation procedures andpost-installation testingassurethattheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentassociated withthespentfuelandspentfuelpoolwillnotbeincreased. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport,Page21of68.SafetyEvaluation No.:.Implementation DocumentNo'..".96-.008'.i-: DDC~1E00045:.;.";",q.'""<.<<,:Q:~.<".:~",~;UFSARAffectedPages:~;,:III-16'-:" -'."=:,>a;..~;~:~'~ z';-.."'~.i.'ystem: RadwasteBuildingHeating8cVentilation (HVW)TitleofChange:Description ofChange:WasteBuildingControlRoomAlarmThischangeretiredinplacetheRadwasteBuildinghighradiation alarm.Thecontinuous airmonitoring systemwarnspersonnel occupying orenteringtheRadwasteBuildingofsignificant airbornecontamination levels,andahighradiation signalstillalarmsinthemaincontrolroom.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedchangeremovesonlytherequirement fortheRadwasteBuildingventilation radiation alarminthewastecontrolroom.Theabilitytodetecthighradiation levelsisprovidedinthemaincontrolroomandvialocalalarms.Deletingthealarmcannotincreasetheprobability. ofanaccidentbecauseitsfunctionisalarmonly.Itdoesnotprovideatrip,nordoesitcontrolothercomponents, i.e.,valves,pumps,etc.Itisnotdiscussed intheSARaspartofanytransient oraccidentanalysis. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluatlon-Summary.Report".Page22of68'='lll~~~>>4(Va>>->aj'<<AI.>> ...SafetyEvaluation No.:96-0.'IO"~a'mplementation DocumentNo;:",'<9.Procedure NEP-POL&1:.-.-'.-'G ri-"-.'4.-name! qm..UFSAR.Affected Pages;"'ystem:TitleofChange:Figul'e"Xlll-3 N/ARestructuring ofUnit1Engineering inAccordance withRevisedProcedure NEP-POL-01 RkoI~~-[g>>>>~>>Description ofChange:~I~l~>>,~a~=J(~~f."~Procedure NEP-POL-01, "NuclearEngineering Department Organization," hasbeenrevised-to reflectorganizational changesinUnit.1Engineering. TheUnit.1Plant.Evaluation group,consisting ofasupervisor andoneengineer, hasbeenmergedwiththeUnit1ProjectManagement group.TheSupervisor -PlantEvaluation positionhasbeeneliminated. Bothindividuals inthePlantEvaluation groupnowreporttotheUnit1Supervisor -ProjectManagement. SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theseprocedure changesestablish departmental responsibilities andlinesof.authority, responsibility, andcommunication withintheNuclearSBU.Theproposedorganizational structure satisfies thecriteriaofSRP13.1.1.Theproposedchangesdonotimpactaccidentormalfunction initiation orconsequences. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport---.Page23of68.96-011.;-SafetyEvaluation No.:E~,(h1Implementation DocumentNo.:,.:.,DER:,1-94-1980';, i,:--.,-.;.;.;.:r: ",-..:,,;-, VFSARAffectedPages:~System:TitleofChange:N/A-"-<'"<.ControlRoomAirTreatment, ReactorBuildingEmergency Ventilation RevisiontotheBasesforTechnical Specification 3.44/4.44and3.4.5/4.4.5 Description ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation evaluated updatingthecharcoalsamplingtechnique currently described intheTechnical Specification BasesforTechnical Specification 3.4.4/4.4.4, Emergency Ventilation System,and.Technical Specification 3.4.5/44.5,ControlRoomAirTreatment System.Thecollection methodpreviously described intheseTechnical Specification. baseswasnotpossibleonthecontrolroomairtreatment system,andwasnotpractical fortheReactorBuildingemergency ventilation system.ThechangetotheTechnical Specification Basesallowsforperformance ofalternate charcoalsamplingtechniques. SafetyEvaluation Summary:Changingthecollection technique toalternate methodsendorsedbyANSI/ASME N510-1980 iswithinthelicensing basisofthesystem.Theproposedalternative techniques samplethecharcoalbedswithminimaldisturbance ofthefiltermedia.Thisresultsinsampleswhicharerepresentative ofthecondition ofthecharcoalbeds,thusensuringthatthetestresultsaccurately reflecttheabilityofthefiltertrainstoremovethepotential releaseofparticulates fromtheairstream.Thisprovidesanaccuratecheckoftheefficiency ofthecharcoalfilters.Whentheefficiencies ofthefiltertrainsaremaintained asspecified, theresulting doseswillbelessthanthe10CFR100guidelines fortheaccidents analyzed. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation ..SummaryReportPage24of-68.;SafetyEvaluation No.:96-012-Rev;051'$~NT'Implementation DocumentNo.'-"""-""-Procedure Nl-TTP~"""""-"ao"-'. '>"-'-::.-',=':.UFSARAffectedPages:"-:XI-9'r~ s<'-.=.="i-s~~~System:Circulating WaterSystem,Condenser Offgas,Condensate/Feedwater TitleofChange:SulfurHexafluoride (SFo)Injection toDetectCondenser TubeLeaks*+R~IDescription ofChange:.=I~4Thissafetyevaluation evaluated injection ofsulfurhexafluoride gas(SF,)and-heliumintothecirculating waterandturbinebuildingservicewatertolocatecondenser tubeleaksoroffgasventcoolerleaks.Itwasalsodispersed inthevicinityofthemaincondenser todetectairin-leakage. SafetyEvaluation Summary:Sulfurhexafluoride, fluorideandheliumdonothaveconcentration limitsforthereactorcoolantsincethesechemicals arenotnormallyexpectedandpresentindetectable concentrations. Noadverseconsequences areexpectedfromtheconcentrations calculated inS1.1-74-F002. Thiscalculation assumesamaximumusageofSF,of250SCFandapostulated tubeleakofupto5gpm.Heliumuseupto250SCFispermitted. Shouldadditional SF6orheliumberequired, engineering shallbecontacted toevaluateitsuse,Reactorwatersulfateconcentration actionlevel1is5ppb.Bycalculation theexpectedincreaseinsulfatesduetodissolution ofSF6willbelessthan5ppb.Inaddition, sulfateswillberemovedbythereactorwatercleanupsystem.Feedwater andreactorwaterconductivity shouldbeunaffected bytheuseofSF6orheliumandcanbemonitored duringthistest.Technical Specification limitsforchlorides andconductivity shallstillbemonitored andadheredto.Conformance toNDD-CHEguidelines assuresthatintergranular stresscorrosion cracking(IGSCC)isnotincreased bythistest.Sulfurhexafluoride andhelium,attheconcentration

expected, haveanegligible impactontheproduction, moderation orabsorption ofneutrons.

Reactivity willbeunaffected bythepresenceofthesechemicals. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation

• SummaryReport-..

-...Page25of68-':-,SafetyEvaluation No;:.'96-013:Implementation Docuinent No.'.:""~ ','.DDC1F00109.t;.'='-;:". UFSAR'Affected Pages:System:FigureX-8SpentFuelPoolTitleofChange:Description ofChange:ReplaceBV-54-70, 3"Chapman-Crane GateValvewith3"Worcester ControlsBallValve~I"ThevalvestemnutfailedonsuctionvalveBV-54-70forthespentfuelpoolfilter"precoattank.Thefailurewasassumedtobecausedbyresinsbeingpackedbetweenthevalveseats.Whenthevalvedidnotcloseproperly, thehandlemayhavebeenover-tightened causingthestemnuttofail.IThischangereplacedthe3-inch,150-pound flangedChapman-Crane aluminumgatevalvewitha3-inch,150-pound flangedWorcester Controlsstainless steelballvalve.Thisreplacement valveboltedintothesystemwithoutanypipingorsupportchanges.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thefunctionandoperating characteristics ofthesystemareunchanged. Thegatevalveandballvalvesarefullyportedandtheflowcharacteristics areunchanged. Theballvalveincreases theweightatthislocationto43pounds,whichisaninsignificant changeforthedesignofthepiping.Theballvalvemeetsorexceedsthedesignrequirements ofthespentfuelpoolsystem.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation

'SummaryReport.Page'26of'68.SafetyEvaluation:No:: -,-.,l96-01:4-'~Implementation:Document No.30l'OORDesfgn Change.N1-.9M)30;(< riolgp;ri~;;,- 'q:...UFSARAffected'Pages: -'-"B.i:IV-17;SIV-18, IV-23,IVe24<iVll.-.22;. Vil-23;;- ~.-'.-',--."F'."VII~,XV-46,XV-47,XV-82;FiguresIV-4,IV~System:ControlRodDrive14~t,~tTitleofChange:UseofModifiedBWR-6OriginalEquipment ControlBladesatNMP1;lDescription ofChange:1~~4rThissafetyevaluation evaluated theuseofmodifiedGeneralElectricBWR-6~OriginalEquipment controlblades(M6CB)asstandardreplacement controlbladesatNMP1.Thesecontrolbladesweremodifiedbyreplacing theexistingrollerswithrollersofcorrectdiameterforuseintheBWR-2latticeatNMP1.Thismodification wasperformed'by GeneralElectric. BrownsFerryNuclearPlant(GEBWR-4),witha"D"latticewatergapdimension equaltoNMP1,hasoperated20M6CBsincontrolcellcorelocations sinceJune1993.Thissafetyevaluation alsoevaluated changingtheNMP1UFSARmaximumcontrolroddropvelocityfrom5ft/secto3.11ft/secconsistent withTechnical Specification Basis3.1.1.b.3. SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheM6CBnominalsheaththickness, absorbertubeoutsidediameter, rollerdimensions, andwingthickness areequivalent tothosedimensions usedintheDuralife230controlblade.TheDuralife230controlbladewasevaluated toensurethatitcouldbeinsertedduringnormal,abnormal, emergency andfaultedmodesofoperation withinthelimitsassumedintheplantanalyses. Theanalysesconsidered theeffectsofmanufacturing tolerances, swellingandirradiation growthandincludesthetime-dependent effectsofcorrosion. TheDuralife230controlbladewasapprovedforuseinaBWR-2bytheNRCandseveralarecurrently inuseatNMP1.Additionally, theweightoftheM6CBisequivalent totheBWR-2OriginalEquipment controlbladedesign.Therefore, themechanical performance oftheM6CBwillnotdifferfromcontrolbladescurrently usedatNMP1.TheM6CBcontrolbladeshaveapproximately thesamehotandcoldreactivity worthastheBWR-2OriginalEquipment controlblade(matchedworth).Therefore, theM6CBhasthesamenuclearperformance properties asbladescurrently installed inNMP1. .SafetyEvaluation

SummaryReport.Page27of68SafetyEvaluation No.::96-014(cont'd.)

SafetyEvaluation Summary:-":"'.-l:(cont'd;:) '.=.-".<':-"~"...'" ".:-"'.-', 'i:-"::-v': "-:.Basedon'theevaluation performed, it'iswoncluded thatthesechangesdonot.:,involveanunreviewed safetyquestion. -".-SafetyEvaluation .;.Summary Report"Page28of;68='=-Safety.Evaluation No.:~~I"Implementation Document', No.:~+p<~a~\ytr<e'i+a+'->a>t'g~:>>96-015~>4r'5ge"~,':.Procedure EPMP;EPP;,02~;3 no:qi.;.:.~..=:- -.-",-'r UFSARAffectedPages:,:: .:~,>..10A-1?.,':.-,-,:-:pq,-0,'=;~-..:-.'= -.-,>>yi,;~System:TitleofChange:N/ADescription ofFireBrigadeEquipment LocationinUnit1FSAR-~".-Description ofChange:Appendix10A(FireHazardsAnalysis) oftheUnit1UFSARlistedareaswithintheplantwherefirefighting equipment isstored.Specifically, theUFSARidentified locations intheTurbine,Reactor,Offgas,andAdministration Buildings, aswellastheUnit1Maintenance Shop,asstoragelocations forfirefighting equipment. Thischangeremovedreference tothesespecificlocations fromtheUFSAR,.thus allowingtheFireBrigademoreflexibility inchoosingthebeststoragelocationforfirefighting equipment. SafetyEvaluation Summary:lnaccordance withindustrycodes,standards, andguidelines, references to.specificplantlocations regarding storageoffirefighting equipment hasbeen'emovedfromtheUnit1UFSAR.Appendix10AoftheUFSARprovidesspecificequipment locations indetailfarexceeding theindustrynorm.Equipment inventory andlocations areadministratively controlled viaapprovedNMPCProcedure EPMP-EPP-02, "Emergency Equipment Inventories andChecklists." ThechangeprovidestheFireBrigadewithmoreflexibility inchoosingthebeststoragelocationforfirefighting equipment basedonimprovedfirefighting technology, trainingandsite-rundrills,andsite-specific knowledge. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation -SummaryReport..Page29of-68,.SafetyEvaluation No.:~:;-Implementation DocumentNo;-.~96.-016/~NFPA16,DER.1-95;2856, '-UFSARAffectedPages:~10A-51,10A-52,10B-78System:Foam-Water TitleofChange:Clarification ofFoam-Water FireSuppression SystemArrangement Description ofChange:Thefoam-water systematNMP1providesprotection around,theturbinegenerator intheeventofanoilfire.Sixfoam-water delugespraysystemsexistasfollows:fourprotecttheTurbineBuildingEl.300areaaroundtheturbine,andoneeachintheturbineoilreservoir andhydrogensealoilrooms.Thewaterportionofthefourturbineareasystemsisautomatically initiated bycross-zoned thermaldetection. Actuation oftheseopenheaddelugesystemsprovidesWATERONLYtothecoveredareas.Whiledetectoractuation opensthesupplymotor-operated valve(foamandwater)totheselines,thefoampumpmustbemanuallystartedinordertogetfoamconcentrate injection. Thismodeofoperation isincompliance withNationalFireProtection Association Code16(NFPA'16),"Installation ofDelugeFoam-Water Sprinkler andFoam-Water SpraySystem,"andisperthe.originalsystemdesign.Discrepancies existedbetweenthesystemdescription sectionsoftheUnit1UFSARandNRCSafetyEvaluation Report(SER)regarding automatic vs.manualstartingofthefoaminjection pumps.Thesediscrepancies wereminorinnatureanddidnotaffecttheFireProtection ProgramatNMP1.TheNMP1UFSARhasbeenrevisedtoindicatethefoaminjection pumpscanonlybestartedmanually, andtheNRCSERdiscrepancies havebeenidentified anddiscussed. SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheproposedchangesclarifyandupdatetheUFSARandreconcile theUFSARandNRCSER.Thechangesarestrictlyeditorial innatureandreflectwhathasalwaysbeenthedesignbasisforthefoam-water system.Thisclarification andreconciliation havenophysicaleffectonanyplantstructure, systemorcomponent, oranydesignbasisoraccident. Thisupdatewillclarifythemethodandmodeofoperation oftheNMP1foam-water systemasdescribed intheFireHazardAnalysisandSafeShutdownAnalysis. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation Nummary.ReportPage30of68...-Safety Evaluation No.

-'Implementation DocumentNo.:-"~<"9&4170~l'"GER"1-96-0738o<"'">r

<."-"-'-':"-'-'r '>""'"-'-"-UFSARAffectedPagesSystem:TitleofChange:ScreenWashClosureofStandbyScreenWashPump~IntertieValvesDescription ofChange:~,II41iwI\%PiTheconfiguration oftheheader'intertie valvesforthestandbyscreenwashpumpwaschangedfromopentoclosed.Thepositionchangewasreqvested toreduce-backflowthroughpump13andavoid.simvltaneous feedofthevpperandlowerscreenwashheaders'in theeventpump13initiated. Screenwashpump13isastandbypumpusedasabackuptoeitherpump'11or12.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Sincetheintertievalvesaremanual,isolation ofupstreameqvipment canbeobtainedasnecessary byclosingthevalves.Withthevalvesnormallyclosed,backflowthrovghpump13isprevented, assuringfullflowtothescreensfrompump11and12andreducingthepotential fordamagetopump13.Closingbothintertievalveswillrequiremanualactiontoopeneithertheupperheadervalveorthelowerheadervalvebeforeputtingthepumpinservice.Thisispreferable torunningwiththevalvesopensince:1)runningwiththevalvesopencausesrecirculation offlowfrompump11or12,resulting inlessflowtothescreensandpotential damagetoseals;and2)thedevelopment ofdifferential pressureacrossthescreenisnotexpectedtooccurrapidly(byengineering judgmentandoperating experience), allowingsufficient timeforoperatoraction.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. -SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport-Page31of68~,.',,;..-SafetyEvaluatiori No'.:"'Implementation DocumentNo.:""96-'018 Rev.0&1'iMod.:N1-94-003 '=UFSAR:Affecte'd'Pagesr System:TitleofChange:-,'~'IV-29, XVI-12,XVI-14;TableXVI-9a..~ggg~ReactorVesselModification totheCoreShroudRepairTieRodAssemblies ".Description ofChange:~=4Theas-builtconfiguration ofthelowerspringcontactoneachofthefourcoreshroudrepairstabilizers (tierods)didnotencompass shroudweldH6Aaswasintendedbytheoriginalshroudrepairdesign.ThischangemodifiedthelowerspringcontacttoextendbeyondtheH6Aweld.Thismodification restoredthecontacttoitsintendeddesigncondition. Also,thelowerspringofthe270'zimuth stabilizer wasbearingontheblendradiusofarecirculation nozzle.Anadditional changereplacedthe270'ierodandspringassemblywithouthavingaspringontheoppositesideofthetierod.Thismodification relocated thespringtobearonthereactorpressurevesselasintended. DuringRFO14,clearance wasfoundbetweenthetoggleboltsandtheshroudsupportconethatcouldaffecttheaxialtightness ofthestabilizer assemblies.'he clearance betweenthetoggleboltsandtheshroudsupportconewasremoved,restoring thestabilizer assemblies totheiroriginally intendeddesign.Thelowerwedgelatcheshadthepotential tobecomeloadedduetodifferential verticaldisplacement greaterthanintendedbytheoriginaldesignofthelatches.Newmodifiedlatcheswereinstalled whicharemoretolerantofdifferential verticaldisplacement. SafetyEvaluation Summary:GESafetyEvaluation GE-NE-B13-01739-5 andNMPCSafetyEvaluation 94-080evaluated thedesign,fabrication andconstruction ofthecoreshroudstabilizers atNMP1,Theevaluation oftheshroudmodification hardwareincludeddesign,code,materials, fabrication, structural, systems,installation andinspection considerations. Theevaluation concluded thattheproposedmodification isinaccordance withtheBoilingWaterReactorVessel&Internals Project(BWRVIP)CoreShroudRepairDesignCriteria. TheshroudrepairdesignanalyseswerealsoreviewedandapprovedbytheNRCasdocumented intheCommission's safetyevaluation report(SER)datedMarch31,1995;however,theNRCSERrequired ...>iSafetyEvaluation -.-.,'='-Summary.Report=,.::::Page 32'of68j...>'"Safety=Evaluation No.:'."~-r~J96-..018Rev.""..-"Safety EvatuatIon Summary:>'-::"'-'E.-" '(cont'd:) =-'0h1(cont'd.), -'.Ii1~c>>'L'sP>4<8~i(t%.~Oe+~$1%4VJPf40>>I'$~<'"'thatcorrectly" actionsbeimplemented toaddressthelackofcoverageofweld==:,.H6A.TheNRCprovidedNMPCwithaSERonMarch3,1997,whichapproved'themodifications tocaptureweldH6Aandtoremovethe'lower wedgefromthe-recirculation nozzle.TheNMP1repairmodification ofthecoreshroudwasperformed asanalternative toASMESectionXlaspermitted by10CFR50.55a(a)(3). Consequently, NRCapprovalofthisrepairapproachwasrequired. TheBWRVIPReport(EPRI.;TR-105692, BWRVIP-04), entitledGuideforFormatandContentofCoreShroud~-'epairDesignSubmittals," requiresthatasafetyevaluation-of coreshroudrepairs.'bemadeandthattheconclusions beprovidedtotheNRC:.Thissafetyevaluation documents. theNMPCreviewoftherepairinaccordance with.theprovisions of10CFR50.59. Theevaluation includedareviewoftheplantlicensing'bases.'- Theevaluation demonstrates thattheproposedmodifications canbeimplemented 1)withoutanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction previously evaluated, 2)withoutcreatingthepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofanewordifferent kindfromanypreviously evaluated, and3)withoutreducingthemarginofsafety.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation Summary-Report Page33of68,-Safety-Evaluation No.:c.*k>.~'Implementation Document~IdgUFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:96-'039No.:,"..~.':Site~Emergency.Plan.o;.".& ~9r.""~".:e.".~r;"->>,:;~'ry$A~p'Xlll-13PEmergency Operations Facility(EOF)Emergency Operations Facility(EOF)MoveFromtheNuclearLearningCenterat9MilePointtotheExistingEOFonRoute176inFulton,NewYorkDescription ofChange:TheEOFisasupportfacilityforthemanagement ofoveralllicenseeemergency

response, coordination ofradiological andenvironmental assessments, anddetermination ofrecommended publicprotective actions.TheEOFisequippedwithadministrative, communication, andcomputerequipment thatmeettherequirements oflicensebasisdocuments including NUREG-0696, SiteEmergency Plan(SEP),Unit1UFSAR,Unit2USAR,andTechnical Specifications.

TheEOFhasbeenrelocated fromtheNuclearLearningCenter(NLC)toanewfacilitylocatedonRoute176bytheOswegoCountyAirportinFulton,NewYork,approximately 11milesfromNineMilePoint.ThenewlocationisalsousedastheNewYorkPowerAuthority EOF.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Relocation oftheEOFwillsatisfytheNRCrecommendation thattheEOFbelocatedoutsidethe10MileEmergency PlanningZone(EPZ).Thiswillalsoeliminate theneedforNMPCtomaintainanAlternate EOFoutsidethe10MileEPZ.TheEOFlocatedattheNLCdoesnotprovideplantcontrolfunctions andisnotconnected toanysystemusedtomitigateanaccident. TheEOFoperatesinaccordance withdesignconfiguration andsiteprocedures tocomplywithNUREG-0696,SEP,Unit1UFSARandUnit2USAR.ChangestotheSEPandUnit1UFSAR,asaresultofrelocating theEOF,willnotaffectanyplantsystemusedtomitigateanaccidentoranysystemassociated withaccidents previously analyzed. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation ~SummaryReport'Page34of68.'=Safety Evaluation =No.:-96-021i)~0<<)vy-.4Implementation DocumentUFSARAffectedPages:NSystem:TitleofChange:No.:vi:;,~~.'alculations'-S7-RX340-W01,,-,~i: ~,=;~'>>,; .-",.S4RX340BLDG01, S4TB300BLDG01' ~Illl-3,VI-17,XVI-70;TableXVI-31Sh1**~~~t<<N/AUFSARChangesforReactorBuildingandTurbineBuildingPressureReliefPanelFailureLoads.Description ofChange:TheUFSARhasbeenrevisedtoshowthenewblowout:load.of TurbineBuilding(TB)pressurereliefpanelsas62psf,newwallpanelareaof1900sq.ft.,andthefailureloadofsuperstructures asatleast135psf.ThischangealsoshowsthenewblowoutloadofReactorBuilding(RB)pressurereliefpanelsas65psf,newwaltpanelareaof2400sq.ft.,andthefailureloadofsuperstructures asatleast117psf(internal pressure). TheUFSARhasalsobeenrevisedtoindicatetheratioofreliefareatobuildingvolumeas1.6ft'/1000ft'ortheReactorBuildingand0.21ft/1000ft'ortheTurbineBuilding. SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thefailureblowoutpressures (internal pressure) of65psf(RB)and62psf(TB)aresufficiently <117psf(RB)and<135psf(TB)andprovideadequateprotection ofReactorBuilding/Turbine Buildingsuperstructures againstinternalpressure, where117psfand135psfaretheminimuminternalpressures thatshouldreachinsidetheReactorBuildingandTurbineBuildingsuperstructures, respectively, forfailure,asdocumented inCalculations S4RX340BLDG01 andS4TB300BLDG01. Theblowoutpanelshavebeenreturnedtoaconfiguration functionally equivalent totheoriginaldesign,i.e.,3/16"diameterboltsspacedat12"O.C.havetheequivalent strengthof1/4"diameterboltsspacedat24"O.C.,withthesametensilestrength. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. .;.,Safety.Evaluation Summary.Report='"-Page35of6896-023.Safety'Evaluation No.:~I-;.;.'mplementation DocumentNo.::"-".-"'~~'"DER.1.-.95-3438 ='-""-.UFSAR.-Affected Pages:"".-=X-24iie'JpA.>'wme"ry,,it~System:ServiceWater(SW)TitleofChange:ServiceWaterStrainers MeshSizeDiscrepancy .Description ofChange:The.UFSARpreviously statedthateachSWpumpwasprovidedwitha.010-inch, ..meshautomatic self-cleaning strainer. Althoughtheinitialmeshsizechosenforthesestrainers was.01inch,.due tofrequentclogging'of thestrainers,"the meshsizewaschangedto.03inch;Thischangeprovidesclarification intheUFSARoftheSWstrainermeshsizetoconformtotheas-builtcondition ofthestrainer. SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thereisnodefinedindustrycriteriafortheselection ofstrainermeshsizes.Thedecisionregarding thesizeisprimarily basedonpastexperience andengineering judgment. Factorssuchasamountandsizeofparticulate matterinthefluid,flowvelocities inpipingandcomponents, andpropensity ofanyequipment todevelopclogging, normallyformsthebasisforengineering judgmentregarding selection ofthestrainermeshsize.Thepresentinstalled meshsizeof.03inchonthenormalSWpumpstrainers isofappropriate designanddoesnotadversely impactnuclearsafety.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. .'afetyEvaluation

,,Summary Report-,Page36of68=.-SafetyEvaluation No'

,'implementation DocumentNo::4..>>~.PCE.toProcedure.N1-OP-6;:.

r"-:-.,=,Calculation S14-54-HX08 ~p'll]a~'FSARAffectedPages:X-33SpentFuelPoolCooling(SFC)f4+~Ag~System:PTitleofChange:SecuringtheSpentFuelStoragePoolFiltering andCoolingSystemforMaintenance .~Description ofChange:~t:4~-~N~~Thissafetyevaluation evaluated changestoProcedure.N1-OP-06, SpentFuel-'.StoragePoolFiltering andCoolingSystem,toallowsecuringspentfuelcoolingformaintenance, providedSFCtemperatures arealternately monitored andcontrolled below125F,andincorporated adescription ofspectacle flangesdownstream oftheheatexchangers whichallowindependent isolation oftheSFCsubsystems. Therearecommoncomponents inthesystem.Further,theeffluentofeachoftheredundant coolingandfiltering trainsisboundedbyacheckvalveandaspectacle flange.Thesystemmustbesecuredtodocorrective maintenance onacommoncomponent. Thesystemmustalsobesecuredforashortperiodformaintenance oneachredundant traintoallowtimetoreversethespectacle flange,becausetheassociated discharge checkvalvecannotbeconsidered asecureboundaryforpersonnel safety.According totheUFSAR,theSFCsystemmustmaintainthepooltemperature below125'Fandmaintainacceptable waterclarity.Thissafetyevaluation considered poweroperation, notrefueling outages;therefore, reactorcavityandequipment storagepitlevelfunctions areunaffected. SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheSFCsystemmaybesecuredforalimitedtimeformaintenance oncommoncomponents, orcomponents whichrequiresecuringcommoncomponents forpersonnel safety.Duringthisperiod,thepooltemperature willbemonitored sothetemperature ofthepoolwillnotexceedthedesignlimitof125F.Evaporative, radiative, andconductive heatlossesarenotconsidered inCalculation S14-54-HX08. Theseheatlossesarenotexpectedtoactuallycoolthepool;therefore, pooltemperature willremainabove68FandK~forthehigh-densityrackswillremain<0.95.K,inthelow-density racksincreases with ,'-.'.:Safety EvaluatIon .";;SummaryReporti-.-Page'.37'of 68...-':".Safety.Evaluatioii No.:"96-'104(cont'd.) '<<I':-:SafetyEvaluation Summary:"-'=='-:(cont'd.) 'temperature; butis<0.91at125'Fandsomeetsthe<0.95criterion;;;; ',.Evaporative inventory lossesareconsidered negligible; however,thefireandcondensate transfersystemswillbeavailable asmakeupwatersupplieswhilethesystemissecured.Theproposedmaintenance ontheSFCsystemwillhavenobearingonotherequipment important tosafetyand,specifically, willhavenoeffectontheRBEVsystem,whichis'necessary tomitigatetheeffectsofthemostrelevantanalyzedaccident, adroppedfuelbundle.SecuringtheSFCsystemforalimitedperiodcanbeaccomplished whileremaining withinthedesignlimitof125'Fandwillensurethereisnonegative. effectonotherequipment important tosafety.Basedonthe'evaluation performed; itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport-Page38of68...Safety,Evaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:.:.."~-.96-196.~Temporary Mod.96-008,,UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:.N/A.~r~PgMainTurbine,Feedwater Plant-Operation withFeedwater.Pump 13StubShaftUncoupled Description ofChange:1,J~>I~s>,S=~qI'>>~<<y=iG1)>)~~pg~ps~The¹1:3feedwater pumplsmechantcally connected to,anddriven.by,the,main.:-.,turbinegenerator. Themechanical. connection includes-a clutchassembly..comprised ofa.fluidfrictionclutchand,ageared(dental)clutchwhichworkinparallel. Damagewassustained tothedentalclutchandremovalforrepairoftherotatingelementwasrequired. Thistemporary modification installed astubshaftasareplacement partwithintheclutchhousing.Thestubshaftiscoupledtotheturbineattheshearshaftandmaybecoupledtothe¹13feedwater pumpgearsetatalaterdate.SafetyEvaluation Summary:installation ofthestubshaftinlieuoftheclutchrotatingelementisanoriginal'esignfeatureoftheclutchintheeventofmajormechanical failure.Theshaftiscapableoftransmitting 10,000hpat1800rpmfromthemainturbinethroughtheclutchhousingtothe¹13feedwater pumpstep-upgear.Theinputendoftheshaftisequippedwithacouplingflangetomatetotheshearshaftattheturbine.TheoutputendofthestubshaftissuitableformountingtheexistingThomasflexiblehalfcoupling. Thismountingisashrinkfit.Thistypeofmountingassuresthecouplingwillnotdetachfromthestubshaftatratedspeed.TheThomascouplingbetweentheclutchandstep-upgearisremovedtodefeatoperation ofthe¹13feedwater pump.Removalofthecouplingdoesnotposeasafetyhazard,asthehousingcoverwillbeinstalled asdesigned. Thethrustbearingintheclutchensuresstability ofthefreecouplinghub.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. ÃSafetyEvaluation -SummaryReportPage39of68..=,,,SafetyEvaluation No.:97-.'901".'".E~~Implementation DocumentNo.'..'",.'.Simple"Design ChangeSC1-0122-92.,'..-,= UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:.V-5:~8~~~~'AFloorDrains,Equipment DrainsDWEDTLevelInstrument UpgradeThissimpledesignchangeinstalled newlevelsensorsforthedrywellequipment andfloordraintanksthatwillprovideinputtonewprogrammable logiccontrollers (PLC),whichwillcalculate. therateofriseofwaterinthefloordraintanksandperformthealarmfunctionbasedonthatrate.Thissafetyevaluation alsoevaluated thechangesrequiredtotheexistingPLCsinstalled indrywellleakdetection cabinetsA&B.Additional circuitboardswereinstalled toaccommodate thesignalssuppliedbythenewlevelsensorsandtoprovideoutputsignalstotheControlRoomchartrecorders. Softwarechangeswererequiredtosupportthenewhardwareandfunctions. Allchangesweretransparent toControlRoomoperations. SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theexcessive leakagedetection systemprovidestheControlRoomwithanannunciator warningofanincipient reactorcoolantsystem(RCS)failure.Thisisdetermined bythemeasurement ofidentified andunidentified leakageinsidethedrywell.Thisleakageiscollected intankswherelevelchangesareusedtodetermine therateofRCSleakage.Anannunciator isalarmediftherateofleakageexceedslimitssetinTechnical Specification 3.2.5.Asecondary functioniscontrolofthetanksumppumps.Thepresentsystemconsistsofmanyoriginalplantcomponents thatareatorneartheendofusefullife.Themethodofcalculating therateofriseintanklevelwilldifferslightlyfromtheoriginalmethod,butfullconformance withallTechnical Specification requirements isdemonstrated inthissafetyevaluation. Thechangewillhavenoeffectonthesafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport-Page40of68-SafetyEvaluation-No.: .Implementation DocumentUFSARAffectedPages:System:97-.'002;= No.:,"..>~;. !:DER'1=96-2795.'oM c'~..n.aVl-32-'py0'~pt~~C'~jgp%h,~E.~tfl.-es~L9)PI%.ReactorBuildingNormalVentilation TitleofChange:ReactorBuildingNormalVentilation IntakeandExhaustLocalFlowIndication '~-Cr~-IW4"W14Description ofChange:I~*~ThischangeupdatedUFSARSectionVI-F.5.1toindicatethatflowswitchesin:the-supplyandexhaustlinesprovideforlowflowalarmsintheControlRoomforthe.reactorbuildingnormalventilation systemflow.Previously, theUFSARindicated: localflowrateindication wasprovidedinthesupplyandexhaustlines.Neither.thecurrentdesignnortheoriginalcompleted plantdesignprovideforthisflowrateindication. Theflowindication wasremovedduringplantconstruction. Flowrateindication isonlyrequiredfortheemergency ventilation system.Reactorbuildingnormalventilation systemincluding flowindication/alarm isnotsafetyrelated.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Localflowindication wasoriginally discussed intheFSARbecausetheoriginalplantdesignonceincludedlocalflowindication inboththeintakeandexhaustofthereactorbuildingnormalventilation system.Theindication wasremovedbeforeoriginalconstruction wascompleted. Flowindications werealsoaddedtotheemergency ventilation systemsuchthatbothtrainsofthesystemwouldhaveflowmonitoring capability, whilethelocalflowindications forthenormalreactorventilation systemwereremoved.Nojustification ordocumented modification wasfoundfortheremovaloftheflowindications. Thefinalas-builtdesigndidnotincludethemandthereisnoevidencethatlocalflowindication waseveractuallyinstalled intheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage41of68SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:~~"p"~~'h~l~atliglv~'FSARAffectedPages:97-003Procedure NIP-FFD-02,:; .N/A=;:-\~~kP~~System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:4N/A"~ChangetoNIP-FFD-02 WhichExtendsRespirator Physicals toOncePer2Yearsfor.SelectGroupsofPersonnel ThischangerevisedtheUFSARtoreflectthe10CFRPart20changesmadeinFebruary1995regarding respirator qualifications. Itisnowrequiredthatrespirator qualifications includeaphysician's determination priortoinitialfittingofrespirators andperiodically atafrequency determined byaphysician thattheindividual ismedically fittousetherespiratory protection equipment. SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThechangestoNIP-FFD-02 arebasedonthecurrentregulations of10CFRPart20asprescribed bythecompanyphysician. Thesechangesmeetorexceedallcurrentrequirements forrespirator qualification physicalfrequency. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. ,SafetyEvaluation .SummaryReport==Page42-of68.'.-.SafetyEvaluatIon No.:Implementation DocumentNo::-:-"<UFSAR.Affected Pages.97-005=.!NEDE'24011-'P-'A-"I 0'~~"<;>""'~ A4l>~">~:<"-i;" ~NEDE-24011-P.-A-10-US {GESTARII)jRNci59Js~iBjig~4lw4l'4I-10,I-15;IV-7,IV-12,IV-32,V-2'I,'VII-20, XV-3,XV-5,XV-6,XV-7,XV-13,XV-15,-:XV-68,XV-79,XV-82;TableV-1Sh2System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:.Various-Operation ofNMP1Reload14/Cycle13ll~Y~1Thischangeconsisted of1headditionofnewfuelbundlesandtheestablishment ofanewcoreloadingpatternforReload14/Cycle13operation ofNMP1.Onehundredeightyeight(188)newfuelb'undiesoftheGE11designwereloaded.Variousevaluations andanalyseswereperformed toestablish appropriate operating limitsforthereloadcore.Thesecycle-specific limitsweredocumented intheCoreOperating LimitsReport.SafetyEvaluation Summary:rThereloadanalysesandevaluations areperformed basedontheGeneralElectricStandardApplication forReactorFuel,NEDE-24011-P-A-10 andNEDE-24011-P-A-10-US(GESTARII).Thisdocumentdescribes thefuellicensing acceptance criteria; thefuelthermal-mechanical, nuclear,andthermal-hydraulic analysesbases;andthesafetyanalysismethodology. ForReload14,theevaluations includedtransients andaccidents likelytolimitoperation becauseofminimumcriticalpowerratioconsiderations; overpressurization events;loss-of-coolant accident; andstability analysis. Appropriate consideration ofequipment-out-of-servicewasincluded. Limitsonplantoperation wereestablished toassurethatapplicable fuelandreactorcoolantsystemsafetylimitsarenotexceeded. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatNMP1canbesafelyoperatedduringReload14/Cycle13andthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. I~Safety'Evaluation SummaryReportPage43of6897-006.,:.=--SafetyEvaluation No.:I'.Implementation DocumentNo..'.."." '"UFSARAffectedPages:DER1-.'96-2971....:i';"; <....-,~iii.;i~<~XI-11System'."'itle ofChange:'Feedwater Shaft-andMotor-Driven Feedwater PumpCapacities Description ofChange:ThischangeupdatedUFSARSectionXI-B.9.0tochangethestatedcapacityoftheshaft-driven feedwater pumpfrom6,400,000 Ib/hrto5,500,000 Ib/hr;andtochangethestatedcapacityforthemotor-driven pumpsfrom1,900,000 Ib/hrto1,250,000 Ib/hr.Thesevalueswereincorrectly changedinUFSARRev.0.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheproposedchangesmaketheUFSARconsistent withtheas-builtplantfeedwater pumpcapacities. Theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSAR,sincehigh-pressure coolantinjection (HPCI)systemperformance wasbasedontheas-builtcapacities ofthemotor-driven pumps.Theshaft-driven pumpdoesnotperformaHPCIfunction; therefore, thechangetotheshaft-driven pumpratinghasnoimpactonHPCIperformance. Further,HPCIisnotanengineered safeguards systemandisnotconsidered inanyloss-of-coolant accidentanalyses. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SiimmaryReportPage44of68SafetyEvaluation No.:-i'-.~qi'.SImplementation DocumentNo;:97-'007.'"',DER196-3180'=: UFSARA'ffected Pag'esSystem:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:Vll-'7CoreSpray(CSS)%,l~CoreSpraySystemPumpandValveTesting4ThischangeupdatedUFSARSectionVII-A.4.0 todeletethereference totestingoftheCSS'umpandvalveshaftsealsbyapplyingpressuretoalanternringbetweensectionsofpackingandvisuallyobserving leakage.-Testingofthecorespraypumpandvalveshaftsealswasneverperformed inthemannerpreviously described intheUFSAR.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TestingoftheCSSpumpandvalvesealsisgovernedbyTechnical Specification 4.2.6,"ISI/IST," and6.14,"SystemsIntegrity," andtheirrespective implementing programs(SecondTen-YearPressureTestingProgramPlanandLeakageReduction Program). Thesetestingrequirements havebeenreviewedanddetermined .adequatebytheNRC.TheproposedchangetotheUFSARwillresultinamoreaccuratedescription ofactualCSSpumpandvalvetesting.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReyortPage45of68,,-SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:"..." ~97-008DER1-97-0002 .;;"UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:VII-2:ICoreSpray(CSS)CoreSpraySystemDesignPressures... ThischangeupdatedUFSARSectionVll-A.2.1 tocorrecttheCSSequipment andpipingdesignpressures toreflecttheoriginaldesignspecifications andas-builtconstruction ofthesystem.Thedesignpressureof'CSSequipment andpipingbetweenthesuppression chamberandthetoppingpumpshasbeen.changedfrom340psigto310psig.ThedesignpressureofCSSequipment andpipingfromthesuctionofthetoppingpumphasbeenchangedfrom465psigto470psig,andclarified toindicateafterthetoppingpump.TheUFSARhasalsobeenrevisedtoclarifythatthecorespraypumpmotorcoolingcoilsaredesignedto100psig.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheprimaryfunctionoftheCSSisaccidentmitigation. Thesystemisnotidentified intheUFSARasaninitiator toanyoftheaccidents described intheUFSAR.TheproposedchangeswillcorrecttheUFSARCSSequipment anddesignpressures tomakethemconsistent withoriginaldesignspecifications andas-builtconstruction oftheCSS.Therefore, theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation "SummaryReportPage46of68...,.SafetyEvaluation No.:97.-01$q."...'Implementation DocumentNo..'."'" ";.DDC:.IM00336.;p ';..;"~;;;..UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Figure1V-7t~4lControlRodDrive(CRD).FSARUpdateforChangeinCRDinternals .Description ofChange:4Thecontrolroddrivemechanism (CRDM)isusedtorapidlyinsert(scram)thecontrolrodsinresponsetomanual.or-automatic signalsfromthe-reactor protection system(RPS).TheCRDMisalsousedtochangethepositionofthecontrolrods.~withinthecoreinresponsetothereactormanualcontrolsystemforthecontrolofreactivity. TheCRDMsareprovidedbyGeneralElectric, theoriginalequipment manufacturer. Thissafetyevaluation evaluated aredesignoftheinnerfilterandspud;achangeinmaterialtoXG-Mstainless steelfortheconstruction oftheindextubeandpistontubeassemblies; achangeindesignoftheuncoupling rodand0-ringspacer;andanupgradetoamulti-port coolingwaterorifice.Thesechangesweremadetoimprovereliability oftheCRDandminimizeCRDinstallation errors.SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThesechangesweremadetotheCRDbyGeneralElectrictoincorporate plantoperating andmaintenance experience. Thechangesdonotadversely affecttheabilityoftheCRDtoscramthereactorinresponsetosignalsfromtheRPS,nordotheyadversely affecttheabilityoftheCRDstocontrolreactivity. Theresultsofthesechangesincludedincreased CRDreliability andminimized installation errorsafterCRDrefurbishment, suchthatthereiscontinued assurance thattheCRDwillcontinuetobeabletoperformthesedesignfunctions. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage47of68SafetyEvaluadon No.:97-015Implementation Documerit No..6"8!:DER'.1'-'96-1894 "i';:-..-.-~~:.o.;-,.:.prp}mrg~UFSARAffectedPages:"'Vill-38"~Lt'System:TideofChange:RodWorthMinimizer (RWM)RevisiontoUFSARSectionVill,Description ofRWMDescription ofChange:~~t~ThischangerevisedtheUFSARtoagreewiththeas-builtplant;TheUFSAR,indescribing thefunctionofthebypassing ofRWMcontrolabovethereactorpowerlevelcalledthe"lowpowersetpoint," previously statedthatonlyfeedwater flowprovidesthelowpowersetpointtrip,whereasbothfeedwater flowandsteamflowprovideredundant inputstotheRWMasindirectmeasurements ofreactorpower.Ondecreasing power,eitherthesteamflowinputorthefeedwater flowinputwilltriptolowpowersetpointabove20%reactorpowertoenabletheRWM.Onincreasing power,bothsteamflowandfeedwater flowinputsarerequiredtodisabletheRWMabovethelowpowersetpoint. Afterthelowpowersetpointhasbeenexceeded, theRWMdoesnotinhibitrodselection ormovement. SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheRWMsystemsupplements procedural controlstopreventaninadvertent controlroddropaccident. TheproposedchangeonlycorrectstheUFSARdescription oftheinputstotheRWManddoesnotchangethedesignfunctionofthesystem.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation. Summary'Report Page48of68=----SafetyEvaluation No.:97:016'"IImplementation 'Document No;i'~":f-B'DERs'f-96-2933j 1~9'6-2947~ 4-96-.2948,;~.-... 1-96-2949 (j;yt<~v~.>~~UFSARAffectedPages:X-7,X-8,X-'!0,X-11,X-52;FigureX-3System:5TitleofChange:Description ofChange:ControlRodDrive(CRD)CRDSystemUFSARChangesTheUFSARhasbeenrevisedas=-follows: "w4~aI.,SectionX-C.2.1hasbeenrevisedtostate:"Onepumpisratedet85gpmataheadof3,760ft.'itha250HPmotor."Asentence.has beenaddedtoread:"Theotherisratedat87gpmataheadof3,740ft.witha250HPmotor."SectionX-C.2.2hasbeenrevisedtostate:"Thetwoparallelfilterswillremove99percentofforeignmateriallargerthan40micronsfromthehydraulic systemwater."gANlSectionsX-C.2.0andX-C.2.4havebeenrevisedtoindicatethesecond-stagepressureismaintained atapproximately "250-270" psiabovereactorpressure. SectionX-C.2.10hasbeenrevisedtostate:"Thescramdumpvolumehasacapacitytoaccommodate afreevolumeof3.34gal.perdriveuptoanin-leakageofapproximately 0.5gpmperdrive.Asentencehasbeenaddedtostate:"Foranin-leakage ofgreaterthan0.5gpmperdrive,thefreevolumewillfallbelow3.34gallonsperdrive;however,thesystemfunctionwillbemaintained." SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheCRDsystemisnotidentified asaninitiator ofanytransients oraccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR.TheCRDpumpsarenotdesignated asanelementoftheemergency corecoolingsystem(ECCS),eventhoughtheymayaidinmitigation ofsmallhigh-pressure linebreaks.TheproposedchangeswillnotimpactCRDperformance, andwillprovidelicensing basisconsistency withthe Safety,Evaluation =SummaryReportPage49of68..SafetyEvaluation No.:97.-'0'l6'(cont'-d.) "-"~"...;.>, r~-.,SafetyEvaluation,Summary: '-.."'(contd.)'-',;:~:;.'nŽ<:;,-*a-.-, .,-;-~.;.~1as-builtdesign.'Therefore, the'.proposed'changes <do,not~increase the:probability;-

• '.-ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR.~'aBasedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnot-'nvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

a~ Safety.Evaluation.=-: Sumrrlary ReportPage50-of68"~~~;..">.::.'97-'018-'a'fetyEvaluation'No.: Implementation DocumentNo.:.~04~4"+IAlod."N1-97-005':4;.< ..",rli:<c. v>r:".",.i! e;,9'~g.:.:UFSAR'Affected'Pages:.' System:::"."Vl-'2G,"Vl-'25;:Table Vl-3aSh28c3;.;FigureVl-22ShutdownCooling(SDC),Postaccident Sampling(PASS)TitleofChange:AdditionofThermalOverpressure Protection onPenetrations X-7,X-8andX-139Description ofChange:ThischangeaddedarupturedisktoPASSpenetration X-139.Therupturediskdischarges intoanenclosedexpansion chamberlocatedoutsideprimarycontainment. Theexpansion chamberisattachedtoexistingsupportsteelandpipedintothecavitybetweenisolation valves110-127and110-128.Theexpansion chamberisflangedtoaccommodate periodicreplacement oftherupturedisk.Thenewvalvebetweentherupturediskandtheprocesspipingwaslockedopenafterinstallation wascomplete. Overpressure protection oftheSDCpenetrations wasprovidedbyaddingabypasslinewithaflowrestricting orificeandacheckvalve.Thenewlineisusedtoventfluidfromtheisolatedpenetrations totheupstreamsideofinboardisolation valve38-01.TheSDC'atersealtiespenetrations X-7andX-8togetherviathecommonsealpiping.Thisallowstheuseofasinglebypasslooptoaccommodate thermalexpansion inbothpenetrations. Theuseofasinglebypassloopminimizes thelossofsealwaterthroughtheline.Theflowrestricting orificeissizedto:1)passtheflowraterequiredtooffsetthermalexpansion inbothSDCpenetrations, 2)maintaintheintegrity oftheSDCwaterseal,and3)passthelargestexpecteddebristoprecludeplugging. Acheckvalveisinstalled inthebypasslooptomaintaincontainment andreactorcoolantisolation. Thebypassloopisflangedtoallowremovalfordecontamination. SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thismodification providesoverpressure protection forpenetrations X-7,X-8andX-139.Containment andreactorcoolantisolation isstillmaintained fortheSDCbypasslineviaacheckvalve.Thesemodifications insurethatproperthermalreliefisprovidedasrequiredbyGenericLetter96-06.AppendixJandSectionXIrequirements areinstituted intothephysicaldesignofthetwochanges.ThePASSandSDCsystemconfigurations meetorexceedthedesigncriteriafortheexistingsystemsandthereactorcoolantsystem. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage51of68~1PSafetyEvaluation No.:97-018(cont'd.) SafetyEva'luatlon Summary:(cont'd.) j'eBasedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanUnreviewed safetyquestion. ~ .:...Safety Evaluation .SummaryReport'-Page52of68.:.!SafetyEvaluatlbn No.:"t'Implementation Document:l"UFSARAffectedPages::System:-.~97-019Rev.0L1'gg1ic+fj.4v'iNo.:'rocedure S-MMP-GEN-014 "ye>vg~~I~\~q.L~4"1$(,~g"s"N/A~'ZReactorWaterCleanup(RWCU)TitleofChange:...-..-installation ofFreezeSealForIV33-01RorIV33-02R.Description ofChange:Thistemporary changeinstalled freezesealsonsectionsofRWCUpipingtoassistincompletion ofthetestingandrepairofIV33-01RandIV33-02Rinthereactorvesselandreactorrecirculation loop¹11,respectively. Revision1ofthissafetyevaluation clarified thatcarbonsteelpipeisbrittlebelow-40'F.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedactivitywillbeperformed duringRFO14whenthereactorheadisremovedandtheentirereactorcorewillbeoffloadedtothespentfuelpool.,Withthefueloffloadedandtheinnerortheouterspentfuelpoolgateclosed,thefuelissufficiently protected andcannotbeuncovered. Additionally, freezesealshavebeenshowntobeeffective upto10,000psi.Sincethefuelissafeguarded andfreezesealshavebeenprovenreliable, theprobability offueldamageduetoalossofwaterinventory isnotincreased. Secondary Containment willbeavailable andimplemented ifrequiredinaccordance withTechnical Specifications. Althoughcontainment isolation isnotineffectforthiswork,maintenance ofthewaterinventory inthereactorcavity,internals storagepit,andspentfuelpoolisnecessary. Thefreezesealswillperformthevesselisolation functionwhileinstalled. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. -SafetyEvaluation

-'SummaryReport~Page63of68-,97-022-SafetyEvaluation No.:~Implementation DocumentNo.:'..:Mod.N1-97-012

74'UFSARAffectedPages:"Vll-42System:TitleofChange:Feedwater/HPCI RPVOverfillPrevention BackupTimeDelayTripofHPCIPumpsDescription ofChange:Thismodification installed backuptimedelayrelaysinthebreakertrip.circuitry of.thehigh-pressure coolantinjection (HPCI)pumpmotors.ThisprovidesatripoftheHPCIpumpsifreactorpressurevessel(RPV)levelissustained above95inches.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thenew/additional triplogichasadelay,whichissetinaccordance withtheanalysisdocumented inCalculation S22.1-XX-G025NF, topreventRPVoverfill. Thenewtriplogicwillnotbeinterlocked withtheflowcontrolvalvepositionswitches. Therefore, animproperly adjustedorfaultyvalvepositionswitchwillnotpreventatripofthemotor-driven feedwater pumpifRPVwaterlevelissustained above95inches.Theexistingtriplogic,including thehighlevelresetlogic,willnotbealtered.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.

-

.-..Safety'Evaluation

-.;-'.Summary Report."-~",Page54of68~~"."=...Safety Evaluation No.:'i~*Implementation.Document 4JI+tUFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:-=.97.-'025Rev.1J~ItNo.':.".. '==":IGE-NE-523-B13-01869-043 Rev.0;;.:;.'..-~GE-NE-523-113-0894 Rev.1,BWRVlP-07 IV-25,IV-26,IV-32~IReactorVesselInternals CoreShroudVerticalWeldCrackingDescription ofChange:Inspection ofthecoreshroudverticalweldsidentified intergranular stresscorrosion cracking(IGSCC)ofthe-vertical welds.Theinspections revealedfairlysignificant crackingonweldsV-4,V-9,.andV-10;relatively minorcrackingonweldsV-3,V-12,V-15andV-16;nocrackingontheaccessible portionsofV-7,V-8,andV-11.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theverticalweldcrackinghasbeenanalyzedanddetermined toprovidetherequiredASMESectionXImarginsconsidering bothfractureandlimitloadmechanisms for10,600hoursofoperation beforethenextrequiredinspection. Thismarginismaintained withallowance forthefollowing: Thismarginismaintained withnocreditforanyofthehorizontal weldsH1throughH7whicharestructurally replacedbytheshroudstabilizer assemblies. Aboundingcrackgrowthof5E-5inchesperhourisusedtodefinethenextinspection interval. TheGeneralElectricanalysishasdemonstrated thatthe5E-5growthrateisapplicable andconservatively boundingfortheNMP1coreshroudverticalweldcracking. Allowance ismadeforcracksizinguncertainty consistent withtheNRC-approvedBWRVIP-03 requirements. Alluninspected regionsareassumedcrackedthroughwall.Inadditiontothestructural margin,allthedesignbasisrequirements andcriteriahavebeendemonstrated tobesatisfied. TheNDEinspections performed ofthecoreshroudverticalweldsandadjacentbasemetalhavedemonstrated thatthe SafetyEvaluation 'ummaryReportPage55of68PgBasedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thattheverticalweldcrackingidentified intheRFO14shroudverticalweldinspections doesnotinvolvean.unreviewed safetyquestion. 4SafetyEvaluation No.:'7-'025Rev;.1tcont'd.) .fSafetyEvaluation Summary:.,':Ž;,".'i."'!:.(cont',d.) .'>'.==';>p~.;--."".;-,",-,.; ~'..~...--.,verticalweld.cracking'is IGSCCb'oundedbyNRGreview.ofithe coreshroudIGSCCcrackingaddressed bytheBWRVlPcoreshroudinspection andevaluation documents. Theboundingcoreshroudcrackgrowthrateof5E-5,approvedbytheNRCforgenericapplication, isapplicable tothecoreshroudverticalweldcracking. TheNMP'lTechnical Specification regarding reactorcoolantchemistry hasbeenreviewedanddetermined tobeconsistent withtheapplication oftheboundingcrackgrowthrate.-Basedonthisreview,nounreviewed safetyquestionexistsassociated withtheverticalweldcrackingidentified intheRF014shroud..., verticalweldinspections, providedaninspection intervalof10;600hoursisestablished fortheverticalwelds.The10,600hourinspection intervalisbased.onhotoeratintimeabove200'F. ~.*-Safety'Evaluation ~-"Summary.Report~-'<'age66of68UFSARAffectedPages:WSystem:=- -TitleofChange:vIDescription ofChange::=-.SafetyEvaluation No.:"'-a.",':<<. Implementation Docume'nt No.:-':97-100aijigig'ai~"'alculation SO-GOTHIG RB01.Rev,. 01'"i-"-XV-68XV-76'-:>'"a-.:;~:~,-;:,"a +~hReactorWaterCleanupReactorWaterCleanupSystemHighEnergyLineBreakRe-Analyses ~~tl~g~Thefollowing changestotheplantconfiguration havebeenperformed: 1.Allresistance temperature detectors (RTD)inthecleanupsystemareashavebeenaddedtotheEquipment Qualification (EQ)program.2.EightofthetwelvecleanupareaRTDs,-which wereoriginally MINCOModelS1255,havebeenreplacedwithPYCOModel122-7026. 3.TwoRTDshavebeenrelocated totheauxiliary cleanuppumproom.Onewasrelocated fromthecleanuppumpareaandtheotherfromtheheatexchanger roomarea.4.High-energy linebreak(HELB)temperature andpressureprofilesintheReactorBuildinghavebeenrevised.5.Additional components havebeenincludedintheEQprogram.6.ThebackupSCRAMsolenoidvalveshavebeenreclassified fromsafety-relatedactivetosafety-related passive.7.ThecleanupsystemHELBanalysishasbeenrevised;thenewanalysisassumesthattheisolation isinitiated byhightemperature detection. Thecleanupsystemasconfigured andanalyzedmeetsthedesignandlicensing basiscommitments asdefinedintheUFSARandotherdesignandlicensing basisdocuments. SafetyEvaluation .SummaryReportPage67of68....='7-1 00(cont'd.) ~'ISafetyEvaluation No.:.-'iirr-".fi~g4'I'II&IISafetyEvaluation Summaryi'i"~~.;.:.-..='i'.". i'.':i"~'~..~"-i-."." i.:-.ii~i<~ -;el:~:.II~~I)IgAllequipment necessary'to mitigatetheconsequences ofacleanupsystemline-..:iI breakortoinitiateandmaintainasafeshutdownduringorfollowing acleanup";,systemlinebreakhavebeenverifiedtobequalified fortherevisedHELBprofiles. I~P~IWithhighareatemperature detectors locatedinappropriate locations, itcanbeconcluded thattheguillotine linebreakisaboundingeventforthecleanup..;:".--,system.Theguillotine breakatfullpowerisboundedbythemainsteamlinebreak.NMP1hasinherentfeaturesandcapabilities whichprovideabasisforreasonable <<assurance thatleaksandsmallbreakswillbedetectedwithindesignbasislimits.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation-Summary.ReportPage:58'o'f 68NMP-SOT-001,",~'=,."w-.."v"-', -::::NMPBOT002vc,:>"-.vIt'p~'l~g~4+Mr)a)~6g)ega~g~gplgl"N/AIReactorVessel,CoreShroud,ReactorWater~~teel()ted&,~JPi)It<UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Description ofChange:CoreShroudBoatSampleRemoval~.Safety-EvsiuatIon No.!"':~'-'.;97-101Rev.1Implementation DocumentNo.:'rocedure No.Thissafetyevaluation analyzedtheimpactofremovingtwo-boat-shaped samplesfromtheUnit1coreshroud.Theboatsampleswereapproximately 1.7"long,*1.13"wideand0.85"deep.Thecoreshroudhasbeenstructurally analyzedconsidering theremovalofthissampleandtheremaining structural ligamentandprobability ofintergranular stresscorrosion cracking(IGSCC).Inaddition, thegeneration andimpactofswarf,duetotheelectrical discharge machining (EDM)process,ontheplantsystemshasbeenevaluated. SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheEDMoftwoboat-shaped samplesfromthecoreshroudhasbeenanalyzedfor.conformance toUFSARandTechnical Specification requirements. Astructural analysisofthecoreshroudhasbeenperformed anddemonstrates thestructural adequacyofthecoreshroud.Thegeneration andimpactofswarfonplantsystems,including reactorwatercleanup,spentfuelpoolfiltering andcooling,reactorrecirculation, controlroddrive,andcondensate andfeedwater, hasbeenconsidered andfoundacceptable. Theintegrity ofthecoreshroudassuresthatthecoresprayspargers, coregeometry, coreflowdistribution andcontrolbladesfunctionasrequired. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation ,Summary;Report=Page-59of68.SafetyEvaluation No.Imptementation:Document, No'.'-'-"-.-: 97-,-'1.02 -'-iDCR.',1)-97-'UFS-:043 i.-";;-"...;.'"-'i;>'.Jh>.: UFSARAffectedPages:System:XII-14AreaRadiation Monitoring TitleofChange:ChangetoSectionXII-B.2.1.1.2 ofUnit1UFSARDescription ofChange:eTheUFSARhasbeenupdatedtoclarifythedesignbasisofthearearadiation monitor(ARIVI)inthenewfreshfuelstoragevaulttoshowitisnotsubjecttosuddenchangesinradiation levelsand,therefore, doesnotrequirebothanalarmintheControlRoomandintheareawherethemonitorislocated.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheARMinthefreshfuelstoragevaultisnotsubjecttosuddenchangesinradiation levelsduetotheinherentdesignofthebundlesintherackwheregeometric spacingisusedtoprecludecriticality. Thischangeonlyprovidesclarification intheUFSARregarding theuseoftheARMalreadyinplaceinthevaulttoshowthatitiswithintheNMP1designbasis.Basedontheevaluation performed, itis-concluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport.'age 80-of88-~~,SafetyEvaluation No.:..*Imple'mentation DocumentNo;:.'.'97-1.03'".'-:Mod.N1-94-003:.i~ --.-;.-,->>..-,. UFSARAffectedPages:'"i.~'ystem:iN/Aif:;".*ReactorVessel)ip)4<<1fl&.Titleof.Change:Description ofChange:Installation ofModifiedShroudRepairLatchesPriortoNRCApprovalofAdequacyUnder10CFR50.55a(a)(3) ~~<<<<TheUFSARdescribes theshroudtierodlowerlateralspringasbeingincontactwiththeshroudandthereactorpressurevessel(RPV),andisdesignedtorestrainlateralmovementoftheshellbetweenweldsH5andH6Aviathecoreplateboltsandwedges,theringbetweenweldsH6AandH6B,andtheshellbetweenH6BandH7.Forthisanalysis, thelowerlateralspringwaspresumednottobeincontactwiththeshroudandRPVandnotcapableofproviding horizontal restraint. Lateralmovementofthelowershroudisrestrained bytheremaining ligamentofgoodmetalatweldsH4throughH7.Thismodification installed amodifiedlatchdesignwithoutpriorNRCapprovalofthemodification and,therefore, takesnocreditforthelatchtoperformitsdesignbasisfunction. Theanalysiswasperformed withtherestriction thatthereactorremaininthecoldshutdownorhotshutdowncondition. SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thisevaluation analyzedtheabilityofthetierodassemblytoproviderestraint totheshrouddifferently thanthatcurrently described intheUFSAR.Theanalysisdemonstrates thatthemodifiedlowerwedgelatchesarenotrequiredtoperformtheirintendeddesignbasisfunctionduringthecoldshutdownandhotshutdowncondition, i.e.,thecombination ofthestructural integrity providedbyshroudhorizontal weldsH4throughH7,andthetierodcomponents creditedintheanalysis, hasdemonstrated thattheshroudwillperformitsdesignbasisfunctions duringnoncritical hydrotestingabove212F,and/orcontrolroddrive(CRD)scramtimetestingwiththereactorvesselbeltlinedowncomer watertemperature asrequiredtosatisfyTechnical Specification 3.2.2.e.Compliance withtheTechnical Specification requiresthereactorbeconsidered inthehotshutdowncondition. Inaddition, duringhotshutdownseveralleakratetestsandCRDscramtimetestsare SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage61of68--:;.'.:.." ..:-.SafetyEvaluation No.-..-'..97:l03(cont'd.) r,-SafetyEvaluation 'Summa'ry:"-6 I'8-CRr"-{c'one!d.)-;....:.c.'V.,mam>8" vQ~vgi;;,oem.-i,;,.- >"80>IF-CWV-i4->9. performed.'hese testshavenoimpactontheconditions evaluated intheanalysissection.Thisreviewdemonstrates that'during theshutdownconditions theshroudisoperableanditsrepairassemblies areoperable1)withoutanIncreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction previously evaluated, 2)withoutcreatingthepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofa"new'rdNerentkindfromanypreviously evaluated, and3)withoutreducingthemarginofsafetyinthebasesofaTechnical Specification. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnot"-.-involveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage52of58..:SafetyEvaluation No.:i'--"'7104 ImplementatIon DocumentNo.:lGE-)IE523-B13-01869-043 Rev.0,:=-......GE-NE-523-113-0894 Rev.1,BWRVIP-07 "">>-'>tlljc).'Ai'9":l5J)d. a'i's,".~~~-,~i" Nq~ip';cpu,' ~i!~,'=I<:: .g~i;-q>:yl'~;-,;.:~ UFSARAffectedPages:'-.':~.--N/ASystem:;, TitleofChange:,ReactorVesselInternals CoreShroudVerticalWeldCracking, ColdandHotShutdownDescription ofChange:Inspection ofthecoreshroudverticalwetdsidentified intergranular stresscorrosion cracking(IGSCC)oftheverticalwelds.Theinspections revealedfairlysignificant crackingonweldsV-4,V-9,andV-10;relatively minorcrackingonweldsV-3,V-12,V-15andV-16;nocrackingontheaccessible portionsofV-7,V-8,andV-11.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theverticalweldcrackinghasbeenanalyzedanddetermined toprovidetherequiredASMESectionXImarginsconsidering bothfractureandlimitloadmechanisms forthereloadcondition. Thismarginismaintained withallowance forthefollowing: Thismarginismaintained utilizing shroudstabilizer assemblies andhorizontal weldsasapprovedinSafetyEvaluation 97-103.Aboundingcrackgrowthof5E-5inchesperhourisusedtodefinethenextinspection interval. TheGeneralElectricanalysishasdemonstrated thatthe5E-5growthrateisapplicable andconservatively boundingfortheNMP1coreshroudverticalweldcracking. Crackgrowthrateisinsignificant forthetemperature andreactorwaterchemicalconditions duringtheseconditions. Evenwhenconsidered, theresulting crackgrowthisimmeasurable fortherequireddurationofthetesting.Allowance ismadeforcracksizinguncertainty consistent withtheNRC-approvedBWRVIP-03 requirements. Alluninspected regionsareassumedcrackedthroughwall. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage63of68SafetyEvaluation No.:..97-104(cont'd.) ......~"-:~". ':-:".-~~~'pSafetyEvaluation Summary:"'"'"-""="(cont'd.);-...5';,".e.i. ~ri.-'='".e.ts:."r~-.r-.=-'".,: 4eI.4-~"gF'C".'2'-"Yin,addition tothestructural, margin,allthedesignbasisrequirements andcriteriahavebeendemonstrated tobesatisfied. Iav~*Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatverticalweldcrackingidentified intheRFO14shroudverticalweldinspections forthecoldandhot-=shutdownmodes,including noncritical hydrotestingandCRDscramtimetesting,doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage64of681~g.o;,,,...',,Safety Evaluation No.:Implementation Document,C'IIfa,~.~1T+~~~l>t0u~UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:..;"~ea)87-'107No.:NuclearDivisionPolicy,(POL) Rev.10,NuclearSafetyAssessment 8cSupport..-~.Policy(NSAS-POL-01) Rev~)0k~.)ACXlll-1,Xlll-3,XIII-4;FiguresXlll-1,XIII-4~~.':N/A't:Organization ofQ1P,LaborRelations, HRD..andOccupational SafetyandHealthUndertheNewlyCreatedPositionofDirectorHumanResourceDevelopment Description ofChange:TheNuclearDivisionPolicy(POL)andNSAS-POL-01 havebeenrevisedtoreorganize thefunctions ofEmployee/Labor Relations, Leadership/Career Development, Occupational SafetyandHealth,QualityFirstProgram(Q1P)administrative issues,andtheFitnessforDutyProgramunderthenewlycreatedpositionof"Director HumanResourceDevelopment." SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theproposedorganizational changesestablish responsibilities andlinesofauthority andcommunications forthenewlycreatedpositionof"Director HumanResourceDevelopment." Theproposedorganizational structure satisfies thecriteriaofSRP'13.1.1andconformswiththerequirements ofSection6.2.1.aoftheplantTechnical Specifications. Theproposedchangesdonotimpactaccidentormalfunction initiation, orradiological consequences. Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. ISafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage65of68~~SafetyEvaluation No;:97-108~<VVImplementation DocumentNo.::..">-,DER-1-97-1433 ";".-:,;.;;-;,.;;:.. "c,Cft'-'I)0g4y1gUFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:IV-20,X-8,X-12,X-14~ControlRodDrive(CRD)UFSARUpdateforControlRodWithdrawal SpeedDescription ofChange:I4pThissafetyevaluation evaluated achangetotheUFSARintheallowedtolerance forcontrolrodwithdrawal ratefrom3in/secto3~20%(i.e.,24-3.6)in/sec,,- whichcorresponds toafullwithdrawal timeof38.4-57.6seconds.Additionally, thechangeallowsoperation withwithdrawspeedsupto5.0in/seccorresponding toa28-second stroketime.AnanalysisbyGeneralElectricconcluded thatsuchoperation isboundedbytheassumptions usedintherodwithdrawal error(RWE)analysisandtheminimumcriticalpowerratiosafetylimitanalyses.. Thissafetyevaluation alsoevaluated operating withCRDdrivewaterpressurelessthan250psid.SafetyEvaluation Summary:AdditionofthebasesusedintheRWEformaximumcontrolrodwithdrawal timeprovidesinformation whichcanbeusedtodetermine operability ofacontrolrodifthestroketimeisfoundoutofspecification. Loweringdrivewaterpressuretocompensate fordegradedCRDsealsorhydraulic controlunitleakageisaconservative actionwhichcanbeusedtomaintainCRDstroketimewithindesign.TheoriginaldesignandfunctionoftheCRDsystemareunchanged; theabilityoftheCRDtofunctionasdescribed intheUFSARisnotaffected; andtheperformance requirements asdefinedintheTechnical Specifications arenotaffectedbytheproposedchange.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage66of68~~SafetyEvaluation No.:',-..".,, "97-121ImplementatIon DocumentNo.:""~,Mod.'N1-87-032:; '~UFSARAffectedPages'.:" '-"'-:,:. "".BOA-34. eJtt'~4~/l,'J~(System:TitleofChange:SmokeDetection AdditionofSmokeDetectorinZoneDA-2022S; Description ofChange:~'saresultofwalkdowns conducted bytheSecurityDepartment todetermine ifunauthorized accessmaybeobtained; itbecameevidentthatopeningsintheUninterruptible PowerSupply(UPS)BatteryRoomandUPSRoom(TBEl.250'):maypermitunauthorized accesstotheserooms.Thismodification providedbarriersdesignedtocontrolaccesstotheseareasand..installed anadditional smokedetectorinsidetheUPSRoom.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Additionofthisextrasmokedetectorprovidesfiredetection monitoring fortheUPSRoom.Thisenhancestheabilityofplantpersonnel todetectandrespondtopotential fires.Thus,thischangehasnoadverseeffectontheprobability ofoccurrence ofafireinanyplantareawhichisdifferent fromanyfireoraccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage67of68>.Saay.~~~~aS-'.'>rtr~,": '97-124SafetyEvaluation No.:Implemen'tation DocumentNo.:IS~qaaaaaap~~".an)pa,~Saa,.',~~,SV>>aS1~UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:l.IGE-.NE-523-B'1 3-01869-043 Rev..0;>>:= ~-.":<~BGE-NE-523;113-0894 Rev..1,BWRVIP-07 ~~s.'asf(.-~~I~st')$~asa,Ah~s)+4)f":-=f4baaq*~a>>a~Jsa,all)staaas~'AL"~~-aaa~aaaSIPN/A>>*~a=wa'a.g(~qa~~~>>a>>>>~~a~aa>>aaa~ReactorVesselInternals .CoreShroudVerticalWeldCrack,ColdShutdown(Refueling andMajorMaintenance) Description ofChange:Inspection ofthecoreshroudverticalweldsidentified intergranular stresscorrosion cracking(IGSCC)oftheverticalwelds.Theinspections revealedfairlysignificant crackingonweldsV-4,V-9,andV-10;relatively minorcrackingonweldsV-3,V-12,V-15andV-16;nocrackingontheaccessible portionsofV-7,V-S,andV-11.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theverticalweldcrackinghasbeenanalyzedanddetermined toprovidetherequiredASMESectionXImarginsconsidering bothfractureandlimitloadmechanisms forthereloadcondition. Thismarginismaintained withallowance forthefollowing: Thismarginismaintained withnocreditforanyofthehorizontal weldsH1throughH7whicharestructurally replacedbytheshroudstabilizer assemblies. Aboundingcrackgrowthof5E-5inchesperhourisusedtodefinethenextinspection interval. TheGeneralElectricanalysishasdemonstrated thatthe5E-5growthrateisapplicable andconservatively boundingfortheNMP1coreshroudverticalweldcracking. Crackgrowthrateneednotbeappliedfortherefueling mode.Allowance ismadeforcracksizinguncertainty consistent withtheNRC-approvedBWRVIP-03 requirements. Alluninspected regionsareassumedcrackedthroughwall. SafetyEvaluation SummaryRepoit=-,Page68of68'I*C,~,Safety,EvaluatIon No.:.=-'-.-',:".:-',.'97-,'I24 (cont'd.) ~t.SafetyEvaluation".Summary -"~".:Dkr.-(cont'.A.) =;".!'"'r::n-":."~~.."-"iZ-';-..t,".'..=.; lInadditiontb'theStructuraf'margin,-all thedesignbasisrequirements andcriteriahavebeendemonstrated tobesatisfied. gBasedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatverticalweldcrackirig identified intheRFO14shroudverticalweldinspections fortherefueling modedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion. 4 pA~/6Wii7/<7PP~~~~~<>" U.S."NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO-DOCKET0-220LICENSED-3NINEMILEPOINTNUCLARSTATIONU'T1FINALSAFTYANALYSISREPRT(UPDATED) VOLUME1JUNE1996REVISION14NIAG&&MOHAWKPOWERCORPORATION S&&CUSE,NEWYORK 0 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTSSectionTitlePacaeSECTIONIA.1.02.03.04.05.06~07.08.09.010.0B.1.02.03.04.05.06.07.08.09.010.011.012.013.014.015.016.0C.D.E.SECTIONIIA.1~0TABLEOFCONTENTSLISTOFTABLESLISTOFFIGURESINTRODUCTION ANDSUMMARYPRINCIPAL DESIGNCRITERIAGeneralBuildings andStructures ReactorReactorVesselContainment ControlandInstrumentation Electrical PowerRadioactive WasteDisposalShielding andAccessControlFuelHandlingandStorageCHARACTERISTICS SiteReactorCoreFuelAssemblyControlSystemCoreDesignandOperating Conditions DesignPowerPeakingFactorNuclearDesignDataReactorVesselCoolantRecirculation LoopsPrimaryContainment Secondary Containment Structural DesignStationElectrical SystemReactorInstrumentation SystemReactorProtection SystemIDENTIFICATION OFCONTRACTORS GENERALCONCLUSIONS REFERENCES STATIONSITEANDENVIRONMENT SITEDESCRIPTION GeneralI-2I-2I-2I-2I-4I-5I-6I-8I-8I-8I-8I-9I-9I-9I-9I-9I-9I-10I-10I-10I-11I-11I-11I-11I-11I-12I-12I-12I-13I-14I-15II-1II-1II-1UFSARRevisionJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~Sectio2.03.0B.1.01~12.02.12.22.3C.D.E.F.G.SECTIONIIITitlePhysicalFeaturesPropertyUseandDevelopment DESCRIPTION OFAREAADJACENTTOTHESITEGeneralPopulation Agriculture, Industrial andRecreational UseAgricultural UseIndustrial UseRecreational UseMETEOROLOGY LIMNOLOGY EARTHSCIENCESENVIRONMENTAL RADIOLOGY REFERENCES BUILDINGS ANDSTRUCTURES PacaeII-1II-2II-3II-3II-3II-3II-3II-3II-4II-5II-6II-7II-8II-9III-1A.1.01.11~21~31.41.52.02.12.22.32.43.0B.1'1.11~21.31.41.52'2.1TURBINEBUILDINGDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeatingandVentilation Shielding andAccessControlStructure DesignGeneralStructural FeaturesHeatingandVentilation SystemSmokeandHeatRemovalShielding andAccessControlSafetyAnalysisCONTROLROOMDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeatingandVentilation Shielding andAccessControlStructure DesignGeneralStructural FeaturesIII-3III-3III-3III-3III-3III-4III-4III-4III-5III-5III-7III-7III-7III-9III-9III-9III-9III-9III-9III-9III-10III-10UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) Section2.22.32.43.0C.1.01.11.21'1.41.52.02.12.22.33.0D.1.01.11.21'1.41.52.02.12.22.33.0E.1.01.111'.21.1.311.1.51.21'.11.2.21'-31.32.0F12.1.1TitleHeating,Ventilation andAirConditioning SystemSmokeandHeatRemovalShielding andAccessControlSafetyAnalysisWASTEDISPOSALBUILDINGDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeatingandVentilation Shielding andAccessControlStructure DesignGeneralStructural FeaturesHeatingandVentilation SystemShielding andAccessControlSafetyAnalysisOFFGASBUILDINGDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeatingandVentilation Shielding andAccessControlStructure DesignGeneralStructural FeaturesHeatingandVentilation SystemShielding andAccessControlSafetyAnalysisNONCONTROLLED BUILDINGS Administration BuildingDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeating,CoolingandVentilation Shielding andAccessControlStructure DesignGeneralStructural FeaturesHeating,Ventilation andAirConditioning AccessControlSafetyAnalysisSewageTreatment BuildingDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPacaeIII-11III-11III-12III-12XII-13III-13III-13IIX-13III-13III-14III-'14III-14III-14III-15III-17III-17III-19III-19IXI-19IIX-19III-19III-19III-19III-19III-19III-20III-20III-20III-22III-22III-22III-22III-22III-22III-23III-23III-23III-23III-24IXI-24III-24XII-25III-25III-25UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) Section22.1-32.1.42.1.52.1.62.1.72.22~212'.22'.33.0F13'.133'.33.1.43.1.53'3.2.13.2.23.2.3TitledingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandXnternalLoaElectrical DesignFireandExplosive GasDetectioHeatingandVentilation Shielding andAccessControlStructure DesignGeneralStructural FeaturesVentilation SystemAccessControlEnergyInformation CenterDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeatingandVentilation Shielding andAccessControlStructure DesignGeneralStructural FeaturesHeatingandVentilation SystemAccessControlPacaeIII-25III-25III-25IIX-25III-26III-26III-26XII-26III-27III-28III-28III-28III-28III-28III-28III-29III-29III-29III-29III-29III-30F.1.01.11~1~11.1.21.1.31.1.41.1.51.22.02.12'3.0G.1.01~11.21.31.42.03.03.13.2SCREENHOUSE, INTAKEANDDISCHARGE TUNNELSScreenhouse DesignBasisWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeatingandVentilation Shielding andAccessControlStructure DesignIntakeandDischarge TunnelsDesignBasesStructure DesignSafetyAnalysisSTACKDesignBasesGeneralWindLoadingSeismicDesignShielding andAccessControlStructure DesignSafetyAnalysisRadiology StackFailureAnalysisZII-31III-31III-31III-31III-31III-31III-31III-31III-31XII-33III-33XII-33III-34III-35III-35III-35IXX-35III-35III-35III-35III-36III-36III-37UFSARRevision14ivJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) Section3.2.13'.23.2.3H.TitleReactorBuildingDieselGenerator BuildingScreenandPumpHouseSECURITYBUILDINGANDSECURITYBUILDINGANNEXPacaeIII-37III-38III-38III-391~01~11.21'1.41~52.02'2.22.33.0RADWASTESOLIDIFICATION ANDSTORAGEBUILDINGDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsPressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsHeating,Ventilation andAirConditioning Shielding andAccessControlStructure andDesignGeneralStructural FeaturesHeating,Ventilation andAirConditioning Shielding andAccessControlUseIIX-40III-40III-40III-40XXX-40IIX-40III-40III-41IIX-41IXI-41IXI-43IIX-43SECTIONIVA.1.02.03.0B.1.02.02.12'2~2~12.2'2'3.03~13.1.133.1.2.13.1.

2.2REFERENCES

REACTORDESIGNBASESGeneralPerformance Objectives DesignLimitsandTargetsREACTORDESIGNGeneralNuclearDesignTechnique Reference LoadingPatternFinalLoadingPatternAcceptable Deviation FromReference LoadingPatternReexamination ofLicensing BasisRefueling CycleReactivity BalanceThermalandHydraulic Characteristics ThermalandHydraulic DesignRecirculation FlowControlCoreThermalLimitsExcessive CladTemperature CladdingStrainIII-45IV-1IV-1IV-1IV-1IV-2IV-3IV-3IV-4IV-5IV-6IV-6IV-6.IV-7IV-7IV-7IV-7IV-7IV-8IV-9UFSARRevision14vJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) Section3.1.2.33'3.2.13.2.23.2.F13.2.2.23'4.04.14.25.05.15.1.15.1.25.1.35.1.45.1.55.1.65.1.76.06.16.1.16.1.26.26.2.16.2.26.36.47.07.17.1.17.1.27~l..37.1.47.1.57.1.67.1'7.1.87.1.9C.7.27'TitleCoolantFlowThermalandHydraulic AnalysesHydraulic AnalysisThermalAnalysisFuelCladdingIntegrity SafetyLimitAnalysisMCPROperating LimitAnalysisReactorTransients Stability AnalysisDesignBasesStability AnalysisMethodMechanical DesignandEvaluation FuelMechanical DesignDesignBasesFuelRodsWaterRodsFuelAssemblies Mechanical DesignLimitsandStressAnalysisRelationship BetweenFuelDesignLimitsandFuelDamageLimitsSurveillance andTestingControlRodMechanical DesignandEvaluation DesignControlRodsandDrivesStandbyLiquidPoisonSystemControlSystemEvaluation RodWithdrawal ErrorsEvaluation OverallControlSystemEvaluation LimitingConditions forOperation andSurveillance ControlRodLifetimeReactorVesselInternalStructure DesignBasesCoreShroudCoreSupportTopGridControlRodGuideTubesFeedwater SpargerCoreSpraySpargersLiquidPois'onSpargerSteamSeparator andDryerCoreShroudStabilizers REFERENCES DesignEvaluation Surveillance andTestingPacaeIV-9IV-9IV-9IV-11IV-11IV-12IV-13IV-14IV-14IV-14IV-15IV-15IV-15IV-15IV-16IV-16IV-16IV-16IV-16IV-17IV-17IV-17IV-19IV-20IV-20IV-21IV-23IV-23IV-24IV-24IV-25IV-25IV-26IV-26IV-26IV-26IV-26IV-26IV-27IV-30IV-29IV-29UFSARRevision14viJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) SectionSECTIONVTitleREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMPacaeV-1A.1.02.03.04.05.0B.1~01.11.21.31.41.52.03.04.05.0C.1'2'3'4.04.14'4.34'4.55.05.15.25.36.0D.1.02.02.12.2DESIGNBASESGeneralPerformance Objectives DesignPressureCyclicLoads(Mechanical andThermal)CodesSYSTEMDESIGNANDOPERATION GeneralDrawingsMaterials ofConstruction ThermalStressesPrimaryCoolantLeakageCoolantChemistry ReactorVesselReactorRecirculation LoopsReactorSteamandAuxiliary SystemsPipingReliefDevicesSYSTEMDESIGNEVALUATION GeneralPressureDesignHeatupandCooldownRatesMaterials Radiation ExposurePressure-Temperature LimitCurvesTemperature LimitsforBoltupTemperature LimitsforIn-Service SystemPressureTestsOperating LimitsDuringHeatup,Cooldown, andCoreOperation Predicted ShiftinRT>>~Mechanical Considerations JetReactionForcesSeismicForcesPipingFailureStudiesSafetyLimits,LimitingSafetySettingsandMinimumConditions forOperation TESTSANDINSPECTIONS Prestartup TestingInspection andTestingFollowing StartupHydroPressurePressureVesselIrradiation V-1V-1V-1V-2V-3V-3V-4V-4V-4V-4V-4V-5V-5V-5V-6V-7V-7V-9V-9V-9V-10V-11V-11V-11V-12V-12V-12V-12V-12V-13V-13V-13V-15V-15V-15V-15V-15UFSARRevision14viiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) SectionE.1.02'3'F13'3'3.44.04.14'F.SECTIONVITitleEMERGENCY COOLINGSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignandOperation DesignEvaluation Redundancy MakeupWaterSystemLeaksContainment Isolation TestsandInspections Prestartup TestSubsequent Inspections andTestsREFERENCES CONTAINMENT SYSTEMPacaeV-16V-16V-16V-17V-17V-18V-18V-18V-19V-19V-19V-20VI-1A.1.02.02.12'2'3.0B.1.01~11~21~31.41.51.61.72.0212.22.32.42.52.62'C.1.01.1PRIMARYCONTAINMENT-NARK ICONTAINMENT PROGRAMGeneralStructure PressureSuppression Hydrodynamic LoadsSafety/Relief ValveDischarge Loss-of-Coolant AccidentSummaryofLoadingPhenomena Plant-Unique Modifications PRIMARYCONTAINMENT -PRESSURESUPPRESSION SYSTEMDesignBasesGeneralDesignBasisAccident(DBA)Containment, HeatRemovalIsolation CriteriaVacuumReliefCriteriaFloodingCriteriaShielding Structure DesignGeneralPenetrations andAccessOpeningsJetandMissileProtection Materials Shielding VacuumReliefContainment FloodingSECONDARY CONTAINMENT -REACTORBUILDINGDesignBasesWindandSnowLoadingsVI-2VI-2VI-2VI-2VI-3VI-4VI-5VI-6VI-6VI-6VI-6VI-8VI-8VI-8VI-9VI-9VI-9VI-9VI-11VI-12VI-13VI-13VI-14VI-14VI-16VI-16VI-16UFSARRevision14viiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~Sectic1'1.31.42.02.1D.1.01.12'3.0E.1.01.11'2.02.12.2F.1.01.11.22.02.12.23.04.05.05.15.25.3G.SECTIONVIIA.1.02.02'2.23.04.0TitlePressureReliefDesignSeismicDesignShielding Structure DesignGeneralStructural FeaturesCONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMDesignBasesContainment SprayAppendixJWaterSealRequirements SystemDesignTestsandInspections CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEMPrimaryContainment DesignBasesSystemDesignSecondary Containment DesignBasesSystemDesignTESTANDINSPECTIONS DrywellandSuppression ChamberPreoperational TestingPostoperational TestingContainment Penetrations andIsolation ValvesPenetration andValveLeakageValveOperability TestContainment Ventilation SystemOtherContainment TestsReactorBuildingReactorBuildingNormalVentilation SystemReactorBuildingIsolation ValvesEmergency Ventilation SystemREFERENCES ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS CORESPRAYSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignGeneralOperatorAssessment DesignEvaluation TestsandInspections PacaeVI-16VI-17VI-17VI-17VI-17VI-20VI-20VI-23VI-24VI-26VI-27VI-27VI-27VI-27VI-28VI-28VI-28VI-30VI-30VI-30VI-30VI-31VI-31VI-31VI-32VI-32VI-32VI-32VI-33VI-33VI-33VII-1VII-2VII-2VII-2VII-2VII-5VII-6VII-6UFSARRevisionixJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~SectioB.1.02.02.13.04.0C.1.02.0'~13.04.05.0D.1.02.03.03'3.23.34.0E.1.02.02.13.04.0F.1.02.03.04.0G.1.02.02'2'3.03.13.24.0TitleCONTAINMENT SPRAYSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignOperatorAssessment DesignEvaluation TestsandInspections LIQUIDPOISONXNJECTION SYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignOperatorAssessment DesignEvaluation TestsandInspections Alternate BoronInjection CONTROLRODVELOCITYLXMITERDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluation GeneralDesignSensitivity NormalOperation TestsandInspections CONTROLRODHOUSINGSUPPORTDesignBasesSystemDesignLoadsandDeflections DesignEvaluation TestsandInspections FLOWRESTRICTORS DesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluation TestsandInspections COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLSYSTEMDesignBasesContainment InertingSystemSystemDesignDesignEvaluation Containment Atmospheric DilutionSystemSystemDesignDesignEvaluation TestsandInspections PacaeVII-8VII-8VII-8VII-11VII-12VII-13VII-15VII-15VII-15VII-18VII-19VII-20VIX-20VII-22VII-22VIX-22VII-24VII-24VII-24VII-25VII-25VII-26VII-26VII-26VII-28VII-28VII-29VII-30VII-30VII-30VII-30VII-31VII-32VII-32VII-32VIZ-32VII-33VII-33VII-33VII-35VII-35UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~SecticH.1.02.02.13.04.0I~1.02.03.04.0SECTIONA.1.01~11.22.02'2.23.0B.1.02.02.12.22'2.43.03.13'3.33.4C.1.01.11.1.11.1.21.1.31.1.41.1.5VIIITitleEMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignOperatorAssessment DesignEvaluation TestsandInspections HIGH-PRESSURE COOLANTINJECTION DesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluation TestsandInspections REFERENCES INSTRUMENTATION ANDCONTROLPROTECTIVE SYSTEMSDesignBasesReactorProtection SystemAnticipated Transients WithoutScramMitigation SystemSystemDesignReactorProtection SystemAnticipated Transients WithoutScramMitigation SystemSystemEvaluation REGULATING SYSTEMSDesignBasesSystemDesignControlRodAdjustment ControlRecirculation FlowControlPressureandTurbineControlReactorFeedwater ControlSystemEvaluation ControlRodAdjustment ControlRecirculation FlowControlPressureandTurbineControlReactorFeedwater ControlINSTRUMENTATION SYSTEMSNuclearInstrumentation DesignSourceRangeMonitorsIntermediate RangeMonitorsLocalPowerRangeMonitorsAveragePowerRangeMonitorsTraversing In-CoreProbeSystemPacaeVII-36VII-36VII-36VII-38VII-39VII-39VII-41VII-41VII-41VII-42VII-43VII-44VIII-1VIII-1VIII-1VIII-1VIII-4VIII-4VIII-4VIII-10VIII-10VIII-12VIII-12VIII-12VIII-12VIII-12VIII-13VIII-14VIII-14VIII-14VIII-14VIII-14VIII-14VIII-15VIII-15VIII-15VIII-17VIII-18VIII-19VIII-19VIII-21UFSARRevision14XiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) Section1.21.2.111.2'1.2.42'2.12.1.122.1.32.22.2.12.2'2.2'3.03.13~1~13.1.23'4.04.14.1.14.1.25.05.15.25.35.45.4.15.4.25.4.35.4.45.5TitleEvaluation SourceRangeMonitorsIntermediate RangeMonitorsLocalPowerRangeMonitorsAveragePowerRangeMonitorsNonnuclear ProcessInstrumentation DesignBasesNonnuclear ProcessInstruments inProtective SystemNonnuclear ProcessInstruments inRegulating SystemsOtherNonnuclear ProcessInstruments Evaluation Nonnuclear ProcessInstruments inProtective SystemNonnuclear ProcessInstruments inRegulating SystemsOtherNonnuclear ProcessInstruments Radioactivity Instrumentation DesignBasesRadiation MonitorsinProtective SystemsOtherRadiation MonitorsEvaluation OtherInstrumentation RodNorthMinimizer DesignBasesEvaluation Regulatory Guide1.97(Revision 2)Instrumentation Licensing Activities -Background Definition ofRG1.97VariableTypesandInstrument Categories Determination ofRG1.97TypeAVariables forUnit1Determination ofEOPKeyParameters forUnit1Determination Basis/Approach Definition ofPrimarySafetyFunctions Association ofEOPstoPrimarySafetyFunctions Identification ofEOPKeyParameters Unit1RG1.97Variables, VariableType,andAssociated Instrument CategoryDesignations PacaeVIII-21VIII-22VIII-23VIII-25VIII-25VIII-26VIII-26VIII-26VIXI-28VIII-29VIII-31VIII-31VIII-3gVIII-31VIXI-32VIII-32VIIX-32VIII-34VIXI-36VIXI-37VIII-37VIII-37VIII-38VIII-39VIII-39VIII-39VIII-41VIII-42VIII-42VIII-43VIII-43VXXX-44VIII-44UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) SectionTitleParcae5.65.6~15.6.25.6'5.6'5.6.55.6.65.6.75.6.85.6.95.6.105.6.115.6.12D.SECTIONIXA.B.1-01~11.22.02~12.2SummaryoftheRG1.97Instrument DesignandImplementation CriteriathatwereEstablished forUnit1asPartoftheUnit11990RestartActivities NoTypeAVariables EOPKeyParameters SingleTapfortheFuelZoneRPVWaterLevelInstrument Nonredundant Wide-Range RPVWaterLevelIndication Upgrading EOPKeyParameter Category1Instrument LoopComponents toSafety-Related Classification Safety-Related Classification ofInstrumentation forRG1.97VariableTypesOtherthantheEOPKeyParameters RoutingandSeparation ofChannelized Category1Instrument LoopCablesElectrical Isolation ofCategory1Instrument LoopsfromAssociated Components thatarenotSafetyRelatedPowerSourceInformation forCategory1Instruments MarkingofInstruments ofControlRoomPanels"Alternate" Instruments forMonitoring EOPKeyParameters Indication RangesofMonitoring Instruments REFERENCES ELECTRICAL SYSTEMSDESIGNBASESELECTRICAL SYSTEMDESIGNNetworkInterconnections 345-kVSystem115-kVSystemStationDistribution SystemTwo+24-VDcSystemsTwo120-V,60-Hz,Single-Phase, Uninterruptible PowerSupplySystemsVIII-45VIII-46VIII-46VIII-46VIII-48VIII-48VIII-49VIII-49VIII-50VIII-51VIII-51VIII-51VIII-52VIII-53IX-1IX-1ZX-2IX-2IX-2IX-3IX-9IX-12IX-12UFSARRevision14XiiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~Sectio2.32.42.53.03.13.23.33.43.4.13.4.23.4.33.53.5.13.5.24.04.14.24.35.05.15.25.36.06.16.26.36.46.56.6TitleTwo120-V,57-60Hz,One-Phase, ReactorTripPowerSuppliesOne120/208-V, 60-Hz,Instrument andControlTransformer One120/240-V, 60-Hz,Three-Phase, ComputerPowerSupplyCablesandCableTraysCableSeparation CablePenetrations Protection inHazardous AreasTypesofCablesPowerCableControlCableSpecialCableDesignandSpacingofCableTraysTrayDesignSpecifications TraySpacingEmergency PowerDieselGenerator SystemStationBatteries Nonsafety BatterySystemTestsandInspections DieselGenerator StationBatteries Nonsafety Batteries Conformance with10CFR50.63StationBlackoutRuleStationBlackoutDurationStationBlackoutCopingCapability Procedures andTrainingQualityAssurance Emergency DieselGenerator Reliability ProgramReferences PacaeIX-13IX-14IX-14IX-14IX-14IX-15IX-15IX-15IX-16IX-16IX-16IX-17IX-17IX-17IX-17IX-17IX-20IX-22IX-23IX-23IX-24IX-24IX-24IX-25IX-25IX-27IX-27IX-28IX-29SECTIONXREACTORAUXILIARY ANDEMERGENCY SYSTEMSX-1A.1.02.03.04.0B.1.02.03.04.0REACTORSHUTDOWNCOOLINGSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignSystemEvaluation TestsandInspections REACTORCLEANUPSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignSystemEvaluation TestsandInspections X-1X-1X-1X-2X-2X-3X-3X-3X-4X-5UFSARRevision14xivJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~SecticC.1~02'2'2'2'2.42.52.62.72.82.92.102'12'22~132.143.03'3.23.33.43.54.05.0D.1~02'3.04.0E.1.02.03.04.0F.1.02.03.04.0TitleCONTROLRODDRIVEHYDRAULIC SYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignPumpsFiltersFirstPressureStageSecondPressureStageThirdPressureStageExhaustHeaderAccumulator ScramPilotValvesScramValvesScramDumpVolumeControlRodDriveCoolingSystemDirectional ControlandSpeedControlValvesRodInsertion andWithdrawal ScramActuation SystemEvaluation NormalWithdrawal SpeedAccidental MultipleOperation ScramReliability Operational Reliability Alternate RodInjection ReactorVesselLevelInstrumentation Reference LegBackfillTestsandInspections REACTORBUILDINGCLOSEDLOOPCOOLINGWATERSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluation TestsandInspections TURBINEBUILDINGCLOSEDLOOPCOOLINGWATERSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluation TestsandInspections SERVICEWATERSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluation TestsandInspections PacaeX-6X-6X-6X-7X-7X-7X-8X-8X-9X-9X-10X-10X-10X-11X-11X-12X-13X-13X-13X-14X-14X-15X-15X-15X-16X-17X-17X-17X-19X-20X-21X-21X-21X-22X-23X-24X-24X-24X-25X-26UFSARRevision14XVJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) SectionG.1.02.03.04.0H.1.02.03.04.01.02.03.04.01.02.02.12.1.12.23.04.0K.1.01.11.21.31.41.51.62.02.1TitleMAKEUPWATERSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignSystemEvaluation TestsandInspections SPENTFUELSTORAGEPOOLFILTERING ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluation TestsandInspections BREATHING, INSTRUMENT ANDSERVICEAIRSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignDesignEvaluation TestsandInspections FUELANDREACTORCOMPONENTS HANDLINGSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignDescription ofFacilityCaskDropProtection SystemOperation oftheFacilityDesignEvaluation TestsandInspections FIREPROTECTION PROGRAMProgramBasesNuclearDivisionDirective -FireProtection ProgramNuclearDivisionInterface Procedure -FireProtection ProgramFireHazardsAnalysisAppendixRReviewSafeShutdownAnalysisFireProtection andAppendixRRelatedPortionsofOperations Procedures (OPs,SOPs,andEOPs)andDamageRepairProcedures FireProtection PortionsoftheEmergency PlanProgramImplementation andDesignAspectsFireProtection Implementing Procedures pacaeX-27X-27X-27X-28X-29X-30X-30X-31X-33X-33X-34X-34X-34X-36X-37X-38X-38X-38X-38X-41X-42X-42X-43X-44X-44X-44X-44X-44X-45X-45X-45X-45X-45UFSARRevision14xviJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) Section2.22.32.43.03.13.24.0TitleFireProtection Administrative ControlsFireProtection SystemDrawingsandCalculations FireProtection Engineering Evaluations (FPEEs)Monitoring andEvaluating ProgramImplementation QualityAssurance TopicalReportFireBrigadeManning,Training, DrillsandResponsibilities Surveillance andTestsPacaeX-46X-46X-46X-46X-46X-46X-47L.1.02.03.04.0M.1.02.03.04.0N.REMOTESHUTDOWNSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignSystemEvaluation TestsandInspections SAFETYPARAMETER DISPLAYSYSTEMDesignBasesSystemDesignSystemEvaluation TestsandInspections REFERENCES X-48X-48X-48X-48X-49X-50X-50X-50X-50X-51X-52APPENDIX10AFIREHAZARDSANALYSISAPPENDIX10BSAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISSECTIONXIA.B.1.02.03.04.05.06.07.08.09.010'STEAM-TO-POWER CONVERSION SYSTEMDESIGNBASESSYSTEMDESIGNANDOPERATION TurbineGenerator TurbineCondenser Condenser AirRemovalandOffgasSystemCirculating WaterSystemCondensate PumpsCondensate Demineralizer SystemCondensate TransferSystemFeedwater BoosterPumpsFeedwater PumpsFeedwater HeatersXI-1XI-1XI-2XI-2XI-4XI-5XI-9XI-9XI-9XI-10XI-11XI-11XI-11C.SYSTEMANALYSISXI-13UFSARRevisionXvllJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) SectionD.SECTIONXIITitleTESTSANDINSPECTIONS RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLSPacaeXI-16XII-1A.1.01.11.21.2.1112.02~12~1~12~1~22.1.32.1.42.22.2.12.2'2.2.32.2.42.32.3.12.3.23.04.04.14.24.34.3.14.3'B.1.0111.21.2.11.2.21.2.31~32.02.12~1~12.1.22.1.3RADIOACTIVE WASTESDesignBasesObjectives TypesofRadioactive WastesGaseousWasteLiquidWastesSolidWastesSystemDesignandEvaluation GaseousWasteSystemOffgasSystemSteam-Packing Exhauster SystemBuildupVentilation SystemsStackLiquidWasteSystemLiquidWasteHandlingProcesses SamplingandMonitoring LiquidWastesLiquidWasteEquipment Arrangement LiquidRadioactive WasteSystemControlSolidWasteSystemSolidWasteHandlingProcesses SolidWasteSystemEquipment SafetyLimitsTestsandInspections WasteProcessSystemsFiltersEffluentMonitorsOffgasandStackMonitorsLiquidWasteEffluentMonitorRADIATION PROTECTION PrimaryandSecondary Shielding DesignBasesDesignReactorShieldWallBiological ShieldMiscellaneous Evaluation AreaRadioactivity Monitoring SystemsAreaRadiation Monitoring SystemDesignBasesDesignEvaluation XII-1XII-1XII-1XII-1XII-1XII-1XII-2XII-2XII-2XII-3XII-3XII-3XII-3XII-4XII-4XII-6XII-6XII-6XII-7XZI-7XII-9XII-9XII-9XII-9XII-9XII-9XII-9XII-10XII-11XII-11XII-11XII-12XII-12XII-12XII-12XII-13XII-13XII-13XII-13XII-14XII-15UFSARRevision14xviiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) SectionTitlePacae2.22~2.122'.33'F13.1.13'.233'.43.23'.13'.23'3'.133.23'.33.43'.13.53~5.13'.23.5.33.5.43.5.54'4.14.24.34'4'.14'.24'AreaAirContamination Monitoring SystemDesignBasesDesignEvaluation Radiation Protection Facilities Laboratory, CountingRoomandCalibration Facilities ChangeRoomandLaundryFacilities Personnel Decontamination FacilityToolandEquipment Decontamination FacilityRadiation ControlShielding AccessControlContamination ControlFacilityContamination ControlPersonnel Contamination ControlAirborneContamination ControlPersonnel DoseDeterminations Radiation DoseRadiation Protection Instrumentation CountingRoomInstrumentation PortableRadiation Instrumentation AirSamplingInstrumentation Personnel Monitoring Instruments Emergency Instrumentation TestsandInspections Shielding AreaRadiation MonitorsAreaAirContamination MonitorsRadiation Protection Facilities Ventilation AirFlowsInstrument Calibration WellShielding Radiation Protection Instrumentation A.1.01~11~1~11.1'ORGANIZATION ANDRESPONSIBILITY Management andTechnical SupportOrganization NuclearDivisionVicePresident andGeneralManager-NuclearVicePresident NuclearEngineering SECTIONXIIICONDUCTOFOPERATIONS XII-15XII-15XII-16XII-16XII-16XII-17XII-17XII-18XII-18XII-18XII-19XII-19XII-20XII-21XII-21XZI-21XII-22XII-23XII-23XII-24XII-24XII-24XII-25XII-25XII-25XII-26XII-26XII-26XII-27XII-27XII-27XII-27XII-27XIII-1XIII-1XIII-1XIII-1XIII-1XIII-2UFSARRevision14X1XJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) Section1.1.31.1.41~1~51.1.61.22.02.12'3.04.0B.1.02.03.04.04.14.24.34.3.14.3.24.3.34.3.44.3.54.3.64.3'4'5.0C.D.E.F.1.01.11'1.31.4TitleVicePresident NuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportDirectorNuclearCommunications andPublicAffairsManagerHumanResourceDevelopment GeneralManagerBusinessManagement Corporate SupportDepartments Operating Organization PlantManagerGeneralManagerBusinessManagement QualityAssurance FacilityStaffQualifications QUALIFICATIONS ANDTRAININGOFPERSONNEL ThisSectionDeletedThisSectionDeletedThisSectionDeletedTrainingofPersonnel GeneralResponsibility Implementation QualityForOperatorTrainingForMaintenance ForTechnicians ForGeneralEmployeeTraining/Radiation Protection andEmergency PlanForIndustrial SafetyForNuclearQualityAssurance ForFireBrigadeTrainingofLicensedOperatorCandidates/Licensed NRCOperatorRetraining Cooperative TrainingwithLocal,StateandFederalOfficials OPERATING PROCEDURES EMERGENCY PLANANDPROCEDURES SECURITYRECORDSOperations ControlRoomLogBookStationShiftSupervisor's BookRadwasteLogBookWasteQuantityLevelShippedPacaeXIII-2XIII-4XIII-4XIII-4XIII-4XZZI-5XIII-5XIII-8XIII-8XIII-8XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-9XIII-10XIII-10XIII-10XIII-10XIII-10XIII-10XIII-11XIII-12XIII-13XIII-15XIII-16XIII-16XIII-16XIII-16XIII-16XIII-16UFSARRevision14XXJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) Section2.03.03'3.23.33.43.54.05.06.07.0G.1.01.12'F13.0SECTIONXIVTitleMaintenance Radiation Protection Personnel ExposureBy-Product MaterialasRequiredby10CFR30MeterCalibrations StationRadiological Conditions inAccessible AreasAdministration oftheRadiation Protection ProgramandProcedures Chemistry andRadiochemistry SpecialNuclearMaterials Calibration ofInstruments Administrative RecordsandReportsREVIEWANDAUDITOFOPERATIONS StationOperations ReviewCommittee FunctionSafetyReviewandAuditBoardFunctionReviewofOperating Experience INITIALTESTINGANDOPERATIONS PacaeXIII-16XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-17XIII-19XIII-19XIII-19XIII-19XIII-19XIII-20XIV-1A.TESTSPRIORTOINITIALREACTORFUELINGXIV-1B.1'1.11.21.32.02.12'3.04.05.06.0SECTIONXVA.INITIALCRITICALITY ANDPOSTCRITICALITY TESTSInitialFuelLoadingandNear-Zero PowerTestsatAtmospheric PressureGeneralRequirements GeneralProcedures CoreLoadingandCriticalTestProgramHeatupfromAmbienttoRatedTemperature GeneralTestsConducted FromZeroto100PercentInitialReactorRatingFull-Power Demonstration RunComparison ofBaseConditions Additional TestsatDesignRatingSAFETYANALYSISINTRODUCTION XIV-5XIV-5XIV-5XIV-5XIV-7XIV-9XIV-9XIV-9XIV-10XIV-12XIV-12XIV-13XV-1XV-1UFSARRevision14xxiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~SecticB.1.02.03.03.133.1.233.1.43.23.2.133.2'3'3.3.13.3.23.3.33.3.43'3.4.13.4.23.4.33.4.43.53.5.13.5.23.5.33.5.43.63.6.13.6~23.6.33.6.43.73.F13.7.233.7.43.83.8.13.8.23.8.33.8.43.93.9.1TitleBOUNDARYPROTECTION SYSTEMSTransients Considered MethodsandAssumptions Transient AnalysisTurbineTripWithoutBypassObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsLossof100'FFeedwater HeatingObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions ResultsFeedwater Controller Failure-MaximumDemandObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsControlRodWithdrawal ErrorObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsMainSteamLineIsolation ValveClosure(WithScram)Objectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsInadvertent StartupofColdRecirculation LoopObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsRecirculation PumpTripsObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsRecirculation PumpStallObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsRecirculation FlowController Malfunction -IncreaseFlowObjectives PacaeXV-2XV-2XV-3XV-3XV-3XV-3XV-3XV-3XV-3XV-4XV-4XV-4XV-4XV-5XV-5XV-5XV-5XV-5XV-5XV-5XV-5XV-6XV-6XV-6XV-6XV-6XV-7XV-7XV-7XV-7XV-7XV-8XV-9XV-9XV-9XV-9XV-9XV-10XV-10XV-10XV-10XV-10XV-11XV-11XV-11UFSARRevision14xxiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~Sectio3.9.23.9.33.9.43'03.10.13.10'3.10.33.10'3'13.11~13.11.23.11.33.11.43~123.12.13.12.23.12.33.12.43'33.13'3.13.23.13.33.13.43.143.14.13.14.23.14.33'4.43.153.15.13.15.23.15.33.15.43.163.16.13.16.23.16.33.16.43.173.17'3.17.23.17.3TitleAssumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsFlowController Malfunction-DecreaseFlowObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsInadvertent Actuation ofOneSolenoidReliefValveObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsSafetyValveActuation (Overpressurization Analysis) Objectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsFeedwater Controller Malfunction (ZeroDemand)Objectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsTurbineTripwithPartialBypass(LowPower)Objectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsTurbineTripwithPartialBypass(FullPower)Objectives Assumptions andInitialConditions ~CommentsResultsInadvertent Actuation ofOneBypassValveObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsOneFeedwater PumpTripandRestartObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsPacaeXV-11XV-11XV-11XV-12XV-12XV-12XV-12XV-12XV-12XV-12XV-12XV-13XV-13XV-13XV-13XV-13XV-14XV-14XV-15XV-15XV-15XV-15XV-15XV-16XV-16XV-16XV-16XV-16XV-17XV-17XV-17XV-17XV-17XV-18XV-18XV-18XV-18XV-18XV-18XV-18XV-18XV-19UFSARRevision14XxiiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) Section3.17.43.183.193.19.13.19.23.19.33.19'3.203.20.13.20.23.20.33.20.43.213.21.13.21.23.21.33.21.43.223.22.13.22'3.22.33.22.43.233.23.13.23.23.23.33.23.43.243.24.13.24.23.24.33.24.43.253.25.13.25.23.25.33.25.4C.1.01.11.21.2.11.2'1.2.31.2.4TitleResultsLossofMainCondenser VacuumLossofElectrical Load(Generator Trip)Objectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsLossofAuxiliary PowerObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsPressureRegulator Malfunction Objectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsInstrument AirFailureObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsDcPowerInterruptions Objectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsFailureofOneDieselGenerator toStartObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsPowerBusLossofVoltageObjectives Assumptions andInitialConditions CommentsResultsSTANDBYSAFEGUARDS ANALYSISMainSteamLineBreakOutsidetheDrywellIdentification ofCausesAccidentAnalysisValveClosureInitiation Feedwater FlowCoreShutdownMixtureLevelPacaeXV-19XV-19XV-19XV-19XV-19XV-20XV-20XV-20XV-20XV-20XV-20XV-20XV-21XV-21XV-21XV-21XV-21XV-22XV-22XV-22XV-22XV-22XV-26XV-26XV-26XV-26XV-26XV-27XV-27XV-27XV-27XV-27XV-27XV-27XV-27XV-28XV-28XV-29XV-29XV-29XV-29XV-30XV-30XV-30XV-30UFSARRevision14xxivJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~Sectio1.2.51.2.61.2.71.2.81.31.3.1112.02.12.22.2.12.2.22.2.32.2.42.32.42.4.122.4.32.4.3.12.4.3.22.4.43.03'3'3'3.3'3.3.23'3'4.04.14.24.34.44.54.5.14.5.25.05.15.1.1TitleSubcooled LiquidSystemPressureandSteam-Water MassMixtureImpactForcesCoreInternalForcesRadiological EffectsRadioactivity ReleasesMeteorology andDoseRatesComparison withRegulatory Guide1.5Loss-of-Coolant AccidentIntroduction InputtoAnalysisOperational andECCSInputParameters SingleFailureStudyonECCSManually-Controlled Electrically-Operated ValvesSingleFailureBasisPipeWhipBasisDeletedAppendixKLOCAPerformance AnalysisComputerCodesDescription ofModelChangesAnalysisProcedure BWR/2GenericAnalysisUnit1-SpecificAnalysisBreakSpectrumEvaluation AnalysisResultsRefueling AccidentIdentification ofCausesAccidentAnalysisRadiological EffectsFissionProductReleasesMeteorology andDoseRatesComparison toRegulatory Guide1.25ControlRodDropAccidentIdentification ofCausesAccidentAnalysisDesignedSafeguards Procedural Safeguards Radiological EffectsFissionProductReleasesMeteorology andDoseRatesContainment DesignBasisAccidentOriginalRecirculation LineRuptureAnalysis-WithCoreSprayPurposePacaeXV-30XV-31XV-31XV-31XV-31XV-32XV-32XV-33XV-34XV-34XV-35XV-35XV-35XV-35XV-36XV-36XV-36XV-36XV-37XV-37XV-37XV-38XV-38XV-40XV-40XV-41XV-44XV-44XV-45XV-45XV-45XV-45XV-46XV-46XV-47XV-47XV-48XV-50XV-50XV-50XV-50UFSARRevision14xxvJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~Sectic5.1.25.1.35.1.45.1.55.1.65~1.75'.85.1.8.15'.8.25.25.2.15.2.25.2.35.2.45.2.55.2.65.35.3.15.3.25.3.35.3.3.15.3.3.25.3.3.35.3.3.45.3.46.06.16.26.37.07'7'7.37.47.57.67.7~iticAnalysisMethodandAssumptions CoreHeatBuildupCoreSpraySystemContainment PressureImmediately Following BlowdownContainment SprayBlowdownEffectsonCoreComponents Radiological EffectsFissionProductReleasesMeteorology andDoseRatesOriginalContainment DesignBasisAccidentAnalysis-WithoutCoreSprayPurposeCoreHeatupContainment ResponseFissionProductReleasefromtheFuelFissionProductReleasefromtheReactorandContainment Meteorology andDoseRatesDesignBasisReconstitution Suppression ChamberHeatupAnalysisIntroduction InputtoAnalysisDBRSuppression ChamberHeatupAnalysisComputerCodesAnalysisMethodsAnalysisResultsforContainment SprayDesignBasisAssumptions AnalysisResultsforEOPOperation Assumptions Conclusions NewFuelBundleLoadingErrorAnalysisIdentification ofCausesAccidentAnalysisSafetyRequirements Meteorological ModelsUsedinAccidentAnalysesGroundReleasesStackReleasesVariability Exfiltration GroundDeposition ThyroidDoseWholeBodyDosePacaeXV-51XV-51XV-52XV-53XV-54XV-55XV-56XV-56XV-59XV-59XV-59XV-59XV-60XV-61XV-61XV-61XV-61XV-61XV-62XV-63XV-63XV-63XV-64XV-65XV-66XV-66XV-66XV-67XV-67XV-68XV-68XV-68XV-69XV-70XV-76XV-77XV-77UFSARRevision14xxviJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLE.OFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) SectionD.SECTIONXVIA.1~02.02.12.22.2.12.32.42.4.12.52.62.6.12.6.22.6.32.6.42.6.52.72.7'2.7.22.72'2.7.2.32.7.32.7.3.12.7.3.22.83.03.13.24.04.14.25.0TitleREFERENCES SPECIALTOPICALREPORTSREACTORVESSELApplicability ofFormalCodesandPertinent Certifications DesignAnalysisCodeApprovalAnalysisSteady-State AnalysisBasisforDetermining StressesPipeReactionCalculations Earthquake LoadingCriteriaandAnalysisSeismicAnalysisforCoreShroudRepairModification ReactorVesselSupportStressDesignCriteriaandAnalysisStrainSafetyMarginforReactorVesselsIntroduction StrainMarginFailureProbability ResultsofProbability AnalysisConclusions Components RequiredforSafeReactorShutdownDesignBasisLoadCombinations ExpectedStressandDeformation Recirculation LineBreakSteamLineBreakEarthquake LoadingsStressesandDeformations atWhichtheComponent isUnabletoFunctionandMarginofSafetyRecirculation LineBreakSteamLineBreakSafetyMarginsAgainstDuctileFractureInspection andTestReportSummaryMaterials Fabrication andInspection Surveillance Provisions CouponSurveillance ProgramPeriodicInspection CoreShroudStabilizer DesignDescription PacaeXV-79XVI-1XVI-1XVI-1XVI-2XVI-2XVI-3XVI-3XVI-4XVI-4XVI-5XVI-5XVI-7XVI-7XVI-8XVI-9XVI-11XVI-11XVI-11XVI-12XVI-12XVI-12XVI-13XVI-13XVI-14XVI-14XVI-15XVI-17XVI-18XVI-18XVI-18XVI-20XVI-20XVI-21XVI-21UFSARRevision14xxviiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~secticB.1.02.02.12'2.32.42.52.5.12.62.72.82.8.12.8.22.8'2.8.42.8.52.8.62.8.72.8.82.93.03.13.23'3~3~13.3.23.3.2-13.3.2.23.3.2.33.3.2.43'.2.5C.1.01.11'TitlePRESSURESUPPRESSION CONTAINMENT Applicability ofFormalCodesandPertinent Certifications DesignAnalysisCodeApprovalCalculations UnderRatedConditions UltimateCapability UnderAccidentConditions Capability toWithstand InternalMissilesandJetForcesFloodingCapabilities oftheContainment DrywellAirGapTestsandInspections Biological ShieldWallCompatibility ofDynamicDeformations Occurring intheDrywell,Torus,andConnecting VentPipesContainment Penetrations Classification ofPenetrations DesignBasesMethodofStressAnalysisLeakTestCapability FatigueDesignMaterialSpecification Applicable CodesJetandReactionLoadsDrywellShearResistance Capability andSupportSkirtJunctionStressesInspection andTestReportSummaryFabrication andInspection TestsConducted Discussion ofResultsResultsEffectofVariousTransients AmbientTemperature andSolarHeatingofShellThermalLagThroughReference ChamberWallCondensation inReference ChamberVolumeChangesDuetoThermalTransients Overpressure Test-PlateStressesENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS SeismicAnalysisandStressReportIntroduction Mathematical ModelPacaeXVI-22XVI-22XVI-23XVI-23XVI-23XVI-23XVI-24XVI-25XVI-26XVI-26XVI-28XVI-30XVI-30XVI-30XVI-31XVI-31XVI-31XVI-32XVI-32XVI-33XVI-33XVI-34XVI-34XVI-34XVI-36XVI-36XVI-36XVI-36XVI-37XVI-37XVI-37XVI-38XVI-39XVI-39XVI-39XVI-40UFSARRevision14XXViiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~eectic1.31.3.11.3'21.3~31.3~41.3.51.3.611.42.02.12.1~12.1.22.1~32.1.42.22.2'D.1.01~11~1~11.1~21.21.32.02~12.1~12.1.1.12.1.1.22.1~22.1~32.23.04.0E.F.G.TitleMethodofAnalysisFlexibility orInfluence Coefficient MatrixNormalModeFrequencies andModeShapesTheSeismicSpectrumValuesDynamicModalLoadsModalResponseQuantities TheCombinedResponseQuantities BasicCriteriaforAnalysisDiscussion ofResultsContainment SpraySystemDesignAdequacyatRatedConditions GeneralCondensation andHeatRemovalMechanisms Mechanical DesignLoss-of-Coolant AccidentSummaryofTestResultsSprayTestsConducted DESIGNOFSTRUCTURES gCOMPONENTS IEQUIPMENT, ANDSYSTEMSClassification andSeismicCriteriaDesignTechniques Structures SystemsandComponents PipeSupportsSeismicExposureAssumptions PlantDesignforProtection AgainstPostulated PipingFailuresinHigh-Energy LinesInsidePrimaryContainment Containment. Integrity AnalysisFluidForcesImpactVelocities andEffectsSystemsAffectedbyLineBreakEngineered Safeguards Protection OutsidePrimaryContainment BuildingSeparation AnalysisTornadoProtection EXHIBITSCONTAINMENT DESIGNREVIEWUSAGEOFCODES/STANDARDS FORSTRUCTURAL STEELANDCONCRETEPacaeXVI-40XVI-41XVI-41XVI-42XVI-43XVI-43XVI-43XVI-44XVI-44XVI-45XVI-45XVI-45XVI-45XVI-50XVI-51XVI-52XVI-52XVI-53XVI-53XVI-55XVI-55XVI-58XVI-59XVI-60XVI-61XVI-61XVI-61XVI-62XVI-62XVI-63XVI-67XVI-69XVI-69XVI-69XVI-72XVI-110XVI-121UFSARRevision14xxixJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) SectionH.TitleREFERENCES SECTIONXVIIORIGINALENVIRONMENTAL STUDIESPacaeXVI-122XVII-1A.1.02.03.03.13.1'3.1.233.23.33.43.4.14.04.14.24.34.3.14'4.4.14.4.24.54.64.6.14.6.24.6.34.75.0B.1'2.03.03.13.2METEOROLOGY GeneralSynopticMeteorological FactorsMicrometeorology WindPatterns200-FootWindRosesEstimates ofWindsatthe350-FootLevelComparison BetweenTowerandSatellite WindsLapseRateDistributions Turbulence ClassesDispersion Parameters ChangesinDispersion Parameters Applications toReleaseProblemsConcentrations fromaGround-Level SourceConcentrations fromanElevatedSourceRadialConcentrations MonthlyandAnnualSectorConcentrations LeastFavorable Concentrations OveranExtendedPeriodGround-Level ReleaseElevatedReleaseMeanAnnualSectorDeposition DoseRatesfromaPlumeofGammaEmittersRADOSProgramCenterline DoseRatesSectorDoseRatesConcentrations fromaMajorSteamLineBreakConclusions LIMNOLOGY Introduction SummaryReportofCruisesDilutionofStationEffluentinSelectedAreasDilutionofEffluentattheLakeSurfaceAbovetheDischarge DilutionofEffluentattheSiteBoundaries XVII-1XVII-1XVII-2XVII-2XVII-2XVII-2XVII-2XVII-16XVII-19XVII-19XVII-19XVII-39XVII-45XVII-46XVII-53XVII-55XVII-55XVII-83XVII-83XVII-86XVII-87XVII-90XVII-90XVII-91XVII-100XVII-103XVII-106XVII-107XVII-107XVII-107XVII-109XVII-109XVII-114UFSARRevision14XXXJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~Sectic3~2~13.2.23.2.33.33.3'333.3.43.3.53.3.63.43.54.04.14.1.14.1.24.25.0C.1.02.03.03.13.24.04.14.24.34'4.5SECTIONXVIIIA.1.0TitleGeneralDilutionofEffluentattheEasternSiteBoundaryDilutionofEffluentWestoftheStationSiteDilutionofEffluentattheCityofOswegoIntakeTiltingoftheIsothermal PlanesandSubsequent DilutionDilutionasaFunctionofCurrentVelocityPercentofTimeEffluentWillBeCarriedtotheOswegoAreaMixingwithDistanceOswegoRiverWaterasaBuffertoPreventEffluentFromPassingOvertheIntake.SummaryofAnnualDilutionFactorsfortheCityofOswegoIntakeDilutionofEffluentattheNineMilePointIntakeSummaryofDilutionintheNineMilePointAreaPreliminary StudyofLakeBiotaOffNineMilePointBiological StudiesPlanktonStudyBottomStudySummaryofBiological StudiesConclusions EARTHSCIENCESIntroduction Additional Subsurface StudiesConstruction Experience StationAreaIntakeandDischarge TunnelsCorrelation WithPreviousStudiesGeneralGeological Conditions Hydrological Conditions Seismological Conditions Conclusion HUMANFACTORSENGINEERING/SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAYSYSTEMDETAILEDCONTROLROOMDESIGNREVIEWGeneralPacaeXVII-114XVII-116XVII-122XVII-123XVII-123XVII-124XVII-127XVII-127XVII-127XVII-127XVII-128XVII-128XVII-129XVII-129XVII-129XVII-129XVII-130XVII-130XVII-132XVII-132XVII-132XVII-138XVII-138XVII-139XVII-140XVII-140XVII-140XVII-142XVII-142XVII-142XVIII-1XVIII-1XVIII-1UFSARRevision14xxxiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) ~Sectic2.03.03'3.23.33.43.53.63.73.84.04.14.24.2.14.2.25.06.06.16.26.36.47.0B.1.02.03.04.05.05.15.1.15.1.25.1.35.1.45.25.2.15.2.2TitlePlanningRequirements fortheDCRDRDCRDRReviewProcessOperatorSurveyHistorical ReviewTaskAnalysisControlRoomInventory ControlRoomSurveyVerification ofTaskPerformance Capabilities Validation ofControlRoomFunctions Compilation ofDiscrepancy FindingsAssessment andImplementation Assessment Implementation Integrated CosmeticPackageFunctional FixesReporting Continuing HumanFactorsProgramFixVerifications Multidisciplinary ReviewTeamAssessments HumanFactorsManualforFutureDesignChangeOutstanding HumanFactorsItemsReferences SAFETYPARAMETER DISPLAYSYSTEMIntroduction totheSafetyParameter DisplaySystemSystemDescription RoleoftheSPDSHumanFactorsEngineering Guidelines HumanFactorsEngineering Principles AppliedtotheSPDSDesignNUREG-0737, Supplement 1,Section4.1.aConciseDisplayCriteriaPlantVariables RapidandReliableDetermination ofSafetyStatusAidtoControlRoomPersonnel NUREG-0737, Supplement 1,Section4.1.bConvenient LocationContinuous DisplayPacaeXVIII-1XVIII-2XVIII-2XVIII-2XVIII-3XVIII-3XVIII-3XVIII-3XVIII-4XVIII-4XVIII-4XVIII-4XVIII-5XVIII-5XVIII-6XVIII-6XVIII-6XVIII-7XVIII-7XVIII-7XVIII-7XVIII-8XVIII-10XVIII-10XVIII-10XVIII-11XVIII-11XVIII-11XVIII-12XVIII-12XVIII-12XVIII-12XVIII-12XVIII-13XVIII-13XVIII-13UFSARRevision14xxxiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEOFCONTENTS(Cont'd.) Section5.35.3.15.3.25.45.4.15.4.25.56.06.16.27.0TitleNUREG-0737, Supplement 1,Section4.1.cProcedures andTrainingIsolation ofSPDSfromSafety-Related SystemsNUREG-0737, Supplement 1,Section4.1.eIncorporation ofAcceptedHumanFactorsEngineering Principles Information CanbeReadilyPerceived andComprehended NUREG-0737, Supplement 1,Section4.1.f,Sufficient Information Procedures Operating Procedures Surveillance Procedures References PacaeXVIII-13XVIII-13XVIII-13XVIII-14XVIII-14XVIII-14XVIII-15XVIII-15XVIII-15XVIII-15XVIII-16APPENDIXAAPPENDIXBUnusedNIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATION QUALITYASSURANCE PROGRAMTOPICALREPORT(NMPC-QATR-1), NINEMILEPOINTNUCLEARSTATIONUNITS1AND2OPERATIONS PHASEUFSARRevision14XXXiiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFTABLESTable~NuberII-1II-2II-3II-4II-5II-6II-7II-8V-1V-2V-3V-4V-5VI-1VI-2VZ-3aVI-3bVI-4VI-5VII-1VIIZ-1VIII-2VIII-3Title1980Population andPopulation DensityforTownsandCitiesWithin12MilesofNineMilePoint-Unit1CitiesWithina50-mileRadiusoftheStationWithPopulations over10,000RegionalAgricultural UseRegionalAgricultural Statistics -CattleandMilkProduction Industrial FirmsWithin8km(5mi)ofUnit1PublicUtilities inOswegoCountyPublicWaterSupplyDataforLocations WithinanApproximate 30-MileRadiusRecreational AreasintheRegionReactorCoolantSystemDataOperating CyclesandTransient AnalysisResultsFatigueResistance AnalysisCodesforSystemsConnected totheReactorCoolantSystemTimetoAutomatic BlowdownDrywellPenetrations Suppression ChamberPenetrations ReactorCoolantSystemIsolation ValvesPrimaryContainment Isolation Valves-LinesEnteringFreeSpaceoftheContainment SeismicDesignCriteriaforIsolation ValvesInitialTestsPriortoStationOperation Performance TestsAssociation BetweenPrimarySafetyFunctions andEmergency Operating Procedures ListofEOPKeyParameters TypeandInstrument CategoryforUnit1RG1.97Variables ZX-1XII-1XII-2XII-3XII-4XII-5XII-6Magnitude andDutyCycleofMajorStationBatteryLoadsFlowsandActivities ofMajorSourcesofGaseousActivityQuantities andActivities ofLiquidRadioactive WastesAnnualSolidWasteAccumulation andActivityLiquidWasteDisposalSystemMajorComponents SolidWasteDisposalSystemMajorComponents Occupancy TimesUFSARRevision14xxxivJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd.) TableNumberTitleXII-7XII-8XIII-1XV-1XV-2XV-3XV-4XV-5XV-6XV-7XV-8XV-.9XV-9AXV-10XV-llXV-12XV-13XV-14XV-15XV-16XV-17XV-18XV-19XV-20XV-21XV-21AXV-21BXV-21CXV-21DXV-21EXV-22XV-23XV-24XV-25XV-26XV-27XV-28XV-29XV-29aXV-29bGammaEnergyGroupsAreaRadiation MonitorDetectorLocations ANSIStandardCross-Reference Unit1Transients Considered TripPointsforProtective Functions TableDeletedInstrument AirFailureBlowdownRatesIodineConcentrations (pCi/gm)Fractional Concentrations inCloudsMainSteamLineBreakAccidentDosesSignificant InputParameters totheLoss-of-Coolant AccidentAnalysisCoreSpraySystemFlowPerformance AssumedinLOCAAnalysisECCSSingleValveFailureAnalysisSingleFailuresConsidered inLOCAAnalysisTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedAnalysisAssumptions ForNineMilePoint1Calculations TableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedTableDeletedReactorBuildingAirborneFissionProductInventory (curies)StackDischarge Rates(curies/sec) FuelHandlingAccidentDoses(REM)FissionProductReleaseAssumptions Atmospheric Dispersion andDoseConversion FactorsEffectonDoseofFactorsUsedintheCalculations NobleGasReleaseHalogenReleaseWettingofFuelCladdingbyCoreSprayAirborneDrywellFissionProductInventory (curies)UFSARRevision14xxxvJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd.) TableNumberTitleXV-29cXV-29dXV-30XV-31XV-32XV-32aXV-33XV-34XV-35XV-36XVI-1XVI-2XVZ-3XVI-4XVI-5XVI-6XVZ-7XVI-8XVI-9XVZ-9aXVI-10XVI-11XVI-12XVI-13XVI-14XVI-15XVI-16XVI-17XVI-18XVZ-19XVI-20XVI-21XVI-22XVI-23XVI-24ReactorBuildingAirborneFissionProductInventory (curies)StackDischarge Rates(curies/sec) AirborneDrywellFissionProductInventory (curies)ReactorBuildingAirborneFissionProductInventory (curies)StackDischarge Rates(curies/sec) Significant InputParameters totheDBRContainment Suppression ChamberHeatupAnalysisDownwindGroundConcentrations MaximumGroundConcentrations Diversity FactorsforGroundConcentrations ReactorBuildingLeakagePathsCodeCalculation SummarySteady-State -(1004FullPowerNormalOperation) Pertinent StressesorStressIntensities ListofReactions forReactorVesselNozzlesEffectofValueofInitialFailureProbability SingleTransient EventforReactorPressureVesselPostulated EventsMaximumStrainsfromPostulated EventsCoreStructure AnalysisRecirculation LineBreakCoreStructure AnalysisSteamLineBreakCoreShroudRepairDesignSupporting Documentation DrywellJetandMissileHazardAnalysisDataDrywellJetandMissileHazardAnalysisResultsStressDuetoDrywellFloodingAllowable WeldShearStressLeakRateTestResultsOverpressure Test-PlateStressesStressSummaryHeatTransferCoefficients asaFunctionofDropDiameterHeatTransferCoefficient asaFunctionofPressureRelationship BetweenParticleSizeandTypeofSprayPatternAllowable StressesforFloorSlabs,Beams,Columns,Walls,Foundations, etc.Allowable StressesforStructural SteelAllowable Stresses-ReactorVesselConcretePedestalDrywell-AnalyzedDesignLoadCombinations Suppression Chamber-AnalyzedDesignLoadCombinations UFSARRevision14xxxviJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd.) TableNumberTitleXVI-25XVI-26XVI-27XVI-28XVI-29XVI-30XVI-31XVII-1XVII-2XVII-3XVII-4XVII-5XVII-6XVII-7XVII-8XVII-9XVII-10XVII-11XVII-12XVII-13XVII-14XVII-15XVII-16XVII-17XVII-18XVII-19XVII-20ACICode505Allowable StressesandActualStressesforConcreteVentilation StackAllowable StressesforConcreteSlabs,Walls,Beams,Structural Steel,andConcreteBlockWallsSystemLoadCombinations High-Energy Systems-InsideContainment High-Energy Systems-OutsideContainment SystemsWhichMayBeAffectedbyPipeWhipCapability toResistWindPressureandWindVelocityDispersion andAssociated Meteorological Parameters RelationofSatellite andNineMilePointWindsFrequency ofOccurrence ofLapseRates-1963and1964RelationBetweenWindDirection RangeandTurbulence ClassesStackCharacteristics Distribution ofTurbulence ClassesBySectorsSectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorAElev.350SectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorBElev.350SectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorCElev.350SectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorD,Elev.350SectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorD~Elev.350SectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorEElev.350SectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorFElev.350SectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorGElev.350SectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorAGroundHeightSectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorBGroundHeightSectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorCGroundHeightSectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorD,GroundHeightSectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorDzGroundHeightSectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorEGroundHeightUFSARRevision14XXXViiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFTABLES(Cont'd.) TableNumberXVII-21XVII-22XVII-23XVII-24XVII-25XVII-26XVII-27XVII-28XVII-29XVII-30XVIII-1TitleSectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorFGroundHeightSectorConcentrations -1963-64-SectorGGroundHeightEstimates oftheLeastFavorable 30Daysin100YearsConcentrations intheLeastFavorable CalendarMonth-1963-64AnnualAverageSectorDeposition Rates(Vg=0.5cm/sec)AnnualAverageSectorDeposition Rates(Vg=2.5cm/sec)Principal Radionuclides inGaseousWasteReleaseCorrection FactorstoObtainAdjustedCenterline DoseRatesforSectorEstimates AnnualAverageGammaDoseRatesDilutionCalculation forEastwardCurrentsBasedonWaterAvailability SPDSParameter SetUFSARRevision14xxxviiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURESFigureNumineII-1II-2II-3II-4II-5II-6III-1III-2III-3III-4III-5III-6III-7III-8III-9III-10III-11III-12III-13IZZ-14III-15III-16III-17III-18III-19III-20III-21III-22III-23IV-1IV-2IV-3IV-4IV-5IV-6IV-7IV-8TitlePiping,Instrument andEquipment SymbolsStationLocationAreaMapSiteTopography Population Distribution Withina12MileRadiusoftheStationCountiesandTownsWithin12MilesoftheStation1980Population Distribution Withina50MileRadiusoftheStationPlotPlanStationFloorPlan-Elevation 225-6StationFloorPlan-Elevations 237-0and250-0StationFloorPlan-Elevation 261-0StationFloorPlan-Elevations 277-0and281-0StationFloorPlan-Elevations 281-0and291-0StationFloorPlan-Elevations 298-0and300-0StationFloorPlan-Elevations 317-6and318-0StationFloorPlan-Elevations 320-0,333-8,340-0and369-0SectionBetweenColumnRows7and8SectionBetweenColumnRows12and14TurbineBuildingVentilation SystemLaboratory andRadiation Protection FacilityVentilation SystemControlRoomVentilation SystemWasteDisposalBuildingVentilation SystemWasteDisposalBuildingExtension Ventilation SystemOffGasBuildingVentilation SystemTechnical SupportCenterVentilation SystemCirculating WaterChannelsUnderScreenandPumpHouse-NormalOperation Circulating WaterChannelsUnderScreenandPumpHouse-SpecialOperations IntakeandDischarge TunnelsPlanandProfileStack-PlanandElevation StackFailure-CriticalDirections LimitingPower/Flow Line(Typical) FigureDeletedFigureDeletedTypicalControlRod-Isometric FigureDeletedControlRodDriveandHydraulic SystemControlRodDriveAssemblyTypicalControlRodtoDriveCoupling-Isometric UFSARRevision14xxxixJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.) FigureNumberTitleIV-9ReactorVesselIsometric V-1V-2V-3V-4V-5V-6V-7V-8VI-1VI-2VI-3VI-4VI-4aVI-5VI-6VI-7VI-8VI-9VI-10VI-11VI-12VI-13VI-14VI-15VI-16VI-17VI-18VI-19VI-20VI-21VI-22VI-23ReactorEmergency CoolantSystemReactorVesselNozzleLocationReactorVesselSupportFigureDeletedPressureVesselEmbrittlement TrendFigureDeletedFigureDeletedEmergency Condenser SupplyIsolation Valves(Typicalof2)DrywellandSuppression ChamberElectrical Penetrations -HighVoltageElectrical Penetrations -LowVoltagePipePenetrations. -HotClamshell Expansion JointTypicalPenetration ForInstrument LinesReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-Acceleration East-West Direction ReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-Deflections East-West Direction ReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-Elevation vs.BuildingShearEast-West Direction ReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-Elevation vs.BuildingMomentEast-West Direction ReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-Acceleration North-South Direction ReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-Deflections North-South Direction ReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-Elevation vs.BuildingShear-North-South Direction ReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-Elevation vs.BuildingMoment-North-South Direction ReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevation vs.Acceleration ReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevation vs.Deflection ReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevation vs.ShearReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevation vs.MomentTypicalDoorSealsDetailsofReactorBuildingAirLocksInstrument LineIsolation ValveArrangement TypicalFlowCheckValveIsolation ValveSystemDrywellCoolingSystemUFSARRevision14xlJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.) FigureNumberVI-24VII-1VII-2VII-3VIX-4VII-5VII-6VII-7VII-8VII-9VII-10VII-11VXI-12VII-13VII-14VII-15VII-16VII-17VIII-1VIII-2VIII-3VIII-4VIII-5VIII-6VIII-7VIII-8VIII-9VIII-10VIII-11VIII-12VIII-13VIXI-14VIII-15VIII-16VIII-17VIII-18TitleReactorBuildingVentilation SystemCoreSpraySystemCoreSpraySpargerFlow,PerSparger,forOneCoreSprayPumpandOneToppingPumpContainment SpraySystemFigureDeletedFigureDeletedLiquidPoisonSystemMinimumAllowable SolutionTemperature FigureDeletedTypicalControlRodVelocityLimiterControlRodHousingSupportHydrogenFlammability LimitsCombustible GasControlSystemH~-O,SamplingSystemHydrogenandOxygenConcentrations inContainment Following LossofCoolantAccidentNitrogenAddedbyContainment Atmospheric DilutionOperation Following LossofCoolantAccidentContainment PressurewithContainment Atmospheric DilutionOperation -ZeroContainment LeakageFeedwater DeliveryCapability (ShaftDrivenPump)toTimeAfterTurbineTripfor1000psigReactorPressureand1.0InchHGABSExhaustPressureProtective SystemFunctionReactorProtection SystemElementary DiagramProtective SystemTypicalSensorArrangement Recirculation FlowandTurbineControlNeutronMonitoring Instrument RangesSourceRangeMonitor(SRM)SRMDetectorLocationIntermediate RangeMonitor(IRM)IRMCoreLocationLPRMLocationWithinCoreLatticeLPRMandAPRMCoreLocationLocalPowerRangeMonitor(LPRM)andAveragePowerRangeMonitors(APRM)APRMSystem-TypicalTripLogicforAPRMScramandRodBlockTraversing In-CoreProbeRodPatternDuringStartupRadialPowerDistribution forControlRodPatternShowninFigureVXII-16DistancefromWorstControlRodtoNearestActiveIRMMonitorUFSARRevisionxliJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.) FigureNumberVIII-19VIII-20VIII-21VIII-22VIII-23VIII-24VIII-25VIII-26VIII-27VIII-28VIII-29IX-1IX-2IX-3IX-4IX-5IX-6IX-7X-1X-2X-3X-4X-5X-6X-7X-8X-9X-10X-11XI-1XI-2XI-3XI-4XI-5XI-6XI-7TitleMeasuredResponseTimeofIntermediate RangeSafetyInstrumentation EnvelopeofMaximumAPRMDeviation byFlowControlReduction inPowerEnvelopeofMaximumAPRMDeviation forAPRMTrackingWithOnUnitsControlRodWithdrawal MainSteamLineRadiation MonitorReactorBuildingVentilation Radiation MonitorOffgasSystemRadiation MonitorEmergency Condenser VentRadiation MonitorStackEffluentandLiquidEffluentRadiation MonitorsContainment SprayHeatExchanger RawWaterEffluentRadiation MonitorContainment Atmospheric Monitoring SystemRodWorthMinimizer A.C.StationPowerDistribution ControlandInstrument PowerTraysBelowElevation 261TraysBelowElevation 277TraysBelowElevation 300DieselGenerator LoadingFollowing Loss-of-Coolant AccidentDieselGenerator LoadingforOrderlyShutdownReactorShutdownCoolingSystemReactorCleanupSystemControlRodDriveHydraulic SystemReactorBuildingClosedLoopCoolingSystemTurbineBuildingClosedLoopCoolingSystemServiceWaterSystemDecayHeatGeneration, Qvs.DaysAfterReactorShutdown',SpentFuelStoragePoolFiltering andCoolingSystemBreathing, Instrument, andServiceAirReactorRefueling SystemPictorial CaskDropProtection SystemSteamFlowandReheaterVentilation SystemExtraction SteamFlowMainCondenser AirRemovalandOffGasSystemCirculating WaterSystemCondensate FlowCondensate TransferSystemFeedwater FlowSystemUFSARRevision14xiiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.) FigureNumberXII-1XIII-1XIII-2XIII-3XIII-4XIII-5XV-1XV-2XV-3XV-4XV-5XV-6XV-7XV-8XV-9XV-10XV-11XV-12XV-13XV-14XV-15XV-16XV-17XV-18XV-19XV-20XV-21XV-22XV-23XV-24XV-25XV-26XV-27XV-28XV-29XV-30XV-31XV-32XV-33XV-34XV-35XV-36XV-37XV-38TitleRadioactive WasteDisposalSystemNMPCUpperManagement NuclearOrganization NineMilePointNuclearSiteOrganization NuclearEngineering Organization NuclearSafetyAssessment andSupportOrganization SafetyOrganization StationTransient DiagramFigureDeletedPlantResponsetoLossof100FFeedwater HeaFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedStartupofColdRecirculation Loop-PartialRecirculation PumpTrips(1Pump)Recirculation PumpTrips(5Pumps)Recirculation PumpStallFlowController Malfunction (Increased Flow)FlowController Malfunction Decreasing FlowInadvertent Actuation ofOneSolenoidReliefFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFeedwater Controller Malfunction -ZeroFlowTurbineTripWithPartialBypassIntermediate PowerTurbineTripWithPartialBypassInadvertent Actuation ofOneBypassValveOneFeedwater PumpTripandRestartLossofElectrical LoadLossofAuxiliary PowerPressureRegulator Malfunction MainSteamLineBreak-CoolantLossFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedtingPowerValveUFSARRevision14xliiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.) FigureNumberXV-39XV-40XV-41XV-42XV-43XV-44XV-45XV-46XV-47XV-48XV-49XV-50XV-51XV-52XV-53XV-54XV-55XV-56XV-56AXV-56BXV-56CXV-56DXV-56EXV-56FXV-56GXV-56HXV-57XV-58XV-59XV-60XV-60aXV-60bXV-61XV-62XV-63XV-64XV-65XV-66TitleFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedLoss-of-Coolant Accident-WithCoreSprayCladdingTemperature Loss-of-Coolant AccidentDrywellPressureLoss-of-Coolant AccidentSuppression ChamberPressureLoss-of-Coolant AccidentContainment Temperature-WithCoreSprayLoss-of-Coolant AccidentCladPerforation WithCoreSprayContainment DesignBasisCladTemperature Response-WithoutCoreSprayContainment DesignBasisMetal-Water ReactionContainment DesignBasisCladPerforation WithoutCoreSprayContainment DesignBasisContainment Temperature-WithoutCoreSprayDBRAnalysisSuppression PoolandWetwellAirspaceTemperature Response-Containment SprayDesignBasisAssumption DBRAnalysisSuppression PoolandWetwellAirspaceTemperature Response-EOPOperation Assumptions ReactorBuildingModelExfiltration vs.WindSpeed-Northerly WindReactorBuildingDifferential PressureExfiltration vs.WindSpeed-Southerly WindReactorBuilding-Isometric ReactorBuilding-CornerSectionsUFSARRevision14xlivJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.) FigureNumberXV-67XV-68XV-69XV-70XV-71XV-72TitleReactorReactorReactorReactorReactorReactorBuildingBuildingBuildingBuildingBuildingBuilding-RoofSections-PaneltoConcreteSections-Expansion JointSectionsExfiltration -Northerly WindExfiltration -Southerly WindDifferential PressureXVI-1XVI-2XVI-3XVI-4XVI-5XVI-6XVI-7XVI-8XVI-9XVI-10XVI-11XVI-12XVI-12aXVI-12bXVI-13XVI-14XVI-15XVI-16XVI-17XVI-18XVI-19XVI-20XVI-21XVI-22XVI-23XVI-24XVI-25XVI-26XVI-27XVI-28SeismicAnalysisofReactorVesselGeometric andLumpedMassRepresentation ReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevation vs.MomentReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevation vs.ShearReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevation vs.Deflection ReactorSupportDynamicAnalysis-Elevation vs.Acceleration FigureDeletedFigureDeletedFigureDeletedReactorVesselSupportStructure StressSummaryThermalAnalysisFailureProbability DensityFunctionAdditionStrainsPast44RequiredtoExceedDefinedSafetyMarginShroudWeldsCoreShroudStabilizers LossofCoolantAccident-Containment PressureNoCoreorContainment SpraysFigureDeletedDrywelltoConcreteAirGapTypicalPenetrations Biological ShieldWallConstruction DetailsVentPipeandSuppression ChamberPrimaryContainment SupportandAnchorage SealDetails-DrywellShellSteelandAdjacentConcreteDrywellSliding-Acceleration, Shear,andMomentShearResistance Capability -InsideDrywellShearResistance Capability -OutsideDrywellDrywell-SupportSkirtJunctionStressesPointLocationforContainment SpraySystemPipingHeatExchanger toDrywellComparison ofStaticandDynamicStresses(PSI)SeismicConditions -Containment SpraySystemHeatExchanger toDrywellConduction inaDropletLossofCoolantAccident-Containment PressureUFSARRevision14xlvJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.) FigureNumberXVI-29XVI-30XVI-31XVI-32XVI-33XVI-34XVI-35XVI-36XVI-37XVI-38XVI-39XVI-40XVI-41XVI-42XVI-43XVI-44XVI-45XVI-46XVI-47XVI-48XVI-49XVI-50XVI-51XVI-52XVI-53XVI-54XVI-55XVI-56XVI-57XVI-58XVI-59XVI-60XVI-61TitleLossofCoolantAccident-Containment PressureNozzleSprayTest-PressureDropof80psigNozzleSprayTest-PressureDropof80psigNozzleSprayTest-PressureDropof30psigNozzleSprayTest-PressureDropof30psigSeismicAnalysis-ReactorBuildingDynamicAnalysis-DrywellReactorSupportStructure -SeismicSeismicAnalysis-WasteBuildingSeismicAnalysis-Screenhouse SeismicAnalysis-TurbineBuilding(NorthofRowC)SeismicAnalysis-TurbineBuilding(SouthofRowC)SeismicAnalysis-ConcreteVentilation StackReactorBuildingMathematical Model(North-South) ReactorSupportStructure -SeismicReactorSupportStructure -ReactorBuildingReactorSupportStructure -ReactorBuildingandSeismicPlanofBuildingWallSection1WallSection1-Detail"A"WallSection1-Detail"B"WallSection1-Detail"C"WallSection1-Detail"D"WallSection1-Detail"E"WallSection2WallSection3WallSection3A-DetailsWallSection4WallSection4-Detail1WallSection4-Detail2WallSection5WallSection6WallSection7XVII-1XVII-2XVII-3XVII-4XVII-5XVII-6XVII-7XVII-8XVII-9XVII-10XVII-11AverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindAverageWindRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesRosesforJanuary'63-'64forFebruary'63-'64forMarch'63-'64forApril'63-'64forMay'63-'64forJune'63-'64forJuly'63-'64forAugust'63-'64forSeptember '63-'64forOctober'63-'64forNovember'63-'64UFSARRevision14xlviJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.) FigureNumberTitleXVII-12XVII-13XVII-14XVII-15XVII-16XVII-17XVII-18XVII-19XVII-20XVII-21XVII-22XVII-23XVII-24XVII-25XVII-26XVII-27XVII-28XVII-29XVII-30XVII-31XVII-32XVII-33XVII-34XVII-35XVII-36XVII-37XVII-38AverageWindRosesforDecember'63-'64AverageWindRosesfor'63-'64AverageDiurnalLapseRateJanuary'63-'64,February'63-'64AverageDiurnalLapseRateMarch'63-'64,April'63-'64AverageDiurnalLapseRateMay'63-'64,Junei63-'64AverageDiurnalLapseRateJuly'63-'64,August'63-64AverageDiurnalLapseRateSeptember '63-'64,October'63-'64AverageDiurnalLapseRateNovember'63-'64,December'62-'63LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulence ClassesforJanuary'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulence ClassesforFebruary'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulence ClassesforMarch'63-64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulence ClassesforApril'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulence ClassesforMay'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulence ClassesforJune'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulence ClassesforJuly'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulence ClassesforAugust'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulence ClassesforSeptember '63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulence ClassesforOctober'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulence ClassesforNovember'63-'64LapseRatesbyWindSpeedandTurbulence ClassesforDecember'63-'64SectorMapCenterline Concentrations -Turbulence ClassICenterline Concentrations -Turbulence ClassIICenterline Concentrations -Turbulence ClassIIICenterline Concentrations -Turbulence ClassIVCenterline Concentrations -Turbulence ClassIIBecomingClassIVat2kmandClassIIat23kmCenterline Concentrations -Turbulence ClassIVBecomingClassIIat16kmUFSARRevision14xlviiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARLISTOFFIGURES(Cont'd.) Figuregum~beTitleXVII-39XVII-40XVII-41XVII-42XVII-43XVII-44XVII-45XVII-46XVII-47XVII-48XVII-49XVII-50XVII-51XVII-52XVII-53XVI1-54XVII-55XVII-56XVII-57XVII-58XVII-59XVII-60XVII-61XVII-62XVII-63XVII-64XVII-65Centerline Concentrations -Turbulence ClassIVBecomingClassIIat2kmRadialConcentrations -Turbulence ClassIRadialConcentrations -Turbulence ClassIIRadialConcentrations -Turbulence ClassIIIRadialConcentrations -Turbulence ClassIVRadialConcentrations -Turbulence ClassIIBecomingClassIVat2kmandClassIIat23kmRadialConcentrations -Turbulence ClassIVBecomingClassIIat16kmRadialConcentrations -Turbulence ClassIVBecomingClassIIat2kmCenterline GammaDoseRates-Turbulence ClassICenterline GammaDoseRates-Turbulence ClassIICenterline GammaDoseRates-Turbulence ClassZIICenterline GammaDoseRates-Turbulence ClassIVCenterline GammaDoseRates-Turbulence ClassIIBecomingClassIVat2kmandClassIIat23kmCenterline GammaDoseRates-Turbulence ClassIVBecomingClassIIat16kmCenterline GammaDoseRates-Turbulence ClassIVBecomingClassIIat,2kmAssumedConcentration andDoseRateDistributions ClosetotheElevatedSourceGammaDoseRateasaFunctionofayat1kmFromtheSourceSoutheastern LakeOntarioDilutionofRisingPlumeEstimated LakeCurrentsatCoolingWaterDischarge Temperature ProfilesinanEastwardCurrentattheOswegoCityWaterIntakeSubsurface SectionPlotPlanLogofBoring(BoringCB-1)LogofBoring(BoringCB-2)LogofBoring(BoringCB-3)LogofBoring(BoringCB-4)Attenuation CurvesUFSARRevision14xlviiiJune1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARSECTIONIINTRODUCTION ANDSUMMARYThisreportissubmitted inaccordance with10CFRPart50.71(e)entitled"Periodic UpdatingofFinalSafetyAnalysisReports"forNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation's (NMPC)NineMilePointNuclearStation-Unit1(Unit1).TheStationislocatedonthesoutheast shoreofLakeOntario,inOswegoCounty,NewYork,7minortheast ofthecityofOswego.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARA.PRINCIPAL DESIGNCRITERIAThefollowing paragraphs describing theprincipal designcriteriaareorientedtowardthetwenty-seven criteriaissuedbytheUnitedStatesAtomicEnergyCommission (USAEC).+ 1.0GeneralTheStationisintendedasahighloadfactorgenerating facilitytobeoperatedasanintegralpartoftheNMPCsystem.Therecirculation flowcontrolsystemdescribed inSectionVIIIcontributes tothisobjective byproviding arelatively fastmeansforadjusting theStationoutputoverapreselected powerrange.Overallreliability, routineandperiodictestrequirements, andotherdesignconsiderations mustalsobecompatible withthisobjective. Carefulattention hasbeengiventofabrication procedures andadherence toCoderequirements. Therigidrequirements ofspecificportionsofvariouscodeshavebeenarbitrarily appliedtosomesafety-related systemstoensurequalityconstruction insuchcaseswherethecompleteCodedoesnotapply.Forpiping,theASAB31.1-1955 Codewasusedandwhereexceptions weretaken,safetyevaluations wereperformed todocumentthatanadequatemarginofsafetywasmaintained. Periodictestprogramshavebeendeveloped forrequiredengineered safeguards equipment. Thesetestscovercomponent testingsuchaspumpsandvalvesandfullsystemtests,duplicating ascloselyaspossibletheaccidentconditions underwhichagivensystemmustperform.2.0Buildings andStructures TheStationplotplan,designandarrangement ofthevariousbuildings andstructures aredescribed inSectionIII.Principal structures andequipment whichmayserveeithertopreventaccidents ortomitigatetheirconsequences aredesigned, fabricated anderectedinaccordance withapplicable codestowithstand themostsevereearthquake, floodingcondition, windstorm, icecondition, temperature andotherdeleterious naturalphenomena whichcanbeexpectedtooccuratthesite.3.0Reactor1~Adirect-cycle boilingwatersystemreactor(BWR),described inSectionIV,isemployedtoproducesteam(1030psiginreactorvessel,956psigturbineinlet)foruseinasteam-driven turbinegenerator. Theratedthermaloutputofthereactoris1850MWt.2~Thereactorisfueledwithslightlyenricheduraniumdioxidecontained inZircaloycladfuelrodsdescribed UFSARRevision14I-2June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR3~4~inSectionIV.Selectedfuelrodsalsoincorporate smallamountsofgadolinium asburnablepoison.I,kToavoidfuel'damage, theminimumcriticalpowerratio(MCPR)ismaintained greaterthanthesafetylimitCPR.Thefuelrodcladdingisdesignedtomaintainitsintegrity throughout theanticipated fuellifeasdescribed inSectionIV.Fissiongasreleasewithintherodsandotherfactorsaffecting designlifeareconsidered forthemaximumexpectedburnup.5.Thereactorandassociated systemsaredesignedsothatthereisnoinherenttendencyforundampedoscillations. Astability analysisevaluation isgiveninSectionIV.6.Heatremovalsystemsareprovidedwhicharecapableofsafelyaccommodating coredecayheatunderallcrediblecircumstances, including isolation fromthemaincondenser andlossofcoolantfromthereactor.Eachdifferent systemsoprovidedhasappropriate redundant features. Independent auxiliary coolingmeansareprovidedtocoolthereactorunderavarietyofconditions. Thenormalauxiliary coolingmeansduringshutdownandrefueling istheshutdowncoolingsystemdescribed inSectionX-A.Aredundant emergency coolingsystem,described inSectionV-E,isprovidedtoremovedecayheatintheeventthereactorisisolatedfromthemaincondenser whilestillunderpressure. Additional coolingcapability isalsoavailable fromthehigh-pressure coolantinjection (HPCI)systemandthefireprotection system.7~Redundant andindependent corespraysystemsareprovidedtocoolthecoreintheeventofaloss-of-coolant accident(LOCA).Automatic depressurization isincludedtorapidlyreducepressuretoassistwithcoresprayoperation (seeSectionVII-A).Operation ofthecorespraysystemassuresthatanymetal-water reactionfollowing apostulated LOCAwillbelimitedtolessthan1percentoftheZircaloyclad.Reactivity shutdowncapability isprovidedtomakeandholdthecoreadequately subcritical, bycontrolrodaction,fromanypoint.intheoperating cycleandatanytemperature downtoroomtemperature, assumingthatanyonecontrolrodisfullywithdrawn andunavailable foruse.UFSARRevision14I-3June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARThiscapability isdemonstrated inSectionIV-B.Aphysicaldescription ofthemovablecontrolrodsisgiveninSectionIV-B.Thecontrolroddrive(CRD)hydraulic systemisdescribed inSectionX-C.Theforceavailable toscramacontrolrodisapproximately 3000lbatthebeginning ofascramstroke.Thisiswellinexcessofthe440-lbforcerequiredintheeventoffuelchannelpinchingofthecontrolrodbladeduringaLOCA,asdiscussed inSectionXV.Evenwithscramaccumulator failureaforceofatleast1100lbfromreactorpressureactingaloneisavailable withreactorpressures inexcessof800psig.8~9.Redundant reactivity shutdowncapability isprovidedindependent ofnormalreactivity controlprovisions. Thissystemhasthecapability, asshowninSectionVII-C,tobringthereactortoacoldshutdowncondition, K~<0.97,atanytimeinthecorelife,independent ofthecontrolrodsystemcapabilities. Aflowrestrictor inthemainsteamline(MSL)limitscoolantlossfromthereactorvesselintheeventofaMSLbreak(SectionVII-F).4.0ReactorVessel1~Thereactorcoreandvesselaredesignedtoaccommodate trippingoftheturbinegenerator, lossofpowertothereactorrecirculation systemandothertransients, andmaneuvers whichcanbeexpectedwithoutcompromising safetyandwithoutfueldamage.Abypasssystemhavingacapacityofapproximately 40percentofturbinesteamflowforthethrottlevalveswideopen(VWO)condition partially mitigates theeffectsofsuddenloadrejection. Thisandothertransients andmaneuvers whichhavebeenanalyzedaredetailedinSectionXV.2~Separatesystemstopreventseriousreactorcoolantsystem(RCS)overpressure areincorporated inthedesign.Theseincludeanoverpressure scram,solenoid-actuated reliefvalves,safetyvalvesandtheturbinebypasssystem.AnanalysisoftheadequacyofRCSpressurereliefdevicesisincludedinSectionV-C.3~Powerexcursions whichcouldreactivity additionaccidenteitherbymotionorrupture,impairoperation ofrequiredresultfromanycrediblewillnotcausedamage,tothepressurevesselorsafeguards systems.UFSARRevision14I-4June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR4~Themagnitude ofcrediblereactivity additionaccidents iscurtailed bycontrolrodvelocitylimiters(SectionVII-D),byacontrolrodhousingsupportstructure (SectionVII-E),andbyprocedural controlssupplemented by'rodworthminimizer (RWM)(SectionVIII-C).Powerexcursion analysesforcontrolroddropoutaccidents areincludedinSectionXV.Thereactorvesselwillnotbesubstantially pressurized untilthevesselwalltemperature isinexcessofnilductility transition temperature (NDTT)+60'F.TheinitialNDTTofthereactorvesselmaterialisnogreaterthan40'F.ThechangeofNDTTwithradiation exposurehasbeenevaluated inaccordance withRegulatory Guide(RG)1.99Revision2.Vesselmaterialsurveillance samplesarelocatedwithinthereactorvesseltopermitperiodicverification ofmaterialproperties withexposure.

5.0 Containment

1~Theprimarycontainment, including thedrywell,pressuresuppression chamber,andassociated accessopeningsandpenetrations, isdesigned, fabricated anderectedtoaccommodate, withoutfailure,thepressures andtemperatures resulting fromorsubsequent tothedouble-ended rupture(DER)orequivalent failureofanycoolantpipewithinthedrywell.Theprimarycontainment isdesignedtoaccommodate thepressures following aLOCAincluding thegeneration ofhydrogenfromametal-water reaction. Pressuretransients including hydrogeneffectsarepresented inSectionXV.TheinitialNDTTfortheprimarycontainment systemisabout-20'FandisnotexpectedtoincreaseduringthelifetimeoftheStation.Thesestructures aredescribed inSectionsVI-A,BandC.Additional details,particularly thoserelatedtodesignandfabrication, areincludedinSectionXVI.2~Provisions aremadefortheremovalofheatfromwithintheprimarycontainment, forreasonable protection ofthecontainment fromfluidjets'rmissilesandsuchothermeasuresasmaybenecessary tomaintaintheintegrity ofthecontainment systemaslongasnecessary following aLOCA.Redundant containment spraysystems,described inSectionVII,pumpwaterfromthesuppression chamberthroughindependent heatexchangers tospraynozzleswhichdischarge intothedrywellandsuppression UFSARRevision14I-5June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARchamber.Watersprayedintothedrywellisreturnedbygravitytothesuppression chambertocompletethecoolingcycle.Studiesperformed toverifythecapability ofthecontainment systemtowithstand potential fluidjetsandmissilesaresummarized inSectionXVI.3~Provision ismadeforperiodicintegrated leakageratetests(ILRT)tobeperformed duringeachrefueling andmaintenance outage.Provision isalsomadeforleaktestingpenetrations andaccessopeningsandforperiodically demonstrating theintegrity ofthereactorbuilding. Theseprovisions arealldescribed inSectionVI-F.4~Thecontainment systemandallothernecessary engineered safeguards aredesignedandmaintained suchthat,offsitedosesresulting frompostulated accidents arebelowthevaluesstatedin10CFR100. TheanalysisresultsaredetailedinSectionXV.5.Doubleisolation valvesareprovidedonalllinesdirectlyenteringtheprimarycontainment freespace orpenetrating theprimarycontainment andconnected totheRCS.Periodictestingofthesevalveswillassuretheircapability toisolateatalltimes.Theisolation valvesystemisdiscussed indetailinSectionVI-D.6.Thereactorbuildingprovidessecondary containment whenthepressuresuppression systemisinserviceandservesastheprimarycontainment barrierduringperiodswhenthepressuresuppression systemisopen,suchasduringrefueling. Thisstructure isdescribed inSectionVI-C.Anemergency ventilation system(SectionVII-H)providesameansforcontrolled releaseofhalogensandparticulates viafiltersfromthereactorbuildingtothestackunderaccidentconditions.

6.0 ControlandInstrumentation

1~TheStationisprovidedwithacontrolroom(SectionIII-B)whichhasadequateshielding andotheremergency featurestopermitoccupancy duringallcredibleaccidentsituations. 2~Interlocks orotherprotective featuresareprovidedtoaugmentthereliability ofprocedural controlsinpreventing seriousaccidents. Interlock systemsareprovidedwhichblockorpreventrodwithdrawal fromamultitude ofabnormalconditions. ThecontrolrodblocklogicisshownonFiguresVIII-6UFSARRevision14I-6June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARandVIII-8,respectively, forthesourcerangemonitor(SRM)andintermediate rangemonitor(IRM)neutroninstrumentation. Inthepowerrange,averagepowerrangemonitor(APRM)instrumentation providesbothcontrolrodandrecirculation flowcontrolblocks,asshownonFigureVIII-14.Reactivity excursions involving thecontrolrodsareeitherprevented ortheirconsequences substantially mitigated byacontrolRWM(SectionVIII-C.4.0) whichsupplements procedural controlsinavoidingpatternsofhighrodworths,alowpowerrangemonitor(LPRM)neutronmonitoring andalarmsystem(SectionVIII-C.1.1.3), andacontrolrodpositionindicating system(SectionIV-B.6.0), bothofwhichenabletheOperatortoobserverodmovement, thusverifying hisactions.Acontrolrodovertravel positionlightverifiesthatthebladeiscoupledtoawithdrawn CRD.Arefueling platformoperation interlock isdiscussed inSectionXV,Refueling

Accident, which,alongwithotherprocedures andsupplemented byautomatic interlocks, servestopreventcriticality accidents intherefueling mode.Acoldwateradditionreactivity excursion isprevented bytheprocedures andinterlocks described inSectionXV,StartupofColdRecirculation Loop(Transient Analysis)

.Security(keycardandalarms)andprocedural controlsforthedrywellandreactorbuildingairlocksareprovidedtoensurethatcontainment integrity ismaintained. 3~Areliable, dual-logic channelreactorprotection system(RPS),described inSectionVIII-A,isprovidedtoautomatically initiateappropriate actionwhenevervariousparameters exceedpresetlimits.Eachlogicchannelcontainstwosubchannels withcompletely independent sensors,eachcapableoftrippingthelogicchannel.Atripofone-of-two subchannels ineachlogicchannelresultsinareactorscram.Thetripineachlogicchannelmayoccurfromunrelated parameters, i.e.,highneutronfluxinonelogicchannelcoupledwithhighpressureintheotherlogicchannelwillresultinascram.TheRPScircuitry failsinadirection tocauseareactorscramintheeventoflossofpowerorlossofairsupplytothescramsolenoidvalves.Periodictestingandcalibration ofindividual subchannels isperformed toassuresystemreliability. TheabilityoftheRPStosafelyterminate avarietyofStationmalfunctions isdemonstrated inSectionXV.UFSARRevision14I-7June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR4~Redundant sensorsandcircuitry areprovidedfortheactuation ofallequipment requiredtofunctionunderpostaccident conditions. Thisredundancy isdescribed inthevarioussectionsofthetextdiscussing systemdesign.7.0Electrical PowerSufficient normalandstandbyauxiliary sourcesofelectrical powerareprovidedtoassureacapability forpromptshutdownandcontinued maintenance oftheStationinasafecondition underallcrediblecircumstances. Thesefeaturesarediscussed inSectionIX.8.0Radioactive WasteDisposal1~Gaseous,liquidandsolidwastedisposalfacilities aredesignedsothatdischarge ofeffluents isinaccordance with10CFR20and10CFR50AppendixI.Thefacilitydescriptions aregiveninSectionXII-Awhilethedevelopment ofappropriate limitsiscoveredinSectionII.2~Gaseousdischarge fromtheStationisappropriately monitored, asdiscussed inSectionVIII,andautomatic isolation featuresareincorporated tomaintainreleasesbelowthelimitsof10CFR20and10CFR50AppendixI.9.0Shielding andAccessControlRadiation shielding andaccesscontrolpatternsaresuchthatdoseswillbelessthanthosespecified in10CFR20.Thesefeaturesaredescribed inSectionXII-B.10.0FuelHandlingandStorageAppropriate fuelhandlingandstoragefacilities whichprecludeaccidental criticality andprovideadequatecoolingforspentfuelaredescribed inSectionX.UFSARRevision14I-8June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARB.CHARACTERISTICS Thefollowing isasummaryofdesignandoperating characteristics. 1.0SiteLocationSizeofSiteSiteandStationOwnership NetElectrical Output2.0ReactorOswegoCounty,NewYorkState900AcresNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation 615MW(Maximum) Reference RatedThermalOutputDomePressureTurbineInletPressureTotalCoreCoolantFlowRateSteamFlowRate3.0CoreCircumscribed CoreDiameterActiveCoreHeight+Assembly4.0FuelAssemblyNumberofFuelAssemblies FuelRodArrayFuelRodPitchCladdingMaterialFuelMaterialActiveFuelLengthCladdingOutsideDiameterCladdingThickness FuelChannelMaterial1850MW1030psig956psig67.5x10'lb/hr7.32x10'lb/hr167.16in171.125in532SRLR+Reference 3Reference 3UO,andUO,-Gd,03 Reference 3Reference 3Reference 3Reference 35.0ControlSystemNumberofMovableControlRodsShapeofMovableControlRodsPitchofMovableControlRodsControlMaterialinMovableControlRodsTypeofControlDrives129Cruciform 12.0inB4C-704Theoretical Density;HafniumBottomEntry,Hydraulic ActuatedUFSARRevision14I-9June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARControlofReactorOutputMovementofControlRodsandVariation ofCoolantFlowRate6.0CoreDesignandOperating Conditions MaximumLinearHeatGeneration RateHeatTransferSurfaceAreaAverageHeatFlux-RatedPowerInitialCriticalPowerRatioforMostLimitingTransients CoreAverageVoidFraction-CoolantwithinAssemblies CoreAverageExitQuality-CoolantwithinAssemblies CoreOperating LimitsReportCoreOperating LimitsReport7.0DesignPowerPeakingFactorTotalPeakingFactorGE8x8EB-2.90GE11-2.94**2'2***8.0NuclearDesignDataAverageInitialVolumeMetricEnrichment Beginning ofCycle12-CoreEffective Multiplication andControlSystemWorth-NoVoids,20C+Uncontrolled FullyControlled Strongest ControlRodOutReference 31.0950'490'82*Theseparameters arerecalculated foreachreloadbecauseoftheirdependency oncorecomposition andexposure. Thesecalculated valuesareintermediate quantities thatdonotrepresent designrequirements oroperating limitsandthusarenotseparately reportedintheSRLR+.Maximumtotalpeakingfactorfortheportionofthebundlecontaining partlengthrods.*Maximumtotalpeakingfactorfortheregionabovethepartlengthrods.UFSARRevision14,I-10June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARStandbyLiquidControlSystemCapability: ShutdownMargin(dR)20CXenonFreeSRLR~~SRLR~>9.0ReactorVesselInsideDiameterInternalHeightDesignPressure17ft-9in63ft-10in1250psigat575'F10.0CoolantRecirculation LoopsLocationofRecirculation LoopsNumberofRecirculation LoopsandPumpsPipeSize11.0PrimaryContainment TypeDesignPressureofDrywellVesselDesignPressureofSuppression ChamberVesselDesignLeakageRate12.0Secondary Containment Containment Drywell28inPressureSuppression 62psig35psig0.5weightpercentperdayat35psigTypeInternalDesignPressureDesignLeakageRate13.0Structural DesignSeismicGroundAcceleration Sustained WindLoadingControlRoomShielding Reinforced concreteandsteelsuperstructure withmetalsiding40lb/ft1004freevolumeperdaydischarged viastackwhilemaintaining 0.25-inwaternegativepressureinthereactorbuildingrelativetoatmosphere 0.11g125mph,300ftabovegroundlevelDosenottoexceedhourlyequivalent (basedon40-hrweek)ofmaximumpermissible quarterly dosespecified in10CFR20UFSARRevision14I-11June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR14.0StationElectrical SystemIncomingPowerSourcesOutgoingPowerLinesOnsitePowerSourcesProvidedTwo115-kVtransmission linesTwo345-kVtransmission linesTwodieselgenerators Twosafety-related Stationbatteries Onenonsafety 125-Vdcbatterysystem15.0ReactorInstrumentation SystemLocationofNeutronMonitorSensorsIn-coreRangesofNuclearInstrumentation: FourStartupRangeMonitorsEightIntermediate RangeMonitors120PowerRangeMonitorsSourceto0.014ratedpowerandto104withchamberretraction 0.00034to104ratedpower14to1254ratedpower16.0ReactorProtection SystemNumberofChannelsinReactorProtection SystemNumberofChannelsRequiredtoScramorEffectOtherProtective Functions NumberofSensorsperMonitored VariableineachChannel(Minimumforscramfunction) UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARC.IDENTIFICATION OFCONTRACTORS TheGeneralElectricCompany(GE)wasengagedtodesign,fabricate anddeliverthenuclearsteamsupplysystem(NSSS),turbinegenerator, andothermajorelementsandsystems.GEalsofurnished thecompletecor'edesignandnuclearfuelsupplyfortheinitialcoreandiscurrently furnishing replacement cores.NMPC,actingasitsownarchitect-engineer, specified andprocuredtheremaining systemsandcomponents, including thepressuresuppression containment system,andcoordinated thecompleteintegrated Station.StoneandWebsterEngineering Corporation (SWEC)wasengagedbyNMPCtomanagefieldconstruction. Currently, NMPCutilizesvariouscontractors toassistincontinuous Stationmodifications. UFSARRevision14I-13June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARD.GENERALCONCLUSIONS Thefavorable sitecharacteristics, criteriaanddesignrequirements ofallthesystemsrelatedtosafety,thepotential consequences ofpostulated accidents, andthetechnical competence oftheapplicant anditscontractors, assurethatUnit1canbeoperatedwithoutendangering thehealthandsafetyofthepublic.UFSARRevision14I-14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARE.REFERENCES 1.USAECPressReleaseH-252,"GeneralDesignCriteriaforNuclearPowerPlantConstruction Permits," November22,1965.2~3.GENE24A5157,Revision0,"Supplemental ReloadLicensing ReportforNMPl,Reload13,Cycle12,"January1995.GEFuelBundleDesigns,GeneralElectricCompanyProprietary, NEDE-31152P, February1993.UFSARRevision14I-15June1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARSECTIONIISTATIONSITEANDENVIRONMENT A.SITEDESCRIPTION 1.0GeneralTheNineMilePointNuclearStation-Unit1(Unit1),ownedbyNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation (NMPC),islocatedonthewesternportionoftheNineMilePointpromontory. Approximately 300ftdueeastisNineMilePointNuclearStation-Unit2(Unit2).Theeasternportionofthepromontory iscomprised oftheJamesA.FitzPatrick NuclearPowerPlant,ownedbytheNewYorkPowerAuthority (NYPA).ThesiteisonLakeOntarioinOswegoCounty,approximately 5minorth-northeast ofthenearestboundaryofthecityofOswego.FigureII-1showstheStationlocationonanoutlinemapofthestateofNewYork.Itis230minorthwest ofNewYorkCity,143.5mieast-northeast ofBuffalo,and36minorth-northwest ofSyracuse. FigureII-2isadetailedmapoftheareawithinabout50mioftheStation.2.0PhysicalFeaturesFigureII-3isadetailedsitemapshowingStationlocation; anassociated plotplanispresented asFigureIII-1ofthefollowing section.Stationbuildings aresituatedinthewesternquadrantofa200-acreclearedareacentrally locatedalongthelakeshore. Sitepropertyconsistsofpartially-wooded landformerlyusedalmostexclusively forresidential andrecreational purposes. Formanymileswest,east,andsouthofthesitethecountryischaracterized byrollingterrainrisinggentlyupfromthelake.Gradeelevation atthesiteis10ftabovetherecordhighlakelevel,whileunderlying rockstructure isamongthemoststructurally stableintheUnitedStates(U.S.)fromthestandpoint oftiltingandfolding.Thereisnorecordofwaveactivity, suchasseicheortsunami,ofsuchamagnitude astomakeinundation ofthesitelikely.Ashoreprotection dikecomposedofrockfillfromtheexcavation separates thebuildings andthelake.Allelevations inthisreportrefertotheUnitedStatesLandSurvey(USLS)1935data.1.Toconvertelevations to1955International GreatLakesData(IGLD1955),subtract0.375m(1.23ft).UFSARRevision14II-1June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR2.Toconvertelevations to1985International GreatLakesData(IGLD1985),subtract0.217m(0.71ft).Exclusion distances forthesiteareapproximately 1mitotheeast,amiletothesouthwest, andoveramiletothesouthernsiteboundary.

3.0 PropertyUseandDevelopment

Therearenoresidences, agricultural orindustrial developments (otherthantheJamesA.FitzPatrick NuclearPowerPlant)onthesite;allformersummerhomesandfarmbuildings havebeenremoved.Siteboundaries andtheformercountryroadwhichtraverses thesitearepostedasprivateproperty. Theareaimmediately aroundtheStationbuildings isfenced,withbuildingaccesscontrolled byStationsecuritypersonnel. Avisitors'nergy Information Center,mannedbyNMPCandNYPApersonnel, andtheNiagaraMohawkNuclearLearningCenterarelocatedabout1,000ftwestoftheStation,perFigureII-3.Theseinstallations maybereachedbythepublicoverprivatedrivesmaintained bythecompany.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARB.DESCRIPTION OFAREAADJACENTTOTHESITE1.0GeneralTheStationislocatedontheLakeOntariocoastinthetownofScribainthenorth-central portionofOswegoCounty,approximately 5minorth-northeast ofthenearestboundaryofthecityofOswego.1.1Population Population growthinthevicinityoftheStationhasbeenveryslow,withthecityofOswegoshowingadecreaseinpopulation. The1960censusenumerated 22,155residents comparedtoapproximately 19,793peoplein1980.However,countypopulation increased from86,118in1960to113,901in1980.Thetotal1980population within12mioftheStationisestimated tobe46,349(seeFigureII-4).Thisareacontainsallorportionsofonecityandtentowns.Population andpopulation densityforthetentownsandonecitywithinthisareaareshowninTableII-1.CountiesandtownswithinthisareaareshownonFigureII-5.Transient population within12mioftheStationislimitedduetotherural,undeveloped character ofthearea.Thereare,however,anumberofschool,industrial, andrecreational facilities intheareathatcreatesmalldailyandseasonalchangesinareapopulations. Thepopulation withina50-miareasurrounding theStationwasapproximately 914,193in1980(seeFigureII-6).ThecityofSyracuseisthelargestpopulation centerwithinthisarea,withapopulation of170,105in1980.TableII-2listscitieswithinthis50-miradiuswithpopulations over10,000.The50-miradiuscontainsportionsofthreeCanadianCensusDivisions locatedintheprovinceofOntario:PrinceEdward,Frontenac, andAddington/Lennox. The1976population countstotaled22,559,108,052,and32,633,respectively. 2.0Agriculture, Industrial andRecreational Use2.1Agricultural UseTheareawithina50-miradiusofthesiteencompasses allorportionsoftenNewYorkcounties: Cayuga,Jefferson, Lewis,Madison,Oneida,Onondaga, Ontario,Oswego,Seneca,andWayne.Approximately 37percentofthelandwithinthisten-county regionisusedforagricultural production. TablesII-3andII-4presentagricultural statistics forthisten-county region.2.2Industrial UseSeveralindustrial establishments arelocatedinOswegoCounty,withtheAlcanAluminumCorporation andtheIndependence UFSARRevision14II-3June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARGeneration PlantoperatedbySitheEnergiesUSAbeinglocatednearesttotheStation.Thelakeshore eastofOswegoisthemostindustrially developed areanearthesite.ThecitiesofFultonandMexicoaretheonlyotherindustrial siteswithin15miofthesite.Twonaturalgaspipelines liewithin8kmoftheplant;onepipelinesuppliestheIndependence PlantandtheothersuppliesIndeckEnergy.Bothpipelines arelocatedonthenorth-south andeast-west transmission linecorridors. Themajorindustrial establishments inOswegoCounty,theirlocations, andtheirprincipal productsarelistedinTablesII-5andII-6.ThenearestpublicwatersupplyintakeinLakeOntarioislocatedapproximately 8misouthwest oftheStationlocation. ThisintakesuppliesthecityofOswegoandOnondagaCounty.DataontheseandothervicinitypublicwatersuppliesarelistedinTableII-7.FigureII-2showsthelocations ofthecommunities listed.2.3Recreational UseSeventeen stateparksandonenationalwildliferefugearelocatedwithina50-miradiusoftheStation.TableII-8identifies thestateparksandtheirfacilities, capacities, andvisitorcounts.TheMontezuma NationalWildlifeRefugeislocatednorthofCayugaLakeinSenecaCounty,approximately 44misouthwest oftheStation.UFSARRevision14II-4June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARC.METEOROLOGY ~~~~Anoriginal2-yrstudywasperformed todetermine thesitemeteorological characteristics. Thisstudyispresented inSectionXVII-A.Themeteorological monitoring systemmeasuresparameters toprovidedatathatarerepresentative ofatmospheric conditions thatexistatallgaseouseffluentreleasepoints.Meteorological dataiscompiledforquarterly periodsinaccordance withtheTechnical Specifications. Thisdataisusedtoprovideinformation whichmaybeusedtodevelopatmospheric diffusion parameters toestimatepotential radiation dosestothepublicresulting fromactualroutineoraccidental releasesofradioactive materials totheatmosphere. UFSARRevision14II-5June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARD.LIMNOLOGY Acomprehensive researchprogram,designedtomonitorvariousparameters oftheaquaticenvironment inthevicinityofNineMilePoint,wasbegunin1963.Thisdetailedlakeprogramwascontinued through1978.Currently, anaquaticecologystudyprogram(closelycoordinated withJamesA.FitzPatrick NuclearPowerPlant)isconducted inthevicinityofNineMilePointonLakeOntariotomonitortheeffectsofplantoperation withrespecttoselectedecological parameters, andtoperformimpingement studiesonthetraveling screensintheintakescreenwell. Thisprogramiscarriedoutandresultsreportedinaccordance withthestationStatePollutant Discharge Elimination System(SPDES)Discharge Permit.UFSARRevision14II-6June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARE.EARTHSCIENCES~~Apreconstruction evaluation ofthegeology,hydrology, andseismology oftheNineMilePointpromontory ispresented inSectionXVII-C.Subsequent inspection ofrockexposedduringexcavations forthereactorandcoolingwatertunnelsallowedforamoredetailedstudyofsubsurface conditions. Nofaultswereencountered andnounusualconditions wereobserved. Thestructures restonafirm,almostimpervious rockfoundation. Stationseismicdesigncriteriawerebaseduponaconservative evaluation ofthemaximumearthquake groundmotionwhichmightconceivably occuratthesite.Thiscondition wascalculated byassumingthattheworstshockeverobservedwithinaneffective rangeofthesitemightbelocatedat,theclosestpositiontothesiteatwhichanearthquake ofanyintensity occurred. The"maximumpossible" shockassumedforStationstructure acceleration calculations isofmagnitude 7ata50-miepicentral distance. DamesandMooreestimates thatthisshockwillprobablyneveroccurunlessunusualregionalgeologicchangestakeplace.UFSARRevision14II-7June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARF.ENVIRONMENTAL RADIOLOGY Controlled releasesofradioactive materials inliquidandgaseouseffluents totheenvironment ispartofnormalStationoperation. ARadiological Environmental Monitoring Programensuresthatthereleaseratesforalleffluents arewithinthelimitsspecified in10CFR20andthereleaseofradioactive materialabovebackground tounrestricted areasconformswithAppendixIto10CFR50.Comprehensive studieswereoriginally conducted toestablish theeffluentemissionrateswhichwouldproducetheabovelimitingconditions intheuncontrolled environment. Currently, aRadiological Environmental Monitoring Program~, inclusive ofUnit1,isinoperation. Thisprogramdetailsthedesignobjectives forcontrolofliquidandgaseouswastes,including specifications forliquidandgaseouswasteeffluents, .andspecifications forliquidandgaseouswastesamplingandmonitoring. AnannualEnvironmental Operating ReportandSemiannual Radioactive EffluentReleaseReportsarepreparedandsubmitted inaccordance withthereporting requirements intheTechnical Specifications. UFSARRevision14II-8June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARG.REFERENCES ~~~1.NineMilePointNuclearStation"Technical Specifications andBases".UFSARRevision14II-9June1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-11980POPULATION ANDPOPULATION DENSITYFORTOWNSANDCITIESWITHIN12MILESOFNINEMILEPOINT-UNIT1CityofOswegoOswego(town)GranbyRichlandScribaVolneyMexicoHannibalPalermoNewHavenMinetto1980Poulation19,7937,8656,3415,5945,4555i3584,7904,0273,2532,4211,905Population DensityPeolePerSareMile2665.2302.7142.9105.9137.0119.1108.399'81.882.1325.0UFSARRevision141of1June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-2CITIESWITHINA50-MILERADIUSOFTHESTATIONWITHPOPULATIONS OVER10,000~CitNewarkVillageClayCiceroManliusDewittSyracuseGeddesCamillusOnondagaVanBurenSalinaFultonOswegoOneidaRomeWatertown ~CountWayneOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaOswegoOswegoMadisonOneidaJefferson Population 1980Census10/01752,83823,68928,48926,868170,10518,52824,33317,82412,58537,40013/31219,79310,81043,82627,861UFSARRevision141of1June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-3REGIONALAGRICULTURAL USECountyCayugaJefferson LewisMadisonOneidaOnondagaOntarioOswegoSenecaWayneAgricultural Use(squaremiles)560847373407612336511267299Corn(AllPurposes) (acres)84,00242,50114,201"28,00135,60145,00259,10113,20031,50240,499Wheat(acres)11,9994994001,4014,90021,50011,00116,5015,001Fruit(acres)3951732221,0972,33084595425,125Totals(acres)96,39643,00014,20128,57437,22450,99982,93125,04648,95770,625Totals4,630393,61073,20231,141497,953SOURCE:NMP2Environmental Report,Tables2.2-9and2.2-10UPSARRevision141of18une1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-4REGIONALAGRICULTURAL STATISTICS -CATTLEANDMILKPRODUCTION CayugaCountyJefferson CountyLewisCountyMadisonCountyOneidaCountyOnondagaCountyOntarioCountyOswegoCountySenecaCountyWayneCountyRegionStateAllCattleandCalves51,00084,00059,00060,00065,00032,50033,00025,50011,50019,000440,5001,780,000 BeefCows2,2002,6006001,6002,5002,5001,6002,3001,0001,80018,70085,000MilkCows25,00044,00032,50035,50033,50017,00011,50011,5004,3008,500223,300912,000AverageMilkProduction/Cow (lb)12,20011,10012,30011,80011,30013,20011,90011,40011,20010,40011,68011,488SOURCES:2.3.NewYorkCropReporting Service,CattleInventory byCounty-1980;Albany,NY,1980NewYorkCropReporting Service,MilkProduction -1978,Albany,NY.1979NewYorkCropReporting Service,NewYorkAgricultural Statistics -1978,Albany,NY,1979UFSARRevision14lof1June1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-5INDUSTRIAL FIRMSWITHIN8KM(5MI)OFUNIT1FirmAlcanAluminumCorporation Distance/ Direction fromSitekm4.5/SWProductsAluminumsheetandplateEmloent1,000JamesA.FitzPatrick (1/ENuclearPowerPlantElectrical generation 500NineMilePointUnit2SitheEnergiesUSAIndependence Generation PlantAdjacenttoUnit13.5/SWElectrical generation Electrical generation 1,10075NOTEForcompletelistingofmajorindustries inOswegoCounty,reference OswegoCountyIndustrial Directory. UFSARRevision141of1June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-6PUBLICUTILITIES INOSWEGOCOUNTYNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation NewYorkTelephone CompanyPennCentralRailroadOswegoCountyTelephone CompanyAlltelNewYork,Inc.NewYorkPowerAuthority LocationManysitesManysitesOswegoFultonManysitesServiceGasandElectricCommunications 'Shipping Communications Communications GasandElectricUFSARRevision141of1June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEZZ-7PUBLICWATERSUPPLYDATAFORLOCATIONS WITHINANAPPROXIMATE 30-MILERADIUSDistancefromSite(miles)Direction fromSiteTownAverageOutput(mgd)SourceofWater0-1010-2020-30SWSWESEENESSENESEENESSESSWSSWSWNESWOnondaga(County)OswegoMexicoPulaskiFultonSandyCreekCentralSquareOrwellPhoenixBaldwinsville Fairhaven CatoWolcottAdamsRedCreek3690.50.320.20.08Notavailable 0.3510.150.0330.2200.30.03LakeOntario(intakeatOswego)LakeOntarioThreewells>two40-ftdeep,one38-ftdeepSpringsTwelvewells,30-to70-ftdeep;twowells,21-ftdeepTwowells,21-ftdeepOnewell,24-ftdeepSpringTwowells;one25-ftdeep,one45-ftdeepFourwells;one93-ftdeep,threeshallowwellsSpring;onewell,46-ftdeepThreewells;two55-ftdeep,one70-ftdeepLakeOntarioSpringsWellsandspringsSOURCE:NineMilePointUnit2PSARUFSARRevision141of1June1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEII-8RECREATIONAL AREASINTHEREGIONParkSelkirkShoresBattleIslandFrenchman IslandFairHavenBeachSouthwick BeachWestcottBeachLongPointCedarPointBurnhamPointWhetstone GulfChittenango FallsVeronaBeachLock23Brewerton GreenLakesClarkReservation DistanceandDirection fromUnit(miles)9.8NE10.5S26.7SE18.3SW19.1NE29.3NE36.0NE47.8NE45.4NE48.0ENE47.2ENE41.9SE21.6SSE38.7SSE39.1SSECountyOswegoOswegoOswegoCayugaJefferson Jefferson Jefferson Jefferson Jefferson LewisMadisonMadisonOnondagaOnondagaOnondagaAcreage9802352684547231923122,0001831,7351,101290Activities/Facilities Camping,picnicking, hiking,swimmingGolfing,fishing,hikingFishing,hiking,picnicking, boatingCamping,picnicking, boating,fishingCamping,picnicking, boating,fishing,swimming, hikingCamping,picnicking, boating,fishing,swimming, hikingCamping,picnicking, boating,fishing,swimmingCamping,picnicking, boating,fishing,swimmingCamping,picnicking, boating,fishing,swimmingCamping,picnicking,

swimming, hikingCamping,picnicking, hikingPicnicking, swimmingPicnicking, boatingCamping,picnicking, hiking,boating,fishing,swimmingPicnicking, hiking,playground TotalCapacity(No.ofPeople)3,6463031006,2474,4014,4947541,8535531,9816994,3741193,3611,255VisitorCount(April1979-March1980)305,00040,000352,00070,00072,0009,00060,00015,00028,000115,000305,0001,015,000356,000UFSARRevision14lof2June1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARTABLEIZ-8(Cont'd.) ParkCayugaLakeChimneyBluffsDistanceandDirection fromUnit(miles)45.7SSW30.8WSWCountySenecaWayneAcreage135597Activities/Facilities Camping,picnicking,

swimming, boating,playground Camping,picnicking,

swimming, boating,playground TotalCapacity(No.ofPeople)3,2701,036VisitorCount(April1979-March1980)129,00030,000NOTE:Allfacxlxtesareseasonal(summer)Notavailable UFSARRevision142of2June1996

NineMilePointUnit1FSARSECTIONIIIBUILDINGS ANDSTRUCTURES Thestructural designofbuildings andcomponents isbasedonthemaximumcredibleearthquake motionoutlinedinVolumeIIofthePreliminary HazardsSummaryReport(PHSR).Specifically, thismaximummotionconsistsofamagnitude 7(Intensity IX)shockatanepicentral distanceof50mifromthesite.Themaximumgroundmotionacceleration is11percentofgravityandthemaximumresponseacceleration is45percentofgravityforoscillations intheperiodrangeof0.2to0.3sec.Allcriticalstructures fortheStationweresubjected toadynamicresponseanalysisforthedetermination ofmaximumstressesinthestructure. ClassIstructures andcomponents whosefailurecouldcausesignificant releaseofradioactivity, orwhicharevitaltosafeshutdownandisolation ofthereactor,weredesignedsothattheprobability offailurewouldapproachzerowhensubjected tothemaximumcredibleearthquake motion.(Acceleration responsespectrum, PlateC-22,SectionIII,FirstSupplement tothePHSR.)Functional loadstressesresulting fromnormaloperation whencombinedwithstressesduetoearthquake accelerations arewithintheestablished working*stressesforthematerialinvolvedinthestructure orcomponent. Primaryloadstresses, whencombinedwithstressesduetotemperature andpressure, togetherwithstressesduetoearthquake accelerations, arewithinapplicable codeorworking*values.ClassIIstructures andcomponents weredesignedforstresseswithintheapplicable codesrelatingtothesestructures andcomponents whensubjected tofunctional oroperating loads.Stressesresulting fromthecombination ofoperating loadsandearthquake loadsorwindloadshavebeenlimitedtostresses331/3percentaboveworking*stressesinaccordance withapplicable codes.ClassIIIstructures andcomponents arethoseofaservicenaturenotessential forsafereactorshutdownandisolation, andfailureofwhichwouldnotresultinsignificant releaseofradioactive materials. Thesestructures weredesignedonthebasisofapplicable buildingcodeswithseismicandwindrequirements. Allmajorcomponents intheStationwereclassified asaboveandanalyzedtotheappropriate degree.Vitalfluidcontainers wereanalyzedanddesignedforhydrodynamic pressures resulting fromearthquake motion.Asaresultofdeflection determinations,

• AlsoseeSectionXVI,Subsection G.UFSARRevision14III-1June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARprovisions weremadeforrelativemotionbetweenadjacentcomponents andstructures wheredamagemightresultfromdifferential movementandimpactstresses.

Alistofthestructures andcomponents reviewedforseismicdesigniscontained onpagesIII-1,III-2andIII-3oftheFirstSupplement tothePHSR.Stressesinthevariousstructural memberswereinvestigated aftertheearthquake analysiswascompleted toverifythatstressesareincompliance withthosespecified intheconventional codessuchasthoseoftheAmericanInstitute ofSteelConstruction, AmericanConcreteInstitute, andotherapplicable codessuchastheNewYorkStateBuildingCode.Allmajorstructures arefoundedonverysubstantial Oswegosandstone whichexistsonthesiteatanaverageof11ftbelowgrade.Thiseliminates thepotential problemsofsoilconsolidation anddifferential settlement. FigureIII-1isaplotplanshowingtherelationship ofstructures. UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARA.TURBINEBUILDING1.0DesignBases1.1WindandSnowLoadingsExteriorloadingsforwind,snowandiceusedinthedesignoftheturbinebuildingmeetallapplicable codesasaminimum.Theroofanditssupporting structure aredesignedtowithstand aloadingof40psfofsnoworice.Thewallsandbuildingstructure aredesignedtowithstand anexternalloadingof40psfofsurfacearea,whichisapproximately equivalent toawindvelocityof125mphatthe30-ftlevel.1.2PressureReliefDesignTopreventfailureofthesuperstructure duetoasteamlinebreak,awallareaof1800fthasbeenattachedwithboltsthatwillfailduetoaninternalpressureofapproximately 45psf,thusrelieving internalpressure. Wallorbuildingstructure failurewouldoccurataninternalpressureinexcessof80psf.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsTheturbinebuildingisdesignedasaClassIIstructure. Components areeitherClassIIorClassI,asoutlinedonpages-III-1,III-2andIII-3oftheFirstSupplement tothePHSR.Ananalysisoftheturbinebuildingresultedintheuseofthefollowing earthquake designcoefficients forthemajorcomponents. ComonentPercentGravitCommentFeedwater heatersanddraincoolersupportstructures Turbinegenerator foundation 16.0-20.5(calculation used:20.0horizontal 10.0vertical) 23.4N-Shorizontal 26.7E-Whorizontal BasedonspecificdynamicanalysisBasedonspecificdynamicanalysisCondenser supportstructure 11.0horizontal 5.5verticalBasedonspecificdynamicanalysisForthefollowing components, percentgravitywas20.0horizontal and10.0vertical, basedontheUniformBuildingCode.UFSARRevision14III-3June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARSteelstructure supporting emergency condenser makeupwaterstoragetanksanddemineralized waterstoragetank,andcondensate demineralizer (CND)ClassIMotorgenerator (MG)setsforreactorrecirculating pumpmotors150/35-ton overheadtraveling craneStructural anchorssupporting mainsteam,offgas,etc.,pipingAnchorboltsandassociated basesandframeforsupportofalltanks,filtersandpumpsaswellaselectrical equipment. (Powerboards,controlconsoles, etc.)Supportsformoistureseparators andreheaters ClassIIClassIIClassIClassesI&IIClassIIStressesresulting fromthefunctional oroperating loadsarewithinapplicable codesrelatingtothesestructures andcomponents. Stressesresulting fromthecombination ofoperating loadsandearthquake orwindloadshavebeenlimitedinaccordance withapplicable codestoa331/3-percent increaseinallowable stresses*. Theadjoining wallsoftheturbineandreactorbuildingsuperstructures arestructurally separated toprovidefordissimilar deformations duetoearthquake motion.1.4HeatingandVentilation Heatingandventilation isprovidedforequipment protection, personnel comfortandforcontrolling possibleradioactivity releasetotheatmosphere. 1.5Shielding andAccessControlShielding isprovidedaroundmuchoftheequipment tolimitdoserates,asdescribed inSectionXII.Normalaccesstotheturbinebuildingisprovidedthroughtheadministration building.

2.0 Structure

DesignTheturbinebuildinghousesthepowergeneration andalliedequipment. Theequipment arrangement andprincipal dimensions areshownonFiguresIII-2throughIII-11.*AlsoseeSectionXVI,Subsection G.UFSARRevision14III-4June1996 NineMilePoint.Unit1FSAR2.1GeneralStructural FeaturesThepoured-in-place reinforced concretebuildingsubstructure andturbinegenerator foundation arefoundedonfirmOswegosandstone 15ftto25ftbelowgrade.Themaximumbearingpressureontherock,asrecommended byconsultants, is40tons/sqft.Thisresultsinasafetyfactorof18basedonactualunconfined compressive strengthtestsonselectedspecimens ofrockcoreextracted fromtestborings.Someoftheactualbearingpressures ontheconfinerockareasfollows.Structure MaximumRockBearinPressureBuildingcolumnpiersCranecolumnpiersWallsbelowgradeTurbinegenerator foundation 27tons/sqft20tons/sqft13tons/sqft24tons/sqftTheturbinegenerator foundation isisolatedfromthefloorsofthebuildingtominimizetransmission ofvibration tothefloors.Thisfoundation isdesignedforstability underallconditions ofloading,including

vertical, horizontal andtorqueloads,andloadsduetotemperature changes,pipingandseismicforces.Elasticdeflection andverticalshortening ofmembersandstressesresulting fromsuchloadingweretakenintoconsideration.

Theturbinebuildingsuperstructure consistsofanenclosedstructural steelframe.Thelower24ftofbuildingiscoveredwith8-inthickinsulated precastconcretewallpanels.Fromthe24-ftleveltotheroof,thebuildingisenclosedwithinsulated metalwallpanelsmadeupoftypeFK16x16andFKX12x12metallic-coated interiorlinerelements, 11/2-ininsulation withaminimumdensityof21/2pcfand16B&SgageF-2porcelainized aluminumexteriorfacesheets,allmanufactured byH.H.Robertson Company.Theroofiscoveredwithmetaldecking,insulation, anda4-plytarroofingmaterialflashedattheparapetwalls.Anoverheadrollingdooratthewestendofthebuildingprovidesrailcaraccessintothebuilding. 2.2HeatingandVentilation SystemTheturbinebuildingventilating system,shownonFigureIII-12,isdesignedtoprovidefilteredandheatedairatanapproximate rateofonechangeperhour,corresponding to170,000cfm.Twoindependent airsupplysystemsareprovided, eachconsisting ofafreshairintake,filter,electricheatingunit,flowcontroldamper,twofans,dampersandductworktodistribute airtoUFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARvariousareasintheturbinebuilding. Eachfansystemiscapableofsupplying one-halfoftherequiredair,andeitherofthetwofansineachsystemisconsidered aninstalled spare.Theairductelectrical heatingunitsareautomatically controlled tomaintainthesupplyairtemperature atthedesiredlevel.Theexhaustairsystemconsistsoftwofull-capacity fans,withonefanconsidered aninstalled spare,andconnecting ductworkdesignedtoinduceflowofairthroughareasofprogressively highercontamination potential priortofinaldischarge tothestack.Anairinletislocatedineachroomandateachpieceofequipment orotherplacewhereradioactive contamination intheformofdust,gasorvaporcouldbereleased. Ductsfromtheseareasleadtoanexhaustairmanifoldwitheachducthavingamanuallysetcontroldamper.Theradiation protection andlaboratory facilities ventilating system,shownonFigureIII-13,discharges directlytotheturbinebuildingexhaustduct.Incasepowertotheturbinebuildingventilation systemislost,analternate outsidesourceoffilteredandheatedairisavailable tothelaboratory area.Thisareaincludesthetechnician's office,instrument storageroom,highlevellab,lowlevellab,countingroom,auxiliary countingroomandinstrument calibration room.Ashuntcircuitdrawsairfromtheexhaustmanifoldandmonitorsitsairborneradioactivity. Thecircuitislocatedsothatitmonitorsbuildingairconditions andnottheexhaustfromequipment vents.HighactivitycausesalarmintheStationcontrolroom.Theexhaustsystemdischarges intotheplenumwhichalsoreceivesairfromthecontainment andotherbuildings, asshownonFigureVI-24.Backflowfromothersystemstotheturbinebuildingisprevented byinterlocks whichrequirevalvestobeclosediftheexhaustfansarenotinoperation. Theturbinebuildingatmosphere isautomatically controlled atanegativepressureofabout0.1inofwaterrelativetotheoutsidebymodulating theflowcontroldampersontheairsupplysystems.Thisistocontrolreleaseofcontaminated airandpreventout-leakage. Whentheturbinebuildingroofventsareopenedduringoperation, theturbinebuildingdifferential pressuremayapproachzeroinlocalized areas.Insuchcases,supplemental monitoring isinstituted topreventanunmonitored releasetotheenvironment. Electrical heatersareprovidedinvariousareasofthebuildingforauxiliary heatshouldtheventilation systemnotbeinUFSARRevision14III-6June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARoperation foranyreason.Water-cooled heatexchanger coolingunitsareprovidedinareassurrounding theextraction heaters,moistureseparators, condensate circulating pumpsandreheaters todissipate theradiantheatlossfromthisequipment andtomaintaindesiredtemperatures forpersonnel comfortandequipment protection. Thecoolingwaterissuppliedfromtheturbinebuildingclosedloopcoolingwater(TBCLCW)system.2.3SmokeandHeatRemovalSmokeandheatremovalcapability isprovidedforthethreesmokezonesonel250oftheturbinebuildingandtheupperelevation oftheturbinebuilding. Twelvemotor-operated ventsareinstalled intheroofovertheturbinegenerator, andfivesidewallventsareinstalled inthewallatel351.Afirewhichproduceslowheatbutalargeconcentration ofsmokewillbeventedthroughtheroofandsidewallvents.Thiscapability isprovidedbymanualactuation ofthemotor-operated vents.Highheatandhighsmokefireswillautomatically opentheroofventswhenthefusiblelinktrips.Inaddition, therailroadaccessdooronel261willberemotelyopenedtoassistinsmokepurging.2.4Shielding andAccessControlPersonnel accessintotheturbinebuildingiscontrolled fromtheadministration buildingatel248'-0".Anelevatorforoperating personnel servestheentiresevenfloorlevelsintheturbinebuildingandislocatedatHrowbetweencolumnlines11and12(FiguresIII-4throughIII-9).Stairsarealsoprovidedalongside thepersonnel elevatortoservethesevenfloorlevels.Inadditiontothemainorfull-height. stairs,stairsareprovidedatfourlocations atgradeforaccessibility tofloorsabovegrade,andatsevenlocations toservefloorsbelowatel250and237.Walls,floorsandroofsaroundequipment containing radioactivity aredesignedtohaveconcretethicknesses whichsignificantly reduceradiation levels,asdiscussed inSectionXII.3.0SafetyAnalysisTheturbinebuildingwallsareofnoncombustible materialconsisting ofpoured-in-place

concrete, precastconcrete, orinsulated metalpanels.Theturbineroominternalroofalsoconsistsofnoncombustible material.

Metaldeckingspansthesteelpurlinsandiscoveredwithrigidinsulation and4-plybuilt-uproofingmaterial. Allfloorsareofnoncombustible material: eitherpouredconcreteorsteelgrating.Pressurerelieftopreventfailureofthesuperstructure duetoasteamlinebreakhasbeenprovidedinthemetalwallsidingonthenorthwallofthecranebay(columnRowC).UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARAperipheral drainattheexteriorofthebuildingprovidesfortheremovalofgroundwater seepageanddischarges intoasumppitwithpumpatthelowpointofallthebuildings (southwest exteriorcornerofthereactorbuilding). Arockdike1000-ftlongattheshoreline protectstheStationfromlakewaveactionorpossibleiceaccumulation. Thedikeis2fthigherthanyardgradeandisconstructed ofrockfromtheStationexcavation. Largerocksfacethelakesideofthedikeandhaveprovenveryeffective inwavedampingandasabarriertofloatingice.Theturbinebuildinggradeflooratel261is12ftabovemaximumlakelevel(el249).Poured-in-place concretefoundations enclosetheturbinebuildingbelowgradefloorlevel,andpreformed rubberwaterstopsareincorporated intheconcreteconstruction jointsforwatertightness. UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARB.CONTROLROOMThecontrolroomislocatedinthesoutheast corneroftheturbinebuildingatel277.Itisboundedbytheadministration buildingofficesonthesouthandeast,theturbineroomonthewest,andthecontrolroombreakarea,instrumentation andcontrol(I&C)officearea,anddieselbuildingonthenorth.1.0DesignBases1.1WindandSnowLoadingsThewindandsnowloadingsforthecontrolroomarethesameasfortheturbinebuilding. 1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirements forthecontrolroom.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsThestructural designforthecontrolroom,aswellastheauxiliary controlroombelowatel261,isClassIseismicbasedonthemaximumcredibleearthquake motionoutlinedintheintroduction toSectionIII.Components arealsodesignedasClassI.Theseismicanalysisresultedintheapplication ofacceleration factorsof20.0percentgravityhorizontal and10.0percentgravityvertical. Theseacceleration factorswerecalculated fromthedynamicanalysisoftheturbinebuilding. Althoughthecontrolroomisstructurally apartoftheturbinebuilding, functional loadstresseswhencombinedwithstressesduetoearthquake loadingaremaintained withintheestablished workingstresses* forthestructural materialinvolved. 1.4HeatingandVentilation Heatingandairconditioning areprovidedforpersonnel comfortandinstrument protection. Theventilating systemalsoprovidescleanairtothecontrolroomfollowing anaccident. 1.5Shielding andAccessControlNormalaccesstothecontrolroomisprovidedfromtheadministration buildingthroughsecurity-controlled doors.Shielding issuppliedtoallowcontinuous occupancy duringanyreactoraccident. Themostlimitingaccidents arethemainsteamline(MSL)breakaccidentandtheloss-of-coolant accident(LOCA)withoutcorespray,whicharedescribed inSectionXV.As*AlsoseeSectionXVI,Subsection G.UFSARRevision14III-9June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARstatedintheFirstSupplement tothePHSR,personnel inthecontrolroomwouldnotreceivemorethanthehourlyequivalent ofthemaximumpermissible quarterly radiation doseaccording to10CFR20.Inaddition, theconcentration ofradioactive materials inthecontrolroomduringallcredibleaccidents wouldbewithinthelimitsforrestricted areasgiveninParagraph 20.103andTableI,AppendixBof10CFR20.Ifairoutsidethebuildingiscontaminated, theventilating systemwillbecontrolled toassurethatcontamination withinthecontrolroomisminimized andkeptwithintheabovelimits,asshowninSection3.0,following.

2.0 Structure

DesignPlansshowinglocationandprincipal dimensions areshownonFiguresIII-4,III-5,andIII-6.2.1GeneralStructural FeaturesThestructural steelenclosing thecontrolroomandtheauxiliary controlroombelowissupported onconcretewallsandconcretefoundations bearingonandkeyedintosoundrock.Actualrockbearingpressures arelessthanone-third oftheallowable workingbearingpressure. Lateralearthquake forcesorwindloadsaretransmitted totheconcretefoundations bythecombination ofstructural steelbracingandconcretewalls.Thecontrolroomwalls,roofandfloorsareframedwithstructural steel.Thewestandnorthinteriorwallsare12-insolidreinforced concrete. Theeastwallisenclosedwithinsulated metalwallpanelsmadeupofFK-16x16metallic-coated interiorlinerelements, 11/2-ininsulation and16B6SgageF-2porcelainized aluminumexteriorfacesheets,asmanufactured byH.H.Robertson Company.Thewallpaneljointsaresealedwithasynthetic elastomer caulkingmaterial. Thiswallisseparated fromtheadministration buildingextension bya3-inrattlespace.Thesouthinteriorwallconsistsof8-inconcreteblockslaidwithsteel-reinforced mortarjoints.Aninteriormetalpartition wallparalleltothesouthwallformsa6'-6"corridorandisprovidedwithwindowsforobserving thecontrolroomoperations fromthecorridor. Theslabimmediately abovethecontrolroomatel300ispinnedtothewallsandprovidesradiation shielding, andconsistsof81/2-inthickpoured-in-place reinforced concretesupported onstructural steelbeamframing.Two-thirds ofthisslabareahasaroofaboveatel333whichismadeupof3-indeepmetaldecking,2inofinsulation anda5-plyroofwithslagsurface.Theremaining thirdoftheslabareaprovidesashielding roofoverthecontrolroomandconsistsofthe81/2-inthickpoured-in-place reinforced concreteslabtowhichisapplied11/2inofrigidinsulation anda5-plyroofwithslagsurface.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARThecontrolroomfloorispoured-in-place reinforced concreteon14-gaugemetaldecking.Thegrossdepthofthefloorslabis8inandtheaveragedepthofconcreteis53/4in.2.2Heating,Ventilation andAirConditioning SystemTheventilation systemshownonFigureIII-14isdesignedtoprovideairatarateofapproximately 16,300cfmtothecontrolroomandauxiliary controlroomareas.Outsideairentersthesystemthroughalouveredintakeafterwhichitpassesthroughanormalsupplyisolation damper,whichisinterlocked withanemergency ventilation inletdamper.Theairthenpassesintotheoutsideairmixdamperwhichissetat100-percent openposition. Outsideairisneededtorecoupairfromleakageandlosses.Theairisthenmixedwithrecirculated returnairfromtherecirculation damperwhichissetat12,750cfmminimum.Thetotalamountofair(16,300cfm)willthenpassthroughatwo-element dustfilter.Next,itpassesthroughacoolingcoilwhereitwillbecooled,ifnecessary, tomaintainthecontrolroomtemperature atapproximately 75F.Thecooledairentersthecontrolroomcirculation fanfordistribution tovariousareasthroughducts.Airwillcirculate throughthecontrolroomtothereturnductworkforrecirculation andmixingwithadditional outsideair.Inordertopreventinfiltration ofpotentially contaminated air,doorsareweatherstripped andpenetrations aresealedtomaintainapositivepressureofapproximately one-sixteenth ofaninchofwater.Intheeventofoutsideaircontamination, thenormalsupplydamperswillbeautomatically closed,anduponahighradiation signal,theemergency inletdamperswillbeopened.Theoutsideairwillthenflowthrougha15-kWductheaterandthenoneofthetwofull-capacity controlroomemergency ventilation fans.Thedesignflowrangeforthecontrolroomemergency ventilation systemis2875cfm+10percent.Thisistheairflowrangedetermined tomaintainapositivepressureof0.0625inW.G.Itthenpassesthroughahigh-efficiency particulate filterandthenthroughaheatedactivated charcoalfilterunit.Thisairwillthenjointhenormalductworkandentertheoutsideairmixdampertobecirculated bythenormalventilation fan.Heatingisprovidedbythermostatically-controlled ventilation ductheaters.Coolingisprovidedbytwochillerunits.Testsandinspections onthecontrolroomemergency ventilation filtersaredoneinaccordance withTechnical Specifications. 2.3SmokeandHeatRemovalToassistinmaintaining ahabitable atmosphere inthecontrolroomandauxiliary controlroom,asmokepurgecapability isprovidedfromtwoindependent fans,one6000-cfmmakeupfanandone8000-cfmexhaustfan(FigureIII-14).UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR2.4Shielding andAccessControlNormalpersonnel accesstothecontrolroomisprovidedbythreecontrolled accessdoorsalllocatedonel277.Thenorthdooropensintothecontrolroombreakarea,thesouthdooropensintotheadministration

building, andthewestdooropensintoacorridor, givingaccesstotheadministration buildingatel277andalsomakingavailable thestairwaytoel261oftheadministration building.

Inadditiontotheabove,astairisprovidedwithinthecontrolroom(northwest corner)downtotheauxiliary controlroomonthegroundfloor,shownonFigureIII-4.Incaseofareactoraccident, personnel accesstoorfromthecontrolroomwouldbefromthesoutherly extremeofallbuildings andapproximately 400ftfromthecenterofthereactor.Thewalls,roofandfloorsaredesignedtohaveconcretethicknesses whichprovideshielding duringthedesignbasisaccident(DBA).3.0SafetyAnalysisThecontrolroomisdesignedforcontinuous occupancy byoperating personnel duringnormaloperating oraccidentconditions. Concreteshielding providedintheroofandfloorsaboveandinthewallsfacingthereactorbuildingismorethansufficient topreventdoseratesfromexceeding thehourlyequivalent ofthe10CFR20quarterly radiation dose.Maintaining positivepressureinsidethecontrolroomandregulating thefilteredoutsideairsupplypreventstheconcentration ofradioactive materials fromexceeding thelimitsof10CFR20.Inaddition, suppliedairrespirators areavailable inthecontrolroomforuseifnecessary. Bothnormalandemergency lightingareprovidedinthecontrolroomtogetherwithcommunications, airconditioning, ventilation, heatingandsanitaryplumbingfacilities. Ifnormalelectricpowerserviceisnotavailable, provision hasbeenmadetopowerthecooling,ventilating andheatingunitsfromtheemergency dieselgenerators. Buildingcomponents andfinishmaterials arenoncombustible andcombustible materials arenotstoredinthecontrolroom.Theminimumdistanceofthecontrolroomtothecenterline ofthereactoris330ftandtherearenodirectconnections frompassageways, ventilating ductsortubeconnections betweenthereactorbuildingandthecontrolroom.Thefloorofthecontrolroomis16ftaboveyardgradeand28ftabovemaximumlakelevel(el249).Therefore, thepossibility offloodingorinundation isincredible. UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARC.WASTEDISPOSALBUILDING1.0DesignBases1.1WindandSnowLoadingsWindandsnowloadingsforthewastedisposalbuildingarethesameasfortheturbinebuilding. 1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirements forthisbuilding. 1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsThewastedisposalbuildingandmajorcomponents withinaredesignedasClassIstructures. Theanalysisofstresslevelsusedthefollowing earthquake designcoefficients. PercentGravitHorizontal VerticalElevations 225and229Elevation 236-6Elevations 246-6,247and24811.011.512.25.55'5.5Elevation 261Elevation 277(276-6)RoofElevation 28917.030.730.77.337.337'3Exteriorwallsofthesubstructure aredesignedforanearthpressureatanydepthequaltothedepthinfeettimes90psf.Theexteriorwallsofthesubstructure andthebaseslabaredesignedtoresisthydrostatic pressureandupliftduetoexteriorfloodingtoel249.Exceptwhereconcentrated loadingduetothehandlingandplacement ofequipment requiresconstruction ofgreaterstrength, thesubstructure floorsaredesignedfordeadloadsplusthefollowing: UFSARRevision14III-13June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARElevations LiveLoadsPoundsPerSFt225and229236-6,237and248241and247Unlimited 350250Thegradeflooratel261,including theconcreteshielding plugswhichclosehatchways overequipment inthesubstructure, isdesignedforauniformliveloadof450psf;orintheloadingareaaconcentrated loadingpatternproducedbyanAASHO*H20loading,or1000psf,whichever requiresthestrongerconstruction. 1.4HeatingandVentilation Heatingandventilation isprovidedforpersonnel comfort,equipment protection andforcontrolling possibleradioactivity releasetotheatmosphere. 1.5Shielding andAccessControlShielding isprovidedaroundtanksandequipment tomaintaindoseratesasdescribed inSectionXII.Normalaccesstothewastedisposalbuildingisfromtheturbinebuilding.

2.0 Structure

DesignFloorandroofplans,exteriorelevations, sectionsshowinginteriorwalls,andarchitectural detailsofthebuildingareshownonFiguresIII-2throughIII-6andFigureIII-11.2.1GeneralStructural FeaturesThepoured-in-place reinforced concretebuildingsubstructure isfoundedonfirmOswegosandstone. Themaximumbearingpressureontherockasrecommended byconsultants is40tons/sqft.Thisresultsinasafetyfactorof18basedonactualunconfined compressive strengthtestsonselectedspecimens ofrockcoreextracted fromtestborings.Thebuildinghasaflatroofconsisting ofacellularmetaldeckcoveredwithinsulation andabitumenandfeltroofingmembrane. Theexteriorfacingofthesuperstructure wallsisofsheetmetal,attachedeithertoanexteriorshielding wallortoinsulated cellularsheetmetalwall.Theinteriorwallsofthe*AmericanAssociation ofStateHighwayOfficials. UFSARRevision14III-14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARsubstructure areofcast-in-place concreteandthoseforthesuperstructure areeithercast-in-place ormadeofconcretemasonryunits.Withminorexceptions, allstructural floorsarepoured-in-place concreteslabs.Thesuperstructure frameisoffabricated steel.Thenorthsectionofthebasementisdividedintothreelevels.Thesefloorsareforthestoringofsolidradioactive wasteinmetaldrumsuntilitissuitableforoffsiteshipmenttoapermanent disposalarea.Eachofthesestorageareasisservedbyapairofliftsfordrums,onebeinglocatedneareachsideofthebuilding. Theintermediate levelfloorelevation isforthestorageofevaporator bottomsandfiltersludgepriortosolidification. Thesouthsectionofthebasementprovidesspaceforthetemporary storage,pumpingandprocessing ofradioactive liquidwasteasdescribed inSectionXII.Theloadingareaforreceiving emptywastedrumsandequipment asdescribed inSectionXIIislocatedonel261(FigureIII-4).Thedesignedcontrolforspilledliquidistoallowthefluidtoseekalowerleveland,thus,beaccommodated bythesumpswhichcontainthefluid,andpumpitdirectlytostoragetanks.Alldrainagesumpshavesmoothliningsofsteelplatewithalljointswelded.Thewastedrumfillingareaalsohasadrainagegutterlinedwithhalfofasteelpipe.Thesedesignsaretofacilitate cleanupbypreventing contaminated liquidsfrompermeating theconcreteshellofthesumppitorgutter.2.2HeatingandVentilation SystemTheheatingandventilating system,shownonFigureIII-15,isdesignedtosupplyfilteredandheatedairatapproximately 9,000cfmandexhaustitafterfiltration. Thiscorresponds toaboutonechangeofairperhour.Noairisdischarged fromthebuildingexceptthroughthestack.Thesupplyfans,exhaustfansandexhaustfiltersareprovidedwithfull-capacity backups.Eithersupplyfanandeitherexhaustfancanthenbeusedtooperatethesystemwhiletheothermembersofthepairsareonstandby.Outsideairisdrawnintothesystemthroughafixedlouverhousedabovetheroofofthebuildingandprotected bybirdandinsectscreening. Theairisdrawnthroughafilterdesignedtoremovedust,andanelectricheaterof200-kWcapacity. Theheateristhermostatically controlled towarmtheairtomaintainatleast70Finaccessible areas.Beyondtheheatersectionthesupplyductissplitwitheachhalfroutedthroughasupplyfanof9,000cfmcapacity. Eachfanisisolatedinitssectionofductbyabutterfly valvedamperonbothinletanddischarge UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARsides.Beyondthefandischarge controldampers,theductsrejoinintoacommonmanifoldfromwhichsupplyductsconveyfreshairtovariousareas'ofthebuilding. Atornearthedischarge pointofeachoftheseducts,amanuallysetdamperdetermines thefractionofairdelivered atthatparticular point.Thefreshairsupplypointsarelocatedwheretherateofaircontamination islowestwhiletheinletstotheexhaustductsarelocatedwheretherateofcontamination islikelytobethehighest.Anairoutletislocatedineachroomandateachpieceofequipment orotherplacewhereradioactive contamination intheformofdust,gasorvaporcouldbereleased. Ductsfromtheseareasleadtoanexhaustairmanifoldwitheachducthavingamanuallysetcontroldamper.Ashuntcircuitdrawsairfromtheexhaustmanifoldandmonitorsitsairborneradioactivity. Thecircuitislocatedsothatitmonitorsbuildingairconditions andnottheexhaustfromequipment vents.HighactivityisalarmedinboththewastebuildingcontrolroomandtheStationmaincontrolroom.Beyondthispoint,theexhaustductdividesintotwofull-sized parts,eachofwhichcontainsaroughingfilterfollowedbyahigh-efficiency filterandanexhaustfanasshownonFigureIII-15.Butterfly valvesintheducts,beforethefilters,betweenfiltersandfans,andfollowing thefansdetermine whichofthealternate routestheexhaustwilltakeandregulatetheamountofairexhausted. Fromhereon,theductsarereunitedanddischarge totheplenumleadingtothestack.Backflowfromothersystemsisprevented byinterlocks whichrequirevalvestobeclosediftheexhaustfansarenotinoperation. Eachhigh-efficiency particulate filterintheexhaustsystemhasaminimumremovalefficiency of99.97percentbasedonthe0.3micron"DOP"(dioctylphthalate smoke)test.Supplementing thisexhauster systemisa300-cfmcapacityauxiliary system,whichexhaustsairdirectlyfromthehydraulic balerthrougharoughingfilterandahigh-efficiency filterbymeansofasmallexhauster fan,anddischarges directlyintotheventilation breaching. Also,a5000-cfmcapacityauxiliary systemexhaustsdirectlyfromthedrumfillingareathrougharoughingfilterbymeansofasmallexhauster fan,anddischarges totheexhaustductofthebuildingventilating system.Equipment ventsandthesampleStationhooddischarge directlytotheexhaustduct.Supplementing theheatsuppliedbythemainintakeairheater,smallheatingunitsareprovidedlocallytomaintaindesiredtemperatures forcomfortofpersonnel andprotection ofequipment. UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTheventilation systemforthewastebuildingextension isshownonFigureIII-16.Oneoftwofull-capacity exhaustfansdrawsairatarateof5400cfmfromthewastebuildinganddistributes theairthroughductworktothevariousequipment roomswithinthewastebuildingextension. Theairthatpassesthroughthesystemisdischarged tothestack.2.3Shielding andAccessControlNormalpersonnel accesstothewastedisposalbuildingisfromtheturbinebuildingthroughthewastedisposalcontrolroom.Accessdoorsfromtheturbinebuildingarealsolocatednearthebalerroom.Accessisalsoavailable throughthetruckloadingbaylocatedatthenortheast, cornerofthebuilding. AllaccesstothebuildingisatgradelevelasshownonFigureIII-4.Alllevelsareaccessible bysteelstairways fromthegradefloorandanemergency ladderway exitisprovidedforthosepartsofthedrumstorageareawhichareremotefromthestairs.Hatchesareprovidedforaccesstoequipment. Concretethicknesses forbothwallsandfloorsareestablished toprovidethedegreeofradiation shielding ofradioactive wasteadjacenttotheshieldedarea.Thereinforced concretesubstructure completely isolatesthebasementandservesasshielding foradjoining basementareas.Eachitemorgroupofcloselyassociated itemsofequipment ishousedinaseparateroom,surrounded byconcreteshielding wallsofappropriate thickness toprovideadequateprotection tooperating personnel asdetermined bytheanticipated intensity ofradiation andtimedurationofexposure. Thewastedisposalbuildingcontrolroomiscompletely surrounded byshielding wallsandwithaccesssoarrangedthattheroomwillbeaccessible atalltimes.3.0SafetyAnalysisThedesignandconstruction ofthewastebuildinghasprovidedforallforeseeable conditions andloads.Allstructural materialusedisnoncombustible andaccumulation ofcombustible materialiscarefully avoided.Asoutlinedinthedetaileddescription ofthestructure, provision hasbeenmadethat,shouldsomeunforeseen condition oraccidentreleasecontaminated waste,thehazardwouldbelocalized andthesizeofthecleanupanddecontamination jobrestricted. Alltanksaremadeofductilemetalandallsumppitsarelinedsothatthesecontainers canbesubjected tosubstantial distortion withoutrupture.Thetworoomsforthecentrifuges onthegradeflooraresurrounded byheavywallswhichserveadualpurposebyproviding UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARbothradiation andmechanical shielding. lntheextremely unlikelyeventthatthecentrifuge shouldsufferamechanical failure,itwouldbecontained withintheroomandpreventinjurytooperating personnel ordamagetotanks,piping,pumpsorotherequipment outsidetheroom.Thesubstructure ismassivereinforced

concrete, not.subjecttofracturing.

UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARD.OFFGASBUILDING1.0DesignBases1.1WindandSnowLoadingsExteriorloadingsforwind,snowandiceusedinthedesignoftheoffgasbuildingarethesameastheturbinebuilding. 1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirements forthisbuilding. 1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsTheoffgasbuildingisdesignedasaClassIstructure. Theanalysisofstresslevelsusedthefollowing earthquake designcoefficients. Elevation North-South GEast-West G28927626124723637.219.315.213.612.032.024'19.016.013.0Theliveloaddesignonthegroundfloorandintermediate subfloors is300psf.1.4HeatingandVentilation Heatingandventilation isprovidedforpersonnel comfort.1.5Shielding andAccessControlShielding isprovidedaroundtanksandequipment tomaintaindoseratesasdescribed inSectionXII.Normalaccesstotheoffgasbuildingisfromtheturbinebuilding.

2.0 Structure

DesignFloorandroofplans,exteriorelevations, sectionsshowinginteriorwalls,andarchitectural detailsofthebuildingareshownonFiguresIII-2throughIII-9.2.1GeneralStructural FeaturesThesubstructure isconstructed ofcast-in-place reinforced concreteandisfoundedonfirmOswegosandstone. UFSARRevision14III-19June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARThemaximumbearingpressureontherockis20tons/sqft.Thisresultsinasafetyfactorof18basedonactualunconfined compressive strengthtestsonselectedspecimens ofrockcoreextracted fromtestborings.Thebuildinghasabuilt-uproofconsisting ofacellularmetaldeckcoveredwithinsulation andasbestosfeltandagravelsurface.Thesuperstructure isstructural steelframewithinsulated exteriormetalwalls.Theinteriorwallsofthesubstructure areofcast-in-place concreteandthoseforthesuperstructure areconcreteblockwitha144-pcfdensityforshielding. Withminorexceptions, allstructural floorsarepoured-in-place concreteslabs.Thebasementisdividedintotwolevels.El229housesthecharcoalcolumntankroom.Locatedonel232isthechillersystemcompressors anddeicingwaterbuffertankrooms.Thenextfloorisdividedintothreelevels.Themainlevelel247housesthethreechillerroomsandequipment hatch.El244'-9"housesthetwopreadsorber rooms,andatel250isgratingsurrounding thecharcoaltanks.Normalpersonnel andequipment accessfromtheturbinebuildingislocatedonel261.Alsolocatedonthislevelareequipment plugs,equipment hatchandstairopeningstothelevelsbelow.2.2HeatingandVentilation SystemTheheatingandventilation systemisshownonFigureIII-17.Oneoftwoexhaustfanswithafullcapacityof6,000cfmdrawsairatarateof5400cfmfromtheturbinebuildinganddistributes theairthroughductworktothevariousequipment roomswithintheoffgasbuilding. Theairthatpassesthroughthesystemisdischarged tothestack.2.3Shielding andAccessControlNormalpersonnel accesstotheoffgasbuildingisfromtheturbinebuilding. Anaccessdoorfromthewastedisposalbuildingisalsoprovided. Allaccessislocatedongradelevel261.Alllevelsoftheoffgasbuildingareaccessible bysteelstairways fromthegradefloor.Equipment plugsandhatchareprovidedforaccesstoequipment. Concretethicknesses forbothwallsandfloorswereestablished toprovideadequateradiation shielding consistent withaslowasreasonably achievable (ALARA)criteria.

3.0 SafetyAnalysisThedesignandconstruction

oftheoffgasbuildinghasprovidedforallforeseeable conditions andloads.UFSARRevision14III-20June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARAllwalls,floorsandroofareofnoncombustible materials. Equipment ishousedinroomswithwalls,floorsandshieldwallsappropriately designedtoprovideadequateshielding tomeetALARAcriteria. UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARE.NONCONTROLLED BUILDINGS

1.0 Administration

BuildingTheadministration buildingisaoneandtwo-story structure adjoining theturbinebuildingonthesouthandeast.1.1DesignBases1.1.1WindandSnowLoadingsThewindandsnowloadingsfortheadministration buildingarethesameasfortheturbinebuilding. 1.1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirements fortheadministration building. 1.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsTheadministration buildingisdesignedasaClassIIandIIIstructure. Theoriginaladministration buildingwasdesignedasaClassIIIstructure withnospecialseismiccriteria. Thefollowing designliveloadswereusedinadditiontothedeadloadsfortheoriginaladministration building. Elevation 261Storeroomandshoproom-1000psfOtherAreas150psfElevation 277Officeareas,including areasforofficeequipment andpersonnel, corridors, stairways andotherrelatedareas-125psfTheadministration buildingextension isdesignedasaseismicClassIIstructure. Aportionoftheextension islocatedoverthedieselgenerator roomsrequiring anupgradedseismicclassification. Theextension isdesignedtoaccommodate thesameseismicloadsasthecontrolroomanddieselgenerator rooms.Thecriteriausedfortheadministration buildingextension are:1.Normalallowable stress*levelswereused.(However, upto1/3overstress waspermitted.)

• AlsoseeSectionXVI,Subsection G.UFSARRevision14III-22June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR2~3~4~Horizontal north-south andeast-west earthquakes werenotcombinedbutwereconsidered separately.

Verticalaccelerations wereassumedtobe1/2ofthehorizontal. Accelerations anddeflections causedbytheearthquake are:Elevation North-South OQEast-West <oG30027726125034.019.013.012.030.018.013.012.01.1.4Heating,CoolingandVentilation Heating,coolingandventilation areprovidedforpersonnel comfort.1.1.5Shielding andAccessControl~~~Noshielding isrequired. 1.2Structure DesignTheadministration

building, shownonFiguresIII-3throughIII-5,containsallthefacilities requiredforadministrative andtechnical servicing functions requiredofanucleargenerating station.1.2.1GeneralStructural FeaturesTheadministration buildingisasteel-framed structure withcellularmetalandconcretefloorsandexteriorwallsofinsulated sandwichprecastconcreteslabs.Theexteriorwallsoftheadministration buildingextension aremetalsiding.Theexteriorsouthandwestwallsofthewomen'slockerroomandthefoamroomaremasonrywalls.Thebuildinghasthreelevels.Thebasement(el248)housestheonsiteTechnical SupportCenter(TSC).TheTSCmeetstherequirements ofNUREG-0578.

ThelayoutoftheTSCanditsproximity tothecontrolroomisshownonFigureIII-5.Thislevelisalsousedforstorage,additional officespace,andentrancetotheturbinebuildingandpersonnel lockerroom.UFSARRevision14III-23June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARThegroundfloor(el261)isdividedintothreeparts.OneoftheseisassignedtoStationstores.Theremaining twoareassignedtoshops.Thebalanceofthegroundfloorcontainsananteroomandafoyerforthestairwayandelevatortothegeneralofficesonthesecondfloor.Theroomforequipment andmaterials whichproducefireextinguishing foamisalsointhisarea.Ontheupperlevel(el277)arethestair,elevatorlobby,restrooms, offices,conference rooms,andasatellite documentcontrolstation.Documentcontrol,microfilming facilities, andtherecordstoragefacility, inaccordance withANSIN45.2.9-5(6), arelocatedatNineMilePointNuclearStation-Unit2(Unit2).1.2.2Heating,Ventilation andAirConditioning Ventilation fortheadministration buildingandtheadministration buildingextension isprovidedasfollows.Oneself-contained rooftopairconditioning unit,onesupplyfan,threeexhaustfans,andassociated ductworkandequipment provideventilation totheoriginaladministration building. Fivesupplyfans,associated ductworkandequipment supplyairtotheadministration buildingextension. Individual heatingandairconditioning unitsareprovidedthroughout theoriginaladministration buildingandtheadministration buildingextension forpersonnel comfort.TheonsiteTSClocatedonel248isprovidedwithanairfiltering systemwhichishousedinthecharcoalfilterbuildingatel261(seeFigureIII-18).1.2.3AccessControlNormalaccesstotheadministration buildingisprovidedbytwodoorslocatedonthewestsideofthebuilding. Threeoverheaddoorsarelocatedonthesouthsideofthebuildingtoprovideaccesstotheshopsandstoresatthe261ftlevel.1.3SafetyAnalysisNoradioactivity complications existatanyofthenoncontrolled buildings. Firehazardislowsinceconstruction isoffire-resistant, materials andeachbuildinghasaminimumofcombustibles. UFSARRevision14III-24June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR2.0SewageTreatment BuildingThenewsewagetreatment facility(STF),whichutilizespartoftheexistingSTF,islocatedinthevicinityofrailroadtrackspurno.3thatwasremovedforconstruction, approximately 300ftnorthwest oftheturbinebuildingandduewestofthenorthendofthereactorbuildingasshownonFigureIII-1.Thesitewasselectedbasedonreviewofavailable areasoutsidethefloodplainforaUnit210,000-yr floodyearflood(rain).TheexistingSTFwasmodifiedtofunctionasarawsewagepumpstationandanequalization tankforthenewSTF.ThecontrolbuildingforthenewSTFislocatedbetweenandtothesouthofthecircularextendedaerationunits.Thecontrolbuildinghousesanewlaboratory, amotorcontrolcenter(MCC),blowerroom,storageroom,maintenance roomandhypochlorite room,aswellasaninfluent/effluent room.Normalaccesstothetreatment unitsisfrominsidethecontrolbuilding's influent/effluent room.Maintenance andemergency accesstothetreatment unitmaybefromoutsideaccessdoorsoneachtank.2.1DesignBases2.1.1WindandSnowLoadingsThewindloadingsforthesewagetreatment buildingarethesameasfortheturbinebuilding. Thesnowloadingforthebuildingroofis14lb/ft~.2.1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirements forthisbuilding. 2.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsThesewagetreatment buildingisdesignedasaClassIIIstructure withnospecialseismiccriteria. Thesystemconformstostateregulations forsewagesystems.2.1.4Electrical DesignIncertainareasofthebuilding, electrical components areprotected byexplosion-proof enclosures. 2.1.5FireandExplosive GasDetection Automatic firedetection equipment isprovidedintheSTF.Thefiredetection equipment actuatesalarmsonlocalfirepanelsintheSTFwhichinformspersonnel offirelocation. Automatic gasdetection equipment isprovidedforchlorine, andformethanandotherexplosive gases.Thedetection equipment actuatesanalarmbellandwarninglightsinsideandoutsidetheSTF.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARBothsystemsareprovidedforpersonnel safetyandequipment protection. 2.1.6HeatingandVentilation Heatingandventilation isprovidedforequipment protection andpersonnel comfortinaccordance withtherequiredcodes.2.1.7Shielding andAccessControlShielding isnotrequired. 2.2Structure Design2.2.1GeneralStructural FeaturesThesewagetreatment plantwillprovidesecondary treatment anddisinfection foraminimumflowof10,000gal/dayandapeakflowof240,000gal/day.Wastewater flowsbygravityfromNineMilePointNuclearStation-Unit1(Unit1)facilities, theEnergyInformation Center(EIC),theNuclearLearningCenter(NLC),andUnit2totheexistingUnit1sewagetreatment plantbuildingandassociated preliminary treatment facilities. Afterpreliminary treatment, theflowispumpedtotheextendedaerationunits.Flowthroughtheremainder oftheplantisbygravity.Discharge fromtheplantisthrougha12-inoutfallsewertoadrainageditchleadingtoLakeOntario.Flowmeasurement isavailable andisrecordedonstripcharts. Rawsewagewillpassthroughacomminutor toshredlargesolids.Twocomminutors areprovided, eachcapableoftreatingflowsupto300,000gal/day.Intheeventoffailureofbothcomminutors, abypasshand-cleaned barscreenisprovidedtoprotecttherawsewagepumpsfromlargesolids.Rawsewageisthenpumpedtothenewtreatment facilities. Pumpingafterpreliminary treatment minimizes theneedforrockexcavation fordownstream treatment units.A4-inand6-indual-force mainisusedtomeettheanticipated flowrangeof35,000gal/dayto240,000gal/day.Athree-pump rawsewagestationisutilizedwithtwopumpsoperating andthethirdpumpactingasaninstalled standby.Wastewater pumpedtothenewtreatment facilities willenteraflowdistribution structure andwillbesplitequallybyweirstotwoextendedaerationunits.Eachunitcontainstwoequally-sized basinsof2800cuft,whileaffording maximumcontrolandoperational flexibility. Atdoubleoutagedesignconditions, twounitseachwithtwobasinsofthissizewouldprovideanaveragehydraulic detention timeofapproximately 17hrwithanaverageorganicloadingofabout18lbbiological oxygendemand(BOD)perdayper1000cuftoftankvolume.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARTheaerationsystemfortheactivated sludgeprocessisacoarse-bubble diffusedairsystem.Atotalofthreeairblowers(including standby)areprovided, havingatotalcapacityof700scfm.Theseblowerswillprovideapproximately 3200cuftofaerationairperpound.Themixliquoristhensenttotheactivated sludgesettlingtankwherethesludgesolidsareseparated. Thisproducesawell-clarified effluentlowinBODandsuspended solids.Eachtreatment unit.containsan18-ftdiameterclarifier with12-ftsidewaterdepth.Thesetanksarecenterfeedclarifiers withradialoutwardflow.Atdoubleoutagedesignconditions, thetankswillhaveanoverflowrateof240and470gal/day/sq ftataveragepeakflows,respectively. Scumistoberemovedfromthesurfaceofthefinalsettlingtanksbyarotarywiperarm.Scumfromthesurfaceofthesettlingtankisdrawnoverashortinclinedbeachandisdischarged toascumtrough.Thescumisthenflushedtoascumwellfromwhichitisairliftedtotheaeratedsludgeholdingtanks.Tomaintaintheactivated sludgeinanactivecondition, finalsludgeisremovedfromthesettlingtankscontinuously. Sludgewithdrawn fromthefinalsettlingtanksisreturnedtotheaerationtanksataratetomaintainaconstantmixedliquorsuspended solidsandsolidsretention timeintheaerationtanksandtoavoidexcessive sludgedepthsinthesettlingtanks.Returnsludgeairliftsareusedtoreturnsludgetotheheadoftheaerationtank.Excesssludgesolidswillbewastedfromthesettlingtanksandairliftedtoaeratedsludgeholdingtankstobeconcentrated priortosludgedewatering. Hypochlorite isusedfordisinfection ofthefinaleffluentatthenewtreatment facilities. Eachtreatment unitincludesaseparatechlorinecontactzoneof170cuftwhichprovides15mindetention timeandcontactatthepeakflowof240,000gal/day.Eachtreatment unitcontainsanaeratedsludgeholdingtankofapproximately 2000cufteach.Atdoubleoutagedesignflows,thesetanksprovideinexcessof30dayssludgestorage.Eachtreatment unitisfurnished withanaluminumgeodesicdomecoverforwinterization protection. Eachdomeisequippedwithtwoskylights andonegravityventtoprovidenaturallightingandventilation. Thewallsofthetreatment unitsareextendedtosupportthedomesandprovideaworkableclearheadroomheightalongtheinteriorcircumference ofthetreatment unit.Thedomesaredesignedtoberemovable asacompleteunit.2.2.2Ventilation SystemTheSTFisairconditioned andelectrically heated.Unitairconditioners inthelabroomonlyandheatingcoilsforventilation airarelocatedthroughout thefacilitywhererequired. UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR2.2.3AccessControlTheequipment househasnowindowsexceptincertaindoorsandalockonthedoorpreventsaccessbyunauthorized personnel.

3.0 EnergyInformation

CenterTheEICisasingle-story flat-roofed structure locatedonaslightpromontory 1000ftwestandslightlysouthoftheStation(FigureIII-1).3.1DesignBases3.1.1WindandSnowLoadingsExteriorloadingsforwind,snow,andiceusedindesignoftheEICmeetallapplicable codesasaminimum.Theroofanditssupporting structure aredesignedtowithstand aloadingof40psfofsnoworice.Thewallsandbuildingstructure aredesignedtowithstand anexternalorinternalloadingof40psfofsurfacearea,whichisapproximately equivalent toawindvelocityof125mphatthe30-ftlevel.3.1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirements fortheEIC.3.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsTheEICandcomponents aredesignedasClassIIIstructures withnospecialseismiccriteria. Thefollowing designliveloadswereusedinadditiontothedeadloads:Liveloadonstairways andallpublicareasexceptrestrooms 100psf.Liveloadonallotherfloorareasincluding theclassroom, officesandconference room-60psf.Allowable bearingpressureonundisturbed soilfoundations of1.5tons/sqft.Stressesinsteelconstruction arethoseallowedbytheAISC1963Specifications fortheDesign,Fabrication andErectionofStructural SteelforBuildings whenusingASTMA36Structural Steel.Stressesinconcreteconstruction arethoseallowedbytheACI318-63Standardfor3000psiconcretewithintermediate gradenewbilletsteelA-15.UFSARRevision14III-28June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR3.1.4HeatingandVentilation Heatingandventilation isprovidedforpersonnel comfort.3.1.5Shielding andAccessControlNoradioactivity iscontained inornearthebuilding; therefore, noshielding isrequired. 3.2Structure Design3.2.1GeneralStructural FeaturesAsshownonFigureIII-1,theprincipal partofthebuildingisintheformofaregularhexagonwithsides56-ftlong.Awingofirregular shapebutapproximately 96-ftlongby36-ftand451/2-ftwideextendstothewest.Thelobbyoccupiesthefullwidthofthesouthwest portionoftheprincipal partofthebuilding. Totherearofthelobbyareasmalltheater,aroomforamodeloftheStationandaroomforvariousexhibits. Thebuilding's core,centraltotheserooms,containsastorageroom,aprojection roomforthetheaterandstairsforaccesstothebasement. Publicrestrooms andawomen'sloungearelocatedinthewingandadjointhelobbyontheleft.Thewingalsocontainsaclassroom, aconference room,offices,acentralcorridor, anextension ofthemainlobbyandthreesecondary entrances tothebuilding. TheEICbuildinghasastructural steelframerestingonaconcretesubstructure. Itsexteriorcurtainwallsareofconcreteblockwithaveneerofnativestone,trimmedwithredwood,andwellinsulated. Interiorwallsareplastered metalorgypsumlathonsteelstudding. Theroofiscomprised ofabituminous waterproofing membraneonrigidinsulation whichiscarriedbymetalroofdeckingandopenwebsteeljoistpurlins,whichareinturnsupported byrolledsteelgirdersandfasciabeams.Aconcreteslab,hexagonally shapedinplan,about30ftindiameterand4-inthickiscentrally locatedontherooftoserveasaplatformfortheairconditioning condensers. 3.2.2HeatingandVentilation SystemTheEICisairconditioned andelectrically heated.Compressors, heatexchangers, heatingcoilsforventilation airandothermechanical equipment arelocatedinequipment roomsinthebasement. UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR3.2.3AccessControlAccesstotheEICisfromaseparateroadthanthatleadingtotherestoftheStation.Eachroomtowhichthepublicwillbeadmittedhasdoorsofamplewidthtotheroomsadjoining oneithersideand,inaddition, thetheaterandthemodelroomeachhasitsownexitdoortotheoutsideofthebuilding. Alltheseprovideampleegressfromanyareaforanyconceivable emergency. UFSARRevision14III-30June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARF.SCREENHOUSE, INTAKEANDDISCHARGE TUNNELS1.0Screenhouse Thescreenhouse adjoinsthenorthwallofthereactorandturbinebuildings anditssuperstructure iscompletely isolatedfromthereactorbuilding. 1.1DesignBasis1.1.1WindandSnowLoadingsThewindandsnowloadingsforthescreenhouse arethesameasfortheturbinebuilding. 1.1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirements forthescreenhouse. 1.1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadingsThescreenhouse substructure hasbeendesignedtoconformtotherequirements foraClassIstructure whileloadedwithanypossiblecombination offilledandunwatered conditions ofthechannelslocatedinthissubstructure. Thesuperstructure isdesignedasaClassIIstructure asdiscussed onPageIII-3oftheFirstSupplement tothePHSR.Theseismicanalysisresultedintheapplication ofacceleration factorsof20.0percentgravityhorizontal and10.0percentgravityvertical. 1.1.4HeatingandVentilation Noheating,coolingorventilation isprovidedforthescreenhouse. 1.1.5Shielding andAccessControlNoshielding isrequired. Normalaccesstothescreenhouse isthroughtheturbinebuilding. 1.2Structure DesignThesuperstructure ofthescreenhouse isofframedstructural steelsupported onareinforced concretesubstructure whichisfoundedonrock.Thebuildinghasaflatroofconsisting ofcellularmetaldeckingcoveredwithinsulation andatarandfeltroofingmembrane. Thetwobaysoftheeastwall,whichareacontinuation ofaneastwalloftheturbineauxiliaries buildingextension, areofthesameinsulated sheetmetalconstruction. Thebalanceoftheexteriorwall,about7/8ofthetotal,isof8-ininternally-insulated precastconcretepanelscorresponding withthoseinthebaseofthereactorbuildingwalls.WallandUFSARRevision14III-31June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARroofingmaterialandconstruction areidentical withthoseusedforthereactorandturbinebuildings. Thescreenhouse substructure comprises channelsfortheflowofverylargequantities ofrawlakewater,gatesandstoplogsforcontroloftheflow,racksandscreensforcleaningthewaterandpumps.Thewaterchannelsareshownschematically onFiguresIII-19andIII-20.Fiveplainverticalgatesnearthenorthendofthesubstructure separatethechannelsfromthetunnels.GatesAandBseparatetheintaketunnelfromtheforebay.GateCseparates thedischarge channelfromthedischarge tunnel;gateEseparates thedischarge channelfromtheintaketunnel;andgateDseparates theforebayfromthedischarge tunnel.EachofgatesA,B,C,andDhasadedicated electricmotor-driven hoistforraising,lowering, andmaintaining positionofthegates.GateEisoperatedusingahydraulic ramsystem.Normalcirculation isprovidedbyopeninggatesA,B,andCwithgatesDandEclosed.ReversedflowthroughthetunnelsisobtainedbyclosinggatesA,BandCwithgatesDandEopen.Tempering (partialrecycleflow)isobtainedbypartially openinggateEwithallothergatessetfornormaloperation. Theforebayandthesecondary forebayareconnected bythreeparallelcoolwaterchannels, ineachofwhicharelocatedtrashracks,rackrakesandtraveling screenstoremovetrash,waterplantsandfishfromthewater.Eachofthesechannelshasprovisions forstoplogsateachendsothatanyoneofthemmaybesegregated andunwatered formaintenance workwithoutshuttingdowntheStation.Onthefloorabovethesecondary forebayaremountedfourcontainment sprayrawwaterpumpsandtwoemergency servicewater(ESW)pumpswithastrainerforeach.Alsoonthisfloorandaboveeachofthethreecoolwaterchannelsarethescreenwashpumps.Adjacenttothesecondary forebay,onitssouthsideandseparated fromitbychannelsfittedwithstoplogguides,areinletchambersforthetwocirculating waterpumpswhichprovidewatertothemaincondensers. Bymeansofstoplogs,eitherofthesechamberscanbeisolatedforunwatering andworkonthecorresponding pump.Alateralbranchleadsofftotheeastfromthesecondary forebay.Threechambersoffthisbranch,separated fromitbysluicegates,supplywatertoeachoftwoservicewaterpumpswithstrainers andapairoffirepumps.Oneofthesefirepumpsisdrivenbyanelectricmotor,theotherbyadieselengine.Thescreenhouse isalsoequippedwithafloor-operated electricoverheadtraveling bridgecrane.Thiscraneservesthevariousfunctions ofplacingandremovingstoplogs,andservicing thetrashracks,rackrakesandtraveling screens,maintenance ofthetwocirculating waterpumpsandallpumpsmountedabovethesecondary forebay.Theservicewaterpumps,theirstrainers, andthefirepumpsareservicedformaintenance workbyoverheadbeamruns,trolleysandhoists.UFSARRevision14III-32June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR2.0IntakeandDischarge TunnelsAsshownonFigureIII-21,waterisdrawnfromthebottomofLakeOntarioabouttwo-tenths ofamileoffshoreandreturnedtothelakeaboutone-tenth ofamileoffshore. 2.1DesignBasesThewaterintakeanddischarge tunnelsaredesignedtoconformtotherequirements forClassIIstructures. Theintakeanddischarge tunnelsareconcrete-lined boresthroughsolidrock.Assuch,theyarehighlyrigidstructures withextremely smallnaturalperiodsofvibration andaseismicresponseofonly11percentofgravityregardless ofthedampingfactor.2.2Structure DesignWaterisadmittedtotheintaketunnelthroughabellmouth-shaped inlet.Theinletissurmounted byahexagonally-shaped guardstructure ofconcrete, thetopofwhichisabout6ftabovethelakebottomand14ftbelowthelowestanticipated lakelevel.Thestructure iscoveredbyaroofofsheetpilingsupported onsteelbeams,andeachofthesixsideshasawaterinletabout5-fthighby10-ftwide,withthelatteropeningsguardedbygalvanized steelracks.Thisdesignprovidesforwatertobedrawnequallyfromalldirections withaminimumofdisturbance andwithnovortexatthelakesurface,andguardsagainst.theentranceofunmanageable flotsamtothecirculating watersystem(CWS).Thewaterdropsthroughaverticalconcrete-lined shafttoaconcrete-lined tunnelintherock,throughwhichitflowstothefootofaconcrete-lined verticalshaftundertheforebayinthescreenhouse. Thefootofthisshaftcontainsasandtraptocatchandstoreanylake-bottom sandwhichmaywashoverthesillsoftheinletstructure. Thetopoftheshafthasabell-mouthed discharge. Waterisreturnedtothelakeatapointaboutone-tenth ofamileoffshorethroughabell-mouthed outletsurmounted byahexagonal-shaped discharge structure ofconcrete. Thetopofthisstructure isabout4ftabovelakebottomand81/2ftbelowthelowestanticipated lakelevel.Thegeometryofthestructure closelyresembles theinletstructure, althoughreducedinsize.Thesixexitportsareabout3fthighby71/3ftwide.Thedischarge 'tunnelfromthescreenhouse isidentical incross-section withtheintaketunnel.Theverticalshaftconnecting thedischarge tunnelwiththedischarge channelunderthescreenhouse alsohasasandtrapatitsfoot.Waterisdischarged directlytotheverticaldischarge shaft.Asubmerged diffuserintheverticalshaftensuresagooddilutionbeforedischarge tothelake.Samplesaredrawnatalowerpointintheshaft.UFSARRevision14III-33June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR3.0SafetyAnalysisTheselection andarrangement ofequipment andcomponents ofthescreenhouse andcirculating watertunnelsisbasedontheknowledge gainedovermanyyearsofexperience inthedesign,construction andoperation ofsuchfacilities forcoal-fired steam-electric stations. Allcomponents ofthesystemwhichmightpossiblybesubjecttounscheduled outage,andbysuchoutageaffecttheoperability oftheStation,areduplicated. Inthecaseoftheduplicate firepumps,theprimemoversarealsototallyindependent. Thegatesaresimpleandruggedinconstruction, andtheiroperation issimpleandstraightforward, withthepossibility ofinadvertent erroneous operation cuttoaminimum.Thepumpsuctionsareamplysubmerged belowthelowestlowwatersurfaceelevation ofthelakesurfaceadjustedforthefrictionandvelocitydropsinthesupplytunnelandchannels. Thesupplyofwaterbydirectgravityfromthelakeisinexhaustible. Themainportionofthesuperstructure, asingle-story structure elasticframeofonebaywidth,hasarelatively longnaturalperiodofvibration, andbeingboltedhasacomparatively highdampingfactor.Asaresult,thedynamicloadswhichcouldbeappliedtoitbywindpressureandalsooperation ofthecranearemorecriticalthanthoseduetotheseismicloading.Thus,whilenodynamicanalysisoftheframingwasrequiredormade,itisquiteprobablethatthebuildingsuperstructure meetsClassIconditions insteadofonlyClassII,asspecified intheFirstSupplement tothePHSR.Shearingforcesinthewallsandinthebottomchordplaneoftherooftrusssystemareresistedbysystemsofdiagonalbracing.Thesizesofthemembersofthesesystemsweregovernedbydetailandminimumallowable slenderness ratherthanbycalculated forces,whichresultedinexcessstrengthbeingavailable inthesystem.UFSARRevision14III-34June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARG.STACKThestackisafreestanding reinforced-concrete chimney,350-fthigh,located100fteastofthenortheast cornerofthereactorbuilding. 1.0DesignBases1.1GeneralTheheightofthestackandthevelocityofdischarge aretoprovideahighdegreeofdilutionforroutineoraccidental Stationeffluents. Thisisdiscussed onPageIV-8oftheFirstSupplement tothePHSR.1.2WindLoadingAnalysisshowsthattheloadsduetoseismicactionareconsiderably greaterthanthosewhichwouldbeexertedbythevelocityofwindforwhichtheotherClassIstructures aredesigned: 125mphatthe30-ftlevel.Sincethisistrueforalllevelsofthestack(windvelocities andpressures varyingaccording toelevation aboveground), lateralloadsduetoseismicforcesgovernthedesign.1.3SeismicDesignThedesignandconstruction ofthestackmeettheseismicrequirements ofaClassIstructure. Seismicforcesappliedarethoseobtainedfromthevelocityandacceleration responsespectraincludedintheFirstSupplement ofthePHSRforagroundmotionacceleration factorof11percentofgravity(PlateC-22).1.4Shielding andAccessControlShielding isrequiredfortheoffgasandglandsealexhaustpiping.Accessisprovidedforinspection andmaintenance duringshutdown.

2.0 Structure

DesignThegeneralfeaturesofthestack,including itsprincipal dimensions, areshownonFigureIII-22.Itisataperedmonolithic reinforced-concrete tuberestingonamassiveconcretebasewhichextendstosoundrock.Fromthisbaseitrisesthroughtheturbineauxiliaries buildingextension fromwhichitiscompletely isolatedstructurally. Thetopofthestackisatel611,or212ft6inabovethetopofthereactorbuilding, thenexthigheststructure intheStation.Afterfiltration, allStationventilation exhaustwhichisradioactively contaminated isbroughttothestackthroughUFSARRevision14III-35June1996 NineMilePoint.Unit1FSARbreaching, whichisconnected abovetheroofofthesurrounding building. Twopipes,6inand12inindiameter, bringradioactively contaminated gasesandvaporsfromtheturbineshaftsealsandfromthecondenser. Thesepipesenterthestackbelowthegradefloorandturnupthroughencasingconcretetoaterminalpointatel335,whichis20ftabovethetopofthebreaching entrancetothestack.Atthispointturbulence ishigh,whichensuresbestmixinganddilutionofthecontaminated gases.An>>Isokinetic Probe"gassamplerislocatedwithinthestackwithitsorificesatel535,or76ftbelowthetopofthestack.Thisdeviceissupported byabeamwhichspanstheinteriorofthestackandcantilevers outsidetofacilitate withdrawal ofthedeviceforcleaningandmaintenance. Anopeningisprovidedinthestackwallthroughwhichthedeviceisinstalled. Thisopeningisa16-indiameterpipesleevewithitsouterendclosedbyablindflange.Asmalleradjoining openingmakesitpossibletomeasurethegasvelocityprofileinthestackortovisuallyinspecttheprobewithoutwithdrawing it.Theprobeisconnected tomonitoring equipment locatednearthebaseofthestackbytubingwhichdescendsinsidethestack.Accesstotheinteriorofthestackisthroughanairtightdoorfromthebasementofthesurrounding building. Exterioraccesstothetopofthestackandtofourexternalplatforms isfromtheroofofthebuildingbymeansofaguardedladder.Attheprobelevelasmallplatformprovidesaccessandworkingarea.Threeotherplatforms completely surroundthestackwhichprovideaccessforexternalmaintenance andpaintingofthestack.Thestackisprotected byfourlightning rodsanddownconductors whichareinterconnected atthetop,middleandbottomofthestack,thenconnected totheStationgrounding grid.Thestructural reinforcing steel,platforms andladderareinturngroundedbyattachment tothissystem.Thetopofthestackis,ineffect,an8-ft6-ininsidediameternozzle.Fornormalgasflowsof216,000cfm,thecorresponding velocityofthedischarge jetis63fps.Thisrelatively highvelocityassuresthattheturbulence generated willthoroughly mix,diluteanddispersethedischarged gasevenattimesoflowwindvelocity. 3.0SafetyAnalysis3.1Radiology Ifduringnormaloperation thestackweretobeinoperative, therewouldbenoseriousradiological consequences foraperiodoftimedepending onthelevelofactivitybeingreleased. Ifthestackweretoremaininoperative forasignificant lengthoftime,thereactorwouldbeshutdowntopreventexceeding 10CFR20UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARlimits.Exfiltration casesinvolving aninoperative stackarediscussed inSectionXV.3.2StackFailureAnalysisIntheeventthatportions,~of thestackstriketheplant,structural analysisindicated thatthestackwouldtopplewithapproximately theupper3/4(280ft)intact.Asastructural elementthestackisweakincircumferential bending.Thismeansthatthestackcross-section wouldflattentoout-of-round orovalwhenitstruck,spreadtheloadoveralargerareathanhaditremainedcircular, andabsorbenergyindoingso.Sincethestackisstronglongitudinally, itwouldtendtospanopeningsorspanfromgirdertogirder.Theconsequences ofthestackstrikingtheplanthavebeenevaluated bywhatisbelievedtobethethreemostcriticaldirections (seeFigureIII-23).1.Southwest, strikingthereactorbuilding2.South,strikingthedieselgenerator building3.Northwest, strikingthescreenandpumphouse3.2.1ReactorBuildingAconsiderable amountofenergywouldbeabsorbedasthestackfellthroughthebracedwalls,therooftrussesandthecranegirders.Withtheaboveconsiderations takenintoaccount,itisunlikelythatthestackwouldpenetrate thebottomofthefuelpoolortheshieldplugsoverthereactor.Theworstconditions wouldoccurifoneorbothoftheemergency coolingsystemsweredamaged.Sincetheemergency coolingreturnlinesareequippedwithcheckvalves,theonlyflowpathwouldbeoutthesupplylinestotheemergency coolingsystem.Theisolation valvesinthislinewillautomatically closeonhighflowintheline.Hightemperature inthevicinityofthelineandhighradiation arealarmedinthecontrolroom,resulting inmanualclosureoftheisolation valves.Becauseoftheangularseparation betweenthedieselgenerator andthereactorbuilding, thedieselareawouldnotbeaffectedbyfailureofthestackinthedirection ofthereactorbuilding. Thebatteryroomisoutsidethereachofthestackregardless ofthedirection inwhichthestackisassumedtofall.Shouldtheybeneeded,allsourcesofelectricpowerremainavailable tosafeguard systems.Adequateprotection istherefore affordedinthiscase.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSAR3.2.2DieselGenerator BuildingFailureofthestackinthesoutherly direction coulddamagethedieselgenerators. Sincethecontrolroomis350ftfromthestackandtheupper3/4ofthestackisapproximately 280ft,itishighlyimprobable thatthecontrolroomwouldbedamaged.Iffailurewereinthesoutherly direction, thereactorbuildingwouldnotbedamaged.Normalsourcesofelectricpowerwouldbeavailable toconductasafeshutdown. 3.2.3ScreenandPumpHouseIfthestackfellduenorth,thedieselfirepumps,thedieselgenerator coolingwaterpumps,andassociated pipingsystemscouldbecomeinoperative. Ifthestackfellwithinthenorthwest

quadrant, thecontainment sprayrawwater,circulating waterandservicewaterpumps,aswellasthelinesfromthedieselfirepumps,couldbedamaged.However,safeshutdowncouldstillbeaffordedbyuseofthenormalsuppliesofelectricpowerandtheemergency coolingsystem.UFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARH.SECURITYBUILDINGANDSECURITYBUILDINGANNEXThesecuritybuildingandsecuritybuildingannexarelocatedonthesouthwest corneroftheStationsecurityperimeter.

SeeFigureIII-1.Theprincipal functionofthesebuildings istomonitorcontrolled ingressandegressofpersonnel andequipment totheStationsecurityperimeter. Administrative officesarecontained withinthesebuildings forsupportofthedutiesassociated withStationsecurity. Becauseofthenatureofthissubject,adetaileddescription ofthesebuildings willnotbediscussed inthisdocument. Foradditional information regarding thissubject,refertotheStationsecurityplan.UFSARRevision14III-39June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARI.RADWASTESOLIDIFICATION ANDSTORAGEBUILDING1.0DesignBases1.1WindandSnowLoadingsWindandsnowloadingsfortheradwastesolidification andstoragebuilding(RSSB)aredesignedtomeetorexceedthoseofthewastedisposalbuilding. 1.2PressureReliefDesignTherearenospecialpressurereliefrequirements forthisbuilding. 1.3SeismicDesignandInternalLoadings+ Thefoundation mat,structural walls,columns,floorsandroofoftheRSSBareclassified asprimarystructural elements. Allprimarystructural elementsareseismically designedtowithstand theeffectsofanoperating basisearthquake (OBE)inaccordance withRegulatory Guide(RG)1.143.Secondary structure

elements, including platforms,

catwalks, pipesupports, equipment andvesselsupports, andinternalmasonrywalls,areclassified asnonseismic-resistant itemsandaredesignedbyconventional method.1.4Heating,Ventilation andAirConditioning+

Theheating,ventilation andairconditioning (HVAC)andchilledwatersystemsaredesignedforthefollowing primaryfunctional requirements: heat,ventilate andaircondition theRSSB;removeairborneparticulates fromtheRSSBatmosphere; preventunfiltered exfiltration ofairborneradioactivity fromthebuilding; preventinfiltration ofairborneradioactivity intotheRSSBcontrolroomandelectrical room;controlandprovideameansformonitoring (viathemainstack)thereleaseofairborneradioactivity viatheventilation exhaustsystem;minimizetheeffectsonthefacilityanditsoccupants fromreleasesofradioactivity intotheRSSBatmosphere; collectandfilterairdisplaced viatheventsfromallRSSBtankscontaining radioactive fluids;continuously purgetheRSSBoftruckexhaustfumesandotherhazardous gasestoensuresafeoccupancy atalltimes.1.5Shielding andAccessControl@Shielding isdesignedtolimitradiation levelsonthebuildingexterior, inthecontrolroom,intheelectrical room,stairwells, andthepassageway tothetruckbays.AccesstotheexterioroftheRSSBiscontrolled byaccesstotheprotected area,whichiscontrolled byNuclearSecurity. NormalUFSARRevision14III-40June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARaccesstothebuildinginteriorisviathewastebuildingextension. Twoexteriorrollupdoorsallowaccessforvehiclestothetwotruckbays.Fourexteriordoorsarenormallylockedandprovideemergency egress.2.0Structure andDesignFloorandroofplansandsectionsshowinginteriorwallsareshownonFiguresIII-3throughIII-8.2.1GeneralStructural Features<'> TheRSSBislocatedtotheeastof,andisadjacentto,theexistingoffgasbuilding, wastedisposalbuilding, andwastebuildingextension ofUnit1.Thearrangement oftheRSSBcanbeconsidered asfollows:process,handlingandstorageareas.Thissectionisrectangular inshapeandapproximately 277ftlongbelowgrade,330ftlongabovegrade(north-south), and61ftwide(east-west). Themajorityoftheprimarystructural components arereinforced concrete. Thefoundation matisgenerally foundedontopofbedrock.Thefinishgradeandtruckentranceandexitopeningsareatel261'-0".Theroofelevation islocatedatel301'-21/2",withthematerialhandlingcranerunninglongitudinally underneath theroofatel292'-61/2".Withtheexception ofafewfeetaroundtheperimeter, thecranecanservicetheentireinteriorareaofthissection.ThoseportionsoftheRSSBwhichareclassified asseismic-resistant elementsaredesignedtomaintaintheirstructural integrity duringandafterallcredibledesignloadingphenomena, including OBE.Thoseitemswhichareclassified asseismic-resistant elementsarethefoundation basemat,structural concretewalls,floorsandroof.Nonseismic-resistant structural elementsaredesignedtomaintaintheirstructural functionforallanticipated, credibledesignloadingconditions encountered duringconstruction, testing,operation, andmaintenance ofthefacility. Thosecompartments containing largetanks(over2,000gal)ofradioactive liquidsarelinedwithsteeltocontain1.5tankvolumesintheeventofatankruptureduringaseismicevent.Duringnormaloperation, maintenance, andloadingandunloading operations, thestructure providessufficient environmental isolation toensurethattheexposureofplantoperating personnel andthegeneralpublictoradiation isALARA.2.2Heating,Ventilation andAir'Conditioning+ Freshairisfilteredandconditioned andsuppliedtothecontrolandelectrical rooms,whicharemaintained ataslightlypositivepressurewithrespecttootherareasoftheRSSBandtheadjoining radwastebuilding. AirfromotherportionsoftheRSSBisnotrecirculated backtotheseareas.Airisrecirculated withintheRSSBandisprocessed throughafiltersystempriortoreconditioning andredistribution. Therecirculation filterUFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARsystemiscomprised ofthefollowing primaryfiltration components: 1.Prefilters toremovelargerparticles toreducedustloadingonthehigh-efficiency particulate air(HEPA)filters.2.HEPAfilterswithanindividual efficiency ofatleast99.97percent.AllRSSBventilation exhaustairisprocessed throughafiltertrainpriortodischarging intothestack.Thefilteriscomprised ofthefollowing primaryfiltration elements: 1.Prefilter toremovelargerparticles toreduceloadingoftheHEPAfilters.2.HEPAfilterswithanindividual efficiency ofatleast99.97percent.3.Twocarbonadsorbersectionsfortheremovalofradioactive iodinefromtheexhauststream.FinalHEPAfilterswithanindividual efficiency ofatleast99.97percent.AirflowthroughtheprocessareasoftheRSSBisfromareasoflowradioactive contamination potential towardareaswithincreasingly highercontamination potential. Airfromthetwotruckbaysisductedtotheventilation exhaustsystemratherthanreturnedto.therecirculating atmospheric cleanupsystemtopreventrecirculation oftruckexhaustfumesintheRSSB.TheRSSBatmosphere iscontinuously purged(10,250cfm)withcleanoutsideairbyoperation ofthefreshairsupplyandventilation exhaustsystems.PurgeairfromtheprocessareasoftheRSSBreplacestheairdrawnfromthetruckbayssuchthattheentirebuildingispurgedviatheexhaustfromthetruckbays.Radioactive tankventsarepipeddirectlyintotheexhaustsystemupstreamofthefilter.Heatingcoils(electrical), cooling(chilledwater),andfansarelocateddownstream ofthefiltercomponents toprotectthemfromradioactive contamination. Supplemental heatingisprovidedforthecontrolandelectrical roomsbyductheaters.Stairtowersareprovidedwithspaceheaters.Chilledwaterisproducedinoneoftwo100-percent capacitywaterchillersandcirculated byoneoftwo100-percent capacitychilledwaterpumps.Singlefailureofanyonefan,heatingcoilorcoolingcoilmayresultinoperating variations fromthedesignbasisihowever,theoveralleffectwithregardtothehealthandsafetyofthebuildingoccupants orthepublicwillnotbecompromised. Freshairinletandventilation exhaustpenetrations throughtheRSSBouterwallsareeachfittedwithtwoseriesmounteddampersdesignedtowithstand aminimumof3psipressuredifferential resulting fromsevereweatherpressureconditions. Alldesignandspecification requirements areforUFSARRevision14June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARnonseismic, nonnuclear safety-related systemsandcomponents. Instrumentation andcontrolsystemsareprovidedtoachieverequiredspacetemperature conditions andtomaintainairflowrequirements toprovideacceptable buildingandprocessareapressurerelationships. Relativehumidityisnotcontrolled, althoughitismaintained atreasonable levelsbytheHVACsystem.Alloperating controlfunctions areautomatic. Temperature controlsystemsinthefreshairsupplyandrecirculating atmospheric cleanupsystemsareindependent. Airflowcontrolsystemsinthefreshairsupplysystemandtheexhaustventilation systemincludeinterlock provisions tomaintainpressurerelationships uponde-energizing anexhaustorsupplyfan.Airflowcontrolsoftherecirculating atmospheric cleanupsystemareindependent oftheothersystems.Redundant temperature sensingandcontrolloopsareprovidedinthefreshairsupplyandrecirculating atmospheric cleanupsystem.Localinstruments andremoteindication and/orannunciation areprovided. 2.3Shielding andAccessControl~> TheRSSBisdesignedtominimizeexposuretoplantpersonnel andthepublicbyitslocationanddesign.TheRSSBislocatedwithintheprotected areaandisheavilyshieldedbyreinforced concrete.

3.0 UseTheRSSBwasconstructed

withthespecificintentofproviding onsitestorageoflow-level radioactive waste(LLW).TheneedtostoreLLWonsiteistheresultofthefederalLow-Level Radioactive WastePolicyActasamendedin1985,whichinitiated theprocessbywhichthethreeexistingLLWdisposalsites(Barnwell, SC;Beatty,NV;andHanford,WA)wouldnolongerberequiredtoreceiveLLW.Althoughoriginally designedtostoreUnit1LLW,theRSSBiscapableofproviding interimstorageofLLWproducedatbothUnit1andUnit2.Fromatechnical standpoint, thestorageofUnit2wasteatUnit1isconsidered acceptable basedonthefollowing: 1~Theisotopiclibrarytobeconsidered isessentially thesameforbothunits;2~Theisotopicdistributions forthetwounitsaresimilar;however,sinceUnit2isazincinjection plant,thedistribution ismoreheavilyweightedtowardZn-65,whileUnit1ismoreheavilyweightedtowardCo-60.ThenetimpactoninterimstorageintheRSSBisnotsignificant sincetheshielding hasbeendesignedassumingthemorelimitingCo-60levelsofUnit1;3.Theselective storageofthehigh-activity LLWfrombothunitsintheRSSB(andthelow-activity LLWatUFSARRevision14III-43June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARUnit2)createsthepotential forthestorageofgreateraverageactivityconcentration inthebuilding, althoughnotgreatervolume.However,sincetheRSSBwasdesignedassumingthestorageofincinerated resinswhichrepresent aboundingactivityconcentration, thebuildingdesignisconsidered adequateforthecombinedstoragefrombothunits;4~TotalactivityintheRSSBwillultimately becontrolled pertheSiteradiation protection programtoensurethatbothonsiteandoffsitedoseanddoseratelimitsaremaintained; and5.Thetransferofby-product materialbetweenUnit1andUnit2willbeconducted inaccordance withapprovedradiation protection implementing procedures. Radioactive pipingisroutedthroughashieldedpipetunnelandinshieldedareastolimitexposure. Majorpiecesofequipment thatcanbesignificant sourcesofradiation exposureareeachprovidedwithaseparateshieldedcubicle.Thestoragevaultsareshieldedwith48inofconcreteinthestoragezone(belowcrane).Theroofis24-inthick.Thetankcubiclesareshieldedby36inofconcrete. Theeast-west. truckbayisequippedwitharetracting shielddoorintheceilingwhichmitigates albedoradiation inthetruckbayfromthestoragevaults.Thelow-level storageroomandtheprocessequipment cubicleareequippedwithslidingshielddoors.Accessiscontrolled administratively bytheUnit1Radiation Protection Program.Physicalcontrolofhighradiation areasismaintained inaccordance withTechnical Specifications. UFSARRevision14III-44June1996 NineMilePointUnit1FSARJ.REFERENCES 1.Catalytic, Inc.,ProjectNo.36700,SystemDescription forRadwasteSolidification andStorageBuilding, Procedure No.601Revision1,February26,1981.2~3.Catalytic, Inc.,ProjectNo.36700,SystemDescription forHeatingVentilating andAirConditioning (HVAC)and,ChilledWaterSystems,Procedure No.204,204.1Revision1,February10,1981.Catalytic, Inc.,ProjectNo.36700,SystemDescription forRadiation Protection, Procedure No.603Revision0,October14,1981.UFSARRevision14III-45June1996}}